

Poona Oriental Series, No. 10

THE
TATTVA-KAUMUDĪ

(*Vācaspati Miśra's Commentary on the Sāṃkhya-Kārikā*)

Translated into English and containing

A SYNOPSIS OF THE CARDINAL DOCTRINES OF THE
SĀMĀKHYA PHILOSOPHY

BY

Mahāmahopādhyāya Ganganatha Jha, M.A., D. Litt.

and with

AN HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION AND CRITICAL NOTES

BY

Vidyāsudhākara Har Dutt Sharma, M.A., Ph.D.

Professor of Sanskrit, S. D. College, Cawnpore.

Second Edition. Thoroughly Revised

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31	Insentience of <i>Buddhi</i>	15
32	Differentiation of "Perception" from the other forms of proof	15
33	Final definition of perception	15
34	Inference, a distinct proof	16
35	Inference defined	16
36	The three kinds of Inference	17
37	The first Division of Inference	17
38	The Negative—a <i>posteriori</i> —Inference	18
39	The Affirmative—a <i>priori</i> —Inference	18
40	Definition of Valid Assertion	19
41	Self-evidence of Valid Assertion	20
42	Reliability of Kapila	20
43	Pseudo-Revelations	20
44	Differentiation of Valid Assertion from Inference	21
45	Other kinds of proof set aside or included in above	21
46	Analogy included in Valid Assertion	21
47	Presumption included in Inference	23
48	"Absence" included in "Perception"	25
49	"Probability" in Inference	25
50	Rumour discarded	25

Kārikā VI

51	The Sphere of the Means of Cognition	26
52	Knowledge of Nature &c., through Inference	26
53	Knowledge of others by Revelation	27

Kārikā VII

54	Objection—Nature &c., being not amenable to the senses, are non-existing	27
55, 56	Different causes of non-perception of objects by the Senses	27
57	Non-perception of an object, no proof of non-existence	28

Kārikā VIII

58	Objection—existence of Nature can be denied like that of sky-flowers—stated, and set aside: there are effects bearing testimony to the existence of Nature	29
59	Such effects mentioned	30

Kārikā IX

60	Different views with regard to the nature of an effect	30
61	Impossibility of the existence of Nature being proved in accordance with the Vedānta and Buddha tenets	31
62	Effect declared to be a permanent Entity	31

Kārikā XII

97	Introduction to the consideration of the Attributes	4-
98	Construction of the Kārikā	45
99	Character of the Attributes as pleasure, pain, delusion	45
100	The functions of the Attributes	45
101	The method of operation of the attributes	46

Kārikā XIII

102	Introduction to Kārikā XIII	47
103	Properties of "Goodness"	48
104	Necessity of the properties of "Poulness"	48
105	Necessity of the properties of "Darkness"	48
106	Objection based on the impossibility of the co operation of Attributes of contradictory properties	49
107	Necessity of postulating the three Attributes	49

Kārikā XIV

108	Question of the indiscreetness and other properties of the Attributes	50
109	Proof of the existence of such properties	51
110	Question of the Existence of Nature	52

Kārikā XV

111	Why not except the atomic theory?	53
112	Proofs of Nature's Existence—(1) initial Separation and final reunion of cause and effect	54
113	(2)—Because Evolution is due to Energy	56
114	Objection. These two reasons might rest with <i>Duddhī</i> , Reply: (3)—from Flatness	56
115	(4) Because of homogeneity	57

Kārikā XVI

116	Operation through the Attributes	58
117	By a blending of the Attributes	58
118	Objection How can an attribute of uniform nature produce diverse effects? Reply	59

Kārikā XVII

119	Introduction to the Proofs of Spirit's Existence	60
120	Proofs (1)—Because all compound objects are for other's purpose	60
121	Objection and reply	60
122	(2) Because there must be superintendence	62
123	(3) Because there must be one to feel	62

Kārikā XXVI

153	Sense defined	77
-----	---------------	----

Kārikā XXVII

154	Double nature of mind	77
155	Mind defined	78
156	Objection: Why make mind a sense?—and Reply thereto	78
157	Whence the multifarious effects from Egoism?	79
158	Multifariousness also a modification of the Attributes	79

Kārikā XXVIII

159	Functions of the ten sense organs	79
-----	-----------------------------------	----

Kārikā XXIX

160	Reflection of Manas, Self-consciousness of Ahaṅkāra and Determination of Buddhi	80
161	The five vital Airs common to all	81

Kārikā XXX

162	Function of the organs—(1) Instantaneous	82
163	(2) Gradual	82
164	With regard to visible objects function of the internal organs independent of the external ones	82

Kārikā XXXI

165	Objection: Functions permanent or otherwise?	83
166	No collision of the functions of the organs	83
167	Objection: How can insentient organs comprehend each other's motives?—Reply thereto	84

Kārikā XXXII

168	Division of the organs introduced	84
169	The thirteen organs and their functions	85
170	Objects of these functions	85

Kārikā XXXIII

171	Sub-division of the organs introduced	86
172	The three internal organs	86
173	The ten external organs	86
174	External organs operating at the present time, and the internal at all Times	86
175	Time not a distinct principle	87

Kārikā XXXIV

176	Objects of external organs introduced	87
177	Specific and gross objects of the functions of intellectual organs explained	87
178	Do. do. organs of action	88

Kārikā XXXV

179	The importance of the internal organs	89
-----	--	-----	----

Kārikā XXXVI

180	Predominance of Buddhi	89
181	The external organs as modifications of Attributes	90

Kārikā XXXVII

182	Further grounds for the Superiority of Buddhi	91
183	Objection absence of Mukti—Reply thereto	91

Kārikā XXXVIII

184	The Subtle character of the Tanmātras	93
185	The gross Elements produced out of the Tanmātras	93
186	These are Specific because soothing, terrific and deluding	93

Kārikā XXXIX

187	Three sorts of Specific Objects	94
188	Subtle bodies are permanent	91

Kārikā XL

187	Subtle body unconfined and permanent	95
190	Objection. Two bodies unnecessary,—and reply	95
191	Question How does the Subtle Body migrate? Reply	96
192	Subtle Body Dissolving at each Pralaya	96

Kārikā XLI

193	Existence of the Subtle Body proved	97
-----	---	-----	----

Kārikā XLII

194	Reason and manner of the migration of the Subtle Body	98
195	Power of the Subtle Body due to Nature	98

Kārikā XLIII

196	Incidental and Essential Dispositions	99
197	Flesh, blood &c., related to the gross body	99

Kārikā XLIV

198	Consequences of the various means introduced	100
199	Virtue leads to higher planes and vice to lower	100
200	From the reverse, the reverse—the threefold bondage	100

Kārikā XLV

201	Absorption into Prakṛti from Dispassion	102
202	Transmigration from Passionate attachment	102
203	Non-impediment from Power	102

Kārikā XLVI

204	Error Disability, Contentment and Perfection	103
205	Fifty Sub-divisions of do do	103

Kārikā XLVII

206	The Fifty forms of Error	104
-----	--------------------------	-----	-----	-----

Kārikā XLVIII

207	The Sub divisions of Error &c. introduced	104
208	Eight forms of Ignorance	104
209	Eight forms of Delusion	104
210	Ten forms of Extra Delusion	105
211	Eighteen forms of Gloom	105
212	Eighteen forms of Utter Darkness	105
213	The total coming to sixty-two	105

Kārikā XLIX

214	The twenty-eight forms of Disability	105
215	Eleven forms of disability, those of the sense organs	106
216	The seventeen forms of disability of Buddhi	106

Kārikā L

217	Nine forms of Contentment	106
218	Four forms of internal Contentment	107
219	(1) Ambha	107
220	(2) Śalila	107
221	(3) Ogha	108
222	(4) Vṛṣṭi	108
223	Five forms of external Contentment	108
224	(1) Pāra	109
225	(2) Supāra	109
226	(3) Pārapāra	109
227	(4) Anuttaroāmbha	109
228	(5) Uttamoāmbha	110

Kārikā LI

229	Forms of Power introduced	110
230	The eight forms of Power	110
231	(1) Tāra—Study	110

232	(2) Sūtāra—Word	111
233	(3) Tārāra—Reasoning	111
234	(4) Ramyaka—Acquisition of Friends	111
235	(5) Sadāmodita—Purity	111
236	The three consequent on the suppression of three kinds of pain	112
237	The first five forms otherwise explained	112
238	Error &c., are hooks to the Powers	112
	Kārikā LII				
239	Necessity of twofold creation	113
240	Proofs of the above	113
241	Objection of reciprocity set aside	114
	Kārikā LIII				
242	Forms of the Elemental Creation introduced	114
243	The eight Divine sorts	115
244	Five of the Lower Animals	115
245	Mankind single.	115
	Kārikā LIV				
246	Threefoldness of the material Evolution introduced	115
247	Six Heavenly Regions	115
	Kārikā LV				
248	Evolution productive of pain	116
249	Imposition of pleasure and pain on Spirit	117
250	Do. due to Spirit's non discrimination	117
	Kārikā LVI				
251	Question of the Maker of the Universe introduced	117
252	Creation due to Nature	118
253	Creation for another's (Spirit's) sake	118
	Kārikā LVII				
254	Objection—incapacity of insentient Nature of creation	119
255	Reply—instance of the flow of milk	119
256	View of a personal God overthrown	119
257	Freedom of the Śāṅkhya theory from faults	120
	Kārikā LVIII				
258	"How for Spirit's purpose?" Explained	120
	Kārikā LIX				
259	"Whence the cessation of the operations of Nature?" Explained	121

	Kārikā LX	
260	"Nature acts for no compensation"	121
	Kārikā LXI	
261	No reappearance of Nature with regard to an emancipated Spirit	122
	Kārikā LXII	
262	Objection: "emancipation and bondage not possible to unmodifying Spirit"	123
263	Reply: "No Spirit is bound, nor migrates &c."	123
	Kārikā LXIII	
264	"Nature binds herself by seven forms &c."	123
	Kārikā LXIV	
265	"Truth" explained	124
266	The purity of wisdom explained	125
267	Objection based on the eternal tendency to false knowledge	125
268	The form of discriminative knowledge	125
269	"Completion" of the knowledge	126
	Kārikā LXV	
270	Cause of the cessation of Nature's operation	126
	Kārikā LXVI	
271	Objection "though one set of objects has been enjoyed, others remain to be enjoyed"	127
272	Reply. "The Spirit having attained to wisdom, there is no motive to further action"	128
	Kārikā LXVII	
273	Objection: The body dissolving on the attainment of wisdom, how could the bodiless Spirit behold Nature?	129
274	Body continues in obedience to the momentum imparted by previous Karma	129
	Kārikā LXVIII	
275	Final release of the Spirit	130
	Kārikā LXIX	
276	The precedence of Kapila	131
	Kārikā LXX	
277	Importance of the Sāṃkhya doctrine	132
	Kārikā LXXI	
278	"Ārya" explained	132
	Kārikā LXXII	
279	The Treatise is a whole, not a part	132
	Notes	149-

INTRODUCTION

I. *The Origin of Philosophical Enquiry*

In this world, the end of all activity is happiness. Nobody even in his imagination likes to suffer pain even for a moment. Even those who commit suicide do so only when they are sorely disgusted with the pains inherent in Saṁsāra. Truly has it been said by our elders, "Every one desists from pain; every one desires happiness." But what happiness is cannot be very well explained by those who lack philosophical insight. The enjoyment of sense-objects which people resort to as 'pleasure' day and night and for which they put forth their utmost effort is considered by philosophers as entirely undesirable, mixed as it is always with pain. So the wise leave all worldly enjoyments even as one does honey mixed with poison and seek the highest end of human existence which alone leads to final and absolute happiness; and after they have attained it for themselves, they are moved with pity for the creatures quivering in the well of misery and for their good they apply themselves to the propagation of the truth attained. Thus do the wise explain the Origin of Philosophical Enquiry.

II. *The Significance of Sāṁkhya Philosophy*

Of all the philosophical systems, Sāṁkhya has been considered by all to be the most ancient. Nobody can gain-say the fact that this occupies a prominent place in all the Śāstras, since this is either supported or controverted by every philosophical system. Therefore, the importance of this Śāstra is recognised by all the systems. Śaṅkarācārya says — "The doctrine, moreover, stands somewhat near to the Vedānta doctrine since, like the latter, it admits the new-

difference of cause and effect, and it, moreover, has been accepted by some of the authors of the Dharma-sūtras, such as Devala, and so on. For all these reasons we have taken special trouble to refute the pradhāna doctrine." (S. B. E., XXXIV, p. 289). So also in the Mahābhārata we read—"There is no knowledge like that of Sāṃkhya, no power like that of Yoga. You should have no doubt as to Sāṃkhya being the highest knowledge" (S'ānti. 316, 2)

Though the use of the word *Sāṃkhya* is found first of all in the 8th vet. Up—तत्कारणं सांख्ययोगादिगम्य etc., (VI, 13), yet Sāṃkhya reflections are found even in the R̥gveda and the other Upaniṣads. This proves the antiquity of this S'āstra. This will be made clear in detail further on.

Sāṃkhya is derived from the word *saṃkhyā*. The word *saṃkhyā* is used in the sense of thinking and counting. Cf. "चर्चा संख्या विचारणा" (Amara I V. 3) Thinking may be with reference to basic principles or knowledge of Self. Counting refers to the twenty-four principles and *as'akti*, *atustī*, etc. The double implication of the word has been set forth by Vijñānabhikṣu in his preface to Sāṃkhya-pravacana-bhāṣya, by a quotation from the Mbh—

"संख्यां प्रकुर्वते चेद प्रकृतिं च प्रचक्षते ।

तत्त्वानि च चतुर्विंशतेन संख्यं प्रकीर्तितम् ॥"

So, *Sāṃkhya* means knowledge of Self through right discrimination. Garbe is of opinion that the word *Sāṃkhya* was originally used in the sense of counting, and it was then applied to the system of Kapila which enumerates the 25 principles. (For details and the opinion of Jacobi, see S. P., p. 182, 2n and pp. 190-191) Jayacandra Sarmā says with regard to *Sāṃkhya* in *Saṃskṛta-Candrikā*, a magazine which became defunct long ago, that the Sāṃkhya is tawny, with deep-brown face, and has a big belly. He has a rosary in his hand and a staff, and keeps long nails and hair. (Ādi-purāṇa quoted. VII of 1821 *S'aka*, Vol. 1 and 2, p. 8) Really

speaking, since the word *Kapila* stands both for a particular colour and for the founder of Sāṃkhya Philosophy, therefore, owing to the similarity of word the writer of the Purāṇa has indulged in conjectures of his own. It appears that the writer of the Purāṇa at the time of writing happened to see some sage with tawny face and corpulent body, and was led to describe his form and colour.

Some scholars, seeing the rejection of *Īśvara* in the Sāṃkhya-system, have maintained that it is *vedaviruddha* or opposed to S'ruti (S. S., p. 21 f.; S. P., 13 ff.). Śaṅkarācārya also, seeing that Sāṃkhya is opposed to *adwaita*, avers that Sāṃkhya is not rooted in the S'rutis.

"Although there are many Smṛtis treating of the soul, we have singled out for refutation the Sāṃkhya and Yoga because they are widely known as offering the means for accomplishing the highest end of man and have found favour with many competent persons. Moreover, their position is strengthened by a Vedic passage referring to them, 'He who has known that cause which is to be apprehended by Sāṃkhya and Yoga he is freed from all fetters' (S'v. Up. VI, 13), we refute by the remark that the highest beatitude is not to be attained by the knowledge of Sāṃkhya Smṛti irrespective of the Veda, nor by the road of Yoga-practice." (S. B. E., XXXIV, pp. 297-8). In deciding also the *vaidika* or the *non vaidika* character of Sāṃkhya, the great Śaṅkara says—"The scriptural passage which the *pūrvapakṣin* has quoted as proving the emnence of Kapila's knowledge would not justify us in believing in such doctrines of Kapila (i. e., of some Kapila) as are contrary to scriptures, for that passage mentions the bare name of Kapila (without specifying which Kapila is meant), and we meet in tradition with another Kapila, viz., the one who burned the sons of Sagar and had the surname of Vāsudeva." (S. B. E., XXXIV, p. 291).

Similarly others have also maintained the opposition of Sāṃkhya to Śruti. Truly speaking, Sāṃkhya could be divided into two—one *śes'vara*, the other *nirīś'vara*. Let the theists not take the *nirīś'vara*-Sāṃkhya, propounded in the Kārikā, etc., as rooted in Śruti, but who can take exception to the *vaidika* character of the *śes'vara*-Sāṃkhya as propounded in the Upaniṣads, the Mahābhārata and the Purāṇas? For instance, we come across 'yathāśruti-nidars'ana as a synonym of Sāṃkhya in —

एतानि नव सर्गाणि सत्त्वानि च नराधिप ।

चतुर्विंशतिरुक्तानि यथाश्रुतिनिर्दिष्टानाम् ॥

(Mbh., S'ānti., 310, 25)

In the 313th chapter of S'āntiparvan, in the section describing the intrinsic, extrinsic and super-natural aspects of the *vibhūti*s of *Prakṛti* many synonyms of the upholders of Sāṃkhya are met with: e.g., यद्वाप्यस्तत्त्वदर्शिनः (p. 1) सत्त्वार्थ-दर्शिनः, (2) योगप्रदर्शिनः, (3) संख्यानदर्शिनः, (4) योगनिर्देशिनः, (5) यथाश्रुतिनिर्देशिनः, (6, 7, 8 and 9) सत्त्वशुद्धिविशारदाः, (10) यथाशास्त्रविशारदाः, (11) सत्त्वनिर्देशिनः, (12) यथावदभिर्देशिनः, (13). Here the word 'Yathāśruti-nidars'ana' being repeated four times establishes the *vaidika* character of theistic Sāṃkhya. Moreover, even the atheistic Sāṃkhya is *vaidika* in character, inasmuch as the traditional categories have been borrowed from Upaniṣads, etc. [Jacobi takes the atheistic Sāṃkhya as older, and believes that there has been an attempt for the synthesis of the theistic and the atheistic Sāṃkhyas in the later Upaniṣads, the Bhagavadgītā and portions of the Mahābhārata. *vide*—*Int.* Gott p. 32]. Therefore, from the presence of the names of the *ācāryas* of Sāṃkhya in the offering to R̥sis, it may be fairly guessed that in olden times, even the most staunch theists undertook the study of Sāṃkhya. (S.S., p/22). This could not have been possible if Sāṃkhya was not founded on Śruti.

III. *Gems of Sāṃkhya in the Vedas, etc.*

The presence of Sāṃkhya categories in the S'rutis in a germinal form corroborates the former guess. We do not mean to say that the principles of Sāṃkhya in their detail are to be sought in the Vedas and Upaniṣads as propounded by Sāṃkhya-Kāṅkā. That would be as ridiculous as trying to find out the great banyan tree in its minute seed. *Tamas* described in the R̥gveda (X. 129, 3) "तम आसीत्तमसा गूळहममेऽप्रकेतं" etc., assumed later on the form of the Unmanifest. This very S'ruti, showing the dissolution of the elements and the elemental world in its cause, the darkness, points to *satkāryavāda*. Sāyaṇa also favours this interpretation in his *bhāṣya* on this verse. Giving this very interpretation elsewhere, the Veda even explains *Aja* (the unborn) as the name of *Pradhāna*—

तमिद्रुमं प्रथमं दध्न आपो यत्र देवाः समगच्छन्त विश्वे ।

अजस्य नामावप्येकमर्पितं यस्मिन् विश्वानि भुव्नानि तस्युः ॥

(R̥gveda, X. 82, 6)

Chronologically, Jacobi has divided the Upaniṣads into four divisions on account of their variety, their origin in different times, and their subject-matter (Ent. Gott. p. 6 and 19; H. I. II. I, p. 28 ff; I. P. I., p. 141 ff.).

1. *The most ancient* : as, Bṛhadāraṇyaka, Chāndogya, Taittirīya, Aitareya and Kauṣṭaki.

2. *Ancient* : as, Kāṭhaka, Īśa, S'vetās'vatara, Muṇḍaka and Mahānārāyaṇa.

3. *Modern* : as, Praśna, Maitrāyaṇi and Māṇḍūkya.

4. *Most modern* : the many Atharvāna Upaniṣads.

Among the most ancient ones, in the Br. Up., the Puruṣa is declared to be only a seer, not a doer, devoid of activity in as much as he is without any association with anything (in

reality) as in "स वा एव एतस्मिन् संप्रसादे स्त्वा चरित्वा दृष्टुं..... असद्गो व्यं पुरुष इत्येवमेवैतथाग्रवक्ष्य" (IV 3, 15 ff). The word *mahat* is indicative of the Sāṅkhya word *Buddhi* in "स यथा सङ्घट्ट.....यतो यतस्त्वाददीत लवणमेवैव वा अर इदं महद्भूतमनन्तमपारं विज्ञानयन् एवंतेभ्यो भूतेभ्यः सङ्कल्पाय etc." (Br. Up II. 4, 12). The term *Vijñānaghana* expounds the intelligent nature of *Buddhi*, [Jacobi says that it is very surprising how Sāṅkhya attributes unconsciousness to *Buddhi* which is by nature intelligence. *vide*, Ent. Gott. p. 32.] In this connection, consult also the *Vātsyāyana Bhāṣya* on the Gautama-Sūtra "शुद्धि-एतन्निर्ज्ञानमित्यनर्थान्तरम्" (1. 15)]

In the Ch. Up. (VI, 2, 1) having first introduced the theory of *satkāryavāda* in "सदेव सोम्येदम आसीदेकमेवाद्वितीयम्" the S'ruti in the same *mantra* mentions the *pūrva-pakṣa* of *asat-kāryavāda* in "तदेक आदुरसदेदम आसीदेकमेवाद्वितीयं तस्मादसतः सजायत". It then advances in the next *mantra* *satkāryavāda* that is, (सतः सजायते), as a contradiction of the previous statement, *e. g.*, "इतस्तु सद्य सोम्येव स्यादिति होशच कथमततः सजायेनेति, सत्त्वे सौम्येदम आसीदेकमेवाद्वितीयम्" (VI. 2, 2). Here the difference from Sāṅkhya-Vedānta is that it accepts the aggregate of effects as *real* and not *unreal* like *māyā*. It maintains that this aggregate of effects exists as a reality in the cause. Thus it clearly expounds *satkāryavāda*. The cause has been signified as *real*. This has also been indicated in the *mantra* यथा सोम्येन सृष्टिरेव सौम्यं विज्ञानं स्याद्विचारमप्यं विचारो नामधेयं सृष्टिरेवैव सत्यम्" (Ch. Up VI. 1, 4). Thus arose the *Parināmavāda* of the Sāṅkhyas (Ent. Gott., p. 14). From this reality or existence were produced fire, earth, etc. The expounding of three forms of these objects in "एतदे रोहितं रूपं तेजमस्तदूर्ध्वं, यच्छुद्धं तदर्षा, यत्तृणं तद्वनस्पत्याणादप्रेरयित्वै वाधारम्भणं विचारो नामधेयं त्रीणि ह्यर्णवीत्येव सत्यम्" (Ch. Up. VI 4, 1) is only an earlier form of the *Sattva*, *Rajas* and *Tamas* of the Sāṅkhya philosophy. The redness of fire indicates *Rajas*. Just as

red colour colours cloth, etc., so *Rajas* colours *citta*, because of its property of activity. Even so, the whiteness of water indicates *Sattva*, because white water has the property of purifying things. *Sattva* also purifies the mind with knowledge. The dark colour of *anna* = Earth is an indication of *Tamas*. The dark colour covers everything. Even so, the insentient *Tamas* covers the knowledge born of *Sattva*. [See, *Bāla*, p. 3. What has been propounded by *Sūryanārāyaṇa Sāstri* in contradiction of this will be found in the Introduction, || N. S.]. This very thing is propounded in the *mantra* "अजमेखं सोदितयद्रहण्याम्" (S'v. Up IV 5, *Mahānārāyaṇa Up*, p. 141, *Īśādi*). The *trīṣṭkarana* (trebling) *S'ruti* found in the (Ch. Up. VI. 4 and 5) also corroborates this opinion. We also see that the word *trīṣṭa* has been used in the sense of the three Attributes in "तमेकमेति त्रितुल्यम् etc." (S'v. Up I, 4) also. There the three-foldness of grain, etc., has been indicated by the gross, the medium and the small sizes. It appears that the three-foldness of the Attributes has also been used similarly. Jacobi has also accepted this (*Ent. Gott.*, p. 32).

The *Sāṃkhya* categories are clearly stated in the later *Upaniṣads*, e. g. in *Katha* "मनसस्तु परा बुद्धिर्यदेतन्मा महात् परः (III, 10). *Mahat* is the synonym of *Ahaṃkāra*. Similarly we find *Avyakta* and *Puruṣa* in "महतः परमन्यक्तमन्यक्तात्पुरुषः पर । पुरुषात् परं किञ्चिन्ना काश्च स्य परा गतिः ॥" (*Ibid*, III, 11). Prof Radhakrishnan believes that the indifference and inactivity of *Puruṣa* have been indicated in "इह सुषणी सयुजा भव्याया समानं वृद्धं परिपस्त्रजाने । तथोरन्यः पिप्पलं स्वाद्वनि अनमन्नन्यां अभिच्यवर्त्तन्ति ॥" in the *Mundaka Up* (III, 1) [I P. I, 257, 1 n].

योगाधिगम्यम्" (VI. 13). "कपिं प्रभूतं कपिलं यस्तमग्रे" (V. 2). In this connection, we shall show later that there is a good deal of controversy about the word *Kapila*. It is again in this Upaniṣad that the words *vyakta*, *avyakta* and *jñā* are found, e. g., "संयुक्तमेतत्क्षरमक्षरं च व्यक्ताव्यक्तं भरते विश्वमीशः etc." (I. 8); also "शान्तिं द्वावजगतीशानीशवज्जा ऐश्वर्यं etc." (I. 9). *vide* also the *Mbh.* "अत्रो जन्तुरनीशोऽयमात्मनः सुखदुःखयोः" (III. 30. 88). This whole verse is quoted in the *Gauda*, on the 61st *Kārikā*. Similarly, the use of the words *Pradhāna*, *Prakṛti* and *guṇa* is also found here, e. g., "क्षरं प्रधानम्" (I. 10), "मायां तु प्रकृतिं विश्वम्" (IV. 10), "देवममर्शति स्वर्गुर्नानिगुह्यम्" (I. 13), etc. Also, the mantra "तमेकनेमिं त्रिवृत्तं षोडशान्नं शतार्धं विंशतिप्रत्ययभिः । अष्टर्कः पञ्चभिर्विंशत्पञ्चपाशं त्रिमासं येन द्विनिमित्तं मोहम् ॥" (S'v. Up. I. 4) propounds the categories of Sāṃkhya. The word *triṣṭa* refers to the three *gunas*, the word *ṣoḍaśānta* refers to sixteen *vikāras*, the word *śatārdhāra* points to the fifty varieties of *pratyaya-sarga*. Keith's doubt about the Sāṃkhya character of this verse will not bear examination (S. S. p. 11). He has given up the reasonable interpretation and says, "The worth of such identifications must be regarded as uncertain and no conclusive evidence is afforded by them, as plays on numbers are much affected by the Brahmanical schools." But he has not given any different interpretation himself and is, therefore, open to the charge of leaving the present and the relevant in favour of the absent and the irrelevant.

But simply on the basis of the presence of a few technical terms of Sāṃkhya, we should not conclude that a particular Upaniṣad propounds Sāṃkhya doctrines. For instance, in places like "मायां तु प्रकृतिं विश्वमायिनं तु मोक्षयन्" (S'v. Up. IV. 10) though there is a technical term of Sāṃkhya, yet it appears that it is only supporting the Vedānta doctrine. Therefore, seeing that Sāṃkhya comes closely after Vedānta in these Upaniṣads, Jacobi declares that there cannot be

any two opinions among scholars with regard to the fact that the rise of the Sāṃkhya and Yoga systems lies between the most ancient and the ancient Upaniṣads. (Ent. Got p 21).

Among the modern Upaniṣads, the mention of *Sattva*, *Rajas* and *Tamas* by name, the exposition of the five subtle elements, the enunciation of the five gross elements and reference to the Sāṃkhya categories of *kṣetrajña*, *raṃkalpa*, *adhyavasāya*, *abhimāna* and *linga* clearly show that these Upaniṣads come after the formulation of the Sāṃkhya system. As—"तमो वा इमेहमात्रं, तन्पञ्चाक्षरपरैर्गौरितं विषमस्य प्रयात्येतद् रजमो रूपं.....मोक्षोऽयं यश्चेतनमात्रः प्रतिपुष्टं क्षेत्रज्ञः संकल्पाध्यवसायाभिमानजिगः प्रजापतिः etc." (Maitrāyaṇī, Up. IV, 5), "यश्चेतनमात्राणि भूतवद्भेनोप्यन्ते पञ्चमहाभुतानि भूतवद्भेनोप्यन्ते etc. (Ibid III, 2), "पृथिवी च पृथिवीमात्रा आपश्चापोमात्राः etc (Pr up IV, 8) and so on.

In the Mbh. and the Purāṇas, we find Sāṃkhya philosophy fully reflected. At one place we find the mention of the five gross elements, the twenty-four categories in their manifested or unmanifested character and the three *gūṇas* (Mbh III, 209, 16-21; 211, 4). The distinction between *Prakṛti*, and *Puruṣa* has been extensively expounded in S'āntiparvan (285, 33-40). Here the word *sattva* stands for *Prakṛti* and not *Brahman*. But Keith, seeing that *sattva* was used as the subject of comparison of a spider, erroneously maintains that *sattva* is referring to *Brahman* (S S, p. 17). It will be clear from the two verses quoted below that his explanation is erroneous, since it is opposed to the context :—"सृजते हि गुणान् सत्त्वं रजः, परिपश्यति । सम्प्रयोगस्तयोरेव सत्त्ववेद्यप्रयोधुव ॥ ३७ ॥ स्वभावान्मदमेव । तद्विमान् सृजते गुणान् । ऊर्णनाभिर्द्वेषा सत्त्वं विज्ञेयान्तन्नुवद् गुणा ॥ ३८ ॥". We find a reference in the Mbh. of Sāṃkhya knowledge being called *Vaiśeṣika* which was imparted to Janaka by Pāṇcāsikha of Parāśara *gotra*, e. g. "यस्माच्चैतन्मया प्राप्तं ज्ञानं वैशेषिकं पुरा" (S'ānti. 330, 23a). There again, three paths of emancipation have been described. We find there from the

context that leaving aside the paths of mere knowledge or action, Sāṅkhya lays down a third kind of path, *viz.*, a combination of knowledge and action. S'ānti, 320, 38—40. In this connection, *vide* my article, P. O. C., Lahore, II, 1027 f).

In the dialogue between Janaka and Sulabhā, the latter uses the word *Sāṅkhya* in the sense of a particular kind of a sentence, —“ मांस्म्यं मांस्वयं चोर्ध्वं निर्णयः मप्रयोजनः । पञ्चतान्यर्थ-
जानानि वाक्यमित्युच्यते नृप ॥ दोषाणां च गुणानां च प्रमाणं प्रविभागत, ।
कंचिदर्थमभिप्रेत्य मा संख्येत्युपधार्यताम् ॥ ” (S'ānti, 320, 79 and ■).
But at one place in the Mbh., thirty qualities of a body have been mentioned. This classification of qualities is not met with in the Sāṅkhya philosophy *e. g.*, (1) *S'abda*, (2) *Spars'a*, (3) *Rasa*, (4) *Rūpa*, (5) *Gandha*, (6—10) the five senses, (11) *Manas*, (12) *Buddhi*, (13) *Sattva*, (14) *Ahaṁ-kartā*, (15) *Sūmagrya*, (16) *Sanghāta*, (17) *Prakṛti*, (18) *Vyakti*, (19) *Dvandvayoga*, (20) *Kāla*, (21—25) the five gross elements, (26) *Sadbhāvayoga*, (27) *Asadbhāvayoga*, (28) *Vidhi*, (29) *S'akra* and (30) *Bala* (S'ānti 320, 97—112). So it has been said —“ विंशति-
द्वैतं हि गुणाः संख्यात स्मृता । समण यत्र वर्तन्ते तच्छरीरमिति स्मृतम् ॥ ”
(*ibid.*, 112) There, the eight-fold varieties of *Prakṛti* and sixteen varieties of modifications have been described in the 310th chapter of the same *parvan*. Again, the nine kinds of creation mentioned there are not found in Sāṅkhya books. They are as given below —

(1) The creation of *mahat* from *avyakta*, (2) from *mahat* there is the creation of *ahamkāra*, (3) from the latter of *manas*, (4) from it, that of the five gross elements, (5) from these, that of five attributes, (6) from these, that of five senses, (7) from these, that of “ connected with the senses (*aindriyaka*), ” (8) from this, that of the upper and oblique varieties and (9) from the oblique, there is the creation of the lower variety. Thus, there is mutual discrepancy in the doctrines expounded in the Mbh. The categories taught by Pāñcas'ikha in S'ānti, 219, are nowhere obtained in the

Sāṃkhya. A teaching of this very teacher, quite different from that mentioned above, is found in 321, 96-112 of the S'ānti. In the 274th chapter, the doctrines expounded by Devala are different from every other. But even in the midst of divergent expositions of Sāṃkhya doctrines, all agree with regard to the exposition of *Brahman* or *Īś'vara*. Even though the plurality of *paraśas* has been accepted, *Brahman* has been described as the basis of all. (*vide*—“ब्रह्मं पुण्याणं स यथैका योविरुच्यते,” S'ānti 350. 26). Āsuri, having taught Sāṃkhya to Pāṇcas'ikha, got merged in *Brahman*—“यतदेकाधरं ब्रह्म नानाहर्षं प्रदृश्यते । भासुरिमण्डे तस्मिन् प्रतिपेदे तद्व्ययम् ॥” (S'ānti, 218, 13)

In the Bhagavadgītā also, we do not find atheism among the Sāṃkhyas. Rather we find the antiquity and dualism of Sāṃkhya propounded in it (Tilak's Gītārāhasya, Hindi translation by Sapre, p. 514, 1917 edn.) Kapila, the pioneer of Sāṃkhya philosophy has been described by Lord Kṛṣṇa as an example of his own glory; *e. g.* “सिद्धानां कविषो मुनिः” (Bh. G. X, 26). Here the Sāṃkhya path without *karman* is only a synonym of *Jñāna*. Therefore S'āṅkarācārya explains the word *kṛtānta* as “कृतमिति कर्मोच्यते । तस्यान्तः परित्तमसिर्द्वयं न कृतान्तः कर्मान्त इत्येतत् ॥” (Bh. G. XVIII, 13). S'āṅkarācārya explains the word *gunasāṃkhyāna* (Bh. G. XVIII, 19) as the system of Kapila the subject-matter of which is the exposition of the three *gunas*, *vis. Sattva, Rajas* and *Tamas*.

Again in the 3rd chapter of Bhāgavata Purāṇa, the Sāṃkhya doctrines in detail tend to propound devotion to Viṣṇu. Among the Purāṇas also, the various traditional schools interpret Sāṃkhya doctrines in their own way (see V. P. VI 5, 2-8, VI. 4, 35 Sk. P. Prabhāsa-khaṇḍa, 18, 13-15; Brah. P. ch. 213 ff.)

In the Manu-smṛti also which is contemporary with the Mbh. (8 8, p. 52) there is a detailed description of *Sattva, Rajas* and *Tamas* (XII. 24-52) and reference to the three *pramāṇas* (*ibid.*, 105). But the word Sāṃkhya is not found

in it. Medhātithi, commenting on "आकाशतु त्रिकुर्वाणात् सर्वगन्ध-
 चहः शुचिः। (I. 76), says—त्रिकुर्वाणादहङ्कारादकाशस्तस्माद्वायुः—, and thus
 indicates the presence of Sāṅkhya doctrine. In Viṣṇusmṛti,
 the distinction of Puruṣa from the twenty-four categories,
 preceded by discrimination, has been clearly described. One
 of the stanzas (XX, ॥) of this Smṛti very closely corresponds
 with the comment on the second Kāṅkā by Gauḍapāda (S
 S p. 52). In the S'āṅkha-saṁhitā we find twenty-five cate-
 gories, but Puruṣa is identified with Viṣṇu (VII 21-25).
 Yājñavalkya Smṛti has also been influenced by Sāṅkhya, e. g.
 हुद्देष्टवन्तिरप्यकाशततोऽहङ्कारसम्भवः। तन्मात्रादीन्यहङ्कारादौ तत्तत्पुणादि च॥"
 (III, 179 ff.). We have already said that the Sāṅkhya cate-
 gories expounded in these books give prominence to Is'vara
 (See also Bh. Com. pp. 183-4, where Belvalkar points out
 five stages of the evolution of Sāṅkhya doctrines)

IV. Sāṅkhya Teachers

Names of twenty-six Sāṅkhya teachers are met with in
 the Smṛtis, the Mbh., the Kāṅkās, etc. They are as follows.—

(1) Kapila, (2) Āsuri, (3) Pañcas'ikha, (4) Vindhya-
 vāsa, or Vindhyavāsaka or Vindhyavāsini, (5) Vārṣaganya,
 (6) Jaigīṣavya, (7) Vodhu, (8) Asitadevala or Devala, (9)
 Sanaka, (10) Sanandana, (11) Sanātana, (12) Sanatkumāra,
 (13) Bhṛgu, (14) S'ukra, (15) Kās'yapa, (16) Parā's'ara, (17)
 Garga or Gārgya, (18) Gautama, (19) Nārada, (20) Āraṇiṣena
 (21) Agastya, (22) Pulastya, (23) Hārīta, (24) Ulūka, (25)
 Vālmīki and (26) S'uka.

1. Kapila

Mentioned in the Ś'v. Up. (5, 2) for the first time,
 Kapila is known everywhere as the founder of the Sāṅkhya
 philosophy. Many people think that he was not a historical
 personage. But Garbe, criticising the views of Max-Müller
 and Colebrooke, believes that the traditionally handed down
 name of Kapila cannot be regarded as fictitious; there is

another support in the name of the town Kapilavastu of the Buddhists (S. Y., 2, § 3). Keith, on the other hand, opines that Kapila was not a historical person as he is found identified with *Agni* or *Viṣṇu* or *S'iva*, and is, therefore, another name for *Hiraṇyagarbha* (S. S. 9, In; Mbh. S'ānti. 33), 66-67; 342, 92-93). Kaviṛāja Gopinātha also agrees with this opinion as expressed by him in the introduction to Jayamaṅgalā published by me (p. 3). Bālarāma Udāsīna, in his footnotes to Yogabhāṣya 1. 25; "आदिविद्वान् निर्माणक्षेममपिडाय काण्ड्यादृगवान् परमर्षिसुरये जिज्ञासमानाय तन्त्रं प्रोवाच ।" says :—

"(1) आदिविद्वान्=सर्गोदाधिविर्भूतो हिरण्यगर्भः स्वयंभू, निर्माणक्षितं =योगबलेन स्वनिर्मितं क्षितमपिडाय=स्वर्गेन प्रविश्य कपिलाख्यपरमर्षिर्भूत्वा काण्ड्याजिज्ञासये आसुरये तन्त्रं प्रोवाचेत्यर्थः ॥ (2) 'क्षपि प्रसूतं कपिलं यस्तमग्रं ज्ञानिर्बभूवितं जायमानं च पश्येत्' इति श्रुत्या कपिलस्य जायमानस्य ज्ञानप्राप्तिः श्रूयते ॥ (3) पञ्चमे कपिलो नाम भिद्देशः कलविष्णुतमः । प्रोवाचासुरये माण्ड्यं तत्त्वग्रामविनिर्णयम् । (Bhāgavata Purāṇa, 1. 3. 11). इति स्मृतौ पञ्चमावतार-स्वोक्तेर्विष्णोरवतारः कपिल इति भावः । 'अग्निः स कपिलो नाम माण्ड्यशाख-प्रवर्तकः' इति महाभारतं तु कल्पभेदेन नेयम् । कल्पभेदेनैव च कपिलो ब्रह्मपुत्र इति स्मर्यते ॥ (4) भास्कराचार्यप्रभृतयस्तु 'क्षपिं प्रसूतं कपिलं' इति कपिलपदे-नापि हिरण्यगर्भं एव श्रूयते ॥ 'यो ब्रह्माणं इत्यादिचतुर्वर्षोत्तरमन्त्रसंवादादित्याहुः ॥' (Ch. B. S. p. 62).

From a quotation in the Baudhāyana (2. 6. 30), we learn that an *asura* Kapila divided the four āśramas. There is another Kapila also who wrote a Kapilasmṛti dealing with the *s'rāddha*, *vicāha*, *prāyaścitta* ceremonies (H. Dh. 1, pp 25, 525). S'āṅkarācārya also thinks that the Kapila of Sāṅkhya is different from the Vedic Kapila (Br. S. Bhāṣya II, 1, 1). Ānandagiri, commenting on this says that the Vedic Kapila is that one who reduced the sixty-thousand sons of Sagara to ashes. He is quite different from the Sāṅkhya teacher. But we find in the Padmapurāṇa that one Kapila *alias* Vāsudeva taught the Sāṅkhya doctrines to Brahman, Bhṛgu, etc., supported by the Vedas; another Kapila taught (the Sāṅkhya) as opposed to all the Vedic tenets (quoted in N. B. S., II 1, 1).

p. 4) But according to the Bhāgavata Purāṇa (3. 25. 1) Vāsudeva himself was born as Kapila from the womb of Devahūtī कपिलस्तत्त्वमन्यता भगवन्नात्मयायता । जातः स्यदमजः माता-
दारमग्रजने नृणाम् ॥ "

Thus, we find no strong proof for believing Kapila a historical person.

2. Āsuri

There is a difference of opinion also with regard to the reality of Āsuri, the first disciple of Kapila. Kavirāja Gopinātha thinks him to be a historical person (Jay., Int., p. 3). But Garbe and Keith are opposed to this view (S. S. pp. 47-48, S. Y. pp. 2-3: Garbe adds that if Āsuri is really historical then he is different from his namesake mentioned in the Śātapatha-Brāhmaṇa). The two interesting accounts as to how Kapila taught Āsuri are found in the Jayamaṅgalā and the Māyharavṛtti. In the Mbh., Āsuri is made the teacher of Pāñcas'ikha "तत्र पञ्चशिक्षो नाम कापिलेयो महाशुनिः ।... आशुरः प्रथमं शिष्यं etc." (S'ānti, 218, 6, 10). We find only one quotation ascribed to Āsuri, viz. "विविक्ते हृत्परिणता बुद्धौ भोगोदय कल्पते । प्रविबिन्दोदयः स्यत्तो यथा चन्द्रमनोदयसि ॥" in the commentary of Hanbhadra on the Śāddars'anasamuccaya (p. 36).

3. Pāñcas'ikha

Pāñcas'ikha, the disciple of Āsuri is found quoted in the following works :

A. Y. Bh.—

(अ) "एकमेव दर्शनं व्याप्तिरेव दर्शनम्" [१. ४] । (आ) "आदि-
विद्वान् निर्माणचित्तमधिष्ठाय कारण्याद्भगवान् परमपिरामुरये जिज्ञासमानाय
तन्त्रं प्रोवाच" । [१. २५] । (इ) "तमणुमात्रमात्मनमनुविद्याऽस्मिन्त्येवं
तावत्संप्रजानीते" [१. ३६] । (उ) "व्यक्तमव्यक्तं वा सारवमात्मत्वेना-
भिप्रतिरूप्य तस्य सम्यग्दमनुनन्दत्यात्मसम्पदं मन्वानस्तस्य व्यापदमनुज्ञोक्त्याम-
व्यापदं मन्वानः स सर्वोऽप्रतिबुद्धः" [२. ५] । (ऊ) "बुद्धितः परं

पुरुषमाकारशैलविद्यादिभिर्विमलमपश्यन् कुर्याच्चत्रात्मबुद्धिं मोहेन ” [२. ६]’
 (क) “म्यान् स्वल्पः सङ्करः सपरिहारः सप्रत्यवमर्षः कुशलस्य नापकर्पायालम्
 कस्मान्, कुशलं हि मे बह्वन्यदस्ति यत्रायमाचार्यं गतः स्वर्गेऽप्यपकर्षमल्पं
 करिष्यति ” [२, १३] । (क) “रूपातिशया वृष्यतिशयाश्च परस्परेण
 विरूप्यन्ते, सामान्यानि त्वतिशयैः मह प्रवर्तन्ते ” [२. १३] । (ख) .
 “ तुल्यदेशध्वनानामेकदेशश्रुतित्वं भवति ” [३. ४१.] ॥

Vyāsa does not give the name of Pañcas'ikha, but it is Vācaspati who says so.

III S. Sū.—

(ण) “ भाषेयशक्तियोगः पञ्चशिखः ” [५. ३२] । (ऐ) “ अविधेक-
 निमित्तो वा पञ्चशिखः ” [६. ६८] ”

C. S. S. B.—

(ओ) “ मयं नाम प्रसादलाघवाभिष्वङ्गतीतितिक्षासन्तोषादिरूपान-
 न्तभेदं समासतः सुखात्मकम्, एवं रजोऽपि शोकादिनानाभेदं समासतो
 दुःखात्मकम्, एवं तमोऽपि निद्रादिनानाभेदं समासतो मोहात्मकम् ”
 १. १२३] ।

D. Bhāmatal.—

(आ) “ तत्संयोगहेतुधिवर्जनात्स्यादयमात्यन्तिको दुःखप्रतीकारः ” [मङ्ग-
 सूत्र, २. २. १०].

E. Gauḍa. (Kār. 1) and Māth. (Kār. 22)—

(क) “ पञ्चविंशतितत्त्वज्ञो यत्र कुत्राश्रमे रतः । उरी मुग्धी शिखी वापि
 मुच्यते नात्र संशयः ॥ ”

This verse is ascribed to Pañcas'ikha by Bhāvāganes'a in his Tattvayāthārthyadipana and by Haribhadrāsūri in Śāstravārtasamuccaya (see Int. to Mātharavṛtti). Bhāvāganes'a was the disciple of Viṣṇūnābhaḥkṣu and flourished in the 17th century A.D. The time of Haribhadrāsūri is 'about 725 A.D.

F. Bāla.—

(स) “उभयथा चास्य प्रवृत्तिः प्रवानव्यवहारं दमते ।” (p. 153).

We find no account of this Pañcas'ikha born in the family of Parāś'ara (Mbh. S'anti. 320, 23). All the quotations ascribed to him are in prose except the “E”. It is just possible that he wrote a prose treatise. According to Garbe Pañcas'ikha flourished in the first century A.D. (S. Y. p. 3). Vyāsa, the author of the Yogabhāṣya, flourished in the 4th century A.D. (I. P. II, 342). It is possible that the writings of Pañcas'ikha were very common in the 4th century A.D., and, therefore, Vyāsa did not give his name while quoting. As Vācaspati frequently mentions his name, we can safely infer that the writings of Pañcas'ikha were known to him. Was it the Commentary on the Samāśasūtras which fell into the hands of Vācaspati? Vyāsanabhikṣu refers to Pañcas'ikha as the author of a commentary on the Samāśasūtras or the Tattvasamāsa; Bhāvāganeśa also says the same thing: “समाससूत्राख्यात्मन्यं व्याख्यां पञ्चसिक्तस्य च ।” (Int. to Māth. p. 2). According to Chinese tradition, Pañcas'ikha is the author of Śaṣṭitantra (S. S. 48). But this account is not to be believed, as is proved by many writers. Vācaspati, on the other hand, thinks that Śaṣṭitantra is a book on Yogaśāstra and its author was Vārṣaganya (see Tattv. V. on Y. S. IV. 13; and Bhāmati on Brahmasūtra II. 1, 3). Kaviraja Gopinātha is of opinion that Vācaspati never saw the Śaṣṭitantra (Jay. Int. pp. 4-7). But, according to the late M. M. P. Rāmāvatāra S'armā, Vācaspati knew Śaṣṭitantra (Bāla, p. 226). That this Pañcas'ikha is different from his namesake in the Mahābhārata is evident from their views; he is different from Gandhabha Pañcas'ikha also (S. S., pp. 48, 51).

4. Vindhyavāsa

The view that Vindhyavāsa is to be identified with Iśvara-kṛṣṇa is not sound (Jay. Int. pp. 6-7). We find one quotation

from him in the Rājamārtanda of Bhoja "सत्त्वतप्यत्वमेव पुरुषतप्यत्वम्. (Y. S. IV 23) : Medhātithi also quotes his opinion in his Bhāṣya on Manu I 55: "सांख्या हि केचिन्नान्तराभवमिच्छन्ति विन्ध्यवास. प्रभृतयः।". This seems to be derived from the S'lokavārtika : "अन्तरामवेदस्तु निषिद्धो विन्ध्यवासिना।" (p. 704) Also in the Saddarśanasamuccaya we find a quotation from him : "पुरुषे-
ऽविहृतात्मेव स्वनिर्भासमचेतनम्। मनः करोति सांनिध्यादुपायेः स्फटिको यथा॥" (p 36). Vallālasena, king of Bengal (12th century A.D.), has given a list of works which he consulted while compiling his Adbhūtasāgara. There we find a work of a certain Sāṁkhya teacher named Vindhyavāsin (H. Dh I, 341, 793n). This proves that the work of Vindhyavāsin was available as late as the 12th century A.D. Tanusukharāma, in his introduction to the Mātharavṛtti (Ch. S S.), has established an identity between Vindhyavāsin and Vyāḍi on the basis of quotations from the Trkāṇḍaśeṣa, the Haimakośa and the Sāmīyamināmamālā. He says, स च भगवतो वर्षस्य शिष्यो वन्दम-
कार्त्तन. (Kathāsaritsāgara, I. 2) शांतिनिमृशार्णो संप्रदाख्यदीक्षायाः
कस्यचित् कोशस्य कर्ता, दाशायणेः पत्न्यगृहेऽपि पुरोगामी सांख्ययोगाचार्यश्च॥" (p. 3). This leads us to suppose that Vindhyavāsin *alias* Vyāḍi, flourished in the 4th century B.C. According to a Chinese tradition Vindhyavāsin wrote a Sāṁkhya work called Hiranyasaptati (Bh. Com. p 175). According to Dr Belvalkar, Hiranyasaptati is a commentary on the Sāṁkhya-kāṅkā (ibid 177) But Kaviraja Gopinatha says : "The Anuyogadvārasūtra of the Jainas preserves a list of Brahmanical works, which contains the name of Kanagasattari (Kana-ksaptati), which I take to be equivalent to the Suvarnasaptati or Hiranyasaptati, the name of Sāṁkhya-saptati familiar in China." (Jay. Int. p. 7, 12n). But it must be noted here that along with the Kanagasattari, we find Mād̥hara also in the list of the Anuyogadvārasūtra. If Mād̥hara stands for the Mātharavṛtti then it is impossible to conclude that Anuyogadvārasūtra was written in the 1st

century A.D. (F. O. Schrader in a letter to me from Kiel, March 1, 1927). In the *Mātharavṛtti* we find : “ यथा दर्पणमात्रं आभासद्वयम् ” a quotation from the *Hastāmālākastotra* which is of the age of Śāṅkarācārya (i. e. 780-812 A.D., See Int., *Māth.*, p. 5). Therefore, it is wrong to decide the age of Vindhyavāsa or Īśvarakṛṣṇa on the basis of the *Kanaṣasattari*. And, if Vyāḍi *alias* Vindhyavāsin, is the author of the *Hiranyasaptati*, then the latter is certainly different from the *Sāṅkhyakāṅkā*, and Vindhyavāsin is different from Īśvarakṛṣṇa. Otherwise the date of Īśvarakṛṣṇa will have to be pushed back to the 4th century B. C. Therefore, it is safe to conclude, as Keith also says, that there are more than one Vindhyavāsins and that their dates are uncertain (S. S., 79 in; also, *Karma*, p. 59).

5. Vārṣaganya

We are as uncertain about Vārṣaganya as about the former teachers of Sāṅkhya. We find two quotations from him in the *Vyāsabhāṣya*. (1) “ मूर्तिव्यवधानिभेदाभावात्तास्ति नृद-
पृथक्त्वमिति वार्षगण्यः । ” (*Ibid.* 53, (2) “ गुणानां परमं रूपं न दृष्टिपथमृच्छति ।
यत्तु दृष्टिपथं प्राप्तं तन्मात्रेव सुगुच्छम् ॥ ” (*Ibid.* IV, 13) Vācaspati thinks that the latter quotation is taken from the *Śaṣṭitantra*. This very verse is quoted by Vācaspati in his *Bhāmātī* with the remarks : “ अत एव योगशास्त्रं व्युत्पादयित्वा आह स्य भगवान् वार्ष-
गण्यः । ” (on the *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya*, II 1, 3). Another quotation from Vārṣaganya, “ पञ्चपदा अविवक्षा इत्याह स्य भगवान्
वार्षगण्यः । ” is found in the *Tatt. K.* (on *Kāṅkā* 47) The quotation—“ पुरुषाधिष्ठितं प्रमाणं प्रवर्तते । ” found in the *Gaud*, and the *Māth.* (*Kāṅkā* 17), is ascribed to Vārṣaganya by Keith (S. S. 73, 3n). All these lead us to the conclusion that the Chinese tradition ascribing the authorship of the *Śaṣṭitantra* to Pañcasūkha is not trustworthy. There is also considerable doubt as to Vārṣaganya being the author of the *Śaṣṭitantra* (Jay. Int. pp 4-6, Huriyanna: “ *Śaṣṭitantra and Vārṣaganya* ”.

Journal of Oriental Research, Madras, April-June, 1929, pp. 107-112). This has been discussed in detail below.

6. Jaigīṣavya

According to the Kūrmapurāṇa, Jaigīṣavya was a class-fellow of Pāṇcas'ikha (S. S. II). Thus Jaigīṣavya is quoted as an authority on Yoga (Y. Bh., II. 55 and III. III). Vēcasapati also refers to him in his Nyāyavārtikatātparyatikā as the author of Dhāraṇāśāstra (on Nyāyasūtra III. 2. 43). But, according to the Buddhacarita (12 67), Arāḍakalāma refers to Jaigīṣavya, Janaka and Parāśara as persons who obtained salvation through Sāṃkhya (Jay., Int. p. 2, 2n.) In the present state of our knowledge, we can say nothing more about Jaigīṣavya.

7. Voḍhu

Voḍhu is also familiar by name alone. We have not come across any of his writings or quotations. In the list of the names of the sages pronounced in the Rātarpana, we find the name of Voḍhu after that of Āsuri, and before that of Pāṇcas'ikha. The opinion of Weber that it is the Brahmanised form of Buddha's name, is quite untenable (see S. Y. II 6). Keith has, however, discovered Voḍhu's name before that of Āsuri in one of the *pariśiṣṭas* of the Atharvaveda (S. S. 51).

8. Devala

We find a dialogue between Astadevala and Nārada in the Mahābhārata (Śānti., Ch., 274). There we find eight kinds of *bhūtas* (*bhūta*, *abhūta*, *kāla*, *pṛthivī*, *āpas*, *vāyu*, *ākāśa* and *tejas*); and *kāla* impelled by *bhūta* creating all the five elements, viz., earth, air, water, wind and glow. The senses themselves are not the knowers but produce knowledge for the *kṣetrajña*. Higher than the senses is *citta*, higher than the latter is *manas*, higher than it is *buddhi* and the highest of all is *parma*. The ear, the skin, the eye

the nose, the tongue, the *citta*, the *manas* and the *buddhi* are the eight instruments of knowledge, etc. It is said there - पुण्यपापदयार्थं हि मांश्वज्जनं विधीयते । तत्पुण्ये ह्यस्य पश्यन्ति ब्रह्म-
भावे परं गतिम् ॥ ” (Verse 39) Thus we see that this dialogue deals with theistic Sāṃkhya. The quotations from Devala as found in the Aparārka, a commentary on the Yājñavalkya-smṛti, resemble the Tattvasamāsa very much (See Yājñavalkya-smṛti, Ānandāśrama, Edn. II, pp. 936-7). Kane, in his H Dh. Vol. I, p. 121, says that Devala was a contemporary of the Smṛtikāras, viz., Bṛhaspati and Kātyāyana. And the age of Kātyāyana according to him is between the 4th and 6th centuries A.D. (see p. 218). But Udayatīrasāstri says that as Devala is frequently alluded to in the Mahābhārata, his age must be determined by the age of the epic in its present form. The Mahābhārata according to western scholars (says Mr Śāstri), assumed its present form by the 2nd century B.C. (P. O. C. Lahore, II p. 865). But according to Prof. Winternitz, the epic assumed its present form by the 4th century A.D. (See H. I. L. I. pp. 465-475). Devala does not seem to be much older than Śvarakṣṇa. The theory to the contrary does not seem to be convincing. It is based on the following quotation from the Mātharvṛtti - “ कविदासमुनिना प्राप्तमिदं ज्ञानं ततः पञ्चशिखेन तस्माद् भागव-वङ्क-वाल्मीकि-हारीत-देवदत्त-प्रभृतीनागतम् ”, (p. 84), where the word *prabhṛti* is taken to indicate a wide gap between Devala and Śvarakṣṇa. But the traditional list found in the Mātharavṛtti does not tally with any other such list. Therefore, Māthara's quotation can only establish Devala's priority to Śvarakṣṇa and nothing else.

9-26 Sanaka, etc.

Gauḍapāda (on Kār. I), quotes a verse and a half in which he enumerates the names of the seven sons of Brahman. They are : Sanaka, Sananda, Sanātana, Āsuri, Kapila, Voḍhu and Pāñcāsikha. But in the Mahābhārata, the list is different (Śānti. 340, 67-69), viz., Sana, Sanatsujāta, Sanaka,

Sanandana, Sanatkumāra, Kapila and Sanātana. Unfortunately we find no information about Sanaka, Sanandana, Sanātana, Sana, Sanatsujāta and Sanatkumāra, except a reference ■ Sanandanācārya in लिङ्गशतनिमित्तक इति सन्नन्नाचार्यः । (S. Sū VI, 69). There is a reference to a Sanatkumāra, author of some Smṛti, in the Nṛnayasiṃdhu and the Tristha-lisetu (H., Dh., 1, 656). Similarly we find Bhṛgu, Śukra, Kāśyapa, Parāś'ara, Garga, Gautama, Nārada, Ārṣiṣena, Agastya, Pulastya and Hārīta mentioned as writers of Smṛtis (Ibid, index). The dialogue between Parāś'ara and Janaka named the Parāś'ara gītā, and found in the Mahābhārata (S'ānti, Chs., 290-299), deals with the duties of the *varnas* and *āś'ramas* and has no vestige of Sāṃkhya teaching in it. It is just possible that Parāś'ara came to be regarded as a teacher of Sāṃkhya because he happened to be born in the same family as Pañcas'ikha (Mbh., S'ānti., 320-23). Ulūka is a synonym for Kaus'ika. In the Chinese translation of the Sāṃkhya Kārikā, Īś'varakṛṣṇa is referred to as born in the Kaus'ika family (Jay. Int p. 2, 2n). We know absolutely nothing of Vālmiki and Śuka as teachers of Sāṃkhya.

V. *Standard Works on Sāṃkhya*

A Available :—

Of the standard works on Sāṃkhya, only three are available. They are "Sāṃkhya-Sūtras", "Tattva-samāsa" and "Sāṃkhya-Kārikā".

Some scholars are of opinion that S. Sū. are not written by Kapila. The reason is that we find many passages from other works in them. For example, "आवृत्तिरसद्वयदेवत्" (Br. S., IV, 1, 1) = S. Sū., IV 3, "वृत्त्यः पञ्चतप्यः द्विष्टाद्विष्टाः" (Y. S., II, 46) = S. Sū., III 34 and VI 21. Again, in the sūtras establishing the authority of the Vedas (S. Sū., V, 40-51), the influence of the Vedānta is clearly visible. Again, we find many passages from "Sāṃkhya-Kārikā", quoted in the

Sūtras. Mādhavācārya of the 14th century A.D., quotes from the Kārikās and not Sūtras in his S. D. S. The oldest commentator on the Sūtras is Anuruddha who flourished in about 1500 A.D. Therefore, the Sūtras must have come into existence between 1380 and 1450 A.D. (See S. Y., pp. 8-9).

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... author of

Samāsa-Sūtra (Ch., B. S., No. 246, pp. 93-94). But as the author of the S. D. S. does not quote from the Tattva-samāsa even, so the antiquity of the latter also is doubtful. And if the author of the S. Sū., is Kapila, then how did he quote Pañcas'ika, etc., who were his grand disciples and who, therefore, must have flourished much later (See S. Sū., VI 68-69)?

But Udayavīra S'āstri has tried to prove that Kapila himself is the author of the S. Sū., in his article "Antiquity of the Sāṅkhya Sūtras" (P. C. O., Lahore, II, pp. 855-882). He is of opinion that several sūtras have been interpolated in the original of Kapila. For example, in the I chapter, the sūtras 20-54 are interpolated, because the 19th sūtra is literally the same as the 55th sūtra, and because the 53rd and 54th sūtras are identical with the 15th and 16th sūtras. And as we find the names of Sruṅgha and Pātaliputra in these interpolated sūtras, the interpolation must have been made when these towns were famous (from 4th century B.C., to the 5th century A.D.). The sūtras 79, 80 and 84-115 of the V chapter are also interpolations; the interpolation of these (84-115) is obvious as they discuss the principles opposed to Sāṅkhya Philosophy.

Thus Mr. S'āstri thinks that 68 sūtras are interpolated. I, on the other hand, think that the entire book was written by some later writer and therein some interpolations might have been made. Mr. S'āstri does not give any weighty or conclusive argument in support of his thesis. On the other

hand, when S'āṅkarācārya and others quote from Sāṃkhya-Kārikā only, there is no doubt that the Sūtras did not exist in their time. Had the S. Sū. been existent, then S'āṅkarācārya and others would not have deliberately left aside the composition of a ṛsi and quoted from the work of an ordinary mortal like Is'vakraṇa.

Mr. S'āstri further tries to prove that V. Bh., and others have borrowed from the S. Sū. His contention is :—

(1) “प्राप्नुवन्तर्निष्पत्तिवर्गं नास्तन् उपादाननियमात् = अस्त्यचिदुत्पत्तये किंचिदुपादेयम्” (V. Bh., on N. 8, IV. 1, 48)—here उपादाननियमात् is borrowed from “उपादाननियमात्” (S. Sū., I, 115). This very sūtra has been quoted again by Vātsyāyana in his gloss on the next N. 8, viz., “यत्पुनरुक्तं—प्राप्नुवन्ते; कार्यं नास्तन् उपादाननियमान् इति”. Here the insertion of the word इति shows that it is a quotation from some other work. That other work is S. Sū.

To this we reply—If the word इति is a sure sign of quotation from another work then why did not Vātsyāyana put it after “उपादाननियमात्” in the first passage (V. Bh., on N. 8, IV. 1, 48) quoted above? And as regards the presence of इति in the second passage, it should be noted that this word is not connected with only “उपादाननियमात्” but the whole passage, viz.,—“प्राप्नुवन्ते कार्यं नास्तन् उपादाननियमात्.” Here Vātsyāyana merely repeats his own words with slight change. Therefore, it does not show that V. Bh. has borrowed from the S. Sū., rather, it may be just the reverse.

(2) In the Aparārka, a commentary on the Yājñavalkya-Smṛiti (Prāyaścittādhyaṃya, v. 109), we find quotations from Devala which resemble the sūtras in S. Sū. very much. Therefore, Devala must have borrowed them from the S. Sū.

Mr. S'āstri starts here on the presumption of the priority of the S. Sū., to Devala, a fact which he has to prove.

(3) Patañjali, in his Mahābhāṣya, lays down the six causes of non perception thus—“षडभि-प्रकारैः सतां भावनामनु-

पलब्धिर्भवति — अतिसाधिकपांडतिविप्रकर्षान्मूर्त्यन्तगव्यवधानात्तमसावुत्तत्वादिति-
 न्प्रियं वैलप्यादतिप्रमाणादिति ॥” On this, Kaiyyāṭa says in his gloss-
 Pradīpa—इतरे विद्यमानस्यापि लिङ्गस्य सौहर्म्यमनुपलब्धिकारणं दर्शयितुमाह-
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 from some other work. It seems that he took this view from
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 causes of non-perception and in the Sāṃkhya-Kārikā, there
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In reply to Mr. S’astri’s arguments, the following may
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 II. 31 = Kār. 29). In (a) and (b) we find different readings.

Avyāpi in (a) has not been commented upon by Aniruddha. The word *pravartate* in (b) is not found in the Ms. in Mr. Sāstri's possession.

The arguments of Mr. Sāstri do not stand a close examination. If Aniruddha did not comment upon the word *avyāpi*, then it alone does not mean that the word did not exist formerly. Moreover, Vijñānabhikṣu has commented upon this word. Again, what is there to prove that the Ms. in Mr. Sāstri's possession is the oldest and the only correct Ms., whose one reading should decide so important a question as the authorship of Kapila. In his zeal to disprove the theory that "the Sūtras were composed on the basis of the Kārikās," Mr. Sāstri says that if we change the order of words in "सामान्यकरणवृत्तिः प्राणायाम वायवः पञ्च" and read it as "सामान्यकरणवृत्तिः प्राणायामः पञ्च वायवः" we attain *anuṣṭubh* metre in place of *āryā*. But this flight of imagination, *viz.*, changing the reading itself, is too much to be swallowed even by ordinary people. Therefore, Mr. Sāstri has failed to disprove that the 8. sū. are based upon the Kārikās.

There is a tradition that Paramārtha translated the Kārikās into Chinese in 557-569 A.D. (Bh., Corn., pp. 175-178). According to Paramārtha, Buddhāmītra the teacher of Vasubandhu, was vanquished in debate by Vindhyavāsa, the Sāṃkhya-teacher; Vindhyavāsa died before Vasubandhu. Thus, Vindhyavāsa and Vasubandhu were contemporaries. There is another tradition, according to which Vindhyavāsa was a contemporary of king Bālāditya and pupil of Vārṣaganya. A third tradition tells us that the pupil of Vārṣaganya composed *Hraṇyasaptati*. But all these traditions
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(4) The following sūtras agree verbatim with the Kārikās
 (a) “हेतुमदित्यस्यापि सांक्ष्यमनेकमाश्रितं लिङ्गम्” (S. Sū. I. 124 =
 Kār., 10) (b) “सात्विकमेकादशकं प्रवर्तते विहताद्वयारात्” (S. Sū. II.
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the conclusion that Vārṣaganya is the author of Śaṣṭitantra. But the reading in the Y. Bh. is मायेव सुतुच्छम्, while as the reading in the Bhāmati is मायेव सुतुच्छम्. The reading cannot have been deliberately altered by Vācaspati, for a scholar of his reputation would not commit such a crime. On the other hand, from the opinions of Vārṣaganya as found quoted in Buddhistic works, it seems that he altered the reading. Moreover, from Bhāskara's remark, viz., "कपिलमहर्षिप्रणीतपटितन्त्राख्यसूत्रैः" (on Br. S., II, 1, 1), we can infer that Kapila was the author of a Śaṣṭitantra. (See also P. O. C., Lahore, II, p. 832, where Mr. S'āstri states Śaṣṭitantra is the real *Sūmṅkhyā-dars'ana* written by Kapila. Mr. Bhattacharya also holds this view. See I. H. Q., Sept., 1932, p. 518). This old Śaṣṭitantra of Kapila has been enlarged by Pañcas'ikha in his Śaṣṭitantra.

To this we reply—One should not put implicit faith in commentators when they refer to the names of writers. For example, we see that Bhaṭṭa-Utpala, in his commentary on Bṛhat-Saṁhitā, quotes the verses (22-30) from Sāṁkhya-Kārikā, preceded by the remark "तथाह कपिलाचार्यः". As regards the alteration of मायेव into मायैव, if it is considered impossible in the case of Vācaspati, it should be still more impossible in the case of Vārṣaganya whom Vācaspati refers to with great reverence as भगवान् वार्येभ्यः. The opinion of Vārṣaganya, as quoted in the Buddhist work Abhidharma-kos'a (viz., nothing new comes into existence, nor anything born is ever destroyed; that what is existent, is ever existent; that what is non-existent can never become existent) is simply a statement of the *sat-kārya* theory. It is futile to read from it the difference between the theories of modification, as Mr. Hanyanna does, when it is admitted that But that requires proof.

A SYNOPSIS OF THE CARDINAL DOCTRINES OF THE SĀṆKHYA PHILOSOPHY

BY

Gaṅgānātha Jhā

The lucid writing of Vācaspati Miśra does not stand in need of much in the shape of an Introduction. But under the cover of this title, I propose to give a brief synopsis of the cardinal doctrines of the Sāṅkhya Philosophy, in the hope that a reading of this *resume* would prepare the mind of the student for the reception of the abstruse truths, in which the *Tattvakaumudī* abounds. Any corrections or suggestions for alteration, &c., will be most gratefully received.

To begin with, the Sāṅkhya lays down a fourfold division of categories based on their respective causal and productive

purely productive, since the Sāṅkhyas allow of no other purely productive agency. The Productive and produced are the other Principles—Buddhi, &c. These partake of the nature of both;—thus Buddhi is productive in as much as out of it evolves Ahaṁkāra, and it is produced in as much as it itself evolves out of Prakṛti. The purely non productive Principles are the eleven sense-organs and the five material substances. These are purely non-productive because none of these can give birth to a substance essentially different from themselves. The Puruṣa (Spirit) is neither productive nor produced. In fact it is without attributes. All accessories are the effects of the Gunas, and the Spirit is by its very nature free from these and as such without any accessories.

Having thus classified the various principles, we now turn to the consideration of the various principles separately

First of all then we must examine the nature of the all-powerful productive agent of the Sāṅkhyas or, more properly, the productive force of the Universe. How is this force constituted? It is made up of the three Gunas—Sattva, Rajas and Tamas; and when Nature is in its quiescent state, lying dormant, these three attributes are in equilibrium. When occasion presents itself, i. e. when the Adiṣṭa of the Spirits waiting to be born acts upon Nature, the equilibrium is disturbed, and it is this disturbance that gives rise to the various kinds of Products. The diversity of Products is thus rendered explicable. As already mentioned, all accessories are due to the predominance of one or other of the three Gunas—the predominance of Sattva giving rise to the kind of Product in which that attribute predominates, and so forth.

The three attributes—Sattva, Rajas and Tamas,—have respectively the character of Happiness, Unhappiness and Delusion; and have their operations characterised respectively by enlightenment, activity and inertia; and are so constituted that the one always operates through the suppression of the other, and at the same time depending upon this latter. To explain this contrariety of properties—The universe would be in an unceasing round of activity, if the only operating force were Rajas; in order to provide against this, Nature provides herself with a restraining agency in the shape of Tamas which by its nature is inert. The character of the objects of the universe is thus determined in accordance with the excess of one or the other of these attributes. Again, if there were no enlightening agency in the shape of Sattva, Nature would be nothing better than a mass of blind force acting in a haphazard manner.

Here an objector comes forward and says—"How can the Attributes, endowed as they are with mutually

properties, cooperate and bring about such a grand and stupendous structure as our Universe?"

The answer is that it is a very common fact that two or more substances, though mutually contradictory, do cooperate towards a single end;—e. g. the wick and the oil—both taken separately are as much against the action of one another as towards fire, but when they are together they help to enliven the fire. In the same manner, though the Attributes are mutually counteractive, yet when combined, they act towards a single end, supplying each other's deficiencies.

The necessity of postulating three different forces is further supported by another reason. We see that in Nature there are three distinct properties—of 'happiness', 'unhappiness' and 'delusion'. All other properties are reducible under these three heads. Again we find that these are properties so much opposed to one another that all could never be the product of a single cause. Thus it is necessary to postulate three different forces or constituent elements of Nature, to which severally we could trace the three distinct properties. To these three constituents of Nature we give the names—Sattva, Rajas and Tamas. We find in the universe the above three properties, and as all the properties of the Product must be a direct resultant of a like property in its cause, we arrive at the conclusion that the cause of the Universe—Nature—must be imbued with the three Attributes.

So much for the action of the Gunas. We now turn our attention towards the all-important Prakṛti, Nature—the Key-stone of the Sāṃkhya Philosophy.

What, then, is this Prakṛti, Nature? Does it stand for the Theistic God? Or for the Buddha "Sensations"? Or does it correspond to the Vedāntic "Māyā"? To all this we reply—It is all these, and it is none of these. It resembles the Vedāntic Māyā in as much as it is the one root of the Uni-

verse. It is not the God; since it is said to be without intelligence, mere dead Matter equipped with certain potentialities.

The next point that we have to consider is—How do the Sāṅkhyas prove the existence, the rootlessness, and eternality of this Prakṛti? Is it necessary to postulate such a rootless root, itself unmanifested, and yet manifesting all objective and subjective entities? Proofs of this are given at length in all works on the Sāṅkhya Philosophy, and it will not be altogether out of place here briefly to sum them up. But before we take up this, it is necessary to explain the Sāṅkhya doctrine of *causality*, the point on which rests the whole fabric of the system. What then is the cause and how is it related to the effect? Cause is defined as a substance in which the effect subsists in a latent form. Thus the effect must be said to be eternally existent—primarily in a latent condition, in the cause, and latterly manifesting itself and then commonly recognized as the *effect*. How to prove that the effect has been lying latent in the cause and has not been newly produced by the cause?

Firstly.—What is a nonentity can never be made an entity.—That is to say—that which has never existed can never be brought into existence. What remains to be done by the operation of the cause is the manifestation of the effect—that is to say, its manifestation as the effect of the particular cause. And this kind of manifestation we find in the production of oil from the different oil-seeds wherein it has been hitherto lying latent.

Secondly.—We find that the effect is always in one way or the other related to the cause. Now, this relation would not be possible if the effect were a

for a nonentity can have no relations. If the relation of the effect with the cause were not necessary then every effect would be possible from every cause. Since in that case there would be no restrictive qualification which would confine the operation of particular causes to particular effects. This would lead to an absurdity.

Thirdly — We cannot deny causal efficiency. Now what does this efficiency consist in? It cannot be anything other than the 'existence' in the cause of the effect in a latent

take an example, the cloth is non-different from the threads composing it; because it is neither heavier than the latter, nor is any other relation than that of inherence possible between the two; and it is only between two different things that any other relation as that of conjunction, etc., is possible. Nor can the cloth ever exist apart from the threads. The difference of properties and actions cannot establish any difference. For though a single thread cannot do what is done by the cloth, yet this latter is nothing more than a collection of threads; and we see that what a single man cannot do, can be done very well by a number of them together; e. g., a single man cannot carry a palanquin, which work can be performed by a number of men together. Thus then we see that the effect is nothing more than the developed cause; and the latter again is merely an undeveloped effect. This identity of cause and effect has been thus explained by Sir William Hamilton also, who says—"When we are aware of something which begins to be, we are by the necessity of our intelligence, constrained to believe that it has a cause. But what does the expression, *that it has a cause*, signify?

If we analyse our thought, we shall find that it simply means, that as we cannot conceive any new existence to commence, therefore, ϵ^1 that new existence must have been under some previous existence had previously been. are utterly complement of existence either increased or diminished. We are unable, on the one hand, to conceive nothing becoming something—or on the other something becoming nothing... There is thus conceived an absolute tautology between the effect and its causes. We think the cause to contain all that is contained in the effect; the effect to contain nothing which was not contained in the cause."

—Lectures on Metaphysics—XXXIX.

Having thus proved the existence of the effect in the cause, the Sāṃkhya employ this fact in proving the existence of their Prakṛti, Nature. The effect being only a developed cause, in which it has been lying latent, all entities must have their unmanifested condition in their cause. That is to say, the elements lie in Ahaṁkāra which lies in Buddhi. Now if we go on expanding this series we would be landed in a *regressus ad infinitum*. In order to avoid this we must postulate the existence of a principle which must be uncaused and which must be the final substratum of the undeveloped state of all other entities. Thus we have a causeless cause which must be by its very nature unmanifested, the final cause of all;—and to this the Sāṃkhya give the names "Pradhāna," "Prakṛti", "Avyakta." (Nature).

Secondly, we find that all entities—from Buddhi downwards—are limited and are the development of some further ultimate Principle—and this latter is Prakṛti.

Having thus proved the Existence of Nature the Sāṃkhya proceeds to define its properties as well as those of its Products, and to explain wherein lies their difference.

In order to do this they first of all consider the properties of the Manifested Entities—the effects of Prakṛti. These are caused, and as a necessary consequence of this—transitory, limited, mobile, many, dependent (on the activity of the Prakṛti), made up of parts; these are the characteristics where the Prakṛti differs from the Manifested Entities, Buddhi and the rest. For, as already explained, the Prakṛti is the uncaused root of the Universe, and as such, must be eternal. And as all Universe is the result of its evolution, it must be all-prevading; as a necessary consequence of this it is immoveable i. e., it cannot move, in the sense of going from one place to another. And further, since it is all-prevading it must be one. It is independent—depending only on the activity of its own constituent Guṇas.

These are the points of difference. Those of agreement are, that Prakṛti as well as the manifested entities are the resultants of the various actions and interactions of the three Guṇas. Secondly, being without intelligence, both must be without discrimination, since discrimination proceeds from intelligence. Thirdly, both these present objects for the enjoyment of the Spirit. Fourthly, since they are without intelligence, they can never be the observers, they must always remain the observed, and as such common. That is to say, every object that is observed is so observed, not differently by different individuals, but is a common object of observation by all, and it is common in that sense. Fifthly, they are without intelligence—the only Principle endowed with intelligence being the Spirit. Sixthly, they are prolific, i. e., endowed with evolutionary potency. The Spirits are without this.

These in brief, are the points of agreement and difference between Prakṛti on one hand and its Products on the other.

Now we must consider the nature of the Spirits and see what the Śūtrikhyas have to say as to their existence, number and properties. But before we proceed with this, we must

first see if it is necessary to have a distinct principle in the shape of innumerable Spirits. And on this score, the first reason that presents itself is the fact that we have not yet got any principle that will supply the factor of intelligence.

cause cannot manifest itself in the product. So we must have a distinct *Principle of Sentience*.

Secondly.—We see in our everyday life that all that is composite is for the use of another, as a bed, a chair, &c. And we have seen before that all the entities from Prakṛti downwards are *composites*. Though this sounds a little absurd as regards Prakṛti, Buddhi, and Ahankāra, yet we must see

existence of an incorporeal entity. And this is Puruṣa, the Spirit, and as we have not yet had an intelligent principle, we attribute intelligence to this incorporeal Spirit. This Spirit cannot be *composite* because it is devoid of the three Attributes, as it is only what is made up of the Guṇas that is found to be *composite*.

Thirdly.—We have in daily life found that whatever is naturally connected with either pleasure, pain or delusion, is supervised by something else; and we have also seen that all the entities from Prakṛti downwards are made up of the pleasure by supervisor. this supervisor must be himself unattached in his essence by pleasure, etc.; and as such must be something over and above Prakṛti. And this is Puruṣa, the Spirit.

Fourthly.—Prakṛti and the rest are objects of enjoyment and as such they necessitate the existence of an *enjoyer* who again must not be an *object* himself. And the enjoyer must be an intelligent entity. For a non-intelligent principle being devoid of consciousness can never be the enjoyer. This again must be something not made up of pleasure, etc. This can never be the case with Buddhi and the rest.—These latter being made up as they are of the three Gunas which are of the nature of pleasure, pain and delusion, cannot be the *enjoyer* of these; for that will involve the absurdity of self-contradictory action—one made up of pleasure, pain and delusion, cannot be pleased or pained; for each of these is contradictory to the one or other phase of the constitution of Buddhi. So we must have an enjoyer over and above Prakṛti and the rest. And this is Spirit.

Fifthly and lastly.—All systems of Philosophy, and all the great men of the past we find striving after final Release. Now this is not possible for Prakṛti or Buddhi. For these latter are, by their constitution, made up of pain and as such can never be released from this. So the object of final Release must be one who has neither pleasure nor pain nor delusion for its constituent element; and such an entity is the Spirit alone.

We have thus shown the necessity of postulating a distinct entity in the shape of Puruṣa, over and above Prakṛti.

The next thing, we have to consider is—What is this Puruṣa?—How is it constituted?—What are its properties?—What its aim?—and finally, how and when does it attain final Release? We must take each of these questions one by one.

(1) What is Puruṣa? It is not the thinking principle, since thinking belongs to the *mind*. Nor is it the determining principle, since that is allotted to Buddhi. The character of the Spirit is unique. It is none of these, and yet

... faster in all these. It is the principal
well as material. It is the

Without it no functions would be possible, specially consciousness. In short, Spirit is the source of intelligence, and as such, the necessary factor in every function of the mind—feeling, intellecting and willing.

(2) How is this Spirit constituted? As a matter of fact the Spirit is constituted of intelligence or sentience pure and simple, and is free from every other qualification and encumbrance.

(3) What are its properties? These are thus enun-
scri-
non-
the
action of the Attributes, no liberation from metempsychosis
would be possible. Since pain constitutes the very nature of
the Attributes and as such cannot possibly be separated
from it. And thus no liberation being possible, there would
be no necessity for enquiries to which the various systems of
philosophy are devoted. And lastly, if the Spirit were not
equipped with discriminative faculties, it could never attain
the discriminative wisdom arrived at by the philosophical
systems, which would thus become purposeless.

delusions—the modifications of Buddhi. Now the one all-absorbing aim of every Spirit is the attainment of that wisdom which would help him to discriminate between Himself and the fluctuations of the Attributes, and thus see the pleasure and pain caused by these in their true light and be no longer affected by them.

The next question that presents itself to us is—how does Puruṣa attain to this wisdom and thence to final emancipation? This wisdom arises from a constant study of the Sāṃkhya Philosophy, when the Attribute of Sattva = paramount in one's constitution and the others have almost ceased to exist. The Puruṣa then sees Nature and its constituents in their true light and finds out His mistake and so shakes off all mistaken preconceptions about self, and thus becomes free from the self-imposed bonds of Buddhi, and finally retires from metempsychosis and attains final Beatitude.

Having thus said all that we had to say about Prakṛti and Puruṣa we must look a little into the details of the process of creation.

We have already said that Prakṛti is the rootless Root of the Universe. From this Prakṛti emanates Buddhi, to which the technical name of *Mahat* or the Great Principle is given, it is the Cosmic Mind. From this Buddhi proceed *Ahaṃkāra* or the I-principle. From this again emanate the eleven, senses and the five subtle elements of sound, odour, taste, colour and touch. And from these latter five, proceed the five gross substances—Earth, Water, Fire, Air and Ākāśa. First in this scale comes Buddhi. This is defined as the principle of *adhyavasāya*. This term literally means "ascertainment" and in explaining this term, the writers exemplify it as the determination that "this is to be done by me." It is that process that the function of this principle are the will, and y of the Kantian School—"Intellect contemplates the circumstances calling for action and provides the rule of conduct: Will controls the disposition in harmony with the dictates of intelligence." The Sāṃkhyas attribute both these functions

to their *Buddhi*. That *Buddhi* resembles *will*, is further made clearer by the properties assigned to it, by the Sāṃkhya. These properties are Virtue, Wisdom, Dispassion and

the course of
of actions
to find that
ive and so

to attribute the property of wisdom to *Buddhi* is to give it the dual character of Intellect and Will. Dispassion and Power again must belong to the principle that decides on a certain course of action and in this too we find *Buddhi* cognate with *Intellect* and *Will* combined. We have, therefore, called it the *Cosmic Mind*.

The principle that we have to consider next is that of *Egoism*, the *I-principle*. It is the principle to which all notions of the 'I' are due. It corresponds with Kant's "*apperception*" and Hamilton's "*self-consciousness*", that is to say, the notion of self in every form of consciousness: The idea that "*I have the consciousness*," "*I feel*, etc." As immediate effects of this *I-principle* we have the eleven sense-organs and the five subtle elements. The eleven sense-organs consist of the five intellectual (subjective) senses—the eye, the ear, the nose, the tongue, the skin,—and the five of action (objective) viz.—the hands, the feet, speech, the excretory organ and the organ of generation. The eleventh sense is *Mānas*, (individual mind). The five subtle rudimentary elements are those of odour, touch, taste, colour and sound. From these latter again proceed the five gross substances—Earth, Air, Water, Fire and *Ākāśa*, and these have the subtle rudimentary elements for their essential properties.

Before proceeding any further we must consider the nature of the eleventh sense-organ, the *mind* or the reflective principle. Here first of all we must consider why we should call *mind* a 'sense' at all? The answer is not far

that cycle. If this were not so, the actions of one incarnation could not react upon the Spirit in the next, for the Spirit itself cannot be affected by either good or evil, and as such could not be affected by the actions of one incarnation in another. For the actions were done by the body and the organs of the former incarnation and these dying with the Body, wherein would the traces of the former actions be left? So we must postulate the existence of a substratum in the form of the "Linga-S'arira", the subtle Body, which is equipped with subtle counterparts of all the sensory and motor organs. This Linga-S'arira is imprinted with all the effects of the actions of the Spirit. And since this subtle body follows the Spirit in all its subsequent incarnations, it is but natural that the fruits of past actions should affect the Spirit :—though the Spirit cannot be affected, yet so long as he has not attained to discriminative wisdom, he thinks all the affections of Buddhi to be his own. This subtle body thus must have traces of virtue and vice on itself so as to bring out their effects in a future incarnation. It acts also as the substratum of the different organs which are subtle in their nature, and as such could not subsist without a subtle substratum.

Let us now see how the Sāṃkhya treat of the idea of means and consequences of actions. By means of virtue the Spirit ascends to higher regions. Vice leads the other way; Emancipation results from discriminative wisdom. This wisdom consists of deep insight into the character of Spirit and Nature, and consequent intelligent perception of the difference between the two—from which results the Spirit's perception of His own true nature, which is above the operation of the three Attributes, though so long He has been labouring under the self-imposed imaginary thralldom of the Attributes. No sooner has this perception been gained than the Spirit casts off His self-imposed chains and becomes free

under the influence of attachments proceeding from the attribute of Rajas it falls into the stingy darkness of metempsychosis from which it can be freed only by the divine ray of wisdom. We are all labouring under this category

The Sāmkhyas have further entered into a very elaborate enunciation of the various manifestations of Buddhi dividing them into no less than fifty forms. These are made up of five kinds of impediments, twenty-eight of incapacity (resulting from the disability of the organs), nine of contentment and eight of perfection. Of these, again there are 62 forms of impediment alone.

So much for 'mental' creation. The 'material' creation ^{ings, the five} The various or otherwise of one of the Attributes. Thus the Attribute of Sattva predominates among divine beings, that of Rajas among human beings, and that of Tamas in all lower creation.

All this elaborate process of creation is begun by Nature solely for the sake of the Spirit's emancipation from the miseries of metempsychosis—miseries inevitable to Him when born in a body. Nature is described as a benevolent benefactress, not caring for any return of services from the Spirit, and working for His emancipation out of her own sweet will, till He comes to perceive her true character; when She retires from the scene like an actress who has

played her part and never again returns to the same Spirit, the spectator. Thus then in reality all bonds and pains are only supposed by the Spirit to be His own. By His very nature He is free from all fluctuations, in as much as He is above the Attributes, whose effect these fluctuations are. After the attainment of discriminative wisdom, the Spirit steers clear of all notions of egoism, and attains to His own natural spiritual condition. But the body continues for a time on account of the impulse previously imparted to it. And the attainment of wisdom having put a stop to the operation of all such agents as virtue, etc.,—the operation of which is a necessary cause of rebirth—the body falls, and the Spirit regains His true character, and attains to absolute and eternal beatitude, never to return to the cycles of metempsychosis.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Bāla.	=	Bālarāma's Comm. on Sāṅkhya Tattva- kaumudī, Bombay, 1929.
Bh. Com.	=	Bhandarkar Commemoration Volume.
Bh. G.	=	Bhagavadgītā.
Br. up.	=	Bṛhadāranyaka Upaniṣad.
Br. S.	=	Brahma-Sūtras.
Brah. P.	=	Brahma Purāṇa.
Ch. S. S.	=	Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series (Benares).
Ch. Up.	=	Chāndogya Upaniṣad.
Davies.	=	Hindu Philosophy : The Sāṅkhya Kārikā of Īśwara Kṛishna, by John Davies. Trübner's Oriental Series, London, 1881.
Ent. Gott.	=	Die Entwicklung der Gottesidee bei den Indern and deren Beweise, von H. Jacobi, Bonn, 1923.
Gauḍa.	=	Gaudapādabhāṣya.
H. I. L.	=	History of Indian Literature, Vol. I., by M Winternitz.
H. I. P.	=	History of Indian Philosophy by Das Gupta.
H. Dh.	=	History of Dharmaśāstra, Vol I., by P. V. Kane, Poona, 1930.
H. S. L.	=	History of Sanskrit Literature, by Macdonell.
I. A.	=	Indian Antiquary.
I. H. Q.	=	Indian Historical Quarterly, edited by N. Law, Calcutta.
I. P.	=	Indian Philosophy by S. Radhakrishnan.

- Isadi. = ईशावद्येनउपनिषद्., निर्णयमागर edn.
 Jay. = Jayamaṅgalā, a Comm., on Sāṁkhya-Kāṅkā,
 edited by H. Sarmā, Calcutta Oriental
 Series, No. 19.
 J. O. R. = Journal of Oriental Research, Madras.
 Karma. = Karmamīmāṁsā by Keith (Heritage of India
 Series.)
 Māth. = Mātharavytti (Ch. S. S., No. 296).
 Mbh. = Mahābhārata, P. C. Roy's edn. Calcutta,
 1810 Saka era.
 N. B. S. = Notes on Brahma-Sūtras, II. 1 and 2 by
 S. K. Belvalkar, Oriental Book Agency
 Poona, 1923.
 N. S. = Nyāya-Sūtras.
 Pr. Up. = Praśna Upaniṣad.
 P. O. C. = Proceedings of the Oriental Conference.
 S. N. S. = The Sāṁkhya Kāṅkā of Īśvarakṛṣṇa by
 S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri, University of
 Madras, 1930.
 'Sovani. = A critical study of Sāṁkhya System on the
 line of Sāṁkhya Kāṅkā, Sāṁkhya-Sūtra
 and their Commentaries, by V. V. Sovani,
 M. A., (The Allahabad University Studies,
 Vol. VII, Art Section, Allahabad, 1931).
 S. S. = Sāṁkhya System by Keith (Heritage of
 India Series).
 S. P. = Sāṁkhya Philosophie von H. Garbe, 2nd
 edn., Leipzig, 1917.
 S. Sū. = Sāṁkhya Sūtras of Kapala.
 S. S. B. = Sāṁkhya-Sūtra-Bhāṣya of Vṛṇānabhikṣu.
 S. B. E. = Sacred Books of the East.
 Sk. P. = Skanda Purāṇa.

- S. Y. = Sāṃkhya und Yoga, von R. Garbe, Grundriss der Indo-Arischen Philologie und Altertumskunde, 1896.
- S. D. S. = Sarvadarśana Saṃgraha, B. O. R. 1., Poona.
- Śv. Up. = Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad.
- Tatt. K. = Vācaspati's Tattva-Kaumudī on Sāṃkhya-Kārikā.
- Tatt. V. = Vācaspati's Tattva-Vaiśāradi on Yoga-Bhāṣya.
- Tatt. Sk. = The Sāṃkhya-Kārikā, Studied in the light of its Chinese version, by M. Takakusu; rendered from the French into English, by S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri, Madras, 1933.
- Y. Bh. = Vyāsa's Bhāṣya on the Yoga-Sūtras of Patañjali.
- Y. S. = Yoga-Sūtras of Patañjali.
- V. Bh. = Vātsyāyana's Bhāṣya on the Nyāya-Sūtras.
- V. P. = Viṣṇu Purāṇa.
- Wilson = The Sāṃkhya Kārikā with Colebrooke's translation and Comments by H. H. Wilson, published by Tookaram Tattya, Bombay, 1887.

तत्त्वकौमुदी.

(सांख्य.)

(१) मद्रत्नचरणम् ॥

अजामैकां लोहितमुद्गकृष्णां बह्वीः प्रजाः सृजमानां नमामः ।

भजा ये तां सुप्रमाणां भजन्ते जहरयेनां भुक्तभागां नुमस्तान् ॥ १ ॥

कपिलाय महामुनये मुनये शिष्याय तस्य चासुरये ।

पञ्चशिखाय तथेश्वरकृष्णार्यताञ्जमस्यामः ॥ २ ॥

इह खलु प्रतिपिस्सितमर्थं प्रतिपादयन् प्रतिपादयिता ऽवधेयवचनो
भवति प्रेक्षावताम् । अप्रतिपिस्सितमर्थं तु प्रतिपाद-

(२) शास्त्रविषयक-
जिज्ञासाकारणम् ॥

यन् ' नायं लौकिको नापि परीक्षक ' इति प्रेक्षाव-
द्भिन्मन्तवदुपेक्षेत । स चैषां प्रतिपिस्सितो ऽर्थो यो

ज्ञातः सन् परमपुरुषार्थस्य कल्पने । इति प्रारिप्सित-

शास्त्रविषयज्ञानस्य परमपुरुषार्थसाधनहेतुत्वात् तद्विषयजिज्ञासामवतारयति-

२१.१२ दुःखप्रयाभिघाताज्जिज्ञासा तदपघातके हेती ।

दृष्टे सा ऽपार्था चैर्नकान्तात्यन्ततो ऽभावात् ॥ १ ॥

“दुःख-” इति । एवं हि शास्त्रविषयो न जिज्ञास्येत, यदि दुःखं नाम

उपगति न स्यात्, सद्वा न जिह्रासितम्, जिह्रासितं

(३) शास्त्रविषयक-
जिज्ञासाया आवश्य-
कत्वसद्वा ॥

वा अक्षय्यममुच्छेदम् । (अक्षय्यममुच्छेदता च द्वेधा,

दुःखस्य निवृत्त्यात्, तदुच्छेदोपायापरिज्ञानाद्वा) ।

अक्षय्यममुच्छेदत्वेऽपि च शास्त्रविषयस्य ज्ञानस्यानु-
पायभूतत्वाद्वा, मुक्तस्योपायान्तरस्य सद्भावाद्वा ॥

संन्ति चोत्पायाः शतशः शरीरदुःखप्रतीकारायेष्वप्यत्र विपत्रां वीररूपदिष्टाः । मानसस्यापि मन्तापस्य प्रतीकाराय मनोज्ञस्त्रीपानमोजनविलेपनवस्त्रालङ्कारादिविषयमग्राप्तिरुपायः सुकरः । एवमाधिर्मातृकस्यापि दुःखस्य नीतिशास्त्राभ्यासकुशलतानिरत्ययुग्धानाध्यासनादिः प्रतीकारहेतुरीप्सुकरः । तथा ऽऽधिदैविकस्यापि मणिमन्त्रौषधाद्युपयोगः सुकरः प्रतीकारोपाय इति ॥

निराकरोति—“ न ” इति । कुतः ? “ एकान्तात्यन्ततो ऽभावान् ” ।

“ एकान्तो ” दुःखनिवृत्तेरवश्यम्भावः ; “ धरयन्तो ”

(६) वैयर्थ्यापत्तिनिराकरणम्—परिगणिते, पापेभ्य आत्यन्तिक-कार्णिकदुःखनिवृत्तेरदर्शयाम् ॥ निवृत्तस्य दुःखस्य पुनरनुत्पादः, तयोः एकान्तात्यन्त-योर्भावः “ एकान्तात्यन्ततो ऽभावः ” । पट्टीस्थाने स्वाविविभक्तिकम्पसिः । एतदुक्तं भवति, यथाविधि रसायनादिकाभिर्नीतीतिशास्त्राभ्यासमग्राधुपाययोगे ऽपि तस्य तस्याध्यात्मिकादेर्दुःखस्य निवृत्तेरदर्शनान् भनैकान्तिकत्वम्, निवृत्तस्यपि पुनरुत्पत्तिदर्शनान्

अनात्यन्तिकत्वम्, इति सुकरोऽपि पेशात्मिकत्यन्तिकदुःखनिवृत्तेर्न ह्य उपाय इति नाऽपार्था जिज्ञासार्थः ॥

(७) दुःखापघातार्थ-नम् मङ्गलमेव ॥ यद्यपि दुःखमङ्गलम्, तथाऽपि तत्परिहारार्थवेज्ञ नदुपघातो मङ्गलमेवेति शुभं शास्त्रादौ तत्कीर्तनमिति ॥ १ ॥

(८) वैदिकस्य दुःखाप-कषातकस्य सुकरस्य सखे शास्त्रविषयजिज्ञासायाः पुनर्वैयर्थ्यापत्तिः ॥ स्यादेतन् । मा भूदृष्ट उपायः, वैदिकस्तु ज्योति-ष्टोमादिः संवत्सरपर्यन्तः कर्मकलापस्तापघ्नयने-कान्तमत्यन्तश्चापनेष्यति । ध्रुतिश्च, “ स्वर्गकामो यजेत ” इति । स्वर्गश्च—

“ यत्त दुःखेन सम्मिश्रं न च ग्रस्तमनन्तरम् ।

अभिलाषोपनीतं च तन् शुभं स्वःपदास्पदम् ” इति ।

१. एतत् (वक्ष्यमाणम्, आर्त्तादितम्) स्यात्—इति ग्रन्थकारोक्तिः । अथवा-एतत् (भवतोक्तम्) स्यात् (भवतु), स्वीकृतमस्माभिरिति शङ्कादुक्तिः । उभयथा-ऽपि युज्यते ।

दुःखविरोधी मुक्तविशेषश्च स्वर्गः । स च स्वशक्त्या समूलधातमपहन्ति दुःखम् ।
न चैव क्षयी । तथा हि श्रूयते—“ अपाम सोमममृता अभूम ” इति [अथर्व-
शिरस् ३] । तदक्षये कुनोऽस्यामृतत्वसम्भवः ? तस्माद्वैदिकोपायस्य तावद्य-
प्रतीकारहेतोर्मुहुर्तयामाहोरात्रिसम्यक्त्वरतिर्वर्तनायम्यानेकजन्मपरम्परायामप-
र्यादनां धान् विवेकज्ञानात् ईषदकृत्वात् पुनरपि व्यर्था जिज्ञासा इत्याशङ्क्याह—

दृष्टवानुभ्रविकः, स ह्यविशुद्धिप्राप्तिशययुक्तः ।

तद्धिंपरितः श्रेयान् व्यक्ताच्यक्त्वविज्ञानात् ॥ २ ॥

“ दृष्ट—” इति । गुरपाश्वदनुभूयते इत्यनुभ्रवो, वेदः । एतदुक्तं भवति—

‘ श्रूयत एव परं न केनापि क्रियत ’ इति । तत्र भव आहु-

(१) वैदिकानामप्युपा-

ध्रविकः, तत्र प्राप्तो ज्ञात इति यावत् । आनुध्रविको

यानां दृष्टोपायैस्त्वह

ऽपि कर्मकलापो दृष्टेन तुल्यो वर्तते, ऐकान्तिकत्वात्

तुल्यत्वम् ॥

निकदुःखप्रवर्तनीकारानुपायत्वस्योभयत्रापि तुल्य-

त्वात् । यद्यपि च “ आनुध्रविक ” इति सामान्या

मिथानं, तथापि कर्मकलापामिथायं द्रष्टव्यम्, विवेकज्ञानस्याप्यानुध्रविक-

त्वात् । तथा च श्रूयते—“ आत्मा वा ऽरे ज्ञातव्यः प्रकृतितो विवेकमयः ”

[गृह्यसूत्रम्, २।१।५], “ न स पुनरावर्तते न स पुनरावर्तते ” [छान्दोग्य

८।१५] इति ॥

अस्यां प्रतिज्ञायां हेतुमाह—“ स ह्यविशुद्धिप्राप्तिशययुक्तः ” इति

“ अविशुद्धिः ” संसारादिबाधस्य पशुपीनादिवप्रसाध-

(१०) दृष्टवैदिकोपाय-

नता । यथाऽऽह स्म भगवान् पद्मप्रतिपादवाच्यः—“ स्व

ययोः अविशुद्धिभङ्गति-

त्यमद्वयः सपरिहारः सप्रत्ययमपः ” इति । ‘ स्व

शक्त्युत्पन्नम् तुल्यम् ॥

त्यमद्वयो ’ व्यतिरेकमादिजन्मनः प्रधानापूर्वम्

स्वत्वेन पशुहिंसादिजन्मना अनर्धहेतुना ऽप्ये-

मद्वयः । ‘ सपरिहारः ’ क्रियता ऽपि प्रायश्चित्तेन परिहर्तुं शक्यः । अथ

प्रमादनः प्रायश्चित्तमपि नाचरितं, प्रधानकर्मविपाकमभये स वृत्तते । तथा ऽ-

यावदगापनर्धं मृते नाश्व प्रत्यजमर्धेन (मतिष्णुनया) मठ घर्तन इ-

“ सप्रत्यमवपः ” । मृप्यन्ते हि पुण्यसम्भारोपनीतस्वर्गसुधामहाद्वावगाहिनः
कुशलाः पापमात्रोपसादितं दुःखवह्निकणिकाम् ॥

न च—“ मा हिंस्यान् सर्वा भूतानि ” इति मामान्यशास्त्रं विशेषशास्त्रेण
“ अग्नीषोमीयं पशुमालभेत ” इत्यनेन बाध्यत—
(११) याज्ञिकहिंसाया इति युक्तम्, विरोधाभावात् । विरोधे हि बलीयसा
अप्यनर्थहेतुत्वसाधनम् ॥ दुर्बलं बाध्यते । न चेहास्ति कश्चिद्विरोधः, भिन्नविषय-
त्वात् । तथा हि—“ मा हिंस्यान् ” इति निषेधेन
हिंसाया अनर्थहेतुभावो ज्ञाप्यते, न त्वक्तवर्थत्वमपि, ‘ अग्नीषोमीयं पशुमाल-
भेत ” इत्यनेन बाधयेन च पशुहिंसायाः प्रवर्धत्वमुच्यते, नानर्थहेतुत्वाभावः,
तथा सति वाक्यभेदप्रसङ्गात् । न चानर्थहेतुत्वकतूपकारकत्वयोः कश्चिद्विरोधो-
ऽस्ति । हिंसा हि पुरुषस्य दोषमावदपति, कनोत्रोपकरिष्यतीति ॥

अदातिशयो च फलगतावप्युपाय उपचरितौ । क्षयित्वं च स्वर्गादेः सत्त्वे
(१२) वैदिकोपायस्य सतिशयत्वप्रदर्शनम् ॥ सति कार्यत्वादानुमितम् । ज्योतिष्टोमाद्यः स्वर्गमात्रस्य
साधनम्, वाजपेयादयस्तु स्वाराज्यस्यैत्यतिशययुक्त-
त्वम् । परसम्पदुत्कर्षो हि हीनमभ्यर्दं पुरयं दुःखा-
करोति ॥

“ अपाम सोमममृता अभूम् ” इति वामृतत्वाभिधानम् चिरस्थेमानमुप-
रुक्षयति । यदाहुः—“ अभूतसंग्रहं स्थानममृतत्वं हि
(१३) अमृतत्वधृति- बाध्यते ” इति (विष्णुपुराणे) ॥ अत एव च श्रुतिः—
विरोधपरिहारः—अमृतत्वस्य “ न कर्मणा न प्रजया धनेन स्वागोर्न केनामृतत्वमा-
चिरस्थेन उपलक्षकत्वात् ॥ ननुः । परेण नाकं निहितं गुहायां विश्राजते यद्यतयो
विशन्ति ” इति [महानारायण १०।५] । तथा
“ कर्मणा मृत्युमृत्यो निषेदुः प्रजावन्तो द्रविणमीहमानाः । तथा परे
अपयो ये मनीषिणः परं कर्मभ्यो ऽमृतत्वमानशुः ” इति च ॥

तदेतन् सर्वमभिप्रेत्याह—“ तद्विपरीतः श्रेयान्, व्यक्ताव्यक्तज्ञविज्ञानात् ” इति । तस्मात् (आनुभविकात् दुःखापघातकोपायात् (१४) लौकिकवैदिको- सोमपानादेरविशुद्धात् अनित्यसातिशयफलात्) पायेभ्यः शास्त्रविषयज्ञा- विपरीतः विशुद्धः हिसादिसत्पराभावात्, नित्यमित- नस्य श्रेयस्त्वप्रदर्शनम् ॥ तिशयफलः, असकृत् पुनरावृत्तिश्रुतेः । न च कार्यत्वेनानित्यता फलस्य युक्ता, भावरूपस्य कार्यस्य तथाभावात्, दुःखप्रभञ्जनस्य तु कार्यस्यापि तद्विपरीत्यात् । न च दुःखान्तरो- र्थादः, कारणाप्रवृत्तौ कार्यस्यानुत्पादात्, विवेकज्ञानोपजननपर्यन्तराव- कारणप्रवृत्तेः । एतच्चोपैरिष्टादुपपादयित्यते ॥

अक्षरार्थस्तु—तस्मात् (आनुभविकात् दुःखापघातकात् हेतोः) विपरीतः (सत्प्रपुरुषान्यताप्रत्ययः साक्षात्कारो) दुःखापघा- (१५) “ तद्विपरीतः तको हेतुः, अत एव श्रेयान् । आनुभविको हि वेद- श्रेयान् ” इत्यस्याह्वारार्थः ॥ विहितत्वात् मात्रया दुःखापघातकत्वाच्च प्रशस्यः । सत्प्रपुरुषान्यताप्रत्ययोऽपि प्रशस्यः । तद्वन्मयोः प्रश- स्ययोर्मध्ये सत्प्रपुरुषान्यताप्रत्ययः श्रेयान् ॥

कुतः पुनरस्योत्पत्तिरित्यत आह—“ व्यक्ताव्यक्तज्ञविज्ञानात् ” इति । व्यक्तं च अव्यक्तं च ज्ञञ्च व्यक्ताव्यक्तज्ञाः, तेषां (१६) शास्त्रविषयस्य विज्ञानम् विवेकेन ज्ञानम्, व्यक्ताव्यक्तज्ञविज्ञानम् । दुःखापघातकस्य तत्त्वज्ञा- व्यक्तज्ञानपूर्वकमव्यक्तस्य तत्स्वरूपस्य ज्ञानम् । तयोश्च नस्योत्पत्तिप्रदर्शनम् ॥ पारार्थ्येनात्मा परो ज्ञायते, इति ज्ञानक्रमेणाभिधानम् । एतदुक्तं भवति—श्रुतिस्मृतीतिहासपुराणेभ्यो व्यक्ता- दीन् विवेकेन श्रुत्या, शास्त्रयुक्त्या च व्यवस्थाप्य दीर्घकालादरन्तरन्तर्येसत्कार- सेवितान् भावनामयात् विज्ञानादिनि । तथा च वक्ष्यति—

१ अनित्यत्वात् । २ अभावरूपत्वात् । ३ (६६) कारिकायाम् । ४ व्यक्ताव्यक्तयोः परार्थत्वेन । व्यक्ताव्यक्तं अचेतने कस्यचित्चेन्नस्वार्थाय वर्तते स च चेतन आत्मेत्यादिक्रमेण ।

भ्यस्तत्त्वान्तरम् । तत्त्वान्तरोपादानम् च प्रकृतित्वमिहाभिप्रेतम्, इति न दोषः । सर्वेषां गोघटादीनां स्थूलतेन्द्रियग्राह्यता ॥ ममेति न तत्त्वान्तरम् ॥

अनुभयरूपमाह—“ न प्रकृतिर्न विकृतिः पुरुषः ” इति । एतत् सर्वमुपरिष्ठा-
(२१) अनुभयरूपकवनम् ॥ दुपपादयिष्यते ॥ ३ ॥

तमिममर्थं प्रामाणिकं कर्तुमधिगताः प्रमाणभेदा लक्षणीयाः । न च
(२२) प्रमाणसामा- सामान्यलक्षणमन्तरेण शक्यते विशेषलक्षणम् कर्तुम् ।
न्यलक्षणम् ॥ इति प्रमाणसामान्यं तावत्तुल्यमिति—

२१-१२ दृष्टमनुमानमाप्तवचनं च, सर्वप्रमाणसिद्धत्वात् ।

विविधप्रमाणमिष्टं, प्रमेयसिद्धिः प्रमाणादि ॥ ४ ॥

“ प्रमाणमिष्टम् ” इति । अत्र—“ प्रमाणम् ” इति समाख्या लक्ष्यपदम् ।
तस्मिन्वर्तनं च लक्षणम् । प्रमेयतेऽमेनेति निर्वचनम् ।
(२३) प्रमाणपदस्य— प्रमां प्रति करणत्वमवगम्यते । तद्यासन्दिग्धाविपरीता-
निर्वचनम् ॥ मधिगन्विषया चित्तवृत्तिः । बोधेन परित्यक्तः फलम्
प्रमा, सम्पादनम् प्रमाणमिति । एतेन संशयविपर्य-
यत्पुतिमाधनैवप्रमाणेष्वप्रसङ्गः ॥

संख्याविप्रतिपत्तिं निराकरोति—“ त्रिविधम् ” इति । तिस्रो विधा-
यस्य प्रमाणसामान्यस्य तन् त्रिविधम्, न न्यूनम् ।
(२४) प्रमाणसंख्या ॥ नाप्यधिकमित्यर्थः । विशेषलक्षणान्तरैर्ज्ञानदुपपाद-
यिष्यामः ॥

कतमाः पुनस्तास्मिन्नो विधा इत्यत्र आह—“ दृष्टमनुमानमाप्तवचनम् ”
इति । एतच्च लौकिकप्रमाणाभिप्रायम्, लोकव्युत्पादना-
(२५) प्रमाणत्रय- र्यत्वाच्छास्त्रस्य, तस्यैवाप्राधिकारान् । आपं तु विज्ञानं
परिगणनम् ॥ योगिनामूर्ध्वमेतन्मां न लोकव्युत्पादनायालमिति सदापि
नाभिहितम्, अवधिकारान् ॥

१ नैयायिकानामनुव्यवसायः—घटप्राने “ घटमहं जानामीति ”—पुरुषगतः ।

रपादेतन्—ना भून्मूयन्म्, अधिकं तु कस्माच्च भवति ? मद्भिरन्ते हि प्रति-

(२६) प्रमाण-
सम्बन्धाऽऽधिक्यशास्त्रा,
तत्परिहारश्च ॥

वादिन उपमानादीन्यपि प्रमाणानि, इत्यत आह—
“ सर्वप्रमाणसिद्धत्वात् ” इति । एष्वेव दृष्टानुमानास-
वचनेषु सर्वेषां प्रमाणानां सिद्धत्वात्, अन्तर्भावा
दित्यर्थः । एतच्चोपपादविषयत इत्युक्तम् ॥

अथ प्रमेयमुपादनाय प्रवृत्तं शास्त्रं कस्मान् प्रमाणं सामान्यतो विशेषतश्च-

(२७) प्रमेयवर्ण-
नात् प्रागेव प्रमाण-
निर्वचनस्यावश्यकत्वम् ॥

लक्षयति ? इत्यत आह—“ प्रमेयसिद्धिः प्रमाणाद्धि ”
इति । सिद्धिः प्रतीतिः ॥

(२८) कारिका-
पाठक्रमपरिवर्तनहेतुः ॥

सेयमायां ऽर्थक्रमानुरोधेन पाठक्रममनादर्यैव व्या-
पाठक्रमपरिवर्तनहेतुः ॥ रपाता ॥ ४ ॥

सम्प्रति प्रमाणविशेषलक्षणावसरे प्रत्यक्षस्य सर्वप्रमाणेषु ज्येष्ठत्वात् तदधी-

(२९) प्रमाणाना
विशेषलक्षणम् ॥

नत्वाद्यानुमानादीनाम्, सर्ववादिनामविप्रतिपत्तेश्च,
तदेव तावदलक्षयति—

प्रतिविषयाध्यवसायो दृष्टं, त्रिविधमनुमानमाख्यातम् ।

तल्लिङ्गलिङ्गिपूर्वकम्, आस्त्युतिरासवचनं तु ॥ ५ ॥

“ प्रतिविषयाध्यवसायो दृष्टम् ” इति । अत्र “ दृष्टम् ” इति लक्ष्यनि-
र्देशः, परिशिष्टं तु लक्षणम् । समानात्ममानजातीयव्यवच्छेदो लक्षणार्थः ॥

अवयवार्थस्तु—विषिष्वन्ति, विषयिणमनुबध्नन्ति, स्वेन रूपेण निरूपणीयं
कुर्वन्तीति यावत् = “ विषयाः, ” पृथिव्यादयः सुखा-

(३०) प्रत्यक्ष-
लक्षणावयवार्थः ॥

दयश्चात्मद्रादीनाम् अविषयाः तन्मात्रलक्षणाः योगिना-
मूर्ध्वस्रोतसां च विषयाः । विषयं विषयं प्रति वर्तते
इति प्रतिविषयम्=इन्द्रियम् । वृत्तिश्च सन्निकर्षः ।

अर्धसन्निकृष्टमिन्द्रियमित्यर्थः । तस्मिन् अवयवमायः, तदाश्रित इत्यर्थः ।
अवयवमायश्च बुद्धिव्यापारो ज्ञानम् । उपात्तविषयाणामिन्द्रियाणां वृत्ती

सत्याम्, बुद्धेस्तमोऽभिभवे सति यः सत्त्वसमुद्देकः सोऽध्यवसायः इति ।
वृत्तिरिति ज्ञानमिति चात्वावते । इदं तावत् प्रमाणम्, "अनेन यश्चेतनाशक्त-
रनुग्रहस्तत्फलं प्रमाबोधः ॥

✓ (बुद्धितत्त्वं हि प्राकृतत्वादचेतनम्, इति तदीयोऽध्यवसायोऽप्यचेतनी,
घटादिवत् । एवं बुद्धितत्त्वस्य सुखादयोऽपि परिणाम-

* (३१) ज्ञानानाम- भेदा अचेतनाः । पुरुषस्तु सुखाद्यननुपग्री चेतनः ।
चेतनत्वम् ॥ सोऽयं बुद्धितत्त्ववर्तिना ज्ञानसुखादिना तत्प्रति-
बिम्बितस्तच्छायापरया ज्ञानसुखादिमानिव भवतीति-
चेतनोऽनुगृह्यते । चित्तिच्छायापरयाऽचेतनाऽपि बुद्धिस्तदध्यवसायोऽप्यचेत-
नश्चेतनवद्भवतीति । तथा च वक्ष्यति—

“तस्मात्तत्त्वयोगादचेतनं चेतनावदिव लिङ्गम् ।

गुणकर्तृत्वेऽपि तथा कर्तव्यं भवत्युदासीनः ॥” इति [कारिका. २०].

अप्राध्यवसायग्रहणेन संशयं व्यवच्छिन्नसि, संशयस्यानवस्थितग्रहणेन-
निश्चितरूपत्वान् । निश्चयोऽध्यवसाय इति चानर्थान्तरम् । विषय-

(३२) प्रत्यक्षलक्षणा- ग्रहणेन चासद्विषयं विपर्ययमपाकरोति । प्रतिग्रहणेन
न्तर्गतानां शब्दानां चेन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षसूचनादनुमानस्मृत्यादयश्च पराकृता
व्यावृत्तिः ॥ भवन्ति ॥

तदेवं मनानाममानजातीयव्यवच्छेदकत्वात् “प्रतिविषयाभ्यवसायः” इति

(३३) प्रत्यक्षस्य दृष्टस्य सम्पूर्णं लक्षणम् । तन्ग्रन्थोऽपि लक्षणान्तराणि
पर्यवगति लक्षणम् ॥ तैर्धिकारानां न भूयितानि न दूयितानि, विस्तरभयादिति ॥

नानुमानप्रमाणमिति यदुता लोकायतिकेनाप्रतिपन्नः सन्निध्यो विपर्ययतो
या पुरुषः कथं प्रतिपद्येत ? न च पुरुषान्तरगत

(३४) अनुमानस्य अज्ञानसंदेहविपर्ययाः शक्या अवगृह्णन् प्रत्यक्षेण प्रति-
प्रमाणत्वसाधनम् ॥ पत्तम् । नापि प्रमाणान्तरेण, अनभ्युपगमान् । अनव-

एताज्ञानसंशयविपर्ययस्तु यं कंचन पुराणं प्रति वर्तमानोऽनवधेयवचनतया

प्रेक्षावद्विस्मृतवदुरेक्ष्येत । तदनेनाज्ञानादयः परपुरुषवर्तिनो ऽभिप्रायभेदा-
द्वचनभेदाद्वा लिङ्गादनुमातव्याः, इत्यकामेनाप्यनुमानप्रमाणमभ्युपेयम् ॥

तत्र प्रत्यक्षकार्यत्वात् अनुमानं प्रत्यक्षानन्तरं लक्षणीयम् । तत्रापि,
(३५) अनुमानस्य सामान्यलक्षणम् ॥ सामान्यलक्षणपूर्वकत्वाद्विशेषलक्षणस्यानुमानसामान्यं
सावल्लक्षयति—“ तत् लिङ्गलिङ्गिपूर्वकम् ” इति ।
लिङ्गम् व्याप्यम् । लिङ्गि व्यापकम् । शङ्कितसमारोपि-

तोपाधिनिराकरणेन च स्वभावप्रतिबद्धं व्याप्यम्, येन प्रतिबद्धं तद्व्यापकम् ।
लिङ्गलिङ्गिग्रहणेन विषयवाचिना विषयिणं प्रत्ययमुपलक्षयति । धूमादिध्याप्यो
बह्वराविध्यापक इति यः प्रत्ययस्तत्पूर्वकम् । लिङ्गग्रहणं चायतनीयम् । तेन
च लिङ्गमस्यास्तीति पक्षधर्मताज्ञानमपि वर्णितम्भवति । तद्व्याप्यव्यापकभाव-
पक्षधर्मताज्ञानपूर्वकमनुमानमित्यनुमानसामान्यं लक्षितम् ॥

अनुमानविशेषान् तन्त्रान्तरलक्षितान् अभिमतान् स्मारयति— “ त्रिवि-

(३६) अनुमानस्य विशेषतश्च धननुमानमाख्यातम् ” इति । तत् सामान्यतां
विशेषतश्च धननुमानमाख्यातम् लक्षितमनुमानं विशेषतश्चिद्विधं, पूर्ववत्-शेषवत्-
पूर्ववच्छेषवत्सामान्यतो सामान्यतो दृष्टमेति ॥

तत्र प्रथमं तावत् द्विविधम्-वीतमवीतं च । अश्ववमुखेन प्रवर्तमानं
(३७) वीतावीतरूपेणा- विधायकं वीतम्, व्यतिरेकमुखेन प्रवर्तमानं निषेध-
नुमानस्य द्विविध्यम् ॥ कर्मवीतम् ॥

तत्रावीतं शेषवत् । शिष्यते परिशिष्यते इति शेषः, स एव विषयतया यस्या-
(३८) अवीतनि- स्यनुमानज्ञानस्य तच्छेषवत् । यद्वाहुः—“ प्रत्यक्ष-
रूपम् ॥ प्रतिषेधे, अन्यत्राप्रमत्तात् शिष्यमाणे सम्प्रत्ययः
परिशेष ” इति [चात्स्यायन-न्यायभाष्य १. १. ५.] -

अस्य चावीतस्य व्यतिरेकिण उदाहरणमग्रे ऽभिधास्यते ॥

१. एकेन विभागप्रकारेण अनुमानम् द्विविधमिति भावः । २. अत्राहु राघवा-
नन्दतीर्थः—“ सतां सम्मतिमाह यथाहुरिति-गणत्वान् पृथिव्याश्रयः शब्दः स्यादिति
प्रसक्तस्य शब्दस्य न पृथिवीगुणत्वम्, अपाकजावशेषगुणत्वान्, तद्विशेषगुणेन गन्धेन
च सहावृत्तित्वान् । एवं निषेधे कृत्वा आकाशादन्यत्र भूम्पाद्यदृश्यप्रमत्तात्, शिष्य-
माणे आकाशे एव शब्दस्य गुणत्वेन सम्प्रत्ययः ”- इति ॥

वीतं द्वेधा—पूर्ववत् सामान्यतो दृष्टं च । तत्रैकम् दृष्टस्वलक्षणसामान्यविषयं
यत्तत्पूर्ववत्, पूर्वं प्रसिद्धं, दृष्टस्वलक्षणसामान्यमिति
(३९) वीतनिरूपणम् यावत्, तदस्य विषयत्वेनासयनुमानज्ञानस्येति पूर्व-
-तद्वद्विषयम् ॥ वत् । यथा धूमाद्वह्निवसामान्यविशेषः पर्वते ऽनुमी-
यते, तस्य वह्नित्वसामान्यविशेषस्य स्वलक्षणं
यद्विषयो दृष्टो रसवत्त्वम् । अपरं च वीतं सामान्यतो दृष्टमदृष्टस्वल-
क्षणसामान्यविषयम् । यथेन्द्रियविषयमनुमानम् । अत्र हि रूपादिविज्ञानां
क्रियात्वेन करणवत्त्वमनुमीयते । यद्यपि करणवत्त्वसामान्यस्य छिदादीं धाम्यादि
स्वलक्षणमुपलब्धम्, तथा ऽपि यज्जातीयं रूपादिज्ञाने करणवत्त्वमनुमीयते
सजातीयस्य करणस्य न दृष्टं स्वलक्षणं प्रत्यक्षेण । इन्द्रियजातीयं हि तत्करणम्,
नचेन्द्रियत्वसामान्यस्य स्वलक्षणमिन्द्रियविशेषः प्रत्यक्षगोचरो ऽर्वाग्राह्यम्,
यथा वह्नित्वसामान्यस्य स्वलक्षणं वह्निः । सो ऽयं पूर्ववत्तः सामान्यतो दृष्टा
स्तद्यपि वीतत्वेन तुल्यत्वे विशेषः । अत्र च दृष्टं दर्शनम्, सामान्यत इति
सामान्यस्य, सार्वविभक्तिकस्तत्तिल् । अदृष्टस्वलक्षणस्य सामान्यविशेषस्य
दर्शनम् सामान्यतो दृष्टमनुमानमित्यर्थः । सर्वं चैतदस्माभिर्मर्यादवातिक्रान्तार्थ-
टीकायां ध्युत्पादितमिति नेदोक्तं विस्तरभयात् ॥

प्रयोजकवृद्धशब्दध्वन्यसमनन्तरं प्रयोग्यवृद्धप्रवृत्तिहेतुज्ञानानुमानपूर्वकावा-
(४०) शब्दप्रमाण-
लक्षणम् ॥ च्छब्दार्थसम्बन्धग्रहणस्य, स्वार्थमन्वयग्रहणसदृकारि-
णश्च शब्दस्यार्थप्रत्यायकत्वादनुमानपूर्वकत्वमित्यनुमा-
नानन्तरं शब्दं लक्षयति—“ आसृष्टुतिरासवचनं तु ”
इति । आसृष्टवचनमिति लक्षयनिर्देशः, परिशिष्टं लक्षणम् । आसा प्रासा युक्तेति
यादत् । आसा चासौ श्रुतिश्चेति ‘ आसृष्टुति ’ । श्रुतिः वाक्यजनितं
वाक्यार्थज्ञानम् ॥

तच्च स्वतः प्रमाणम् । अपौरुषेयवेदवाक्यजनितत्वेन सकलदोषात्तद्वावि-
(४१) तस्य स्वतः-
प्रामाण्यम् ॥ निर्मुक्त्युक्तं भवति । एवं वेदमूलस्मृतिव्रतद्व्यामुराण-
वाक्यजनितमपि ज्ञानं युक्तं भवति ॥

आदिविदुषश्च कपिलस्य कल्यादी कल्यान्तराधीतश्रुतिस्मरणसम्भवः, सुप्त-
(४२) कपिलस्य पूर्व- प्रबुद्धस्येव पूर्वैधुरवगतानामर्थानामपरेद्युः । तथा
जन्माधीतश्रुतिस्मरणम्॥ चावयवजगीत्यव्यसंवादे भगवान् जैगीथव्यो दशमहा-
कल्यावर्तिजन्मस्मरणमात्मन उवाच “ दशसु महाकल्पेषु
विररिवर्तमानेन यथा ” इत्यादिना ग्रन्थसन्दर्भेण ॥

आप्तग्रहणेनायुक्ताः शाक्यमिभूनिर्ग्रन्थकर्मसारमोक्षकादीनामागमाभावाः
(४३) आगमाभास- परिहृता भवन्ति । अयुक्तत्वं चैतेषां विगानान्
निरूपणम् ॥ विशिष्टमूलत्वात्प्रमाणाविरुद्धार्थाभिधानाच्च कैश्चिदेव
म्लेच्छादिभिः पुरुषापमदैः पशुप्रायैः परिग्रहाद्बो-
द्धव्यम् ।

‘तु’ शब्देनानुमानाद्यवच्छिन्नत्वं । वाक्यार्थो हि प्रमेयो, न तु तदर्थो
(४४) आप्तश्रुत- वाक्यम्, येन तत्र लिङ्गं भवेत् । न च वाक्यं वाक्यार्थं
मानाद्यवच्छेदः ॥ बोधयत् सम्बन्धग्रहणमपेक्षते, अभिनवकविरचितस्य
वाक्यस्यादृष्टपूर्वस्याननुभूतचरवाक्यार्थबोधकरत्वादिति॥

१. अत्राहुर्भारतीयस्यादयः—“ कथं ‘तु’ शब्देनानुमानाद्यवच्छेद आप्तवचनस्ये-
त्यत आह—‘वाक्यार्थो हि’ इति । नन्वस्तु तावद्वाक्यार्थस्य प्रमेयत्वम्, एतावता
कथमनुमानाद् व्यवच्छेदः स्यात्, शब्दस्य तत्कारणत्वात्, यथा धूमेन लिङ्गेन लिङ्गी
वर्द्धीयते तथा वाक्येन लिङ्गेन शब्दार्थलिङ्गचनुमानं भवेदित्याशङ्क्याह—‘न तु तदर्थम्’
इति । धूमस्य वक्त्रिधर्मत्वान् तल्लिङ्गत्वम्, न तु वाक्यस्य अर्थधर्मत्वम्, येन तल्लिङ्गं
वाक्यं स्यादिति यावत् । ननु यद्यपि धूमाग्निवत् वाक्यवाक्यार्थयोर्धर्मधर्मभावो नास्ति,
तथा अपि यथा धूमोऽग्निना सम्बन्धित्वा सम्बन्धग्रहणापेक्ष एव तद्गमकः, तथा
वाक्यमपि अर्थेन सम्बन्धग्रहणापेक्षमेव तद्बोधकमिति घट्टुह्यामेव प्रमात इति
चेत्तत्राह—“न च” इति । आत्मात्मिकमूत्रे जैमिनिना शब्दार्थयोर्नित्यसम्बन्धे साधितेऽपि
शब्दस्यैव शब्दव्यवहारतः सम्बन्धग्रहणापेक्षस्यैवावबोधकत्वान्, पदार्थपूर्वकत्वात्
वाक्यार्थस्य स्वार्थबोधकत्वे सम्बन्धग्रहणापेक्षा नास्ति । विशिष्टार्थसंप्रत्ययो हि
वाक्यार्थः ” इति । यदि वाक्यार्थत्रयेऽनुमानं स्यात् तर्हि वाक्यवाक्यार्थयोर्व्याप्यव्या-

(४५) शास्त्रान्तरे- एवं प्रमाणमामान्यलक्षणेषु तद्विशेषलक्षणेषु च समु-
क्तप्रमाणान्तराणामुक्तैष्व- यानि प्रमाणान्तराण्युपमानादीनि प्रतिवादिभिर्मनुष्येनै-
न्तर्भावः ॥ तान्युक्तलक्षणेष्वेव प्रमाणेष्वन्तर्भवन्ति ॥

नथा हि-उपमानं तावद्वधा गोस्ताथा गवय इति वाक्यम् । तत्रानिता गोतामस
(४६) उपमानस्य एवं । यो ऽप्ययं गवयशब्दो गोमदशब्दस्य वाचक इति
शब्देऽनुमाने चान्त- प्रत्ययः, सो ऽप्यनुमानमेव । यो हि शब्दो यत्र पूर्वः
र्भावः ॥ प्रयुज्यते, सो ऽस्ति वृत्त्यन्तरे, तस्य वाचकः, यथा
गोमदो गोचस्य । प्रयुज्यते सैवं गवयशब्दो गोसदस्य,
इति तस्यैव वाचकः, इति तत् ज्ञानमनुमानमेव । यत्तु गवयस्य चक्षुःसिद्धिदृश्य
गोमाददृश्यज्ञानं तत् प्रत्यक्षमेव । अत एव स्मर्यमाणायां गवि, गवयसादृश्यज्ञानं
प्रत्यक्षम् । न त्वम्यद्वि सादृश्यमन्यत्र गवये । भूयोऽप्ययवसामान्ययोगो हि
जात्यन्तरवर्ती जात्यन्तरे सादृश्यमुच्यते । सामान्ययोगश्चक्रः । स चैतद्वद्वै-
प्रत्यक्षो, गवयसि तथैति नोपमानस्य प्रमेयान्तरस्मस्ति, यत्र प्रमाणान्तरमुपमाने
भवेत्, इति न प्रमाणान्तरमुपमानम् ॥

पक्षमन्वोऽपेक्षितः स्यात् । न च तथा । तथाहि वाक्यं प्रमाणं वाक्यार्थः प्रमेय ।
एवं च वाक्यं वाक्यार्थस्य धर्मो न भवति-यथा भवति धूमो कक्षैर्धर्मः । अतो वाक्यं
वाक्यार्थस्य लिंगं न भवतीत्याशयः ।

शब्दज्ञानं ये ऽनुमाने ऽन्तर्भावयति तेषां मते-यथा व्यक्तीज्ञानपूर्वकमनुमानं तथैव
शब्दार्थसम्बन्धज्ञानपूर्वकं शब्द ज्ञानम् । तत्र चेत्त्वमनुमानस्वरूपम्-यत्र यत्र घटमान-
येति शब्दः प्रयुज्यते तत्र तत्र घटानयनं बोध्यते-यथा मम बाल्यावस्थायामुच्चरितोऽ-
शब्दः-जघुनाऽपि स एव शब्दः प्रयुज्यते-तस्मादधुनावपि घटानयनमेव बोध्यत
इति ॥ कस्यैव मतस्य परिहारो ऽत्र अन्ये प्रदर्श्यत न च वाक्यमित्यादिना ।
स्याप्यव्यापकसम्बन्धज्ञानं विना ऽनुमानं नैव प्रसरति । शब्दज्ञानं त्वेवंविधशब्दार्थ-
सम्बन्धज्ञानपूर्वकत्वं न सार्वत्रिकम्-अभिनवकविरचितवाक्यस्याश्रुतपूर्वत्वात्तत्र
सादृश्यमपेक्षानस्यासम्भवः । तथा च सति पूर्वज्ञानमतेन तत्र शब्दज्ञानं नैव-
स्यादिति तात्पर्यम् ॥

एवमर्थापत्तिरपि न प्रमाणास्तरम् । तथा हि-जीवितश्चैत्रस्य गृहाभावदर्शनेन बहिर्भावस्यादृष्टस्य कल्पनमर्थापत्तिरभिमतः ।
 (४७) अर्थापत्ते- साऽध्यनुमानमेव । यदा स्वहृद्व्यापकः संशयः नास्ति
 रनुमानेऽन्तर्भावः ॥ तदाऽन्यत्रास्ति । यदाऽव्यापकः एकत्रास्ति तदाऽन्यत्र
 नास्तीति सुकरः स्वशरीरे व्याप्तिग्रहः । तथा च मती गृहाभावदर्शनेन
 बहिर्भावदर्शनमनुमानमेव । न च चैत्रस्य कचित्सत्त्वेन गृहाभावः
 शक्योऽपह्नोतुम्, येनागिदो गृहाभावो बहिर्भावे न हेतुः स्यात् । न च
 गृहाभावेन वा सत्त्वमपह्न्यते, येन भावमेवानुपपद्यमानमात्मानं न
 बहिरवस्थापयेत् । तथा हि-चैत्रस्य गृहासत्त्वेन सत्त्वमात्रं विरच्यते, गृहसत्त्वं
 वा ? न तावद्यत्र कथं सत्त्वस्यास्ति विरोधो गृहसत्त्वेन, भिन्नविषयत्वात् ।
 “ देशसामान्येन ” गृहविशेषक्षेपोऽपि पाक्षिक इति समानविषयतया विरोधः ”
 इति चेत्, न, प्रमाणविनिश्चितस्य गृहेऽसत्त्वस्य पाक्षिकतया सांशयिकेन गृह-
 सत्त्वेन प्रतिक्षेपायोगात् । नापि प्रमाणनिश्चितं गृहाभावः पाक्षिकमस्य गृह-
 सत्त्वं प्रतिक्षिपत् सत्त्वमपि प्रतिक्षेपं सांशयिकत्वं च व्यदनेनमहर्हतीति युक्तम् ।

१. “ देशसामान्यप्रविष्टगृहविशेषमन्वयः समानविषयतया विरोध इति शङ्कते ”
 इति राघवानन्दाः । सत्त्वं हि गृहबहिर्स्थाधारणतया सामान्यप्रवृत्तिं विशेषगृहसत्त्वेन
 विरुद्धमिति शङ्काकृद्भावः । क्वचिदस्तीति कल्पनेन स्वविशेषविनिर्गमनाविरहात्
 गृहाभावोऽपि वाच्यते, गृहस्यापि क्वचित्पदेऽन्तर्भावान्, अतएव गृहसत्त्वेन विरोध
 इति हृदयम् ।

“ देशसामान्येनेति ” सामान्यस्य साधारणधर्मतया तज्ज्ञानस्य संशयहेतुतया
 उर्ध्वस्तरत्पक्षेन स्थानुत्पुण्ड्रवयोरिव गृहबहिर्देशयोराधेयतासम्बन्धेन क्षेत्रे संशये
 गृहत्वावच्छिन्नप्रकारकज्ञानस्य गृहमावृत्तानविरोधितया गृहाभावरूपहेतोर्गानं न
 सम्भवतीत्यभिप्रायः । शब्दार्थस्तु “ देशसामान्येन ” देशसामान्यज्ञानेन, “ गृह-
 विरोधाशेषः ” गृहात्मकविशेषसम्बन्धः, “ पाक्षिकः ” संशयविषयः, “ समानविषय-
 तया ” गृहाभावप्रतियोगितावच्छेदकवच्छिन्नतया, “ विरोधः ” एकसत्त्वेऽपरा-
 रुन्निवयः ।

“ प्रमाणेति ” प्रतियोगितावच्छेदकावच्छिन्नप्रकारकनिश्चयस्यैवाभावधीहेतुतया
 भेदवत् न विरोधितैर्वाभिप्रायः, अत्रार्थस्तु स्पष्टः ।

गृहायच्छिन्नेन चैत्राभावेन गृहसात्वं विरद्धत्वात् प्रतिक्षिप्यते, न तु सादृ-
मात्रम्, तस्य तत्रादार्शन्यात् । नस्माद्गृहाभावेन लिङ्गेन सिद्धेन सतो बहि-
र्भावोऽनुमीयत इति युक्तम् । एतेन 'विरुद्धयोः प्रमाणयोर्विषयव्यवस्थया
'विरोधापादनमर्थापत्तौ विषय' इति निरस्तम्, अवच्छिन्नानवच्छिन्नयोर्विरोधा
भावात् । उदाहरणान्तराणि चार्थापत्तेरेवमेवानुमानेऽन्तर्भावनीयानि । तस्मा
च्चानुमानात्प्रमाणान्तरमर्थापत्तिरिति सिद्धम् ॥

पृथग्भावोऽपि प्रायश्चमेव । न हि भूतलस्य परिणामविदोऽगतं केवलं
लक्षणांशव्यो घट्यभावो नाम । प्रतिक्षणपरिणामिनो हि
(४८) अभावस्य सर्वं पृथग् भावाः, कृते चिन्तिताः । स च परिणामभे-
दप्रत्यक्षेऽन्तर्भावः ॥ ऐन्द्रियक इति नास्ति प्रत्यक्षानवच्छिन्नो विषयो यत्रा
भावाङ्गत्वं प्रमाणान्तरमभ्युपेयेतेति ॥

सम्भवस्तु, यथा-नार्याः श्रेणाटकप्रस्थापकगणः । स चानुमानमेव । गार्या-
(४९) सम्भवस्यानु- हि श्रेणाद्यविनाभूतं प्रतीतम् खायां श्रेणादिमात्र
मानेऽन्तर्भावः ॥ भवगमयति ॥

यत्त्वानिर्दिष्टप्रवक्तृकं प्रवादप्रारम्भ्यमाश्रम्- 'इति होचुर्बुद्धाः,'-इत्ये-
तियम्, यथा 'इह वटे यशः प्रतिवसति' इति,
(५०) ऐन्द्रियस्य न तन् प्रमाणान्तरम्, अनिर्दिष्टप्रवक्तृकत्वेन सांश-
प्रमाणत्वान्नाशः ॥ यिरुधान् । आसवक्तृकत्वेन श्रये त्वाराम एव । इत्यु-
पक्रमम् "त्रिविधप्रमाणम्" इति ॥ ५ ॥

एवं तावद्व्यक्त्याप्यनश्वरलक्षणप्रमेयमिदं च प्रमाणानि लक्षितानि । तत्र व्यक्तं
वृथिव्यादि स्वरूपतः पञ्चमुल्पादको हानिकोऽपि प्राय-
(५१) प्रमाणानां हानः प्रतिपद्यते, पूर्ववत्ता चानुमानेन धूमादिदशनात्
शक्तिनिर्णयः ॥ यद्वादीति चेति, तदुत्पत्त्यादनाय मन्दप्रयोजनं शास्त्रम्
इति दुरधिगममनेन व्युत्पाद्यम् । तत्र यत्प्रमाणं यत्र
शास्त्रम् तदुत्पत्त्यलक्षणेभ्यः प्रमाणेभ्यो निवृत्त्य दशयति—

‘सामान्यतस्तु दृष्टात् अतीन्द्रियाणाम्प्रतीतिरनुमानात् ।

तस्मादपि चासिद्धं परोक्षमाप्तागमात् सिद्धम् ॥ ६ ॥

29-12

—“ सामान्यत ” इति । ‘ तु ’ शब्दः प्रत्यक्षपूर्ववद्ग्राह्यं विनिनष्टि । सामा-

(५२) अतीन्द्रियाणां न्यतो दृष्टादनुमानादतीन्द्रियाणां प्रधानपुरुषादीनां प्रतीतिः—चित्छायापत्तिबुद्धेरध्यवसाय इत्यर्थः । सामान्यतो दृष्टादनुमानात् प्रतीतिः ॥ - उपलक्षणं चैतत्, शेषवदित्यपि द्रष्टव्यम् ॥

तर्हि सर्वेष्वतीन्द्रियेषु सामान्यतो दृष्टमेव प्रवर्तते ? तथा च यत्र तज्जास्ति,

महदाधारभूतमे स्वर्गापूर्वदेवतादीं च, तत्र तेषा-

(५३) सामान्यतो दृष्टादनुमानादसिद्धानामाप्तगमात् सिद्धिः ॥ मभावः प्राप्त इत्यत आह— “ तस्मादपि ” इति । तस्मादित्येतावत्तत्र सिद्धे ‘ च ’ कारणे शेषवदित्यपि समुचितम् ॥ ६ ॥

स्यादेतत्, यथा गगनकुसुममृमंरोमशशविषाणादिषु प्रत्यक्षमप्रवर्तमानम्

(५४) प्रत्यक्षमावात्, तदभावमवगमयति, एवं प्रधानादिष्वपि । तत्कथं प्रधानादीनामभावश्च ॥ तेषां सामान्यतो दृष्टादिभ्यः सिद्धिरित्यत आह—

31-12 अतिदूरात् सामीप्यात् इन्द्रियघातात्मनोऽनवस्थानात् ।

सौम्याद्रवधानान् अभिभवात् समानाभिहाराच्च ॥ ७ ॥

१: यथा कीमुयां तथैवेयं कारिका व्याख्याता गौडपदेनाथ जयमङ्गलायाम् ॥ इदमपरमपि व्याख्यानमुपलभ्यते चन्द्रिकायाम्—‘ सामान्यतः ’ साधारणस्य वस्तु-जातस्य प्रतीतिः ‘ दृष्टात् ’ प्रत्यक्षान् भवति ‘ अतीन्द्रियाणां ’ तु प्रतीतिः ‘ अनुमानात् ’ भवति—‘ तस्मात् ’ अनुमानान् अपि केचित् पदार्थाः प्रत्येनं न शक्याः—तेषां प्रती-तिस्तु ‘ आप्तागमात् ’ सिध्यति—इति ॥

त. की. २ .

“अतिदूरात्” इति । अनुपलब्धिरिति वक्ष्यमाणं सिंहावलोकनत्वावे-
 नानुपजनीयम् । यथा उत्पन्नं विद्यति पतन्त्री अतिदू-
 (५५) तजिरामः, तया, मन्त्रपि, प्रत्यक्षेण नोपलभ्यते । सामीप्यादित्यत्र
 अतिदूरातिमामीप्येन्द्रि- प्यतिरनुवर्तनीयः, यथा लोचनस्थमजनमतिमामीप्या
 यथातमनाऽनवस्थानसौ- दृश्यते । इन्द्रियघातोऽन्धत्ववधिरत्वादिः । “मनोऽन-
 द्यव्यधानाभिवसमा- वस्थानान्,” यथा कामाद्युपहतमनाः स्फीतालोकमुप-
 नाभिहारेभ्यः प्रत्यक्षा- वर्तितमिन्द्रियमन्त्रिकृष्टमर्थं न पश्यति । “मोक्ष्यान्”
 भावः ॥ यथेन्द्रियमन्त्रिकृष्टम् परमाण्वादि प्रणिहितमना अपि न
 पश्यति । “व्यवधानात्,” यथा कुड्यादिव्यवहितं
 राजद्वारादि न पश्यति । “अभिभवात्,” यथा ऽहनि मारीभिर्भांभिरभिभूतं ॥
 नक्षत्रमण्डलं न पश्यति । “समानाभिहारान्,” यथा तोयद्विमुक्तानुद्विन्दू-
 शलाकाये न पश्यति ॥

‘च’ कारोऽनुक्तसमुच्चयार्थः । तेनानुक्तवोऽपि संगृहीतः । तद्य-
 (५६) अनुद्भादपि क्षीराद्यवस्थायां दध्नाद्यनुद्भादं पश्यति ॥
 प्रत्यक्षनिवृत्तिः ॥

पूतदुक्तं भवति । न प्रत्यक्षनिवृत्तिमात्रात्स्वभावो भवति, अतिप्रसङ्गात् ।
 (५७) प्रत्यक्षनिवृत्ति- तथा हि गृहादिनिर्गतो गृहजनमपश्यंस्तदभावं
 रेव नामावस्य कारणम् । विनिश्चिनोति, न त्वेवम् । अपि तु योग्यप्रत्यक्ष-
 अपि तु योग्यप्रत्यक्ष- निवृत्तेरयमभावः विनिश्चिनोति । न च प्रधानपुरा-
 निवृत्तिः ॥ दीनामस्ति प्रत्यक्षयोग्यता, इति न तन्निवृत्तिमात्रा-
 तदभावनिश्चयो युक्तः प्रामाणिकानाम् इति ॥ ७ ॥

कतमपुनरेतेषु कारणे प्रधानादीनामनुपलब्धावित्यत आह—

सौम्यात्तदनुपलब्धिर्नामावात्, कार्यतस्तदुपलब्धेः ।

महदादि तच्च कार्यं प्रकृतिसरूपं विरूपं च ॥ ८ ॥

१. यथा सिद्धः पुरतो गत्वा पश्चात् पश्यति तथा अग्रिमपदस्य यत्र प्राग्गतशब्दः
 सम्बन्धस्तत्रास्य न्यायस्य प्रकृतिरित्यादिकमस्मदीयन्यायलक्षिकाया द्रष्टव्यम् ॥

“मोक्षम्यान्” इति । अथाभावादेव सप्तमस्मद्वदेतेषामनुपलब्धिः कस्मान्न

भयतीत्यत आह— “नाभावात्” इति । कुतः ?

(५८) प्रधानानुप- “कार्यतस्तदुपलब्धेः” इति । ‘तत्’ इति प्रधानं परा-
लब्धौ मोक्ष्यम् कार- मृशति । पुरोपलब्धौ तु प्रमाणं वक्ष्यति, “सद्वा-
णम् ॥ तपरार्थत्वात्” (कारिका १७) इति । दृढतरप्रमाणा-
यधारिते हि प्रत्यक्षमप्रवर्तमानमयोग्यत्वात् प्रवर्तने

इति कथ्यते । सप्तमस्तु रसो न प्रमाणेनावधारित इति न तत्र प्रत्यक्षत्वा-
योग्यता शक्या ऽप्यधमिनुमित्यभिप्रायः ॥

किं पुनस्तत्कार्यं यतः प्रधानानुमानमित्यत आह— “महदादि तच्च कार्यम्”

इति । एतच्च यथा गमकम् तथोपरिष्ठादुपपादयिष्यते ।

(५९) प्रधानादिन- तस्य च कार्यस्य विवेकज्ञानोपयोगिनी सारूप्यधैरूप्ये
त्वसाधनकारणभूतम- आह— “प्रकृतिसरूपं विरूपं च” इति । एते
हृदादिकार्यम् ॥ नूपरिष्ठादिभजनीये इति ॥ ८ ॥

कार्यान् कारयमात्रं गम्यते । सन्ति चात्र चादिनां विप्रतिपत्तयः । तथा हि

केचिदाहुः, ‘असतः सन् जायते’ इति, ‘एकस्य

(६०) कार्यकारणस- सतो विवर्तः कार्यजनं न वस्तु सन्’ इत्यपरे, अन्ये
स्वल्पे वादिविप्रतिपत्तयः ॥ तु ‘सतः असन् जायते’ इति, ‘सतः सन् जायते’
इति वृद्धाः ॥

तत्र पूर्वस्मिन् कंठप्रत्ये प्रधानं न विध्यति । सुखदुःखमौडभेदव्याम्वरूप-

परिणामशब्दाद्यात्मकं हि जगत् कारणस्य प्रधानस्य

(६१) सत्कार्यस- प्रधानत्वं सत्त्वरजस्तमस्त्वभावत्वमवगमयति । यदि

एव प्रधानास्ति त्वमप्रकृतः ॥ पुनरसतः सज्जायेत अमक्षिरपात्त्यं कारणं सुखादिरूप-

शब्दाद्यात्मकं कथं स्यात्, सद्यस्ततोस्त्वाद्याग्यानुपपत्तेः ?

अदेवस्य सतो विवर्तः शब्दादिप्रपञ्चः, तथा ऽपि सतः सज्जायत इति न

स्यात् । न चास्याद्वयस्य प्रपञ्चात्मन्यवम्, अपि त्वप्रपञ्चस्य प्रपञ्चात्मकतया

प्रतीतिर्धेम एव । येषामपि कर्मप्रज्ञाक्षरणादीनां सत एव कारणादसतो

जन्म तेरामपि सद्यस्तोरेक्यद्वानुपपत्तेर्न कार्यात्मकं कारणमिति न तन्मते

प्रधानमिद्विः

(१२) सत्कार्यप्रति- भेतः प्रधानसिद्ध्यर्थं प्रथमं तावत्सत्कार्यं प्रति-
पादनम् ॥ जन्तीते—

११५ असदकरणादुपादानग्रहणात् सर्वसंभवाभावात् । ३१/१३

शक्तस्य शक्यकरणात्, कारणभावाच्च सत् कार्यम् ॥ ९ ॥

“ असदकरणात् ” इति । “ सत् कार्यम् ”—कारणव्यापारात् प्रागपीति

(६३) बाँडसिद्धान्त-
निरासः ॥

शेषः । तथा च न सिद्धसाधनं नैयायिकतन्त्रसङ्गा-
धनीयम् । यद्यपि बीजमृत्पिण्डादिप्रध्वंसानन्तरमदु-
घटादुत्पत्तिरुपलभ्यते, तथाऽपि न प्रध्वंसस्य कारण-

त्वम्, अपि तु भावस्यैव बीजाद्यवयवस्य । अभावात्
मायोपत्तौ, तस्य सर्वत्र सुलभत्वात्, सर्वदा स्ववर्कषोत्पादप्रसङ्ग इत्यादि
न्यायवार्तिकनाम्पर्यटीकायामस्माभिः प्रतिपादितम् ॥

(६४) वेदान्तमत- प्रपञ्चप्रत्ययश्चासति बाधके न शक्यो मिथ्येति वदितुम्
निरासः ॥ इति ॥

कणभक्षाक्षधरणमतमवशिष्यते । तत्रेदं प्रतिज्ञातम्, “ सत् कार्यम् ”

इति । अत्र हेतुमाह “ असदकरणात् ” इति । असत्

(६५) न्यायमतनिरासः । केन कारणव्यापारात् पूर्वं कार्यम्, नास्य सर्वं कर्तुं
असतः करणायमत्वात् केनापि शक्यम्, नहि नीलं शिल्पिर्महत्वेणापि पीतं कर्तुं
सत् कार्यमिति प्रथमो शक्यते । ‘ सदसत्त्वे घटस्य धर्मः ’ इति चेन्, तर्था
हेतुः (१) ॥ . उप्यसति धर्मिणि न तस्य धर्म इति सर्वं तदवस्थमेव ।

तथा च नासत्त्वम्, असम्बन्धेनातदात्मना चासत्त्वेन
कथमसन् घटः ? तस्मात् कारणव्यापारादूर्ध्वमिव ततः प्रागपि सदेव कार्यमिति ।
कारणाच्चास्य सतोऽभिव्यक्तिरेवावशिष्यते । सतश्चाभिव्यक्तिरुपपन्ना, यथा
पीठेन तिलेषु तैलस्यावघातेन घान्तेषु तण्डुलानां दोहनेन सारमेयीषु पथमः ।

१. धर्मिणि (घटे) नासत्त्वम् (घटस्य धर्मः) ॥ “ असत्त्वं घटे संबद्धं
तदात्मकं भवति न तत्र ? आद्ये असदात्मकस्य घटस्य असत्त्वं धर्मो न स्यात् ।
सम्यग्धस्य तदात्मकस्य घटसोपपत्त्यात् सत्त्वं स्यात् घटस्येति सर्वं तदवस्थमेव ।
द्वितीयं प्रत्याह—“ असम्बन्धेन ” इति, तस्यासत्त्वेऽभ्युपगम्यमानेऽतिप्रसङ्गः
स्यादित्युभयथाऽपि सर्वं घटस्येति ” भारतीयत्वादयः ॥

अननः करणे ॥ न निदर्शनं किञ्चिदस्ति । न सर्वविविच्यज्यमानं चोपपद्यमानं वा चचिदमदृष्टम् ॥

इतश्च कारणव्यापरात् प्राक् सदेव - कार्यम्—“ उपादानग्रहणान् ” ।

(६६) कार्यकारण- उपादानानि कारणानि, तेषां ग्रहणं, कार्येण सम्यग्धः ।
सम्बन्धाच्च सत्कार्यमिति उपादानैः कार्यस्य सम्बन्धादिति यावत् । एतदुक्तं
विर्भावो ह्युक्तः (२) ॥ भवति—कार्येण सम्यग्धं कारणम् कार्यस्य जनकम्,
सम्बन्धश्च कार्यस्यास्तनो न सम्भवति, तस्मादिति ॥

स्यादेतन्—असम्बन्धमेव कार्यं कारणः कस्मात् ज्ञेयते ? तथा चासद्देवो-

(६७) कार्यकारण- एतस्यत इत्यत आह—“ सर्वसम्भवाभावात् ” इति ।
योर्नियतसम्बन्धाभावे असम्बन्धस्य ज्ञेयत्वे, असम्बन्धस्याविशेषेण सर्वं
सर्वकार्यकारणभाव- कार्यजातं सर्वस्माज्जयेत् । न चेत्तदस्ति, तस्मात्प्रा-
विश्ववसतिः ॥ त्सम्बद्धमसम्बद्धेन ज्ञेयते अपि तु सम्बद्धं सम्बद्धेन
ज्ञेयत इति । यथाहुः सान्नेयवृद्धाः—

“ अमत्वे नास्ति सम्बन्धः कारणैः सर्ववसक्तिभिः ।

असम्बद्धस्य चोत्पत्तिमिच्छतो न स्थपस्थितिः ” इति ॥

स्यादेतन्—असम्बद्धमपि सन् तदेव करोति यत्र यन् कारणं शक्तम् । शक्तिश्च
कार्यदर्शनादवगम्यते । तेन माध्यमस्थेत्यत आह

(६८) कारणशक्तेः “ शक्तस्य शक्यकरणात् ” इति । सा शक्तिः शक्त-
कारणाश्रया सर्वत्र वा स्यात्, शक्ये एष वा ? सर्वत्र
(२) ॥ चेत्तद्वत्स्थैवात्म्यवस्था, शक्ये चेत्, कथममस्ति शक्ये तत्र,
इति यत्कथ्यम् । शक्तिभेद एव एतादृशो यतः

किञ्चिदेव कार्यं जनयेत् न सर्वमिति चेत्, इन्न भोः शक्तिविशेषः कार्यसम्बद्धो
वा असम्बद्धो वा ? सम्बद्धत्वे नामता सम्बन्धः इति सन् कार्यम् । असम्बद्धत्वे
संवाच्यवस्था, इति सुष्टु “ शक्तस्य शक्यकरणात् ” इति ॥

इतश्च सन् कार्यमित्याह—“ कारणभावात् ” । कार्यस्य कारणारम-

(६९) कारणारमकत्वान् कथान् । नहि कारणाद्विषयं कार्यम्, कारणं च सन्,
कार्यस्य सन् कार्यम् (४) ॥ इति कथं तद्विहितं कार्यममन भवेत् ॥

कार्यस्य कारणाभेदसाधनानि च प्रमाणानि—(१) न पटस्तन्तुभ्यो भिद्यते,
 तन्तुधर्मत्वान् । इह यत् यतो भिद्यते तत् तस्य धर्मो
 (७०) कार्यकारणा- न भवति, यथा गौरश्वस्य । धर्मश्च पटस्तन्तूनां, तस्मा-
 भेदसाधनानि ॥ धार्थान्तरम् । (२) उपाशनोपादेयभावाच्च नार्था-
 स्तरत्वं तन्तुपटयोः । ययोरर्थान्तरत्वम् न तयोरपा-
 शनोपादेयभावः, यथा घटपटयोः । उपाशनोपादेयभावश्च तन्तुपटयोः ।
 तस्माद्धारथान्तरत्वम् । (३) इतश्च नार्थान्तरत्वं तन्तुपटयोः, संयोगाग्रास-
 भावात् । अर्थान्तरत्वे हि संयोगो दृष्टो यथा कुण्डवद्वरयोः, अग्रासिवां यथा
 हिमवद्विन्ध्ययोः । न चेह संयोगाग्रासी, तस्माद्धारथान्तरत्वमिति । (४)
 इतश्च पटस्तन्तुभ्यो न भिद्यते, गुरुत्वान्तरकार्याग्रहणात् । इह यत् यस्मान्निष्पन्नम्,
 तत् तस्मात् तस्य गुरुत्वान्तरं कार्यं गृह्यते, यथैकपलिकस्य स्वस्तिकस्य
 गुरुत्वकार्यो ऽद्यननिविष्टोपमत्स्मादद्विपलिकस्य स्वस्तिकस्य गुरुत्वकार्यो ऽद्यननि-
 भेदो ऽधिकः । न च तथा तन्तुगुरुत्वकार्यात् पटगुरुत्वकार्यान्तरं दृश्यते ।
 तस्मादभिन्नस्तन्तुभ्यः पट इति । तान्येनाप्यभेदसाधनान्येकीकृतानि ॥

पृथग्भेदे मिदं, तन्तव्यं एव तेन तेन संस्थानभेदेन परिणताः पटो, न
 तन्तुभ्यो ऽर्थान्तरं पटः । स्वात्मनि क्रियाविरोधसंभ-
 (७१) कार्यकारण- न्यद्विध्यपदेशार्थक्रियाभेदाच्च नैकान्तिकं भेदं साध-
 योर्भेदान् कारणभिर- यिषुमर्हन्ति, एकस्मिन्नपि तत्तद्विशेषाविभाषतिरोभावा-
 णामभेद एव कार्यम् । भ्यामेतेषामविरोधात्, यथा हि कूर्मस्याङ्गानि कूर्म-
 तन्मते विरोधादिपरि- शरीरे निविष्टमानानि तिरोभवन्ति, निःसरन्ति चावि-
 हारः ॥ र्भवन्ति । न तु कूर्मस्तदङ्गान्युत्पद्यन्ते प्रच्यंसन्ते वा ।

पृथग्भेदस्या मृदः सुवर्णस्य वा घटमुकुटादयो विशेषाः

निःसरन्त आविर्भवन्त उत्पद्यन्त द्रव्युच्यन्ते, निविष्टमानानि तिरोभवन्ति विन-
 द्यन्तीत्युच्यन्ते । पुनरसतामुत्पादः सतां वा निरोधः । यथाह भगवाद्
 कुण्डपयनः—

१. व्यतिरेकानुमानानि । २. स्वात्मनि उत्पत्तिविनाशलक्षणविशदक्रिया, उह
 तन्तुपु पट इति । अत्र तन्तुपटयोः सम्बन्धस्य ज्ञान भासने तादृशी चोक्तिर्भवति ।
 ३. पृथग्भेदः, श्रवणार्थक्रियाभेदश्च ।

“ नासनो विद्यते भावो नाभावो विद्यते सतः ” इति । (भगवद्गीता, २।१६)

यथा कर्मः स्वावयवेभ्यः सङ्कोचविक्रामिभ्यो न भिन्नः, एवं घटमुकुटादयो ऽपि मूलमुवर्गादिभ्यो न भिन्नाः । एवंमेव तन्तुषु पट इति व्यपदेशो, यथेह वने तिलका^१ इत्युपपन्नः । न चार्थक्रियाभेदो ऽपि भेदमापादयति, एकस्यापि नामार्थ-क्रियादर्शनात् । यथैक एव वह्निर्द्राहकः पाचकः प्रकाशकश्चेति । नाप्यर्थक्रियाव्यवस्था वस्तुभेदे हेतुः, तेषामेव समस्तव्यवस्थानामर्थक्रियाव्यवस्थादर्शनात् । यथा प्रत्येकं त्रिष्टयो वस्तेर्दर्शनलक्षणामर्थक्रियां कुर्वन्ति, न तु क्षितिकावहनम् । मिलिताम्बु क्षितिकामुदहन्ति, एवं तन्तवः प्रत्येकं प्रावरणमुकुर्वाणा अपि मिलिता आविर्भूतपटभावाः प्रावरिष्यन्ति ॥

स्यात्रेतन्—आविर्भावः पटस्य कारणव्यापारान् प्राक् सन् भवन् वा ? अमंशेन प्राप्तं तन्मदुत्पादनम् । अथ सन्, कृतं तर्हि कारणव्यापारेण । नहि (७२) कर्मस्य कारणपरिणामविशेषत्वे कारणव्यापारस्याप्रयोजकत्व-मनवस्थापतिश्च ॥ अविर्भावोऽविर्भावान्नरकस्यनेऽनवस्थाप्रसङ्गः । तस्मादाविर्भूतपटभावाम्बन्तवः त्रियन्त इति रिक्तं वचः ॥

मैवम् । अथाप्यदुत्पद्यत इति मते केयममदुत्पत्तिः ? मनी, असती (७३) तत्परिहारः । उक्तं वा ? मनी चेत्, कृतं तर्हि कारणैः । असती चेत्, दोषस्योभयमते तुल्यत्वम् ॥ तस्या अप्युत्पत्त्यन्तरमित्यनवस्था^२ ॥

अथ^३—‘ उत्पत्तिः पटास्त्रायांस्तरम्, अपि तु पट एवार्मा ’, तथा ऽपि यावदुक्तं भवति ‘ पट ’ इति तावदुक्तं भवति (७४) पटनदुत्पत्त्योरैक्य-‘ उत्पद्यते ’ इति । ततश्च ‘ पट ’ इत्युक्ते, ‘ उत्पद्यते ’ शङ्का-निराकरणार्थः ॥ इति न वाच्यम्, पौनरुक्त्यात् । ‘ वित्तस्यति ’ इत्यपि न वाच्यम्, उत्पत्तिविनाशयोर्गुणपदेकत्र विरोधान् ॥

१. तिलकवृक्षमयवनविषये यथा “ इह वने तिलका ” इति सङ्गच्छते तथा तन्तुमयपटेऽप्येति । २. एवं च घटादुदुक्ताविनो दोषः समान एव पशद्वयः । ततश्च दैवेनापरम्पत्युद्भावनीय इति । यथाहुर्मैत्रेयप्रकाराः—स्वपशद्वयोपेति— । ३. उक्तानवस्थापलक्षणद्वेयपरिजिहीर्ष्या पटोत्पत्त्योरैक्यं शङ्कते “ पट एवार्मा ” ततश्च नानवस्थेर्न दोषः ॥ तर्हि पर्यायशब्दवेत्ताविन्यामिमेव परिहरन्ति च ।

तस्मादियं पटोत्पत्तिः स्वकारणसमवायोवा, स्वसत्तासमवायो वा, उभयोऽपि नोत्पद्यते, अथ च तदर्थानि कारणानि व्यापार्यन्ते ।
 (७५) पटोत्पत्तिं सत्या- एवं सत्तु पटदेराविर्भावस्य कारणपरिक्षेपपक्षम् ॥
 मपि कारणव्यापारो- न च पटरूपेण कारणानां सम्यग्धः, तद्रूपस्याक्रिया-
 वेशा ॥ र्त्वात्, क्रियासम्यन्वितत्वाच्च कारणानाम्, अन्यथा
 कारणात्वाभावात् ॥

(७६) कारिकोप- तस्मात् सत् कार्यमिति पुष्कलम् ॥ १ ॥
 संहारः ॥

१. पटोत्पत्तिं सत्यामपि कारणव्यापारस्य प्रयोजनमित्यभिप्रेत्याह—‘तस्मात्’ इति । न्यायमते ऽपि पटोत्पत्तिः स्वकारणभूततन्तुभिर्युतसिद्धा, स्वसत्तामन्विता युतसिद्धा वा भवितुमर्हति । उभययोऽपि तु कारणव्यापारमन्तरेण न पटोत्पत्तिरुत्पद्यते । न चाभिव्यक्तैरपि जन्यत्वे सत्कार्यबाधो ऽनवस्था चेत्यादि वाच्यम् । व्यवहारोपयोगितत्तत्कार्योभिव्यक्तेस्तत्तत्कार्यनिष्ठमत्वगुणरूपतया निरयत्वे ऽपि तमस प्रतिबद्धत्वाच्च व्यवहारोपयोगित्वम् । अभिव्यक्तकसामग्र्या तु तमसः प्रतिबन्धः । उत्तमकस्याप्युत्तेजनमात्रार्थकाराच्च सत्कार्यबाधः । कार्यकारणयोर्भेदेऽपि व्यवहारक्षमता कार्यात्मनाभिव्यक्तस्यैव ज्ञान्यया इत्यादि चन्द्रिकायां स्पष्टम् ॥ “उपसंहारोति ‘तस्मादिति’ इत्यनुत्पत्तेरङ्गीकारे ऽनवस्थापमत्तेनानुत्पत्त्याः अप्युत्पत्तेः कारणव्यापारोपक्षितवदस्मन्मते ऽपि सत् एव घटस्याविर्भावस्य कारणव्यापारोपक्षा । पटोत्पत्तिमङ्गीकुर्वन्नेन घटे कारणव्यापारोपक्षित्वस्य प्रयोज्यत्वरूपस्यैवादर्शयितव्याऽऽविर्भावे एव तदङ्गीकारमात्रेण निर्वाहे कृतमुत्पत्त्यङ्गीकारेण, युक्तं चेत्तत्, अन्योत्पत्तिवादे च कार्यस्यैव कारणगोपक्षतया तस्य च क्रियात्कभावे क्रियासम्यन्वित्वप्रयुक्तकारकत्वाकारणत्वव्यवहारानुपपत्तेः सत्त्वर्थवाद एव साधीयानित्याशयः” इति केचित् । २. न्यायमते कारणस्य सत्त्वयाः सकलस्य समवायस्य नित्यत्वादित्याशयः । “नोत्पद्यते”, अपि तु आविर्भावत्येवेति शेषः । ३. भवन्मतेऽपीति शेषः ॥ ४. ननु ‘अस्मत्पक्षे-घटरूपाणि कारणानि कुर्वन्ति’ इति सदुक्तिस्त्वत्पक्षबाधिका’ इति चेत्, उच्यते = न च” इति । तद्रूपं चानित्यमेवेति भवति तस्योत्पत्तिरिति हृदयम् ।

तदेवं प्रधानसाधनानुगुणं सन् कार्यमुपपाद्य यादृशं तत् प्रधानं साधनीयं
(७७) व्यक्ताव्यक्तसारूप्यवरूप्ये ॥ तादृशमादर्शयितुं विवेकज्ञानोपयोगिनो व्यक्ताव्यक्तसारूप्यवरूप्ये तावदाह—

३०१ हेतुमदनित्यमव्यापि सक्रियमनेकमाश्रितं लिङ्गम् ।

सावयवं परतन्त्रं व्यक्तं, विपरीतमव्यक्तम् ॥ १० ॥

(७८) व्यक्तानां सारूप्यम् । तत्र हेतुम- “हेतुमत्” इति । व्यक्तं हेतुमत्, हेतुः कारणम्, तद्वत्, यस्य च यो हेतुः तमुपरिष्ठाद्वक्ष्यति ॥

(७९) अनित्यत्वम् ॥ (२) “अनित्यम्,” विनाशि, तिरोभावीति यावत् ॥

“अव्यापि”, सर्वं परिणामिनं न व्याप्नोति । कारणेन हि कार्यमाविष्टम्, (८०) अव्यापित्वम् ॥ (३) न कार्येण कारणम् । न च बुद्ध्यादयः प्रधानं वैवि- पत्तीत्यव्यापकाः ॥

“सक्रियम्”, परिस्पन्दवन्^१ । यथा हि बुद्ध्यादयः उपात्तमुपात्तं कैहं (८१) सक्रियत्वम् ॥ (४) त्यजन्ति देहान्तरं चोपादत्त, इति तेषां परिस्पन्दः । शरीरपृथिव्यादीनां च परिस्पन्दः प्रसिद्ध एव ।

“अनेकम्”, प्रतिपुष्टं बुद्ध्यादीनां भेदान् पृथिव्याद्यपि शरीरघटा- (८२) अनेकत्वम् ॥ (५) दिभेदेनानेकमेव^२ ॥

“आश्रितम्”, स्वकारणमाश्रितम् । बुद्ध्यादिकार्याणामभेदेऽपि कथं- (८३) आश्रितत्वम् ॥ (६) शिन्नेदविवक्षयाऽऽश्रयाध्विभावः, यथेह वने तिलका इत्युक्तम् ॥

“लिङ्गम्^३” प्रधानस्य । यथा चैते बुद्ध्यादयः प्रधानस्य लिङ्गम् तथो- (८४) लिङ्गत्वम् ॥ (७) परिष्ठाद्वक्ष्यति । प्रधानं तु न प्रधानस्य लिङ्गम् पुरापस्य लिङ्गमभवदपीति भावः ॥

१. ‘सक्रियम्’ अप्यवरायादिरूपनियतक्रियाशरीरकमेति भाष्ये । २. अथवा रगभेदेन भिन्नम् । ३. ‘लिङ्गयानि’ अनुमानेन भोक्तारं ज्ञापयतीति लिङ्गम् ।

“सावयम्” अवयवावयवविसंयोगसंयोगि । अथवा अवयवनम्^१ अवयव-
 अवयवानामवयवविनां मिश्रः संश्लेषो मिश्रणम् संश्ले-
 (८५) सावयव- इति यावत् । अप्राप्तिपूर्विका प्राप्तिः संयोगः । तेन
 त्वम् ॥ (८) सह वर्तत इति सावयवम् । तथाहि पृथिव्यादय-
 परस्परं संयुज्यन्ते, एवमन्येऽपि । न तु प्रधानस्य
 बुद्ध्यादिभिः संयोगः, तादात्म्यात् । नापि सत्त्वरजस्तमसां परस्परं संयोग-
 अप्राप्तेरभावात् ॥

“परतन्त्रम्” बुद्ध्यादि । बुद्ध्या स्वकार्ये ऽहङ्कारे जनयितव्ये प्रकृत्या
 पूरो ऽपेक्ष्यते, अन्यथा क्षीणा सती मालमहङ्कारं
 (८६) परतन्त्र- जनयितुमिति स्थितिः । पूर्वमहङ्कारादिभिरपि स्वकार्यं
 त्वम् ॥ (९) जनने । इति सर्वः स्वकार्येषु प्रकृत्या पूरमपेक्षते । तेन
 परां प्रकृतिमपेक्षमाणं कारणमपि स्वकार्यजनने परतन्त्र-
 व्यक्तम् ॥

“विपरीतमन्तकम्”—व्यक्तम् । अहेतुमश्रित्यं व्यापि निष्क्रियम्, [यद्यप्य-
 (८७) अव्यक्तस्य ध्यक्तस्यास्ति परिणामलक्षणा क्रिया तथा ऽपि परि-
 विपरीतम् ॥ स्वप्नो नास्ति ॥] एकमनाधितमलिङ्गमनवद्यद-
 स्वतन्त्रमन्तकम् ॥ १० ॥

(८८) व्यक्ताव्यक्तयो- तदनेन प्रबन्धेन व्यक्ताव्यक्तयोर्विधर्म्यमुक्तम्
 स्थापयित्वा पुनराद्य तयोर्विधर्म्यम् ॥ सप्रति तयोः साधर्म्यम्, पुरापाद्य वैधर्म्यम्, आह-

त्रिगुणमविवेकि त्रिपयः सामान्यमचेतनमप्रसवधमि ।

व्यक्तं, तथा प्रधानम्, तद्विपरीतस्तथा च पुमान् ॥ ११ ॥

(८९) त्रिगुणत्वम् “त्रिगुणम्” इति । त्रयो गुणाः सुखदुःखमोहा
 प्रथमम् साधर्म्यम् ॥ अत्येति त्रिगुणम् । तदनेन सुखादीनामात्मगुणत्वम्
 (९) वैराग्यमिममपाकृतम् ।

“अविचेकि” । यथा प्रधानं न स्वतो विविच्यते, एवमहदादयो ऽपि न प्रधानान् विविच्यन्ते, तदात्मकत्वात् । अथ वा (९०) अविवेकित्वम् उग्राविवेकिता । न हि क्रिञ्चिदेकं पर्याप्तम् स्वरूपे, अपि तु सम्भूय । तत्र नैकस्मात् यस्य कस्यचिन् केनचित्सम्भव इति ॥

ये' स्वाहुः—‘विज्ञानमेव हर्षविषादमोहशब्दाद्यात्मकम्, न पुनरितो ऽन्यस्तदमो' इति—तान् मत्याह—“विषय” इति । (९१) विषयत्वम् सा- ‘विषयो’ ग्राह्यः, विज्ञानाद्वहिरिति यावन् । अत एव “सामान्यम्” साधारणम्, अनेकैः पुरुषैर्गृहीत-मित्यर्थः । विज्ञानाकारत्वे तु, असाधारण्याद्विज्ञानानां वृत्तिरूपाणां, ते ऽप्यसाधारणाः स्युः । विज्ञानं परेण न गृह्यते परबुद्धेरप्रत्यक्षत्वादित्यभिप्रायः । तथा च नतंकी-भूखतामज्ञे एकस्मिन् बहुना प्रतिसम्भानं पुनरुक्तम् । अन्यथा' तत्र स्यान् इति भावः ॥

(९२) अचेतनत्वम् “अचेतनम्” । सर्व एव प्रधानबुद्ध्यादयो ऽचेतनाः, न तु वैनाशिकवत् चैतन्यबुद्धेरित्यर्थः ॥

“प्रमवधमि” । प्रसवरूपो धर्मो यः सो ऽस्यास्तीति प्रमवधमि । [प्रसवधमेति वक्तव्ये अर्थवर्धयः प्रमवधर्मस्य निश्च-योगमाग्यातुम्] । स्वरूपविरूपपरिणामाभ्यां न कदा-चिदपि विपुन्यत इत्यर्थः ॥

(९४) उक्तव्यक्तधर्मा- व्यक्तवृत्तमव्यक्ते ऽनिदिशति, “तथा प्रधानम्” णामव्यक्ते ऽतिदेशः ॥ इति । यथा व्यक्तं तथा अव्यक्तमित्यर्थः ॥

(९५) व्यक्ताव्यक्तयोः . ताभ्यां वैधर्म्यं पुरुषत्वा ऽऽह—“तद्विपरीतः पुरुषात् वैधर्म्यम् ॥ पुमान्” इति ॥

* १. विज्ञानवादिनो बाँदाः । २. तेषां विज्ञानाकारत्वे । ३. त्रिगुणादि-साधर्म्यं व्यक्ताव्यक्तयोरिति यावन् ।

स्यादितत्-अहेतुमत्त्वनित्यत्वादि प्रधानसाधर्म्यमस्ति पुरुषस्य, एवमेव
 कत्वं व्यक्तसाधर्म्यम्, तत्कथमुच्यते 'तद्विपरि-
 (१६) साधर्म्यं च ॥ पुमान्' इति? अत आह-"तथा च" इति।
 'अकारोऽप्यर्थः' । यत्तत्प्राप्तेतुमप्यादिकं साधर्म्यं
 'तत्प्राप्यमैगुण्यादि वैपरीत्यमसंशयेत्यर्थः ॥ ११ ॥

अिगुणमित्युक्तम्, तत्र के ते त्रयो गुणाः, किं च तदुपलक्षणमित्य-
 (१७) गुणनिरूपणम् ॥ अह—

प्रीत्यप्रीतिविषादात्मकाः प्रकाशप्रवृत्तिनियमार्थाः ॥ ३॥

अन्योन्याभिनिर्वाययजननमित्युतवृत्तयश्च गुणाः ॥ १२ ॥

"गुणाः" [वार्थाः] "स्वत्वं लघु प्रकाशकम्" [कारिका ११]
 (१८) गुणानां स्वरू- इत्यत्र निर्देह्यन्ते । तदनागतविषयेन तन्प्रयुक्त्या ॥
 पाणि, मुक्तदुःखायोः पर- प्रीत्यादीनां यथार्थत्वं वेदितव्यम् ॥
 पराभावस्वरूपतामुदासथा ॥

एतदुक्तं भवति-प्रीतिः सुखम्, प्रीत्यात्मकः स्वयगुणः; अप्रीतिर्दुःखम्, अप्री-
 त्यात्मको रजोगुणः; विषादो मोहः, विषादात्मक-
 (१९) रजोगुणः- इत्यर्थः । ये तु मन्यन्ते "त प्रीतिर्दुःखानां
 भवत्यर्थः ॥ आदितिरिच्यते, एवं तु स्वमपि न प्रीत्यभावादन्यदिति,"
 तान् प्रति "आत्म"-ग्रहणम् । नेतरेतराभावा-
 मुपादयः, अपि तु भावाः, आत्मशब्दस्य भाववचनत्वात् । प्रीतिः आत्मा
 भावो येषां ते प्रीत्यात्मानः । एवमन्यदपि व्याख्येयम् । भावरूपता येषामनु-
 भवमिदा । परस्परताभावात्तत्रे तु परस्परताभवात्तत्रेकस्याप्यसिद्धेरतन्मा-
 मिदिरिति भावः ॥

१, च=अपि । २, आर्जवशब्दादीनां प्रीत्यान्तर्भावः, द्वेषयोर्द्वेषप्रत्ययमभ्यादीनां
 अप्रीत्यान्तर्भावः ।

स्वरूपमेवामुक्त्वा प्रयोजनमाह— “ प्रकाशप्रवृत्तिनियमार्थाः ” इति ।
 १००) गुणानां प्रयो- अत्रापि यथासंख्यमेव । रजः प्रवर्तकत्वात् सर्वत्र लघु
 तम्-यथासंख्यं प्रकाश- सत्त्वं प्रवर्तयेत्, यदि तमसा गुण्या न नियम्येत ।
 त्वृत्तिनियमरूपम् ॥ तमोनियतन्तु कचिदेव प्रवर्तयतीति भवति तमो
 नियमार्थम् ॥

प्रयोजनमुक्त्वा क्रियामाह—“ अन्योन्याभिभवध्वजननमिधुनवृत्तयश्च ”
 इति । वृत्तिः क्रिया, सा च प्रत्येकमभिमन्यध्यते ।
 (१०१) गुणानां क्रियाः, ‘ अन्योन्याभिभववृत्तयः ’ । एवामन्यतमेनार्थवत्तादु-
 अन्योन्याभिभव-अन्यो- द्भूतेनान्यदभिभूयते । तथा हि सत्त्वं रजस्तमसो
 न्यापेक्षा-अन्योन्यापेक्ष- अभिभूय शान्तामात्मनो वृत्तिं प्रतिलभते, एवं रजः
 जनन-अन्योन्यमिधुन- सत्त्वतमसो अभिभूय घोराम्, एवं तमः सत्त्वरजसो
 वृत्तिरूपाः ॥ अभिभूय मृडामिति । ‘ अन्योन्याध्वजवृत्तयः ’ ।

यद्यप्याध्वजवृत्तयः नात्यमर्षो घटते, तथा ऽपि
 यदपेक्षया यस्य क्रियाः स तस्याध्वजः । तथा हि, सत्त्वं प्रवृत्तिनियमावधिस्त
 रजस्तमसोः प्रकाशेनोपकरोति, रजः प्रकाशनियमावधिस्त प्रवृत्त्येतयोः, तमः
 प्रकाशप्रवृत्ती आध्वजस्त नियमेनेतरयोरिति । ‘ अन्योन्यजननवृत्तयः ’ ।
 अन्यतमो ऽन्यतममपेक्ष्य जनयति । जननं च परिणामः, स च गुणानां
 सदृशरूपः । अत एव न हेतुमत्त्वम्, तत्त्वान्तरस्य, हेतोरसम्भवात्, नाप्य-
 निरपेक्षम्, तत्त्वान्तरे लयाभावात् । ‘ अन्योन्यमिधुनवृत्तयः ’ । अन्योन्य-
 सदृशताः, अविनाभाववृत्तय इति यावत् । ‘ च ’ समुच्चये । भवति चाग्रागमः—

“ अन्योन्यमिधुनाः सर्वे सर्वे सर्वत्रगाग्निनः ।

रजसो मिधुने सत्त्वं सत्त्वस्य मिधुने रजः ॥

तमस्यप्रापि मिधुने ते सत्त्वरजसो उभे ।

उभयोः सत्त्वरजसोर्मिधुने तम उच्यते ॥

नैषामादिः सम्प्रयोगो विद्योगो बोधलभ्यते ” ॥ इति देवी-

भागवत-३।८. ॥ १२ ॥

“ प्रकाशप्रवृत्तिनियमायाः ” इत्युक्तम्, तत्र के ॥ इत्यभ्यूताः कुतश्चेत्य-
(१०२) - गुणत्रयनिरूप- आह—
णम्, तेषां पृथक्स्वभावश्चा।

४०१ सत्त्वं लघु प्रकाशकमिष्टमुपष्टम्भकं चलं च रजः ।

गुरु धरणकमेव तमः, प्रदीपवच्चार्थतो वृत्तिः ॥ १३ ॥

“ सत्त्वम् ” इति । सत्त्वमेव लघु प्रकाशकमिष्टम्-सांख्याचार्यैः । त-

(१०३) सत्त्वगुणस्व- कार्योद्गमने हेतुर्धर्मो लाघवम् गौरवमतिद्वन्द्वि एतं
भावः-लाघवम्, प्रका- ओरुर्ध्वज्वलनं भवति, तदेव लाघवम् कस्यचित्ते
शक्तम् ॥ गमने हेतुर्भवति, यथा वायोः । एवं करणाना वृत्ति
पदुत्पत्तेर्लाघवम्, गुरुत्वे हि मन्दानि स्थिति
सत्त्वस्य प्रकाशात्मकत्वमुक्तम् ॥

सत्त्वतममी स्वयमक्रियतया स्वकार्यप्रवृत्तिं प्रत्यवसीदन्ती रजसोपष्टम्भे

(१०४) रजोगुणस्व- अवमादति प्रच्यव्य स्वकार्यं उरमाहं प्रयत्नं कार्ये।
भावः-उपष्टम्भकत्वम्, तदिदमुक्तम्-“ उपष्टम्भकं रजः ” इति । कस्त-
चलत्वम् ॥ दित्यत उक्तम्-“ चलम् ” इति । तद्वत्त्वेन रजस-
प्रवृत्त्यर्थत्वं दर्शितम् ॥

रजस्तु चलतया परितल्लेगुण्यं चालयेत्, गुरुणा ऽऽवृण्यता च तमसा तत्र

(१०५) तमोगुणस्व- तत्र प्रवृत्तिप्रतिबन्धकेन कचिदेव प्रवर्त्यते इति त-
भावः-गुरुत्वम् आवर- स्ततो म्यावृत्त्या तमो नियामकमुक्तम्-“ गु-
कत्वम् ॥ धरणकमेव तमः ” इति । एवंकारः प्रत्येकं भिन्नज-
मव्यव्यते, सत्त्वमेव, रज एव, तम एवेति ॥

ननु ‘ एते परस्परविरोधशील्य गुणाः सुन्दोऽसुन्दवत् परस्परं ध्वंस्त

(१०६) परस्परविरो- इत्येव युक्तम्, ‘ प्रागेव त्वेतेषामेकक्रियाकर्तृता ’-इत्यत-
भावः-गुरुत्वम् आवर- आह-“ प्रदीपवच्चार्थतो वृत्तिः ” इति । दृष्टे-
कत्वम् ॥ चेतन्, यथा चार्त्तले अनलविरोधिनी, अथ मित्रे
वशान् सहर्तित्वम् ॥ सहानलेन रूपप्रकाशलक्षणं कार्यं कुरतः; तथा च घात

पित्तलेष्माणः परस्परविरोधिनः शरीरधारणलक्षणकार्य-

१. अर्थावभासकमिति यावत् ॥ २. प्रकाशकत्वमिति यावत् । ३. इ-
एव । या तथा परस्परसंघटनानामेकक्रियाकर्तृताया इति भावः ।

कारिणः; एवं सत्त्वरजस्तमांसि मिथोबिरुद्धान्यप्यनुवत्स्यन्ति स्वकार्यं करिष्यन्ति च । “ अर्थत ” इति पुरुषार्थत इति यावत्, यथा च वक्ष्यति—

“ पुरुषार्थं एव हेतुर्न केनचित् कार्यते करणम् ” इति ॥ [कारिका ३१]

अत्र च सुखदुःखमोहाः परस्परविरोधिनाः स्वस्वानुस्वाणि सुखदुःखमोहा-
सकान्येव निमित्तानि^१ कल्पयन्ति । तेषां च परस्पर-

(१०७) सुखदुःख- मग्नमान्याभिभावकमावाप्तानात्वम् । तद्यथा एकैव मोहानां परस्परविरुद्धत्वा- स्त्री रूपयौवनकुलशोलसम्पन्ना स्वामिनं मुग्धाकरोति; तस्या निमित्तरूपेण शुण- तत्कस्य हेतोः? स्वामिनं प्रति तस्या. सुखरूपसमु- द्रयस्या ऽऽवश्यकत्वम् ॥ ज्ञेयम् । सैव स्त्री मपत्नीर्दुःखाकरोति; तत् कस्य हेतोः? नाः प्रति तस्याः दुःखरूपसमुद्भवात् । एवं पुरुषान्तरं तामविन्दमानं सैव मोहयति; तत् कस्य हेतोः? तम्प्रति तस्याः मोहरूपसमुद्भवात् । अनया च स्त्रिया सर्वं भावा व्याख्याताः । तत्र यत् सुखहेतुः तत् सुखारमकम् सखम्, यत् दुःखहेतुः तत् दुःखात्मकं रजः, यन्मोहहेतुस्तन्मोहात्मकं नमः । सुखप्रकाशलाघवानां खेकस्मिन् सुगपशुद्भूता- धविरोधः, महदर्शनात् । तस्मात्^२ सुखदुःखमोहैरिव विरोधिभिः अविरोधि- भिरैकैकगुणवृत्तिभिः सुखप्रकाशलाघवर्न निमित्तभेदा उच्यन्ते । एवं दुःखो- पष्टम्भकवप्रवर्तकत्वैः, एवं मोहगुरुत्वावरणैः—इति मिदं त्रैगुण्यमिति ॥ १३ ॥

स्यादेतत्—अनुभूयमानेषु पृथिव्यादिष्वनुभवमिदाः भवन्वविवेकित्वाद्यः ।

(१०८) अनुभवमि- ये पुनः सत्त्वाद्यो नानुभवपथमधिरोहन्ति तेषां द्वेषु सत्त्वादिष्वविवेकि- कृतस्यमविवेकित्वम्, विषयत्वमचेतनत्वम् प्रमथ- त्वादिगुणसम्भयशङ्का ॥ मिदं च? इत्यत आह—

१. सत्त्वरजस्तमोहाणि । २. सत्त्वरजस्तमांसीव सुखदुःखमोहानाम्, सुखप्रकाशलाघवानामपि भिन्नानि निमित्तानि कस्मान्नोक्तानां त्याशङ्क्या ऽह— “ मुजोति ” । ३. यथा सुखदुःखमोहाः परस्परविरुद्धाः भिन्नानि निमित्तानि सत्त्वरजस्तमोहाणि कल्पयन्ति—न तथा सुखप्रकाशलाघवादीनामेकैकगुणवृत्तिष्वे कर्थाद्विरोधोऽस्ति, येन भिन्नानि निमित्तानि कल्पेरन् इति भावः । अविरोधिनामपि भिन्ननिमित्तकल्पने ऽनवग्याऽपि ॥

अविवेक्यादेः सिद्धिर्त्रैगुण्याच्च द्विपर्ययाभावात् ।

कारणगुणात्मकत्वात्कार्यस्याव्यक्तमपि सिद्धम् ॥ १४ ॥

“ अविवेक्यादेः ” इति । अविवेकित्वमविवेकि-यथा ‘ द्वेकयोर्द्विवचने कवचने ’ [पाणिनि सूत्र. १।४।२२] इत्यत्र द्वित्वं

(१०९) तन्निरासः- कत्वयोरिति अभ्यधा द्वेकेन्द्रित्येति स्यात् । कुतः पुनरत्रैगुणत्रयाविवेकित्वादेः सिद्धिरित्यत आह-“ त्रैगुण्यात् ” इति । नान्यव्यतिरेकाः ॥ सुखदुःखमोहारम्भकं तत्तद्विवेकित्वादियोगि यथेष्टम्

भूयमानं व्यक्तम्-इति स्फुटत्वात्स्वयो व्यतिरेकमाह-“ तद्विपर्ययाभावात् ” इति । अविवेक्यादिविपर्यये पुनर्त्रैगुण्याभावात् । अथ वा व्यक्ताव्यक्तं पक्षीकृत्यान्वयाभावेनावीतः । हेतुत्रैगुण्यादिनि वक्तव्यः ॥

स्यादेतन्-अव्यक्तसिद्धौ तस्यां तस्याविवेकित्वादयो धर्माः ।

अव्यक्तमेव स्वकारणं न सिध्यति,

(११०) अव्यक्तसाधनम्-इति सिद्धिरत आह-“ कारणगुणात्मकत्वात् ” इति । अयमभिसन्धिः-कार्यं हि कारणगुणात्मकं दृष्टम्,

तन्त्वाद्विगुणात्मकं पटादि । तथा

कार्येण सुखदुःखमोहस्येण स्वकारणगतसुखदुःखमोहारम्भना भवितव्यम् । तथा च ताकारणं सुखदुःखमोहारम्भकं प्रधानमव्यक्तं सिद्धम् भवति ॥ १४ ॥

स्यादेतन्-‘ व्यक्तात् व्यक्तमुत्पद्यते ’ इति कणभक्षाक्षिचरणतनयाः ॥ ११

(१११) व्यक्तादेव साधनम्-इति व्यक्तः, तन्त्रैगुणादिप्रत्ययेण पृथिव्यादि सर्वकार्यकारणमात्रोपपत्त्यर्थं कार्यव्यक्तमारभ्यते । पृथिव्यादिषु च कारणगुणक्रमेण रूपाद्युत्पत्तिः । चोत्पत्तेः कृतमदृष्टपरेणाव्यक्तेनेत्यत आह-

१. मत्वाद्योऽ विवेकित्वादियोगिनः त्रैगुण्यात् सुखदुःखमोहारम्भकत्वादिति स्वरूपमनुमानस्य । २. पृथिव्यादि । ३. ‘ यत्राविवेकित्वाभावात्स्वतन्त्रं त्रैगुण्याभावस्यैव रूपम् ।

स्यादेतन्-शक्तितः प्रवृत्तिः कारणकार्यविभागाविभागौ च महत् एव परमा-
व्यक्तत्वं साधयिष्यत, कृतं ततः परेणाव्यक्तेनेत्यत आह-
(११४) महदादिपर्य- “परिमाणान्” इति । परिमितत्वात्, अव्यापित्वा-
न्तस्य कार्यनातस्य दिति यावत् । विवादाध्यासिता महदादिभेदा अव्य-
परिमितत्वाच्चेति तृती- षकारणवन्तः, परिमितत्वात्, घटादिवत् । घटादयो
यम् (३) ॥ हि परिमिता सृष्टाव्यव्यक्तकारणका दृष्टा । उक्तमेतदध्या-
कार्यस्याव्यक्तायस्या कारणमेवेति, यन्महत् कारण-
तत् परमाव्यक्तम्, ततः परतराव्यक्तकल्पनायाः प्रमाणाभावात्^१ ॥

इतश्च विवादाध्यासिता भेदा अव्यक्तकारणवन्तः — “समन्वयान्”^२ ।
भिन्नानां समानरूपता समन्वयः । मुखदुःखमोहस-
(११४) समन्वयाच्चेति मन्विता हि बुद्ध्यादयो ऽव्यवसायादिलक्षणाः प्रती-
चतुर्थम् (४) ॥ यस्ते । यानि च यदुपसमनुगतानि तानि तत्स्वभावा-
व्यक्तकारणानि, यथा सृष्टेर्मपिण्डसमनुगता य-
सृष्ट्यादयो सृष्टेर्मपिण्डाव्यक्तकारणका इति—कारणमस्त्यव्यक्त भेदानामिति
मिदम् ॥ १५ ॥

अव्यक्तं साधयित्वा अस्य प्रवृत्तिप्रकारमाह—

5.1 कारणमस्त्यव्यक्तम्, प्रवर्तते त्रिगुणतः समुदयाच्च ।
परिणामतः सलिलवत् प्रतिप्रतिगुणाधयचिंशपात् ॥ १६ ॥
“प्रवर्तते त्रिगुणतः” इति । प्रतिसर्गावस्थायाः सत्त्वं रजस्तमश्च सत्त्वं
परिणामानि भवन्ति । परिणामस्वभावा हि गुणा नाप-
(११६) प्रवृत्तौ च गुणतः प्रवृत्तिः प्रथमा-
गुणतः प्रवृत्तिः प्रथमा- तथा रजो रजारूपतया तमस्मामोरूपतया प्रतिस्पर्गा-
(१) ॥ यस्यायामपि प्रवर्तते । तदिदमुक्तम् “त्रिगुणतः”
इति ॥

प्रवृत्त्यन्तरमाह—“समुद्रयाच” इति । समेत्य उदयः ‘समुद्रयः’ सम-
वायः । समुद्रयश्च गुणानाम् ॥ गुणप्रधानभावमन्तरेण
(११७) प्रवृत्तेस्तमु- सम्भवति, न च गुणप्रधानभावो वैषम्यं विना, न च
दयान् प्रवृत्तिर्द्वितीया वैषम्यमुपमर्दोपमर्दकभावाहते । इति महदादिभावेन
(२) ॥ प्रवृत्तिर्द्वितीया ॥

स्यादेतन्—कथमेकरूपाणां गुणानामनेकरूपा प्रवृत्तिरित्यत आह—“परिणा-
मनः सलिलवन्” इति । यथा हि वारिद्विमुक्तमुद-
(११८) प्रवृत्तेः प्रवृत्तिः कमेकरूपमपि तत्तद्भूयिकारानासाद्य नारिकेलतालता-
परिणामतो नानाप्रकाराः ॥ लीबिल्वचिरदिल्वतिन्दुकामलकप्राचीनामलककपिस्थ-
कटरमत्तया परिणमन्नपुरामल्लवणतिलकपायकद्रुतया
विकल्प्यते, एवमेकैकगुणममुद्रयान् प्रधानगुणाः परिणामभेदान् प्रवर्तयन्ति ।
तद्विद्वमुक्तम्—“अतिप्रतिगुणाश्रयविशेषात्” । एकैकगुणाश्रयेण यो विशेष-
स्त्वस्मादित्यर्थः ॥ ११९ ॥

ये तु तीष्टिका अभ्यक्तं वा महान्तं वा ऽहङ्कारं वा इन्द्रियाणि वा भूतानि
(११९) पुरुषारित्व- वा ऽऽज्ञानमभिमन्यमानास्तान्येवौपासते तान्
साधनम् ॥ प्रत्याह—

संघातपरार्थत्वात् त्रिगुणादिविपर्ययादधिष्ठानात् ।

पुरुषो ऽस्ति शोक्तृभावात्कैवल्यार्थं प्रवृत्तेश्च ॥ १७ ॥

“संघातपरार्थत्वात्” इति । पुरुषो ऽस्ति, अभ्यक्तादेर्व्येतिरिक्तः । कुतः ?

“संघातपरार्थत्वात्” । अभ्यक्तमहदहङ्कारादयः

(१२०) संघातानां परार्थाः, संघातत्वात्, शयनासनाभ्यन्तादिवत्,
परार्थत्वादिति प्रथम- मुखदुःखमोहात्मकतया ऽव्यक्तादयः सर्वे
साधनम् (१) ॥ संघाताः ॥

१ यदर्थः सङ्घाताः सोऽत्रिगुणविकल्पादियोग्यवश्यं स्यात् । ॥ च पुरुष एव ।

स्यादेतन्-शयनांमनादयः संघाताः संहतशरीरायां दृष्टाः, ॥ त्वात्मानम-
व्यक्ताद्यतिरिक्तं प्रति परार्थाः । तस्मात् संघातान्तरमेव
(१२१) संघातानां परं गमयेयुः, त त्वसंहतात्मानम् इत्यत आह—
संघातान्तरार्थत्वे ऽनव- “त्रिगुणादिविपर्ययात्” इति । अयमभिप्रायः—
स्या त्रिगुणादिविपर्य- संघातान्तरार्थत्वे हि तस्यापि संघातत्वात् तेनापि
यश्च ॥ संघातान्तरार्थेन भवितव्यम्; एवं तेन तेनेत्यनवस्था

स्यात् । न च व्यवस्थायां सत्यामनवस्था युक्ता,
कल्पनागौरवप्रसङ्गान् । न च ‘प्रमाणबलेन कल्पनागौरवमपि मृष्यत’ इति
युक्तम्, संहतत्वस्य पारार्थ्यमात्रेणान्वयात् । दृष्टान्तदृष्टसर्वधर्मानुरोधेन त्वनु-
मानमिच्छतः मर्यानुमानोच्छेदप्रसङ्ग इत्युपपादितं न्यायवार्तिकतात्पर्यटीका-
यामस्माभिः । तस्मादनवस्थाभिधा ऽस्यासंघातत्वमिच्छता ऽत्रिगुणत्वं त्रिवेकि-
त्वमविपर्ययत्वमसामान्यत्वं चेन्नत्यमप्रसवधर्मित्वञ्चाभ्युपेयम् । त्रिगुणत्वादयो हि
धर्माः संहतत्वेन व्याप्ताः । तत्संहतत्वमस्मिन् परे व्यावर्तमानं त्रैगुण्यदि
व्यावर्तयति, प्राह्मणत्वमिव व्यावर्तमानं कठत्वादिकम् । तस्मादाशय्येण
‘त्रिगुणादिविपर्ययात्’ इति यद्वृत्ता ऽसंहतः परां विवक्षितः, स चास्मेति
सिद्धम् ॥

इतश्च परः पुरुषो ऽस्ति—“अधिष्ठानात्”, त्रिगुणात्मकानामधिष्ठीयमान-
(१२२) त्रिगुणात्मका- त्वात् । यद्यस्तुल्यदुःखमोहात्मकं तत्सर्वं परेणाधिष्ठीय-
नामधिष्ठीयमानत्वादिति मानं दृष्टम्, यथा रथादिवेन्द्रादिभिः । सुखदुःख-
द्वितीयं साधनम् (२) ॥ मोहात्मकं चेद् बुद्ध्यादि, तस्मादेतदपि परेणाधिष्ठा-
तव्यम् । न च परस्त्रैगुण्यादन्य आत्मेति ॥

इतश्चामि पुरुषो—“भोक्तृभावात्” । भोक्तृभावेन भोग्ये सुखदुःखे उप-
(१२३) भोक्तृभावा- लक्षयति । भोग्ये हि सुखदुःखे अनुकूलप्रतिकूलवेदनीये
दिति तृतीयम् (३) ॥ प्रत्यात्ममनुभूयेते । तेनानयोरनुकूलनीयेन प्रतिकूलनीयेन
च केनचिदप्यन्येन भवितव्यम् । ॥ चानुकूलनीयाः
प्रतिकूलनीया वा बुद्ध्यादयः, तेषां सुखदुःखाद्यात्मक-

१. सुखदुःखादयो भोगाः । अतो भोक्त्रे पुरुषे सुखदुःखाद्यात्मकव्यव-
गम्यवन्ति । तस्मान् पुरुषे त्रैगुण्यविपर्ययः ॥

त्वेन स्वात्मनि धृतिविरोधात् । तस्मात् यो ऽमुन्वाद्यात्मा सो ऽनुकूलनीयः
प्रतिकूलनीयो वा, ॥ वा ऽऽत्मेति ॥

अन्ये त्वाहुः—भोक्त्या दद्याद् बुद्ध्यादयः । न च द्रष्टारमन्तरेण दृश्यता युक्ता
(१२४) भोक्तृभावा-
दिक्ष्य द्रष्टृभावादि-
त्यर्थो ऽपि सम्भवति ॥
तेषाम् । तस्मादस्ति द्रष्टा दृश्यबुद्ध्याद्यतिरिक्तः, स
वा ऽऽत्मेति । भोक्तृभावात् द्रष्टृभावात्, दृश्येन
द्रष्टुरनुमानादित्यर्थः । दृश्यत्वं च बुद्ध्यादीनां मुखा-
द्यात्मकतया पृथिव्यादिवचनमितम् ॥

इतश्चास्ति पुरुष इत्याह—“कैवल्यार्थं प्रवृत्तेश्च” इति । शास्त्राणां महर्षीणां
दिव्यलोचनानां च कैवल्यमाश्रयन्ति कुरुः सत्रयप्रशमलक्षणं
(१२५) शास्त्राणां कैव-
ल्यार्थं प्रवृत्तेरिति चतुर्थं
साधनम्—(४) ॥
न बुद्ध्यादीनां सम्भवति । ते हि बुःशाद्यात्मकाः कथं
स्वभावाद्भियोऽश्रयिन् शस्यन्ते । सत्तिरिक्तस्य स्वतन्त्रा-
त्मनस्ततो वियोगः शक्यसम्भवादः, तस्मात् कैवल्यार्थं
प्रवृत्तेरागमानां महाधिषां चास्ति बुद्ध्यादिभ्यतिरिक्त
आत्मेति सिद्धम् ॥ १७ ॥

तदेवं पुरुषास्तिष्ठं प्रतिपाद्य, स किं सर्वशरीरेष्वेकः किमैकः प्रतिक्षेत्रमिति
(१२६) पुरुषबहुत्व-
साधनानि ॥ संशये, तस्य प्रतिक्षेत्रमनेकत्वमुपपादयति—

जननमरणकरणानां प्रतिनियमादयुगपत्प्रवृत्तेश्च ।

५०।

पुरुषबहुत्वं सिद्धं त्रैगुण्यविपर्ययाच्चेव ॥ १८ ॥

अननेत्यादिना । “पुरुषबहुत्वं सिद्धम्” । कस्मात्? “जननमरण-
करणानां प्रतिनियमात्” । निकायविशिष्टाभिरपूर्वा-
(१२७) जन्ममरण-
प्रतिनियमादिति प्रव-
मम् (१) ॥
भिर्देहेन्द्रियमनो ऽहङ्कारबुद्धिवेदनाभिः पुरुषस्याभि-
सम्बन्धो जन्म, न तु पुरुषस्य परिणामः, तस्यापरि-
णामित्वात् । तेषामेव च देहादीनामुपात्तानां परित्यागो
भरणम्, नत्वात्मनो विनाशः, तस्य कूटस्थनिरवस्थान् ।
करणानि बुद्ध्यादीनि त्रयोदश । तेषां जन्ममरणकरणानां प्रतिनियमो व्यवस्था ।

सा गत्वियं सर्वशरीरेष्वेकस्मिन् पुरुषे नोपपद्यते । तदा खल्वेकस्मिन् पुरुषे जायमाने सर्वं जायेतन्, श्रियमावे च श्रियेतन्, अन्धादौ चैकस्मिन् सर्वं एव अन्धादयो, विचित्ते चैकस्मिन् सर्वं एव विचित्ताः स्युरित्यवस्था स्यात् । प्रतिक्षेत्रं तु पुरुषभेदे भवति व्यवस्था । ॥ च 'एकस्यापि पुरुषस्य देहोपादान-भेदाद्व्यवस्था' इति युक्तम्, पाणिनिनाद्युपाधिभेदेनापि जन्ममरणव्यवस्था-प्रसङ्गात् । न हि पञ्चा घृत्णे, जाते वा मनादौ महत्यवयवे युवतिर्मृता जाता वा भवतीति ॥

इतश्च प्रतिक्षेत्रं पुरुषभेद इत्याह—“अयुगपत्प्रवृत्तेश्च” इति । प्रवृत्तिः प्रयत्नलक्षणा यद्यप्यन्तःकरणवर्तिनी, तथा अपि (१२८) पुरुषाणाम-पुरुषे उपचर्यते । तथा च तस्मिन्नेकत्र शरीरे प्रयत्न-युगपत्प्रवृत्तेरिति द्वितीयम् (२) ॥ माने, स एव सर्वशरीरेष्वेक इति सर्वत्र प्रपतेत्, ततश्च सर्वान्येष्वेव शरीराणि युगपच्छालयेत् । नानात्वे तु नायं दोष इति ॥

इतश्च पुरुषभेद इत्याह—“त्रिगुण्यविपर्ययाच्च” इति । एवकारो भिन्नक्रमः ‘सिद्धम्’ इत्यस्यानन्तरं द्रष्टव्यः, सिद्धमेव नासिद्धम् । (१२९) त्रिगुण्यविपर्य-त्रयो गुणार्थगुण्यम्, तस्य विपर्ययोऽभ्यधात्वम् । यादिनि तृतीयम् (३) ॥ केचिद्वल्लु सत्त्वनिकायाः सत्त्वबहुलाः, यथोर्ध्वलो-तसः; केचिद्रजोबहुलाः, यथा मनुष्याः; केचित्तमो-बहुलाः, यथा तिर्यग्योनयः । सोऽयमाहशब्दत्रिगुण्यविपर्ययोऽभ्यधात्मावस्थेऽसत्त्वनिकायेषु न भवेत् यद्येकः पुरुषः स्यात्, पुरुषभेदे त्वयमदोष इति ॥ १८ ॥

(१३०) पुरुषधर्मोः ॥ एवं पुरुषबहुत्वं प्रसाध्य विवेकज्ञानोपयोगितया तस्य धर्मानाह—

तस्माच्च विपर्यासात्सिद्धं साक्षित्वमस्य पुरुषस्य ।

किं त्वस्यमाध्यस्थ्यं द्रष्टुमर्हमावध ॥ १९ ॥

“तस्माच्च” इति । ‘च’ शब्दः पुरुषस्य बहुत्वेन सह धर्मान्तराणि ससुच्चिनोति । ‘विपर्यासादस्मान्’ इत्युक्ते त्रैगुण्य-
(१३१) तस्मात्पदस्य विपर्ययादित्यनन्तरोक्तं सम्बध्येत; अतस्तन्निरासाय
सम्बन्धप्रदर्शनम् ॥ ‘तस्मात्’ इत्युक्तम् । अनन्तरोक्तं हिं सन्निधानादि-
दमो विषयो, विप्रकृष्टं च तद्, इति विप्रकृष्टं त्रिगुण-
मविवेकीत्यादि सम्बध्यते ॥

तस्मात्त्रिगुणादेर्यो विपर्यासः स पुरुषस्यात्रिगुणत्वं विवेकिरवमविषयत्वम-
साधारणत्वं चेतनत्वमप्रसवधर्मित्वञ्च । तत्र चेतनत्वेना-
(१३२) अत्रैगुण्यादेः विषयत्वेन च साक्षिरवद्रष्टृत्वे दर्शिते । चेतनो हि
पुरुषस्य साक्षित्वम् द्रष्टा भवति, नाचेतनः; साक्षी च दर्शितविषयो भवति,
द्रष्टृत्वं च ॥ यस्मिन् प्रदर्श्यते विषयः स साक्षी, तया हि लोके-
ऽधिप्रत्यधिर्ना विवादविषयं साक्षिणे दर्शयतः, एवं
प्रकृतिरपि स्वचरितं विषयं पुरुषाय दर्शयतीति पुरुषः साक्षी, न चाचेतनो
विषयो वा शक्यो विषयं दर्शयिषुम्, इति चतुर्ग्यादविषयत्वाच्च भवति
साक्षी । अत एव द्रष्टा ऽपि भवति ॥

अत्रैगुण्याद्यास्य कैवल्यम् । आत्यन्तिको दुःखत्रयाभावः कैवल्यम् । तच्च
(१३३) कैवल्यम् ॥ तस्य स्वाभाविकादेवात्रैगुण्यात् सुखदुःखमोहरहि-
तत्वात्सिद्धम् ॥

अत एवात्रैगुण्यान्माध्यस्थ्यम् । सुखी हि सुखेन तृप्यन् दुःखी हि दुःखं
(१३४) माध्यस्थ्यम्, द्विषन् मध्यस्थो न भवति । तदुभयरहितस्तु
मध्यस्थ इत्युदासीन इति चाख्यायते । विवेकिरवा-
दप्रसवधर्मित्वाच्चाकर्तृति सिद्धम् ॥ १९ ॥

स्यादेतन्-प्रमाणेन कर्तव्यमर्थमवगम्य ‘चेतनोऽहं चिकीर्षन् करोमि’ इति
(१३५) चेतन्यकर्तृ- कृतिचेतन्ययोः सामानाधिकरण्यमनुभवसिद्धम्; तदे-
त्वयोर्येवधिकरण्यापत्ति- तस्मिन्मते नावकस्यते, चेतनस्याकर्तृत्वात् कर्तुंश्चाचेत-
नज्ञा ॥ न्यान् इत्यत आह—

सा खल्वियं सर्वशरीरेष्वेकस्मिन् पुरुषे नोपपद्यते । तद्वा खल्वेकस्मिन् पुरुषे जायमाने सर्वं जायेरन्, म्रियमाने च म्रियेरन्, अन्धादौ चैकस्मिन् सर्वं एव अन्धादयो, विचित्रे चैकस्मिन् सर्वं एव विचित्राः स्युरित्यव्यवस्था स्यात् । प्रतिक्षेत्रं तु पुरुषभेदे भवति व्यवस्था । न च 'एकस्यापि पुरुषस्य देहोपादान-भेदाद्व्यवस्था' इति युक्तम्, पाणिमलानुपाधिभेदेनापि जन्ममरणादिव्यवस्था-प्रमद्धान् । न हि पार्णा वृक्षे, जाते वा मृनादौ महस्यवयवे युवतिर्मृता जाता वा भवतीति ॥

इतश्च प्रतिक्षेत्रं पुरुषभेद इत्याह—“अयुगपत्प्रवृत्तेश्च” इति । प्रवृत्तिः प्रयत्नलक्षणा यद्यप्यन्तःकरणवर्तिनी, तथा ऽपि (१२८) पुरुषाणाम-युगपत्प्रवृत्तिरिति द्वितीयम् (२) ॥
पुरुषे उपचर्यते । तथा च तस्मिन्नेकत्र शरीरे प्रयत्नमाने, स एव सर्वशरीरेष्वेक इति सर्वत्र प्रयतेत, ततश्च सर्वाण्येव शरीराणि युगपच्छालयेत् । नानात्वे तु नायं दोष इति ॥

इतश्च पुरुषभेद इत्याह—“त्रैगुण्यविपर्ययाच्च” इति । एषकारो भिन्नकर्मः 'सिद्धम्' इत्यस्यानन्तरं द्रष्टव्यं; सिद्धमेव नासिद्धम् । (१२९) त्रैगुण्यविपर्ययो गुणान्नैगुण्यम्, तस्य विपर्ययो ऽन्यथात्वम् । यादिति तृतीयम् (३) ॥ केचित्तु सत्त्वनिकायाः सत्त्वबहुलाः, ययोर्ष्वसौ-तमः; केचिद्रजोबहुलाः, यथा मनुष्याः; केचित्तमो-बहुलाः, यथा तिर्यग्योनयः । मां ऽयमोऽश्वैर्गुण्यविपर्ययो ऽन्यथाभावात्तेषु सत्त्वनिकायेषु न भवेन् यथेकः पुरुषः स्यात्, पुरुषभेदेस्त्वयमदोष इति ॥ १८ ॥

(१३०) पुरुषार्थाः ॥ एवं पुरुषबहुत्वं प्रमाप्य त्रिवेकज्ञानोपयोगिताया तस्य धर्मानाह—

नस्माच्च त्रिपर्यासान्सिद्धं साधिन्यमस्य पुरुषस्य ।

त्रैवत्यममाध्यस्थ्यं द्रष्टव्यमकर्तृभावश्च ॥ १९ ॥

“तस्माच्च” इति । ‘च’ शब्दः पुरुषस्य बहुत्वेन सह धर्मान्तराणि समुच्चिनोति । ‘विपर्यामादस्मात्’ इत्युक्ते त्रैगुण्य-
(१३१) तस्मात्पदस्य विपर्ययादित्यनन्तरोक्तं सम्बध्येत; अतस्माद्विरासाय सम्बन्धप्रदर्शनम् ॥ ‘तस्मात्’ इत्युक्तम् । अनन्तरोक्तं हिं सन्निधानादि-
द्वयो विषयो, विप्रकृष्टं च तदः, इति विप्रकृष्टं त्रिगुण-
मविवेकीत्यादि सम्बध्यते ॥

तस्मात्त्रिगुणादेयौ विपर्यासः स पुरुषस्यात्रिगुणत्वं विवेकित्वमविषयत्वम-
साधारणत्वं चेतनत्वमप्रसवधर्मित्वञ्च । तत्र चेतनत्वेना-
(१३२) अत्रैगुण्यादेः विषयत्वेन च साक्षिरवप्रकृष्टत्वे दर्शिते । चेतनो हि
पुरुषस्य साक्षित्वम् द्रष्टा भवति, नाचेतनः; साक्षी च दर्शितविषयो भवति,
इदृत्वं च ॥ यस्मै प्रदर्श्यते विषयः स साक्षी, तथा हि लोके-
ऽभिप्रत्यर्थिनी विवादविषयं साक्षिणे दर्शयतः, एवं
प्रकृतिरपि स्वचरितं विषयं पुरुषाय दर्शयतीति पुरुषः साक्षी, न चाचेतनो
विषयो वा शक्त्यो विषयं दर्शयितुम्, इति चेतन्यादविषयत्वाच्च भवति
साक्षी । अत एव द्रष्टा ऽपि भवति ॥

अत्रैगुण्याद्यास्य कैवल्यम् । आत्यन्तिको दुःखत्रयाभावः कैवल्यम् । तच्च
(१३३) कैवल्यम् ॥ तस्य स्वाभाविकादेवात्रैगुण्यात् सुखदुःखमोहरहि-
तत्वात्सिद्धम् ॥

अत एवात्रैगुण्यान्माध्यस्थ्यम् । सुखी हि सुखेन तृप्यन् दुःखी हि दुःखं
(१३४) माध्यस्थ्यम्, द्विपन् मध्यस्थो न भवति । तदुभयरहितस्तु
मध्यस्थ इत्युदासीन इति चाख्यायते । विवेकित्वा-
दप्रसवधर्मित्वाच्चाकर्तेति सिद्धम् ॥ १९ ॥

स्यादेतन्-प्रमाणेन कर्तव्यमर्थमवगम्य ‘चेतनोऽहं चिकीर्षन् करोमि’ इति
(१३५) चैतन्यकर्तृ- कृतिचैतन्ययोः सामानाधिकरण्यमनुभवसिद्धम्; तदे-
त्ययोर्वैयधिकरण्यापत्ति- तस्मिन्मते नावकल्पते, चेतनस्याकर्तृत्वात् कर्तुश्चाचैत-
नत्वाद्वा ॥ न्यात् इत्यत आह—

तस्मात्तत्संयोगादचेतनं चेतनावदिव लिङ्गम् ।

गुणकर्तृत्वे च तथा कर्तव्यं भवत्युदासीनः ॥ २० ॥

“ तस्मान् ” इति । यतश्चैतन्यकर्तृत्वे भिन्नाधिकरणे युक्तिः सिद्धे, तस्मात्
(१३६) इष्टपनिः । भ्रान्तिरियमित्यर्थः । ‘ लिङ्गम् ’ महदादिबुद्धिपर्यन्तं
सामानाधिकरण्यज्ञानं चक्षति । भ्रान्तिधीजम् तत्संयोगः तत्संनिधानम् ।
भ्रान्तिरोहितार्थमन्यम् ॥ २० ॥

‘ तत्संयोगान् ’ इत्युक्तम्, न च भिन्नयोः संयोगो उपेक्षां विना, न वेद्य-
(१३७) पुरुषप्रधानयोः सुपकार्योपकारकभावं विनैव उपेक्षाहेतुमुपकारमाह—
संयोगे ग्राह्यः ॥

पुरुषस्य दर्शनार्थं कैवल्यार्थं तथा प्रधानस्य ।

पैतृयन्धवदुभयोरपि संयोगस्तत्कृतः सर्गः ॥ २१ ॥ ७०)

“ पुरुषस्य ” इति । प्रधानस्येति कर्मेणि पठ्यते । प्रधानस्य सर्वकारणस्य
(१३८) प्रधानस्य यद्दर्शनं पुरुषेण तदर्थम् । तदनेन भोग्यता प्रधानस्य
पुरुषापेक्षा-भोग्यपेक्षा ॥ दर्शिता । ततश्च भोग्यं प्रधानं भोक्तारमन्त्रेण न
सम्भवतीति युक्तं अस्य भोक्तृपेक्षा ॥

“ पुरुषस्यापेक्षां दर्शयति—“ पुरुषस्य कैवल्यार्थम् ” इति । तथाहि भोग्येन
(१३९) कैवल्यार्थं प्रधानेन अभिभक्तः पुरुषस्तद्वत्तु दुःखग्रयं स्वात्मन्यभि-
पुरुषस्य प्रधानपेक्षा ॥ मन्व्यमानः कैवल्यम् प्रार्थयते । न च सत्यपुरुषान्यता-
न्यातिनिबन्धनम् । न ॥ सत्यपुरुषान्यतारयातिः
प्रधानमन्तरेणेति कैवल्यार्थं पुरुषः प्रधानमपेक्षते
अनादिवाच्यसंयोगपरम्पराया ओगाय संपुर्णोऽपि कैवल्याय पुनः संपुज्यत
इति युक्तम् ॥

१. गुणानां कर्तृत्वे दृष्टासीनोऽ ॥ २. पुरुषः कर्तव्यं भवति । न च न तत्त्वतः
कर्तृत्वेवधारमिभक्तः । ३. कारिकास्थाः पदार्थाः इष्टा एवेत्यर्थः । ४. पुरुषो
निर्लक्ष्यतया ‘ पुरुः, ’ प्रधानमन्त्रेण ‘ लब्धम् ’ ।

ननु भवत्वन्तयोः संयोगो, महदादिमर्गस्तु कुत इत्यत आह—“तत्कृतः
(१४१) भोगापवर्गार्थ- सर्गः” इति । संयोगो हि न महदादिमर्गमन्तरेण
मेव महदादिसर्गस्या- भोगाय केवल्याय च पर्याप्त इति संयोग एव भोगाप-
वर्गार्थं सर्गं करोतीत्यर्थः ॥ २१ ॥

सर्गक्रममाह—

१००। प्रकृतेर्महांस्ततो ऽहङ्कारस्तस्माद्गुणश्च षोडशकः ।

तस्मादपि षोडशकात्पञ्चभ्यः पञ्च भूतानि ॥ २२ ॥ ✓

“प्रकृतेः” इति । प्रकृतिरव्यक्तम् । महदहङ्कारी वक्ष्यमाणलक्षणा । प्रका-
दशेन्द्रियाणि वक्ष्यमाणानि, तन्मात्राणि च पञ्च, सो
(१४१) प्रकृतेर्महानि- ऽयं षोडशमंख्यापरिमितो गणः षोडशकः । तस्मा-
त्यादि. सर्गक्रमः ॥ दपि षोडशकादपकृष्टेभ्यः पञ्चभ्यस्तन्मात्रेभ्यः पञ्च
भूतान्याकाशादीनि ॥

तत्र शब्दतन्मात्रादाकाशं शब्दगुणम्, शब्दतन्मात्रमहितान् स्पर्शतन्मात्रा-
द्रागुः शब्दस्पर्शगुणः, शब्दस्पर्शतन्मात्रमहितान् रूपत-
(१४२) तन्मात्रेभ्यो न्मात्रात्तेजः शब्दस्पर्शरूपगुणम्, शब्दस्पर्शरूपतन्मा-
गुणकेमेण भूतसर्गः ॥ असहिताद्रसतन्मात्रादापः शब्दस्पर्शरूपरसगुणाः,
शब्दस्पर्शरूपरसतन्मात्रमहितान् तन्मात्राच्छब्दस्पर्श-
रूपरसगन्धगुणा पृथिवी, जायत इत्यर्थः ॥ २२ ॥

अव्यक्तं सामान्यतो लक्षितम् “तद्विपरीतमव्यक्तम्” (कारिका १०)
इत्यनेन, विशेषतश्च “सर्वं लघु प्रकाशकम्”
(१४३) बुद्धिलक्षणप्र- (कारिका १३) इत्यनेन । व्यक्तमपि सामान्यतो
लावः ॥ लक्षितम् “हेतुम्” (कारिका १०) इत्यादिना ।
सम्प्रति विवेकज्ञानोपयोगितया व्यक्तविशेषं बुद्धि-

लक्षयति—

अध्यवसायो बुद्धिर्धर्मो ज्ञानं विराग प्रेम्भ्यम् ।

सारिख्यमतद्रूपं तामसमस्माद्विपर्यस्तम् ॥ २३ ॥

“अध्यवसाय” इति । ‘अध्यवसायो बुद्धिः’ क्रियाक्रियावतोरभेदविवक्षया । सर्वो व्यवहर्ता ऽऽलोच्य मत्वा ऽहमप्राधि-
(१४४) बुद्धेलक्षणम् कृत इत्यभिमत्य कर्तव्यमेतन्मयेत्यध्यवस्यति, ततश्च
अध्यवसाय इति ॥ प्रवर्तन इति लोकसिद्धम् । तत्र यो ऽयं कर्तव्यमिति
विनिश्चयश्चित्तिसंविधानादापद्यच्चैतन्याया बुद्धेः सो
ऽध्यवसायः, बुद्धेरमापारणो व्यापारः; तदभेदा बुद्धिः । स च बुद्धेलक्षणम्
समानासमानजानीयव्यवच्छेदकत्वात् ॥

तदेवं बुद्धिं लक्षयित्वा विवेकज्ञानोपयोगिनस्तस्या धर्मान्सारिवकतामसानाह-
“धर्मो ज्ञानं विरागं गेधव्यं सात्त्विकमेतद्रूपं,
(१४५) बुद्धेः सात्त्विका तामयमममाद्रिपर्यस्तम्” इति । धर्मो ऽभ्युद-
धर्मो धर्मज्ञानविरागधर्मा- यजि-धेयसदेतुः, तत्र यागदानाद्यनुष्ठानजनिता धर्मो
भिधानाः । तत्र धर्मज्ञान-ऽभ्युदयदेतुः, अष्टांगयोगानुष्ठानजनितश्च निःश्रेयस-
वैराग्याणा निरूपणम् ॥ हेतुः । गुणपुरुषात्मनाप्यासिर्ज्ञानम् । विरागो वैरा-
ग्यम् रागाभावः ॥

तस्य-यतमानमंज्ञा व्यतिरेकमंज्ञा एकैन्द्रियमंज्ञा वशीकारमंज्ञा-इति
चतस्रः मंज्ञाः । रागादयः कपादाक्षिप्तवर्तिनः,
(१४६) विरागस्य यत- संसृष्टिन्द्रियाणि यथासं विषयेषु प्रवर्त्यन्ते । तन्मा ऽत्र
मानव्यतिरेकैकैन्द्रिय- प्रवर्तिष्यन् विषयेष्विन्द्रियाणीति तत्परिपाचनापारम्भः
शीकाररूपाध्वनयः प्रयत्नो यतमानमंज्ञा । परिपाचने चानुवृत्तिमाने केचि-
रमंज्ञाः ॥ रूपायाः वक्ताः, पश्यन्ते च केचिन्, तत्रैवं* पूर्वापरी-
भावे सति पश्यमाणेभ्यः कपादेभ्यः वक्ताः व्यतिरे-
केनावधारणं व्यतिरेकमंज्ञा । इन्द्रियप्रवृत्तयामर्थतया वक्तव्यार्थामुपदमात्रेण
मनसि व्यवस्थापनमेकैन्द्रियमंज्ञा । आभ्युपगमाप्रम्यापि निवृत्तिरस्यस्थितेऽपि
दृष्टानुभविकविषयेषु, या मंज्ञात्रया च परार्थिता सा वशीकारमंज्ञा । यामत्र-
भगवाद् यत-ज्ञान्विर्जयाम्नाह-“दृष्टानुभविकविषयविनृत्त्यां वशीकारमंज्ञा
वैराग्यम्” इति [योगसूत्र-१।१५] । यो ऽयं बुद्धिधर्मो, विराग इति ॥

ऐश्वर्यमपि बुद्धिधर्मो, यतो ऽजिमादिप्रादुर्भावः । (१) अत्राणिमा-
 ऽणुभावो, यतः शिलामपि प्रविशति । (२) लघिमा
 (१४७) ऐश्वर्यरुद्रिपणे लघुभावः, यतः सूर्यमरीचीनालम्ब्य सूर्यलोकं यति ।
 अत्रासिद्धिनिर्णयणम् ॥ (३) गरिमा गुरुभावः, यतो गुरुर्भवति । (४)
 महिमा महतो भावः, यतो महान् भवति । (५)
 प्राप्तिः, यतो ऽहुस्यग्रेण सृशति चन्द्रमसम् । (६) प्राकाम्यमिच्छानभिधानो
 यतो, भूमाबुन्मज्जति निमज्जति च यथोदके । (७) वशित्वम्, यतो भूतर्मा-
 तिकं वशीभस्यवद्यम् । इंसित्वम् यतो भूतर्मातिकानां प्रभवस्थितिमीदृ ।
 (८) यत्तु कामावसाधित्वम् सा सत्यसङ्कल्पता, येन यथाऽस्य सङ्कल्पो
 भवति भूतेषु तथैव भूतानि भवन्ति । अन्येषां मनुष्याणां निश्चयाः निश्चेतव्य-
 मनुविधीयन्ते, योगिनस्तु निश्चेतव्याः पदार्थाः निश्चयम् । इति चरवारः
 सारिका बुद्धिधर्माः ॥

(१४८) बुद्धेस्तामसा तामसास्तु तद्विपरीता बुद्धिधर्माः । अधर्माज्ञानाद्विरा-
 धर्मा अधर्मादयः ॥ ग्यानैश्वर्याभिधानाश्चरवार इत्यर्थः ॥ २३ ॥

अहङ्कारस्य लक्षणमाह—

अभिमानो ऽहङ्कारः, तस्माद् द्विविधः प्रवर्तते सर्गः । 10.

एकादशकश्च गणस्तन्मात्रपञ्चकश्चैव ॥ २४ ॥ ✓

“ अभिमान ” इति । ‘ अभिमानो ऽहङ्कारः ’ । यत् स्वस्वालोचितम्मतं

(१४९) अहङ्कारस्य लक्षणम् ॥ च तत्र ‘ अहमधिकृतः ’, ‘ शक्तः सत्त्वहमत्र ’, ‘ मदर्था
 पुवामी विषयाः ’, ‘ मत्तो नान्यो ऽप्राकृष्टितः
 कश्चिदस्ति ’, ‘ अतो ऽहमस्मि ’ इति यो ऽभिमानः

सो ऽसाधारणव्यापास्त्वादहङ्कारः । तमुपजात्य हि
 बुद्धिरध्यवस्यति—‘ कर्तव्यमेतन्मया ’ इति निश्चयं करोति ॥

तस्य कार्यभेदमाह—“ तस्माद् द्विविधः प्रवर्तते सर्गः ” इति । प्रकारद्वयमाह

(१५०) अहङ्कारस्य कार्यभेदाः ॥ “ एकादशकश्च गणः ” इन्द्रियाहः, तन्मात्रपञ्चकश्चैव ।
 द्विविध एव सर्गो ऽहङ्कारात् न स्वयम् इति ‘ एव ’—
 कारेणावधारयति ॥ २४ ॥

स्यादेतन्-अहङ्कारादिकस्पात्कारणात्कथं जडप्रकाशको गणौ विलक्षणौ भवत
इत्यत आह—

‘सात्त्विक एकादशकः प्रवर्तते वैकुण्ठादहङ्कारात् ।

भूतादेस्तन्मात्रः स तामसः, तैजसादुभयम् ॥ २५ ॥ ✓

“सात्त्विक” इति । प्रकाशलाघवाभ्यामेकादशक इन्द्रियगणः सात्त्विको
(१५१) एकरूपस्याह- वैकुण्ठादहङ्कारात्प्रवर्तते । भूतादेस्त्वहङ्कारात्तामसात्
हङ्कारस्य गुणभेदादिकास्- तन्मात्रो गणः प्रवर्तते । कस्मान् ? यतः ४५ तामसः ।
भेदाः-सत्त्वादिन्द्रियगणः, एतदुक्तमभवति ‘यद्यप्येको ऽहङ्कारस्तथा ऽपि गुण-
तामसास्तन्मात्रगणः ॥ भेदोऽज्ञवाभिभवान्यां भिन्नं कार्यं करोतीति ’ ॥

ननु यदि सत्त्वतमोभ्यामेव सर्वं कार्यं जन्यते तदा कृतमकिञ्चिद्विचारेण रजसे-
त्यत आह— “तैजसादुभयम्” इति । तैजसाद्व्राज-
(१५२) सत्त्वतमसोः- सादुभयं गुणद्वयं भवति, यद्यपि रजसो न कामान्तर-
प्रवर्तकतया रजसःसा- मग्नि तथा ऽपि सत्त्वतमसो स्वयमक्रिये समर्थं अपि
र्थकता ॥ न स्वस्वकार्यं कुरुतः; रजस्तु चलतया ते यदा चाल-
यति तदा स्वकार्यं कुरुत इति । तदुभयस्मिन्नपि कार्यं
सत्त्वतमसोः क्रियोपादनद्वारेणास्ति रजसः कारणत्वमिति न पदार्थं रज
इति ॥ २५ ॥

१. भाष्यमतेन मनस एवैकस्य सात्त्विकत्वम् एतरेषां दशानां राजसत्वमेवेति ।
२।१८ सूत्रे द्रष्टव्यम् । अहङ्कारतत्त्वं त्रिधा विभज्यम्—‘वैश्वानर’—‘भूतादि’—‘तैजस’—
‘संज्ञाभेदात्’ । तदुक्तं गोटादादेन—“सत्त्वेनाभिभूते रजस्तमसौ यदा अहङ्कारे भरतः
तदा गो ऽहङ्कारः सात्त्विकः-तस्य भेदा कृत्वा ‘वैश्वानर’ इति ॥ एवं च तमसाऽभिभूते
सत्त्वरजसौ यदा अहङ्कारे भवतस्तदा गोहङ्कारस्तामसः-तस्य भेदा कृत्वा ‘भूतादिः’
इति ॥ एवमेव यदा अहङ्कारे सत्त्वतमसौ रजसाऽभिभूते तदा गोऽहङ्कारो राजसः
‘वैश्वानर’ इति त्रिधा भवेत्—इति

सात्त्विकमेकादशमाख्यातुं बाह्येन्द्रियदशकं तावदाह—

बुद्धीन्द्रियाणि चक्षुःश्रोत्रघ्राणरसनत्वगाख्याति ।

वाक्पाणिपादपायूपस्थानि कर्मेन्द्रियाण्याहुः ॥ २६ ॥

“ बुद्धीन्द्रियाणि ” इति । सात्त्विकाहङ्कारोपादानत्वमिन्द्रियाणाम् । तच्च द्विविधम् बुद्धीन्द्रियं कर्मेन्द्रियं च । उभयमप्येतद्वि-
(१५१) बाह्येन्द्रियदश- न्दस्यात्मनश्चिह्नत्वादिन्द्रियमुच्यते । तानि च स्वस्व-
कम् इन्द्रियलक्षणम् पद- श्चक्षुःश्रोत्रादिभिरङ्गानि । तत्र रूपग्रहणलक्षणं चक्षुः,
व्युत्पातिथ ॥ शब्दग्रहणलक्षणं श्रोत्रम्, गन्धग्रहणलक्षणं घ्राणम्,
रसग्रहणलक्षणं रसनम्, स्पर्शग्रहणलक्षणं त्वक्, इति
ज्ञानेन्द्रियाणां संज्ञा । एवं बाह्येन्द्रियाणां कार्यं वक्ष्यति (कारिका २८) ॥ २६ ॥

२६-२७

एकादशमिन्द्रियमाह—

उभयात्मकमज्ञ मनः, सङ्कल्पकमिन्द्रियं च साधर्म्यात् ।

गुणपरिणामविशेषाभातान्त्वं बाह्यमेदाश्च ॥ २७ ॥

“ उभयात्मकम् ” इति । एकादशस्विन्द्रियेषु मध्ये मन उभयात्मकम्,
(१५४) मनसो बुद्धि- बुद्धीन्द्रियं कर्मेन्द्रियं च, चक्षुरादीनां बाह्येन्द्रियाणां च
मौलयात्मकत्वग्रहणम् ॥ मनोऽधिष्ठितानामेव स्वस्वविषयेषु प्रवृत्तेः ॥

तद्व्यापारभेदेन रूपेण लक्ष्यमिति—“ सङ्कल्पकमज्ञ मनः ” इति । सङ्कल्पेन रूपेण
(१५५) मनसो लक्ष- मनो लक्ष्यते । ‘ आलोचितमिन्द्रियेण वसिष्ठदम् ’ इति
णम्—सङ्कल्पकम्, लक्ष- सम्मुखम् ‘ इदमेवम्, त्वमेवम् ’ इति सम्प्रत्ययवति
णसमन्वयश्च ॥ विशेषणविशेष्यभावेन विवेचयतीति यावत् । यद्वाहुः—

सम्मुखं वस्तुमात्रं तु ग्राह्यगृह्यविकल्पिनम् ।

सत् सामान्यविशेषाभ्यां कल्पयन्ति मनीषिणः ॥ इति ॥ तथाहि,

१. ‘ इ ’ विषयाः, ज्ञान प्रति द्वन्तीति ‘ इन्द्रिय ’ शब्दव्युत्पत्तिः कैश्चिन्
क्रियते ।

सन्ति ह्यालोचितज्ञानं प्रथमद्विविकल्पकम् ।

बालमूकादिविज्ञानसदृशम् सुगन्धवस्तुजमिति ॥

ततः परं पुनर्वस्तु धर्मैर्जात्यादिभिर्यथा ।

बुद्ध्या ऽवसीयते सा ऽपि प्रत्यक्षत्वेन सम्मता ॥

सो ऽयं महत्प्रलक्षणो व्यापारो मनसः समानाममानजातार्थाभ्यां व्यवतिष्ठन् मनो लक्षयति ॥

स्यादेतन्—अमाधारणव्यापारयोगिनी यथा महद्बह्वहारी नेन्द्रियम्, एव
मनो ऽप्यमाधारणव्यापारयोगि नेन्द्रियं भवितुमर्ह-
(१५६) मनस इन्द्रिय- तोरयत आह—“ इन्द्रियं च ” इति । कुतः ?
त्वसाधनम्—इन्द्रियैः “ साधर्म्यात् ” । इन्द्रियान्तरः सात्त्विकाहकारी-
-सह सात्त्विकाहकारोपा- पादानत्वं “ च साधर्म्यम् नत्विन्द्रलिङ्गत्वम्, महद्ब-
दानत्वरूपसाधर्म्यात् ॥ ह्वारयोरप्यारमल्लिङ्गत्वेनेन्द्रियत्वप्रसङ्गात्, तस्माद्व्युप-
त्तिमात्रमिन्द्रलिङ्गत्वम् न तु प्रवृत्तिनिमित्तम् ॥

अथ कथं सात्त्विकाहकारादेकस्मादेकादशेन्द्रियाणीरयत आह—“ गुणपरि-
(१५७) एकस्याहका- णामविशेषान् नामात्वं बाह्यभेदाश्च ” इति शब्दाद्युप-
रस्य गुणपरिणामवि- भोगसम्प्रवर्तकादुत्सहकारिभेदात्कार्यभेदः । अदृष्टभेदो
शेषात्कार्यभेदः ॥ ऽपि गुणपरिणाम एव ।

(१५८) बाह्यभेदाधेनि ‘ बाह्यभेदाश्च ’ इति दृष्टान्तार्थम्—यथा बाह्य-
दृष्टान्तार्थम् ॥ भेदान्तर्धतर्पीत्यर्थः ॥ २७ ॥

(१५९) दशेन्द्रियवृ- त्तदेवमेकादशेन्द्रियाणि स्वरूपत उक्त्वा दशानामप्य-
तिव्ययनम् ॥ साधारणीकृतीतह—

३-१ शब्दादिषु पञ्चानामालोचनमाधमिष्यते वृत्तिः ।
वचनादानविहरणोत्सर्गानन्दाश्च पञ्चानाम् ॥ २८ ॥

बुद्धीन्द्रियाणां मम्मगन्धवस्तुदर्शनमालोचनमुक्तम् । “ वचनादानविहरणोत्स-
र्गानन्दाश्च पञ्चानाम् ” कर्मेन्द्रियाणाम् । कण्ठतात्त्वादिम्यानमिन्द्रियं वारं,
तस्या वृत्तिवचनम् । ज्ञानेन्द्रियाणां वृत्तयः स्पष्टाः ॥ २८ ॥

अन्तःकरणत्रयस्य वृत्तिमाह—

स्वालक्षण्यं वृत्तिस्त्रयस्य सैषा भवत्यसामान्या ।

सामान्यकरणवृत्तिः प्राणाद्या वायवः पञ्च ॥ २९ ॥

“ स्वालक्षण्यम् ” इति । स्वालक्षण्यं वृत्तिस्त्रयस्य । स्वमसाधारणं लक्षणं येषां तानि स्वालक्षणानि महदहङ्कारमनांसि, तेषां (१६०) अन्तःकरणत्र- भावः स्वालक्षण्यम्, तच्च स्वानि स्वानि लक्षणान्येव । यस्य स्वस्वतन्त्ररूपमे तद्यथा—महतो ऽध्यवसायो ऽहङ्कारन्याभिमानः वासाधारणं वृत्तित्रयम् ॥ सङ्ख्या मनसो वृत्तिर्न्यापारः ॥

वृत्तिद्वैविध्यं साधारणमाधारणत्वाभ्यामाह—“ सैषा भवत्यसामान्या ” असाधारणी । “ सामान्यकरणवृत्तिः प्राणाद्या वायवः (१६१) पञ्चवायुरा- पञ्च ” । सामान्या आसीं करणवृत्तिश्चेति । त्रयाणा- साधारणी वृत्तिः ॥ मपि करणानां पञ्च वायवो जीवनं वृत्तिः, तन्नावे भावान् तदभावे चाभावान् । तत्र प्राणो नासाग्रहृन्ना- भिराद्वाङ्मृत्तिः, अपानः कृष्णादिकाश्छरादपायूरस्थपार्श्ववृत्तिः, समानो हृन्नाभिसर्वमन्धिवृत्तिः, उदानो इत्कण्ठतालुमूर्धभ्रमप्यवृत्तिः, ध्यानस्त्ववृत्ति- रिति पञ्च वायवः ॥ २९ ॥

चतुर्विधकरणस्यास्यामाधारणेषु वृत्तिषु क्रमाक्रमो भवतीत्याह—

युगपद्वचनपृथगस्य च वृत्तिः क्रमशश्च तस्य निर्दिष्टा ।

दृष्टे तथा ऽप्यदृष्टे त्रयस्य तत्पूर्विका वृत्तिः ॥ ३० ॥ १३१

“ युगपत् ” इति, दृष्टे यथा—यदा सन्तममान्धकारे विद्युन्मभ्यतिमात्रा- द्याधमभिमुखमतिमन्निहितं पश्यति तदा खल्वस्या- (१६२) चतुर्विधकरण- लोचनसङ्ख्याभिमानाध्यवसायाः युगपदेव प्रादुर्भ- स्य प्रत्यक्षे युगपद्वृत्तिः ॥ चन्नि, वतस्तन उल्फुन्य तरस्थानादेकपदे- ऽमरति ॥

“ क्रमशश्च ” यदा मन्दालोके प्रथमन्तावद्वस्तुमात्रं सम्मुखमालोचयति,
 अथ प्रणिहितमनाः कर्णान्ताकृष्टसशरसिजिनीमण्डली-
 (१६३) क्रमशश्च ॥ कृतकोदण्डः प्रचण्डतरः पाटच्चरोऽयमिति निश्चिनोति,
 अथ च माग्प्रत्येतीत्यभिमन्यते, अथाध्यवस्यत्यपसरा-
 मोतः स्थानादिति ॥

परोक्षे त्यन्तःकरणत्रयस्य बाह्येन्द्रियवर्जं वृत्तिरित्यह—“ अदृष्टे त्रयस्य
 (१६४) अन्तःकर- तत्पूर्विका वृत्तिः ” इति । अन्तःकरणत्रयस्य युगप-
 णत्रयस्य परोक्षे वृत्ति- रक्रमेण वृत्तिर्दृष्टपूर्विकेति । अनुमानागमस्मृतयो हि
 द्वयम् दृष्टपूर्वकमेव ॥ परोक्षे ऽयं दर्शनपूर्वाः प्रवर्तन्ते नान्यथा । यथा दृष्टे
 तत्रा दृष्टे ऽपीति योजना ॥ ३० ॥

स्यादेतन्—चतुर्णां प्रयाणां वा वृत्तयो न तावन्मात्राधीनाः, तेषां सदातन-
 (१६५) करणाना स्व- त्वेन वृत्तीनां सदोत्पादप्रसङ्गात्, आकस्मिकत्वे तु
 तन्प्रत्ये दोषाः ॥ वृत्तिमङ्गप्रसङ्गो नियमहेतोरभावादित्यत आह—

स्यां स्यां प्रतिपद्यन्ते परस्पराकृतहेतुकां वृत्तिम् ।
 पुरुषार्थं पप्र हेतुर्न केनचित्कार्यते करणम् ॥ ३१ ॥

“ स्वाम् ” इति । करणानीति शेषः । यथा हि बहवः पुरपाः शाक्ती-
 अतस्कराः कयाष्टीकधानुष्ककर्पांगिकाः कृतमङ्गैताः पराप्रस्कम्ब-
 (१६६) तत्रिराकर- नाय प्रवृत्ताः, तत्रान्यतमस्याकृतमचराभ्यान्वतमः
 णम्—परस्परगपेक्षाण्ये- प्रवर्तन्ते, प्रवर्तमानस्तु शाक्तीकः शक्तिमेवादत्ते न तु
 व करणानि स्वम्बु- यष्ट्यादिकम्, एवं याष्टीको ऽपि यष्टिमेव, न दाव्या-
 तिउ ॥ दिकम् । तथा ऽन्यतमस्य करणस्याकृतानु स्वकार्य-
 करणाभिमुख्यादन्यतमं क्षरणं प्रवर्तते । तन्प्रवृत्तेर्ध-
 हेतुवाद्य वृत्तिमङ्गप्रसङ्ग इत्युक्तम्—“ स्यां स्यां प्रतिपद्यन्ते ” इति ॥

स्यादेतत्—यादृच्छादयश्चेतनत्वान् परस्परकृतमवगम्य प्रवर्तन्ते इति युक्तम्

(१६७) करणानाम्-
चेतनत्वे ऽपि पुरुषार्थ-
स्यैव प्रवर्तकत्वम् ॥
करणानि त्वचेतनानि, तस्मान्नैवं प्रवर्तितुमुत्सहन्ते ।
तेनैषामधिष्ठात्रा करणानां स्वस्वसामर्थ्योपयोगाभिज्ञेन
भवितव्यमित्यत आह—“ पुरुषार्थ एव हेतुः, न केन-
चित्कर्म्यते करणम् ” इति । भोगोपवर्गलक्षणः पुरु-
षार्थ एवानागतवस्थः प्रवर्तयति करणानि, कृतमत्र

तत्स्वरूपाभिज्ञेन कर्ता । एतच्च “ यत्सर्ववृद्धिनिमित्तम् ” (कारिका ५७)
इत्यत्रोपपादयिष्यते ॥ ३१ ॥

(१६८) करणवि-
भागः ॥ “ न केनचित् कार्यते करणम् ” इत्युक्तम् । तत्र करणं
विभज्यते—

करणं त्रयोदशविधम्, तद्वाहरणधारणप्रकाशकरम् ।

कार्यं च तस्य दशधा, कार्यं धार्यं प्रकाश्यं च ॥ ३२ ॥

“ करणं त्रयोदशविधम् ” इति । इन्द्रियाण्येकादश बुद्धिरहङ्कारश्चेति त्रयो-
(१६९) त्रयोदश- दशप्रकारं करणम् । कारकविशेषः करणम् । न च
विभक्करणपरिगणनम् । व्यापारावेशं विना कारकस्यमिति व्यापारावेशमाह—
“ तद्वाहरणधारणप्रकाशकरम् ” इति यथायथम् । तत्र कर्मेन्द्रियाणि वागादीन्ध्या-
हरन्ति, यथास्वमुपादृष्टे, स्वव्यापारेण व्याप्नुवन्तीति यावन् । बुद्धयहङ्कार-
मनांसि तु स्वदृष्ट्या प्राणादिलक्षणया धारयन्ति । बुद्धीन्द्रियाणि प्रकाशयन्ति ॥

आहरणधारणाद्विज्रियाणां सकर्मकतया किं कर्म कतिविधं कल्पत आह—

(१७०) करणव्या- “ कार्यं च तस्य ” इति । कार्यं तस्य त्रयोदशविधस्य
पारपरिगणनम् ॥ करणस्य दशधा, आहार्यं धार्यं प्रकाश्यं च । आहार्यं

व्याप्यम् । कर्मेन्द्रियाणां वचनादानविहरणोत्सर्गानन्दाः यथायथं व्याप्याः,
ते च यथायथं दिव्यादिव्यतया दत्त—इत्याहार्यं दशधा । एवं धार्यमायन्तः-
करणत्रयस्य प्राणादिलक्षणया वृष्या शरीरम्, तच्च पादिव्यादिपाञ्चभौतिकम् ।
तद्वादीनां पञ्चानां समूहः पृथिवी, ते च पञ्च दिव्यादिव्यतया ददोति धार्य-
मपि दशधा । एवं बुद्धीन्द्रियाणां शब्दस्पर्शरूपरसगन्धा यथायथं व्याप्याः, ते
॥ यथायथं दिव्यादिव्यतया ददोति प्रकाश्यमपि दशधेति ॥ ३२ ॥

(१७१) त्रयोद-
शविधकरणे ऽवान्तर-
विभागः—वाह्यान्तर-
भेदात् ॥

त्रयोदशविधकरणे ऽवान्तरविभागं करोति-

अन्तःकरणं त्रिविधं दशधा घातं त्रयस्य विषयाख्यम् ।
साम्प्रतकालं चाह्यं त्रिकालमाभ्यन्तरं करणम् ॥ ३३ ॥

“ अन्तःकरणम् ” इति । अन्तःकरणं त्रिविधम्-

(१७२) अन्तः- ‘ बुद्धिरहङ्कारो मन ’ इति; इतीराभ्यन्तरवर्तिता-
करणस्य त्रिविध्यम् ॥ अन्तःकरणम् ॥

“ दशधा ” बाह्यकरणम् “ त्रयस्य ” अन्तःकरणस्य “ विषयाख्यम् ” ।

(१७३) बाह्य- विषयमाख्याति विषयसङ्ख्याभिमानाध्यवसायेषु
करणानां दशधास्यम् ॥ कर्तव्येषु इतीभवति । तत्र बुद्धीन्द्रियाण्यालोचनेन,
कर्मैन्द्रियाणि तु यथास्वं व्यापारेण ॥

बाह्यान्तरयोः करणयोर्विशेषान्तरमाह—“ साम्प्रतकालम् ” इति । वर्तमान-

(१७४) बाह्या-
न्तरकरणयोर्भेदः—बाह्य-
करणानां वर्तमानका-
लीनत्वं, अन्तःकरणा-
नां त्रिकालीनत्वम् ॥
वसाया भवन्ति ॥

कालं याह्यमिन्द्रियम् । वर्तमानसमीपमनागतमतीत-
मपि वर्तमानम्; अतो घातपि वर्तमानकालविषया
भवति । “ त्रिकालमाभ्यन्तरं करणम् ” इति ।
तद्यथा—नदीपूरभेदाद्भूदृष्टिः; अस्ति धूमादग्निरिह
नगनिकुञ्जे, असत्युपघातके पिपीलिकाण्डसञ्चरणाद्-
विष्यति वृष्टिरिति, तदनुसूयश्च सङ्ख्याभिमानाध्य-

कालश्च यैरौपिकाभिमत एकी न अनागतादिव्यवहारभेदं प्रवर्तयितुमर्हति ।

(१७५) सांख्य- तस्मादयं यैस्याधिभेदैरनागतादिभेदं प्रतिपद्यते सन्तु
मते कालस्य न तत्वा-
न्तरत्वम् ॥

तस्मादयं यैस्याधिभेदैरनागतादिभेदं प्रतिपद्यते सन्तु
मते कालस्य न तत्वा-
न्तरत्वम् ॥

(१७६) बाह्येन्द्रि- साम्प्रतकालानां बाह्येन्द्रियाणां विषयं विवे-
यविषयविवेचनम् ॥ चयति—

बुद्धान्द्रियाणि तेषां पञ्च विशेषाविशेषविषयाणि ।

वाग्भवति शब्दविषया शेषाणि तु पञ्चविषयाणि ॥ ३४ ॥

“बुद्धान्द्रियाणि” इति । “बुद्धान्द्रियाणि” = तेषां दशानामिन्द्रियाणा-
मध्ये “पञ्च,” “विशेषाविशेषविषयाणि” विशेषा-

(१७७) बुद्धान्द्रि- स्थूलाः शब्दादयः सान्तघोरमूढरूपाः पृथिव्यादि-
याणां विषयाः स्थूल- रूपाः, अविशेषास्तन्मात्राणि सूक्ष्माः शब्दादयः,
सूक्ष्मरूपाः ॥ मोक्षग्रहणेन स्थूलभूतमपाकरोति । विशेषाश्च अत्रि-
शेषाश्च विशेषाविशेषाः, त एव विषया तेषां बुद्धी-

न्द्रियाणां तानि तथोक्तानि । तत्रोर्ध्वोत्तमां योगिनाञ्च श्रोत्रं शब्दतन्मात्र-
विषयं स्थूलशब्दविषयं च, अस्मदादीनां तु स्थूलशब्दविषयमेव । एवमेत-
त्तु स्थूलसूक्ष्मस्पर्शविषया, अस्मदादीनां तु स्थूलस्पर्शविषयमेव । एवञ्च-
शब्दोऽपि तेषामस्मदादीनां च रूपादिषु सूक्ष्मस्थूलेषु द्रष्टव्याः ॥

एवं कर्मेन्द्रियेषु मध्ये “वाग्भवति शब्दविषया” स्थूलशब्दविषया, तदे-
तुच्चात् । ननु शब्दतन्मात्रस्य हेतुस्तस्याहकारिकत्वेन

(१७८) कर्मेन्द्रियाणां वागिन्द्रियेण सहैककारणकरणात् । “शेषाणि तु”
विषयाः ॥ चक्षुरि वायुपस्थपानिषादाद्यानि “पञ्चविषयाणि”

पाण्याद्याहार्याणां घटादीनां पञ्चशब्दाद्यात्मकरणा-
दिति ॥ ३५ ॥

१२०।

साम्प्रतं त्रयोदशसु करणेषु केषाञ्चित्प्रधानभावं सहेतुकमाह—

सान्तःकरणा बुद्धिः सर्वं विषयमवगाहते यस्मात् ।

तस्माद्विविधं करणं द्वारि, द्वाराणि शेषाणि ॥ ३५ ॥

“ सान्तःकरणा ” इति । “ द्वारि ” प्रधानम् । “ द्वाराणि ” करणानि बाह्येन्द्रियाणि द्वाराणि । तैरुपनीतं सर्वं विषयं समनो ऽहङ्कारा बुद्धिः यस्मादवगाहते ऽध्यवस्यति तस्माद्बाह्येन्द्रियाणि द्वाराणि, द्वारवती च सान्तःकरणा बुद्धिरिति ॥ ३५ ॥

न केवलं बाह्यानीन्द्रियाण्यपेक्ष्य प्रधानं बुद्धिः, अपि तु ये ऽप्यहङ्कारमनसी द्वारिणो ते अप्यपेक्ष्य बुद्धिः प्रधानमित्याह—

एते प्रदीपकरणाः परस्परविलक्षणा गुणविशेषाः ।

एतौ पुरुषस्यार्थं प्रकाश्यं बुद्धौ प्रयच्छन्ति ॥ ३६ ॥

“ एते ” इति । यथा हि प्रामाण्यक्षः कौटुम्बिकेभ्यः करमादाय विषया-
(१८०) अन्तः-
करणेष्वपि बुद्धेः प्राधा-
न्यम् ॥
ध्यक्षाय प्रयच्छति, विषयाध्यक्षश्च सर्वाध्यक्षाय, स च भूपतये; तथा बाह्येन्द्रियाप्यालोच्य मनसे समर्पयन्ति, मनश्च सदृश्याहङ्काराय, अहङ्कारश्चाभिमान्य बुद्धौ सर्वोध्यक्षभूतायां,—तद्विबुधम्—“ पुरुषस्यार्थं प्रकाश्यं बुद्धौ प्रयच्छन्ति ” इति ॥

बाह्येन्द्रियमनोऽहङ्काराश्च “ गुणविशेषाः ” गुणानां सत्त्वरजस्तमसो विचाराः,
(१८१) परस्पर-
विरोधगालनानपि
गुणानां पुरुषार्थरूप
एककार्यं प्रगतिः प्रदी-
पवत् ॥
ते तु परस्परविरोधशीला अपि पुरुषार्थेन भोगादवग-
रूपेण कयावयतामीताः, यथा चतितैरुपहृत्यः सत्तम-
नापनयेन रूपप्रकाशाय मिलिताः प्रदीपाः, एवमेते
गुणविशेषाः इति योजना ॥ ३६ ॥

कस्मात्पुनर्बुद्धौ प्रयच्छन्ति, न तु बुद्धिरहङ्काराय द्वारिणे मनसे चेतन-
थाह—

मयं प्रत्युपभोगं यस्मान्पुरुषस्य साधयन्ति बुद्धिः ।

मयं च त्रिदिनपि पुनः प्रधानपुरुषान्तरं नृमम् ॥ ३७ ॥

“ मयं ” इति । पुरुषार्थस्य प्रवेक्षकत्वान् नृम्यं यस्याशा/माधनं तत्

(१८२) बुद्धेः

प्राधान्यमाधनम्-माशा-
रपुर्यर्थासाधनत्वात् ॥

प्रधानम् । बुद्धिश्चास्य साक्षात्साधनम्, तस्मात्सर्व-
प्रधानम् । यथा सर्वाप्यक्षः साक्षाद्ग्राह्यसाधनतया
प्रधानमितरे तु प्रामाण्यसादयन्मग्नानि गुणभूताः ।
बुद्धिर्हि पुरुषमन्विधानात् तच्छायाशया तद्रूपेण
सर्वविषयोपभोगं पुरुषस्य साधयति । सुप्तदुःशा-
लुमयो हि भोगः, स च बुद्धौ, बुद्धिश्च पुरुषस्यैवेति, सा च पुरुषमुपभोजयति ।
यथा ऽर्थालोचनसदृशाभिमानाश्च तत्तद्रूपपरिणामेन बुद्धाद्युपसंक्राताः तथेन्द्रिय-
व्यापारा अपि बुद्धेरेव स्वव्यापारेणाध्यवसायेन सहकृत्यापार्गभप्रभृति, यथा
स्वसंन्येन सह प्रामाण्यभादिर्मन्यं सर्वाप्यक्षस्य भवति । “सर्वं” शब्दादिकं
“प्रति” य “उपभोगः” “पुरुषस्य” तं साधयति ॥

ननु पुरुषस्य सर्वविषयोपभोगमभ्यादिना यदि बुद्धिः तर्ह्यनिर्मोक्ष इत्यत
आह—पश्चात् “प्रधागपुरुषयोरन्तरं” विशेषं “विशि-
(१८३) पुरुषार्पस्या- नष्टि” करोति-वर्षादनवाकं पचतीति,—करणं ॥
वर्गस्य कृतकत्वादपि प्रतिपादनम् । ननु प्रधानपुरुषयोरन्तरस्य कृतकत्वाद-
नानित्यत्वम्-करणस्या- नित्यत्वम्, तत्कृतस्य मोक्षस्यानित्यत्वं स्यादित्यत
अ वाधनार्थत्वात् ॥ आह—“विशिनष्टि”—“प्रधानं सविस्कारमन्धद्रह-
मन्य” इति विद्यमानमेवान्तरमविवेकेनाविद्यमानमित्य-
बुद्धिर्बोधयति, न तु करोति, येनानित्यत्वमित्यर्थः । अनेनापदर्शः पुरुषार्थो
दर्शितः, “सूक्ष्मम्” दुर्लक्ष्यम् तदन्तरमित्यर्थः ॥ ३७ ॥

तदेवं करणानि विमश्य विशेषाविशेषान् विभजते—

तन्मात्राण्यविशेषाः तेभ्यो मूतानि पञ्च पञ्चभ्यः ।

एते स्मृतः विशेषाः, शान्ता घोराश्च मूढाश्च ॥ ३८ ॥ (६०)

“तन्मात्राणि” इति । शब्दादितन्मात्राणि सूक्ष्माणि । न चैव
(१८४) आविशप- शान्तत्वादिरस्ति उपभोगयोग्यो विशेष इति
(सूक्ष्म) कथनम् ॥ मात्रशब्दार्थः ॥

अविशेषानुक्त्वा विशेषान्वक्तुमुत्पत्तिमेवामाह—“ तेभ्यो भूतानि ” इति ।
 (१८५) विशेष(स्थूल) तेभ्यस्तन्मात्रेभ्यो यथासंख्यमेकद्वित्रिचतुःपञ्चभ्यो
 कथनम्—तदुत्पत्तिप्रद- भूतान्याकाशानिलानलमलिलावनिरूपाणि “ पञ्च ”
 र्शनपूर्वकम् ॥ “ पञ्चभ्यः ” तन्मात्रेभ्यः ॥

अस्त्वेतेषामुत्पत्तिः, विशेषत्वे किमायातमित्यत आह—“ एते स्मृता विशेषाः ”
 इति । कुतः—“ शान्ता घोराश्च सूक्ष्माश्च ” । अकार
 (१८६) भूताना स्थू- एको हर्तो द्वितीयः समुद्ये । परमाकाशादिषु
 लत्वे हेतुकथनम् ॥ स्थूलेषु सत्त्वप्रधानतया केचिच्छान्ताः सुखाः, प्रकाशा
 लघवः, केचिद्रजःप्रधानतया घोराः दुःखाः अनवस्थिताः, केचित्तमःप्रधान-
 तया मूढा विषण्णा गुरवः । ते उमी परस्परव्यावृत्त्या अनुभूयमाना ‘ विशेषाः ’ ।
 इति च ‘ स्थूलाः ’ इति चोच्यन्ते । तन्मात्राणि त्वरमदादिभिः परस्परव्यावृ-
 त्तानि नानुभूयन्ते, इत्यविशेषाः सूक्ष्मा इति चोच्यन्ते ॥ ३८ ॥

विशेषाणामथान्तरविशेषमाह—

१९१ सूक्ष्मा मातापितृजाः सहप्रभूतस्त्रिधा विशेषाः स्युः ।

सूक्ष्मास्तेषां नियता, मातापितृजा निवर्तन्ते ॥ ३९ ॥

“ सूक्ष्मा ” इति । “ त्रिधा विशेषाः स्युः ” इति, तान् विशेषप्रकारा-
 नाह—“ सूक्ष्माः ” सूक्ष्मदेहाः परिकल्पिताः, “ माता-

(१८७) अथान्तरविशे- पितृजाः ” पार्त्कीशिकाः । तत्र मातृनो लोमलोहित-
 पकथनम्—सूक्ष्ममातृणि- मांसानि, पितृतस्म द्वाय्वन्धिमज्जान इति पदं कौशाः ॥
 तृजभेदेन ॥ प्रकृतानि महान्ति भूतानि = प्रभूतानि ”—तैत्तिरीयम् ।

सूक्ष्मं शरीरमेवो विशेषः, मातापितृजो द्वितीयः, महाभूतानि तृतीयः, महा-
 भूतवर्गं च घटादीनां निवेद्य इति ॥

(१८८) सूक्ष्ममा- सूक्ष्ममातापितृजयोर्द्वयोर्विशेषमाह—“ सूक्ष्मा-
 तापितृजयोर्भेदः नियत- स्तेषाम् ” इति । विशेषाणां मध्ये ये ते “ नियताः ” ।
 यानि नियतनिषेधनः ॥ “ मातापितृजा निवर्तन्ते ” इति, श्रान्ता वा
 अममाम्ना वा विदन्ता येति ॥ ३९ ॥

सूक्ष्मशरीरं विभजते—

पूर्वोत्पन्नमसक्तं नियतम्महदादिसूक्ष्मपर्यन्तम् ।

संसरति निरुपभोगं भावैरधिवासितं लिङ्गम् ॥ ४० ॥

‘पूर्वोत्पन्नम्’ इति । “पूर्वोत्पन्नम्” प्रधानेनादिसर्गं प्रतिपुरुषमेकैकमुत्पादितम् । “असक्तम्” अव्याहतम् शिलासं-
 ध्वनुविशति । “नियतम्” आ चादिसर्गादा-
 च महाप्रलयादवतिष्ठते, —“महदादिसूक्ष्मपर्यन्तम्”,
 महद्बह्द्वरैकाग्र्येन्द्रियपञ्चतन्मात्रपर्यन्तम् । एषां
 समुदायः सूक्ष्मं शरीरम्, शान्तघोरमूर्दैरिन्द्रियैर-
 म्बितत्वादिशेषः ॥

(१८९) सूक्ष्म-

शरीरोपपादनम्—तस्य
 लक्षणानि—(१) असक्त-
 त्वम्—(२) नियतत्वम् ॥
 म्बितत्वादिशेषः ॥

नन्वस्त्वेतदेव शरीरं

(१९०) (१) संसर-
 णम् निरुपभोगत्वं च
 ततश्च पादकौशिक-
 शरीरस्यावश्यकत्वम् ॥

भोगायतनं पुरुषस्य, कृतं दृश्यमानेन पादकौशिकेन
 शरीरेणेत्यत आह—“संसरति” इति । उपात्त-
 मुपात्तं पादकौशिकं शरीरं जज्ञानि हायं हायं वीपादत्ते-
 कस्मात् इति “निरुपभोगम्” यतः, पादकौशिकं
 शरीरं भोगायतनं विना सूक्ष्मं शरीरं निरुपभोगं
 यस्मात्तस्मात्सूक्ष्मं शरीरं संसरति ॥

ननु धर्माधर्मनिमित्तः संसारः, न च सूक्ष्मशरीरस्यास्ति तद्योगः, तत्कथं

(१९१) धर्माधर्मादि-
 भावैरधिवासितत्वमूलकं
 तत्संसरणम् ॥

संसरतीत्यत आह—“भावैरधिवासितम्” इति ।
 धर्माधर्मज्ञानाज्ञानवैराग्यावैराग्यैश्वर्यानि भावाः-
 तदम्बितत्वा बुद्धिः, तदम्बितत्वा सूक्ष्मं शरीरमिति तदपि
 भावैरधिवासितम्, यथा सुरभिचम्पककुसुमसम्यक्-
 द्वयं तदामोदवामितम्भवति । तस्मान्नाभावैरधिवासितत्वात्संसरति ॥

कस्मात् पुनः प्रधानमिव महाप्रलयेऽपि तच्छरीरञ्च तिष्ठतीत्यत आह—

(१९२) महाप्रलये
 तस्य लयं गमितत्वा-
 लिङ्गत्वम् ॥

“लिङ्गम्” इति । लयं गच्छतीति लिङ्गम्—इदमुत्पत्तेन
 चास्य लिङ्गत्वमिति भावः ॥ ४० ॥

स्यादेतत्-बुद्धिरेव साहचारेन्द्रिया कस्माच्च संसरति ? कृतं सूक्ष्मशरीरेणा-
प्रमाणिकेनेत्यत आह—

‘चित्रं यथाश्रयमृते स्थाण्वादिभ्यो विना यथा च्छाया । १७.१
तद्वद्विना विशेषेण तिष्ठति निराश्रयं लिङ्गम् ॥ ४१ ॥

“चित्रम्” इति । लिङ्गान् ज्ञापनात् बुद्ध्यादयो ‘लिङ्गम्’, तत् अना-
श्रयश्च तिष्ठति । जन्ममरणान्तराले बुद्ध्यादयः प्रत्यु-
(१९३) सूक्ष्मशरीर- स्पष्टशरीराश्रयाः, — प्रत्युपपन्नतन्मात्रमात्रे सति
स्यावश्यकत्वप्रदर्शनम् ॥ बुद्ध्यादित्वान् — दृश्यमानशरीरवृत्तिबुद्ध्यादिवत् ।
“विना विशेषैः” इति, सूक्ष्मः शरीरैरित्यर्थः ।

आगमश्चात्र भवति—

“ततः सत्यवनः कायात् पाशवद्धं वशकृतम् ।

भङ्गगुणमात्रं पुरुषं निश्चरुषं बलाद्यतः” (महाभारत वनपर्व-अध्याय
२९९.) इत्यङ्गुष्ठमात्रवेन सूक्ष्मशरीरस्यमुपलक्ष्यति । आत्मनो निष्कर्षासम्भ-
वान् सूक्ष्ममेव शरीरम् ‘पुरुषः’, तदपि पुरि स्थूलशरीरे वेत्ते इति ॥ ४१ ॥

पुनं सूक्ष्मशरीरास्तित्वमुपपाद्य यथा संसरति, येन हेतुना च-तदुभयमाह—

‘तद्वद्विना विशेषेण तिष्ठति निराश्रयं लिङ्गम्’ ।

१७.१

“१

“निमित्तम्”

(१९४) सूक्ष्मशरीर- यथायथं पादकीशिकशरीरप्रदः, स हि धर्मादिनिमित्त-
संगरणप्रकारः ॥ प्रभवः । निमित्तश्च नैमित्तिकश्च-तत्र यः प्रभवः
प्रत्यक्षस्तथा “नटवद्व्यवतिष्ठते लिङ्गम्” सूक्ष्म-
शरीरम् । यथा हि नटस्तां तां भूमिमां विधाय परशुरामो वा उजातशत्रुर्वा

१. केचिदिमां कारिष्य स्थूलशरीरपरतया भ्याकृष्याय ‘लिङ्गम्’ लिङ्गशरीरे
‘विशेषैः’ स्थूलशरीरैरित्याहुः ॥ अन्ये तु ‘लिङ्गम्’ लिङ्गशरीरं ‘विशेषैः’ लिङ्ग-
शरीराधिष्ठानमूर्तः सूक्ष्मशरीरमिति । एतन्मते शरीरत्रयम्-लिङ्गशरीरम्, तद-
धिष्ठानमूर्तं सूक्ष्मशरीरम्, तदधिष्ठानमूर्तं च स्थूलशरीरमिति ।

वाय्वराजो वा भवति, एवमन्यत्तस्यूलशरीरपरिग्रहणाद्वो वा मनुष्यो वा पशुर्वा
वनस्पतिर्वा भवति सूक्ष्मे शरीरमित्यर्थः ॥

कुतस्त्यः पुनरस्येदं महिमेत्यत आह—“प्रकृतेर्विभुत्वयोगान्” इति ।

(१९५) सूक्ष्मशरीर- तथा च पुराणम्—

संसरणे हेतुः—प्रकृतेर्वि-
भुत्वम् ॥

“वैश्वरूप्यान् प्रधानस्य परिणामां ऽयमकुत”
इति ॥ ४२ ॥

“निमित्तनैमित्तिकप्रसङ्गेन” इत्युक्तम्—तत्र निमित्तनैमित्तिके विभज्यते—
21. सांत्तिविकाश्च भावाः प्राकृतिका वैकृतिकाश्च धर्माद्याः ।

दृष्टाः ‘करणाश्रयिणः कार्याश्रयिणश्च कललाद्याः ॥ ४३ ॥

“सांत्तिविकाश्च” इति । “वैकृतिकाः” नैमित्तिकाः, पुरुषस्य जातस्यो-

(१९६) निमित्तनै-
मित्तिकविभागः—धर्मादि-
रूपनिमित्तस्य प्राकृतिक-
वैकृतिकभावकथनम्,
तस्य च करणाश्रयित्व-
वर्णनम् ॥

त्तरकालवैधताराधनादिनोपपन्नाः । “प्राकृतिकाः”
स्वाभाविका भावाः सांत्तिविकाः । तथा हि—सर्गा-
दावादिविज्ञानप्रभगवान् कपिलो महामुनिर्धर्मज्ञान-
धरायैश्वर्यसम्पन्नः प्रादुर्बभूवेति स्मरन्ति । वैकृताश्च
भावा असांत्तिविकाः, ये उपायानुष्ठानेनोपपन्नाः,
अथा प्राचेतसप्रभृतीनामहर्षाणाम् । एवमधर्माज्ञाना-
वैराग्यानीश्वर्याण्यपि ॥

कार्यं शरीरं तद्वाश्रयिणः, तस्यावस्थाः, कललपुद्बुद्धमांसपेशांकरणाद्यन्त-

(१९७) शरीरग्रह-
रूपनैमित्तिकस्य कार्या-
श्रयित्वकथनम् ॥

प्रत्यङ्गच्छन् गमस्थस्य, ततो निर्गतस्य बालस्य
यास्यकीमात्यैविवनवार्धकानीति ॥ ४३ ॥

अद्यगतानि निमित्तनैमित्तिकानि । कतमस्य तु निमित्तस्य कतमनैमि-
त्तिकमित्यत आह—

(१९८) निमित्त-
विशेषाणां कार्यविशेष-
निरूपणम् ॥

१. करणमत्र बुद्धिः । २. ‘स्वाभाविकाः’ यावद्वस्तुमाविनः, ‘वैकृतिकाः’
कादचित्कृतयः ॥ गीटपादभाष्ये तु—‘भावादिषां चिन्त्यन्ते—सांत्तिविकाः, प्राकृताः,
वैकृताधेयुक्तम् ।

धर्मेण गमनमूर्ध्वं, गमनमधस्ताद्भवत्यधर्मेण ।

ज्ञानेन साधवर्गो, विपर्ययादिष्यते बन्धः ॥ ४४ ॥

“ धर्मेण गमनमूर्ध्वम् ” सुप्रभृतिषु लोकेषु । “ गमनमधस्ताद्भवत्यधर्मेण ”

(१९९) धर्मस्य ऊर्ध्व-
गमने प्रति अधर्मस्या-
धोगमनमिति, ज्ञानस्या-
पवर्गमिति, अज्ञानस्य
च बन्धनमिति-कारण-
त्वम् ॥

मुल्लादिषु^१ लोकेषु । “ ज्ञानेन साधवर्गः । ” तावदेव
प्रकृतिर्भोग्यमावस्थे न साधद्विवेकख्याति करोति; भय
विवेकख्याती सत्यां हृतकृत्यतया विवेकख्यातिमन्त-
रुपुण्यमिति निवर्तते । यथाहुः—

“ विवेकख्यातिपर्यन्तं ज्ञेयम् प्रकृतिषेष्टित्वम् ” इति ॥

“ विपर्ययात् ” अतएवज्ञानात् “ इष्यते बन्धः ” ॥

त च त्रिविधः—प्राकृतिको वैकृतिको आक्षिपकश्चेति । तत्र प्रकृतावात्म-

(२००) बन्धत्रैविध्य-
निरूपणम् प्राकृतिक-वै-
कृतिक-आक्षिपकरूपम् ॥

ज्ञानाद्ये प्रकृतिमुपासते तेषां प्राकृतिको बन्धः, यः
पुराणे प्रकृतिहयान् प्रत्युच्यते ।

“ पूर्णं ज्ञानमहत्त्वं हि तिष्ठन्त्यस्यकचिन्तकाः ” इति ॥

वैकारिको बन्धस्तेषां ये विचारानेव भूतेन्द्रियाहङ्कारमुदीः पुरुषधियोपासते,
तान् प्रतीदमुच्यते—

“ दृशं मन्यन्तारागिह तिष्ठन्तीन्द्रियचिन्तकाः ।

भौतिकाश्च^२ ज्ञानमूर्णं, महत्सन्त्वाभिमानिकाः ॥

बाँडा दृशं सहस्रानि तिष्ठन्ति विराजन्वराः ।

ते मन्त्रमी विदेहा^३ तेषां वैकृतिको बन्धः ” इति ॥

१. भूतेति पाठान्तरम् । २. ‘ भौतिकाः ’—ये भूतान्तेव पुरुषधियोपासते
‘ आभिमानिकाः ’—ये उद्वहारेणैव पुरुषधियोपासते । ‘ बाँडाः ’—ये रुद्धिमेव
पुरुषधियोपासते । ३. विदेहाः—वैद्वान्तकर्मभक्त्या संज्ञान्तरमिदम् पारिभाषिकम् ।

इष्टापूर्तेन^१ दाक्षिणिकः । पुरुषतत्त्वानभिज्ञो ह्यीष्टापूर्तकारी कामोपहतमना
बध्यते इति ॥ ४४ ॥

वैराग्यात् प्रकृतिलयः, संसारो भवति राजसाद्रागात् ।

ऐश्वर्यादविघातो विपर्ययात्तद्विपर्यासः ॥ ४५ ॥

“वैराग्यात् प्रकृतिलयः” इति—पुरुषतत्त्वानभिज्ञस्य वैराग्यमात्रान्

(२०१) वैराग्यात् प्रकृतिलयः, प्रकृतिग्रहणेन प्रकृतिमहदहङ्कारभूते-
प्रकृतिलयः ॥ न्द्रियाणि गृह्यन्ते, तेष्व्वात्मबुद्धयोपास्यमानेषु लयः ।
कालान्तरेण च पुनराविर्भवति ॥

“संसारो भवति राजसाद्रागात्” इति । ‘राजसान्’ इत्यनेन रजसो

(२०२) राज- दुःखहेतुत्वात् संसारस्य दुःखहेतुता सूचिता ॥
साद्रागात् संसारः ।

“ऐश्वर्यादविघातः” इति—इच्छायाः । ईश्वरो हि यदेवेच्छति तदेव करोति ।

(२०३) ऐश- “विपर्ययात्” अनैश्वर्यात् “तद्विपर्यासः” सर्वत्रे-
र्यादिच्छानभिघातः, छाविघात इत्यर्थः ॥ ४५ ॥
अनैश्वर्याच्चेच्छानभिघातः ॥

बुद्धिधर्मान् धर्मादीनर्था भावान् समासज्यामाम्बां सुदुश्शृणां हेमोपादेषान्
दर्शयितुं प्रथमन्तावन् समासमाह—

४५^१ एष प्रत्ययसर्गो विपर्ययादक्तिरुष्टिसिद्ध्याख्यः ।

गुणवैषम्यविमर्दात्, तस्य च भेदास्तु पञ्चाशत् ॥ ४६ ॥

२।-१

१. वापीकूपतडागादि देवतायतनानि च । अन्नप्रदानमारामाः पृतमर्ध्याः
प्रचक्षते ॥ एकाग्रिकर्मद्वयेन प्रेतायां यच्च हूयते । अन्तर्वेद्या च दहानमिष्टन्तर्दमि-
र्धयते । २. यः प्रकृतिलये गच्छति ।

“ एषः ” इति । प्रतीयते ऽनेनेति प्रत्ययो बुद्धिः, तस्य सर्गः । नत्र
 “ विपर्ययः ” अज्ञानमविद्या, सा ऽपि बुद्धिधर्मः,
 (२०४) विपर्ययादि- “ अशक्तिः ” अपि करणत्रैकदशहेतुका बुद्धिधर्म एव ।
 बुद्धिसर्गस्य समासेन “ तुष्टिमिद्वी ” अपि वक्ष्यमाणलक्षणे बुद्धिधर्मावेव ।
 कथनम् ॥ तत्र विपर्ययाशक्तितुष्टिषु यथायोगं सप्तानाञ्च धर्मा-
 दीनां ज्ञानचर्ममन्तर्भावः; सिद्धां च ज्ञानस्येति ॥

व्याप्त्यमाह—“ तस्य च भेदास्तु पञ्चाशत् ” इति । कस्मान् ? “ गुण,
 वैषम्यविमर्शान् ” इति । गुणानां वैषम्यमैकैकस्या-
 (२०५) तस्यैव समासेन धिक्बलता द्वयोर्द्वयोर्वा, एकैकस्य न्यूनबलता द्वयो-
 कथनम्-पञ्चाशद्भेदाः ॥ द्वयोर्वा, ते च न्यूनाधिक्ये मन्दमध्याधिक्यमाश्रय-
 यथाकार्ग्यमुच्येते । तदिदं गुणानां वैषम्यम् तेनोपमर्शः
 एकैकस्य न्यूनस्य द्वयोर्वा ऽभिमतः । तस्मात्तस्य भेदाः पञ्चाशदिति ॥ ४६ ॥

तानेव पञ्चाशद्भेदान् गणयति—

पञ्च विपर्ययभेदा भवन्त्यशक्तिश्च करणत्रैकदशात् ।

अष्टाविंशतिभेदा तुष्टिर्नवधा ऽष्टधा सिद्धिः ॥ ४७ ॥

“ पञ्च ” इति । अविद्याऽस्मितारागद्वेषाभिनिवेशा यथासंख्यं तमो-

मोहमहामोहतामिस्रान्धतामिस्रमंशुकाः पञ्च विपर्यय-

(२०६) विपर्ययादीना विशेषाः, विपर्ययप्रभवानामप्यस्मितादीनां विपर्यय-

पञ्चाशद्भेदपरिगणनम् ॥ स्वभावत्वात् । अत्रा-यद्विषया विपर्ययेणावधार्यते

वस्तु, अस्मितादयन्तरस्वभावाः सन्तस्तदभिनिवि-

ज्ञाने । अत एव पञ्चरत्नाविद्येत्याह भगवान् चार्पण्यः ॥ ४७ ॥

(२०७) विपर्ययादीना सम्यग्ति पञ्चानां विपर्ययभेदानामवान्तरभेदमाह—

प्रत्येकमयान्तरभेदकथ-

नम्-तत्र प्रथमं विपर्य-

यस्य द्वार्षटिः ॥

भेदस्तमसो ऽएविधो मोहस्य च, दशविधो महामोहः ।

तामिस्रोऽष्टादशधा, तथा भवत्यन्धतामिस्रः ॥ ४८ ॥

“ भेदः ” इति । भेदस्तमसो ऽविद्याया अष्टविधः । अष्टस्वव्यक्तमह-

(२०८) अविद्यारूप-
विपर्ययरूपाष्टविधत्वम् ॥

दहद्वारपञ्चतन्मात्रैवनाम्नस्वामुक्षिरविद्या तमः,
अष्टविधविपर्ययत्वात्तस्याष्टविधत्वम् ॥

“ मोहस्य च ” इति, अत्राष्टविधो भेदश्चकारेणानुपपद्यते । देवा

(२०९) अस्मितारूप
विपर्ययरूपाष्टविधत्वम् ॥

अष्टविधमैश्वर्यमाप्ताद्यामृतत्वाभिमानिनो ऽणिमादिक-
मात्मीयं शाश्वतिकमभिमन्यन्ते, सैवमस्मिता मोहो
ऽष्टविधैश्वर्यविपर्ययादष्टविधः

“ दशविधो महामोहः ” इति । शब्दादिषु पञ्चसु दिव्यादिव्यतया

(२१०) रागरूपविप-
र्ययश्च दशविधत्वम् ॥

दशविधविषयेषु रजनीयेषु राग असहिर्महामोहः,
स च दशविधविपर्ययादशविधः ॥

“ तामिस्रो ” द्वयोः “ ऽष्टादशधा ” । शब्दादयो दशविपर्यया रजनीयाः-

(२११) द्वैपरूपविपर्य-
यरूपाष्टादशविधत्वम् ॥

स्वरूपतः, ऐश्वर्यन्तवणिमादिकश्च स्वरूपतो रजनी-
यम् । किं तु रजनीयशब्दाद्युपायाः । ते च शब्दादय
उपस्थिताः परम्परणोऽहम्पमानास्तदुपायाश्चाणिमादयः
स्वरूपेणैव कोपनीया भवन्तीति शब्दादिभिर्दशभिः
सहाणिमाद्यष्टकमष्टादशधेति, तद्विषयो द्वैपरतामिस्रो ऽष्टादशविपर्ययादष्टा-
दशधेति ।

“ तथा भवत्यन्धतामिस्रः ” । अभिनिवेशो ऽन्धतामिस्रः । तथेत्यनेनाष्टा-

(२१२) अभिनिवेश-
रूपविपर्ययस्य ष्टादश-
विधत्वम् ॥

दशधेन्यनुपपद्यते । देवाः स्वत्वनिष्ठादिक्रमष्टविधमै-
श्वर्यमाप्ताद्य दश शब्दादीन् विपर्यान् भुञ्जानाः-
‘ शब्दादयो मोक्ष्यास्तदुपायाश्चाणिमादयो ऽस्माकम-
सुरादिभिर्मोषघानियत ’ इति-विभ्यति । तदिदं
भयमभिनिवेशो ऽन्धतामिस्रो ऽष्टादशविपर्ययादष्टा-

दशधेति ॥

(२१३) विपर्ययावा- सोऽयं पञ्चविधो विकल्पो विपर्ययोऽवान्तरभेदा-
न्तरभेदसमष्टिसंख्या द्वे द्वापष्टिरिति ॥ ४८ ॥
द्वापष्टिः ॥

(२१४) अष्टाविंशति- तदेवं पञ्चविपर्ययभेदानुसूया अष्टाविंशतिभेदाम-
प्रकारकाशक्तिकथनम् ॥ शक्तिमाह—

एकादशेन्द्रियवधाः सह बुद्धिवधैरशक्तिरुद्दिष्टा ।
सप्तदश वधा बुद्धेर्विपर्ययात्तुष्टिसिद्धीनाम् ॥ ४९ ॥

“ एकादश ”—इति । इन्द्रियवधस्य ग्रहो बुद्धिवधहेतुत्वेन, न त्वशक्ति-
(२१५) एकादशेन्द्रि- भेदपूर्णत्वेन “ एकादशेन्द्रियवधाः ”—
यवधजन्यैकादशविधा-ऽशक्तिः ॥

वाधिर्यं कुष्टिताऽन्धत्वं जडताऽमिग्रता तथा ।
सूक्ष्माकर्तृण्यपनुस्वक्लृण्योदायतमन्दताः ॥

यथार्थत्वं श्रोत्रादीनामिन्द्रियाणां वधाः । एतावत्वेव तु तद्देतुका बुद्धेर-
शक्तिः स्वव्यापारे भवति । तथा चैकादशहेतुक्त्वादेकादशधा बुद्धेरशक्तिरुच्यते ।
हेतुहेतुमतोरभेदविवक्षया च सामानाधिकरण्यम् ॥

तदेवमिन्द्रियवधद्वारेण बुद्धेरशक्तिमुक्त्वा स्वरूपतोऽशक्तीराह—“ सप्त-
(२१६) बुद्धेः साक्षा- बुद्धिवधैः ” इति । कति बुद्धेः स्वरूपतो वधा इत्यत
दशक्तिः सप्तदशविधा ॥ आह—“ सप्तदश वधा बुद्धेः ” । कुतः ? “ विपर्य-
यात्तुष्टिसिद्धीनाम् । ” तुष्टयो नवधेति तद्विपर्ययात्म-
निरूपणाप्रवधा भवन्ति, एवं सिद्धयोऽष्टाविति तद्विपर्ययास्तनिरूपणादष्टौ
भवन्तीति ॥ ४९ ॥

(२१७) नवविधतु- तुष्टिर्नवधेयुक्तम्, ताः परिगणयति—
ष्टिकथनम् ॥

आध्यात्मिकाश्चतस्रः प्रकृत्युपादानकालभाग्याख्याः । 25।
वाह्या विषयोपरमात् पञ्च,—नव तुष्टयो ऽस्मिन्ताः ॥ ५० ॥

“आध्यात्मिकाः” इति । आध्यात्मिकाः—‘प्रकृतिव्यतिरिक्त आत्मा
(२१६) चतुर्विधा-
ध्यात्मिकतुष्टिचयनम् ॥
विवेकमात्राकाराय त्वसदुपदेशनुष्ठो यो न प्रपतते
सत्याध्यात्मिकश्चतस्रस्तुष्टयो भवन्ति, प्रकृतिव्यति-
रिक्तमात्मनमधिकृत्य यस्मात्तास्तुष्टयस्तस्मादाध्यात्मिकाः । कास्ता इत्यत
आह—“प्रकृत्युपादानकालभाग्याख्याः”, प्रकृत्यादिशब्दा यामां तात्पर्योक्ताः ॥

‘तत्र प्रकृत्याख्या तुष्टिर्यथा कस्यचिदुपदेशे,—‘विवेकमात्राकारो हि
(२१९) आध्यात्मि-
कतुष्टिषु प्रथमा प्रकृ-
त्याख्या अग्रमः ॥
प्रकृतिपरिणामभेदस्तत्र प्रकृतिरेव करोर्मानि कृतान्त-
द्वयानाभ्यासेन, तस्मादेवमेवास्तु वाच्य,—इति तस्य-
मुपदेशप्ररूप तुष्टिः प्रकृती, सा तुष्टिः प्रकृत्याख्या
अग्रम उच्यते ॥

या तु,—‘प्रकृत्यपि विवेकव्यातिर्न, सा प्रकृतिमात्रादभवति, मातृसर्वस्य
(२२०) द्वितीया उपा-
दानाख्या सलिलम् ॥
सर्वदा, तन्मात्रस्य सर्वान् प्रत्यक्षिणान्, प्रत्यक्षा-
वान् सा भवति, तस्मात् प्रत्यक्षानुवाददीयाः,
कृतान्ते ध्यानाभ्यासेनासुप्सन्,—इति उपदेशे या तुष्टिः
सोपादानाख्या ‘सलिलम्’ उच्यते ॥

या तु,—‘प्रत्यक्षा अपि न सद्योनिर्वाणदेति मैव कालपरिवाकमपेक्ष्य मिश्रिते
(२२१) तृतीया काला-
ख्या मेघः ॥
विधास्यति, अलमुत्तमतया तव,—इति उपदेशे या
तुष्टिः सा कालाख्या ‘मेघ’ उच्यते ॥

१. अत्रार्थं सद्रूपद्वयोक्तः—अग्रमः सलिलं मेघो वृष्टिः पारं तथा सुपारं च ।
अन्येषु पारपरमनुत्तमाम्म उत्तमाम्मथ इति । २. प्रकृत्या निर्णयः । ३. प्रकृति-
मात्राद्विवेकव्यातीनां सत्यां प्रकृतेः सर्वे प्रति तुल्यमवगन्धवान् सकलजनस्य विवे-
कव्यातिः स्यादिति हृदयम् । ४. ‘ओष’ इति पाठान्तरम् ।

या तु, - 'न प्रकृतेर्न कालाच्चाप्युपादानाद्विवेकख्यातिः, अपि तु भाग्यादेव ।
 (२२२) चतुर्थो मा- अत एव मदालसापत्यान्यतिवालानि भातुरूपदेशादेव
 ग्याख्या वृष्टिः ॥ विवेकख्यातिमस्ति मुक्तानि यमूवुः, तस्माद्भाग्यमेव
 हेतुर्नान्यन्' - इति उपदेशे या तुष्टिः सा भाग्याख्या
 ' वृष्टिः ' उच्यते ॥

वाह्या दर्शयति - " वाह्याः " तुष्टयः " विषयोपरमात्, पञ्च " । या.
 सत्त्वनात्मनः प्रकृतिमददद्वारादीनामेत्यभिमन्य-
 (२२३) पञ्चविधवाह्य- मानस्य वैराग्ये सति तुष्टयस्ता वाह्याः, आत्मज्ञाना-
 तुष्टिकथनम् ॥ भावे सत्यनात्मानमधिकृत्य प्रवृत्तेरिति । ताश्च वैराग्ये
 सति तुष्टय इति वैराग्यहेतुपञ्चवाह्यैराग्याण्यपि पञ्च,
 संपन्नत्वात् तुष्टयः पञ्चेति । उपरम्यसे ज्ञेनेत्युपरमो वैराग्यम्, विषयादुपरमो
 विषयोपरमः । विषया भोग्याः शब्दादयः पञ्च, उपरमा अपि पञ्च ॥

तथा हि - अर्जनरक्षणक्षयभोगहिंसादोषदर्शनहेतुजन्मानः पञ्चोपरमा भवन्ति ।
 (२२४) वाह्यतुष्टिषु तथा हि - सेवाद्वयो धनार्जनोपायाः, ते च सेवकादीन्
 प्रथमा, पारम् ॥ दुःखादुर्वन्ति,

" इष्यदुरीश्वरद्व्याम्यदण्डिचण्डार्चचन्द्रजाम् ।

वेदनां भावयन् प्राज्ञः कः संवास्यनुपज्जते " ॥

प्रथमस्येऽप्यर्जनोपायाः दुःखा इति विषयोपरमे या तुष्टिः स्या ' पारम् ' उच्यते ॥

तथा जित्जित्जनम् ' राज्ञैरगागिरिजाम्निजलीषादिभ्यो विनश्यद्भवति तद्रक्षणे
 (२२५) द्वितीया महद्दुःखमिति भावयतो विषयोपरमे या तुष्टिः सा
 सुखम् ॥ द्वितीया ' सुखम् ' उच्यते ॥

तथा मटनाऽऽवासेनाजित्जनं मुज्यमानं क्षीयते इति संप्रथमभाषयतो
 (२२६) तृतीया पाठ- विषयोपरमे या तुष्टिः सा तृतीया ' पारंपारम् ' उच्यते ॥

एवं शब्दादिभोग्याभ्यासान् प्रगर्धन्ते कामाः, ते च विषयाप्राप्तौ कामिनं
(२२७) चतुर्थी, अनुत्त- दुःस्वप्नकुरुन्तीति भोगद्रोपम् भावयतो विषयोपरमे
मागमः ॥ या तुष्टिः सा चतुर्थी 'अनुत्तमागम' उच्यते ॥

पृथक्पुपहस्य भूतानि विषयोपभोगः सम्भवतीति 'हिसादोपदर्शनाद्विषयो-
(२२८) पञ्चमी, उत्त- परमे या तुष्टिः सा पञ्चमी 'उत्तमागम' उच्यते ॥
मागमः ॥

पृथक्पुपहस्य भूतानि विषयोपभोगः सम्भवतीति 'हिसादोपदर्शनाद्विषयो-
मताः ' ॥ ५० ॥

(२२९) सिद्धिभेद- गौणमुत्पत्त्यभेदः सिद्धिराद-
यतम् ॥

२१- ऊहः शब्दोऽध्ययनं दुःस्वप्नविधातास्त्रयः सुहृत्प्रोतिः ।

दानं च सिद्धयोऽष्टौ, सिद्धेः पूर्वोऽश्नुशस्त्रिविधः ॥ ५१ ॥

“ऊह” इति । विहन्यमानस्य दुःस्वप्नस्य श्रित्वात्तन्निघातास्त्रयः, इतीमा
(२३०) सिद्धिभेद- मुक्त्यान्विताः सिद्धयः, तदुपायतया चित्तरा गौण्यः
यतम् ॥ पञ्च सिद्धयः, ता अपि हेतुहेतुमन्तया व्यवस्थिताः ।
तत्राद्याऽध्ययनलक्षणा सिद्धिहेतुरेव । मुक्त्यान्तु
सिद्धयो हेतुमन्य एव । मध्यमान्तु हेतुहेतुमन्तः ॥

विधिवद्दुःस्वप्नाद्व्याप्तविधानात्मशरस्वरूपग्रहणमध्ययनम् प्रथमा सिद्धिः
(२३१) अध्ययनरूपाः स्मारमुच्यते ॥
प्रथमा सिद्धिः, स्मारम् ॥

तत्कार्यम् शब्दः, ‘शब्दः’ इति पदम् शब्दजनितमर्थज्ञानमुपलक्षयति,
(२३२) शब्दरूपा द्वितीया, युतारम् ॥
द्वितीया, युतारम् ॥

(२५१) सृष्टिशरणवि-
प्रतिपत्तिनिराकरणम् ॥

उक्तस्य सर्गस्य कारणविप्रतिपत्तीनिराकरोति—

इत्येष प्रकृतिकृतो महदादिविशेषभूतपर्यन्तः ।

प्रतिपुरुषविमोक्षार्थं स्वार्थं इव परार्थं आरम्भः ॥ ५६ ॥

(२५२) चार्वाकवेदान्त-
भ्याममतद्वयणम् ॥
“ इत्येष ” इति । आरम्भ्यते इति = आरम्भः = सर्गः महदादिभूतः प्रकृ-
त्येष कृतो मेखरेण, न ब्रह्मोपादानो, नाप्यकारणः ।
अकारणत्वे ह्यवगन्तामायोऽन्यन्तमायो वा स्यात् ।
न ब्रह्मोपादानः, चितिशक्तेरपरिणामात् । नेश्वराधि-
ष्ठितप्रकृतिकृतो, निर्व्यापारस्वाधिष्ठानृत्वासम्भवात् । न हि निर्व्यापारस्या
वास्यास्यधितिष्ठति ॥

ननु प्रकृतिकृतश्चेत्, तस्या निर्व्यायाः प्रवृत्तिशीलाया अनुपरमात् सर्व-
(२५३) नित्यप्रवृत्ति-
शीलप्रकृतिकृतसृष्टिपक्षे
सम्यग्निमित्यत्वस्यानेमो-
क्षस्य च प्रमद्वशाद्वा-
तजिरासथ ॥
सर्गः स्यादिति न कश्चिन्मुच्येतेत्यत आह—“ प्रति-
पुरुषविमोक्षार्थं स्वार्थं इव परार्थं आरम्भः ” इति ।
यथादनगम ओदनस्य पाके प्रवृत्तः ओदनसिद्धौ
निवर्तते,—एवं प्रत्येकपुरुषान् मोक्षयितुं प्रवृत्ता प्रकृ-
तिर्यं पुरुषमोक्षयति तत्प्रति पुनर्न प्रवर्तते—नदिद-
माह—‘ स्वार्थं इव, ’ स्वार्थं यथा तथा परार्थं आरम्भ-
इत्यर्थः ॥ ५६ ॥

स्यादेतत्—‘ स्वार्थं परार्थं वा चेन्नः प्रवर्तते । न च प्रकृतिरचेन्नैवं भवितु-
(२५४) अचेन्नप्रधान-
प्रवृत्तिराह ॥ महति तन्मादन्ति प्रकृतेरधिष्ठाना येननः । न च
क्षेत्रज्ञाश्रेयना अपि प्रकृतिमधिष्ठानुमहन्ति, तेषां प्रकृति-
स्वस्थानभिज्ञानात् । तन्मादन्ति सर्वाभिर्दर्शा प्रकृते-
रधिष्ठाना, न चेत्तर’—इत्यत आह—

यस्तद्विभृदिनिमित्तं क्षीयन् यथा प्रवृत्तिरक्षयः ।

पुरुषविमोक्षनिमित्तं तथा प्रवृत्तिः प्रधानम्य ॥ ५७ ॥

“वत्सविवृद्धिनिमित्तम्” इति । दृष्टमचेतनमपि प्रयोजनप्रवर्तमानम्,
(२५५) तत्परिहारः— यथा वत्सविवृद्धयर्थं क्षीरमचेतनम् प्रवर्तते । एवं
क्षीरप्रवृत्तिवत्तस्याः प्र- म्रकृतिरचेतना ऽपि पुरुषविमोक्षणाय प्रवर्तिष्यते ॥
वृत्तिः ॥

न च—‘क्षीरप्रवृत्तेरपीधराधिष्ठाननिबन्धनत्वेन साध्यवाद्य साध्यव्यभि-
चार’ इति, साम्प्रतमपेक्षायतः प्रवृत्तः स्वार्थकार-
(२५६) ईश्वराधिष्ठित- व्याभ्यां व्यासत्वात् । ते च जगत्सर्गाद्यावर्तमाने प्रेक्षा-
प्रधानसूत्रा दोषाः ॥ वद्यप्रवृत्तिपूर्वकत्वमपि व्यावर्तयतः । न ह्यवाप्तसकले-
ष्वितस्य भगवतो जगन् सृजतः किमप्यभिलषित-
म्भवति । नापि कारण्यादस्य सर्गे प्रवृत्तिः, प्राक् सर्गाज्जीवानामिन्द्रियशरी-
रविषयानुत्पत्तौ दुःस्वभावेन कस्य प्रहाणेच्छा कारण्यम् ? सर्गोत्तरकालं
दुःखितो ऽवलोक्य कारण्याभ्युपगमे दुरुत्तरमितरेतराश्रयत्वनूपणम्,—कारण्येन
सृष्टिः सृष्ट्या च कारण्यमिति । अपि च करणया प्रेरित ईश्वरः सुखिन
एव जन्तून् सृजेत्त विचित्रान् । ‘कर्मवैचित्र्यावृचिन्यम्’ इति चेत्—कृतमस्य
प्रेक्षायतः कर्माधिष्ठानेन, तदनधिष्ठानमात्रादेवाचेतनस्यापि कर्मणः प्रवृत्त्यनुप-
पत्तेस्तन्कार्यशरीरेन्द्रियविषयानुत्पत्तौ दुःखानुत्पत्तेरपि मुकरत्वात् ॥

प्रकृतेरवचेतनायाः प्रवृत्तेर्न स्वार्थानुग्रहो न वा कारण्यप्रयोजकमिति
(२५७) प्रकृतिपृथ- मोक्तदोषप्रसङ्गावतारः । पारार्थ्यमाग्रन्तु प्रयोजकमुप-
तदोपो भावः ॥ पद्यते । तस्मात् सुप्रकम्—“वत्सविवृद्धिनिमित्तम्”
इति ॥ ५७ ॥

“स्वार्थ इव” इति दृष्टान्तितम् [कारिका. ५६] तद्विभजते—
(२५८) पुरुषविमोक्षा- र्थम् प्रधानस्य प्रवृत्तिः ॥

यान्सुख्यनिवृत्त्यर्थं यथा क्रियासु प्रवर्तते लोकः । २८०
पुरुषस्य विमोक्षार्थं प्रवर्तते तद्वद्व्यक्तम् ॥ ५८ ॥

“औत्सुक्य-” इति । औत्सुक्यमिच्छा, सा खल्विष्यमाणप्राप्तौ निवर्तते । इष्यमाणश्च स्वार्थः, इष्टलक्षणत्वान् फलस्य । दाष्टान्तिके योजयति-
“पुरुषस्य विमोक्षार्थमप्रवर्तते तद्वदन्यक्तम्” इति ॥ ५८ ॥

ननु भवतु पुरुषार्थः प्रकृतेः प्रवर्तकः, निवृत्तिस्तु कुतस्त्या प्रकृतेः
(२५९) विवेकख्यास्य- इत्यत आह—
नन्तरम् प्रधाननिवृत्तिः ॥

रङ्गस्य दर्शयित्वा निवर्तते नर्तका यथा श्रुत्यात् ।

पुरुषस्य तथा ऽऽत्मानं प्रकाश्य विनिवर्तते प्रकृतिः ॥ ५९ ॥

“रङ्गस्य” इति, स्थानेन स्थानिन परिपदानुपलक्षयति । ‘आत्मानम्’
नान्दाद्यात्मना पुरुषाज्जेदेन च प्रकाश्येत्यर्थः ॥ ५९ ॥

स्यादेतन्-‘प्रवर्तनाप्रकृतिः पुरुषार्थम् । पुरुषादुपकृताप्रकृतिर्लक्ष्यते कश्चि-
(२६०) गुणयथाः प्रकृतेः दुपकारम्, आज्ञामम्पादनाराधितादिवाज्ञापयितुर्भु-
प्रमुपकारं विनैव ज्ञिया । तथा च न परार्थोऽस्या आरम्भः -इत्यत
पुरुषोपकारः ॥ आह—

नानाविधैरुपायैरुपकारिष्यनुपाकारिणः पुंसः ।

गुणयन्त्यगुणस्य मतस्तन्मयार्थमपार्थक्यञ्चरति ॥ ६० ॥

“नाना-” इति । यथा गुणवानुपकार्येपि भूयः निर्गुणे ऽत एवानुपाकारिणि
स्यामिनि निष्कलमगधनः, षष्ठमियमप्रकृतिमपरिचयनी गुणयानुपकारिष्यनुपका-
रिणि पुराणे ध्यर्थपरिधमेति पुरुषार्थमेव मतमे न स्वार्थमिति मिदम् ॥ ६० ॥

स्यादेतन्—‘नतंकी नृत्यमरिपद्मयो दर्शयित्वा निवृत्ताऽपि पुनस्तद्वृष्टिकौतू-
(२६१) विवेकख्यात्यन- हलान् प्रवर्तते यथा, तथा प्रकृतिरपि पुरपाद्यात्मानं
न्तरं प्रधानस्यान्य- दर्शयित्वा निवृत्ताऽपि पुनः प्रवर्त्स्यति’-इत्यत
न्तिकी निवृत्तिः ॥ आह—

प्रकृतेः सुकुमारतरश्च किञ्चिदस्तीति मे भतिर्भवति ।

या दृष्टाऽस्मीति पुनर्न दर्शनमुपैति पुरुषस्य ॥ ६१ ॥

“ प्रकृतेः ” इति । सुकुमारतरताऽतिपेक्षलता, परपुररश्मिनामहिष्णुनेति
माषत् । अमूर्यम्भइया हि कुलवधूश्चिन्तामन्दाक्षमन्धरा प्रमादाद्विगलितसिन्धवा-
श्चला वेदालोक्यते परपुरेण, तदाऽस्मीति यथा प्रपतने, अप्रमत्ता यथैनां पर-

१.—अस्याः कारिकाया अनन्तरमेवान्यैक्या कारिकाया भवितव्यमिति स्वर्ग-
सस्य तिलकान्वयजस्य बालगद्गाधरपण्डितस्य सिद्धान्तः । तत्संक्षेपस्तु—

“ सप्तत्यां किल येऽर्थाः ” इतीश्वरकृष्णवचनानुरोधेनार्याणां सप्तत्या भाव्यम् ।
किन्तु गौडपादभाष्ये त्वेकोनसप्ततिरेवोपलभ्यते । भाष्यं चैकपष्टितमाया उपरि
नैकस्या अपि तु कारिकयोः । अत एकपष्टितमाया अनन्तरमेवानया दुपया कारिकाया
भाव्यम् । भाष्यगतप्रतीकानुरोधेन येषां कारिचंदं निर्माणं शक्यते—

कारणमीश्वरमेके भवते कालं परे स्वभावे वा ।

प्रजाः कथं निर्गुणगौ व्यक्तः कालः स्वभावश्च ॥

अस्ति चास्याः कारिकायाः पूर्वापरसन्दर्भसङ्गतिः । निरीश्वरत्वप्रतिपादकत्वाच्च
केनचिदसाहिष्णुना व्यावर्तितम् । किन्तु भाष्यध्यावनमना विस्मृतवान् । पूर्वेपा मते
स्वभावस्य, कालस्य, ईश्वरस्य वा जगन्मूलत्वमिति चेत्तान्तरमन्त्रेण बोध्यते—

स्वभावमेके कवयो वदन्ति कालं तथान्ये परिमुच्यमानाः ।

देवस्यैव महिमा तु लोके येनेदं ब्राम्हणे बाह्यचक्रम् ॥ ” इति

अस्या नष्टायाः कारिकायाः पूर्वादमन्मन्त्रतालुगारेण त्वेवं पठनीयम् ।—

‘ कारणमीश्वरमेके पुरुषं कालं परे स्वभावे वा । ’

सूर्यनारायणनास्त्रिणा च कृतमेतत्कारिकातण्डनं ॥ मयुक्तिकम् । तन्मनानुरोधे-
नैकपष्टितमकारिकाया भाष्यस्यान्तिमे कृतः, कृतां च माठरेण कृतः सुकुमारतरमिति-
शब्दस्य परानर्थः, प्रकृतकारिका विद्यावान्दस्यः कारिकाया भाष्यकृतयोः सम्भावनां
निराकरोति । एतदत्र विचारणीयम्—

पुरुषान्तराणि न पुनः पश्यन्ति, -गुणप्रकृतिरपि कुलबधूतोऽप्यधिका दृष्टा
वित्रेकेन न पुनर्दृश्यत इत्यर्थः ॥ ६१ ॥

भाष्यस्यादिमे भाग एवं पठ्यते—'अहमनेन पुरुषेण दृष्टाऽस्मीत्यस्य पुनः पुनः
दर्शनं नापैति, पुरुषस्यादर्शनमुपयार्तात्यर्थः । तत्र सुकुमारतरं वर्णयति—'एतदनन्तरं
भाष्यचरमभाष्यः—'न पुनर्दर्शनमुपयाति पुरुषस्य' इति पठनीयः । 'सुकुमारतरं वर्ण-
यति' इत्यनन्तरं 'केचिदीश्वरं कारणं ब्रुवते' इत्यादिपाठस्तु नितरामसङ्गत एव । नदी-
श्वरादीनां कारणत्वं प्रकृतेः सुकुमारतरस्त्वर्णनम् । अतो ध्रुवं केनचिदीश्वरनिरासामहि-
ष्णुना कारिकेन स्तेपिता । अन्येन च केनचिद्भारिकेण भाष्यमेतन्मूलकारिकाविहीनमिति
मत्वा तद्वैकपट्टिनकारिकाभाष्यान्तर्निवेशितं यथा स्थूलदर्शनरूपि विभाव्यते । अतः
एव 'न पुनर्दर्शनमुपयाति पुरुषस्य' इत्येवदनन्तरं तेन 'अतः प्रकृतेः सुकुमार-
सुभोग्यतरं न किमिदीश्वरादिकारणमस्तीति मे मतिर्भवति' इति महत्त्वार्थं प्रक्षिप्तम् ।
यथा च नैतन्महत्त्वमस्ति तथा स्फुटमेव । परं च, ईश्वरादीनां सुभोग्यत्वादिकथनमपि
मृगानन्तर्यकम् । एवं मातरवृत्तावपि यथाकथञ्चित् मग्न्यनमेव । अतो वाक्यस्या-
दीनां पुरत एव सुमेय कारिका ।

यस्तु 'ननु ईश्वरनिरासामहिष्णुत्वं कारिकाविलोपे प्रयोजकं चेत्, यथ नान-
तद्भाष्याविलोपे प्रयोजकं न स्यात्' इति मूर्यनारायणशास्त्र्याभिप्रायस्तत्र ब्रूमः—यस्य
शत्रु बुद्धिमतेः स्वानभिमानेन कारिका दृष्टिपर्यं गता, ॥ तस्य भाष्यं हरगोषरी-
भूतमिति सम्भाष्यते । न शत्रु भाष्यकारिकयोरप्यभिचारि गदावस्थानं, येन कारिका
निरासयन् भाष्यमपि बहिः कुर्यात् । भाष्य चास्मद्भाष्यवशात् तद्वस्ते पतितम् ।
अतस्तद्वशाद्बुद्धिम-यनन्तरभाष्याविलोपकालेन केन वा मूलकारिकाविहीनं भाष्यमेत-
द्विलोक्य यथाकथञ्चिद्वैकपट्टिनकारिकाभाष्यं नियोजितमिति रादान्तः ॥

अनुनामि - प्राचीनहस्तलिखितपुस्तकेषु मूलग्रन्थः टीकाग्रन्थतः पृथक् पृथक्
नेगनावस्थितत्वेन दृश्यते । तेन मूलग्रन्थस्यैव कारिका व्याख्यानं । भाष्यग्रन्थस्य
तत्त्वमये भ्रमस्तद्वत् भाष्यस्य अपि निश्चिनहसि । [हरदत्तसमी]

स्यादेतत्—“ पुरुषश्चेदगुणोऽपरिणामी, कथमस्य मोक्षः ? मुचेर्वन्धनविच्छे-
पायत्वात्, सवासनकृतेऽकर्माशयान्नाह बन्धनसमा-
(२६२) निर्गुणपुरुषमो- स्यानां पुरुषेऽपरिणामिन्यसम्भवात् । अत एवास्य च
क्षमसंसारसम्भवाद्वा ॥ पुरुषस्य न संसारः प्रेत्यभावापरनामाऽस्ति, निष्क्रि-
यत्वात् । तस्मात् ‘पुरुषविमोक्षणम्’ इति रिक्तं
वचः ”—इतीमां शङ्कामुपसंहारव्याजेनाभ्युपगच्छन्नप्राकरोति ॥

तस्मान्न बध्यते ऽहो न मुच्यते नापि संसरति कश्चित् ।

संसरति बध्यते मुच्यते च नानाश्रया प्रकृतिः ॥ ६२ ॥

“तस्मान्” इति । अहो न कश्चित् पुरुषो बध्यते, न कश्चित् संसरति,
न कश्चिन्मुच्यते । प्रकृतिरेव तु नानाश्रया सती
(२६३) तत्परिहारः- बध्यते संसरति मुच्यते केन । बन्धमोक्षसंसारः पुरुषे-
प्रकृतिगतानां संसार- पूष्यते ॥ यथा जयपराजयौ भूयःपराजयौ स्वामि-
दीना पुरुषे उपचारः ॥ न्युपचर्येते, तदाश्रयेण भूयःपराजयौ स्वामि-
तस्य च शोकलाभादेः स्वामिनि सम्भवात् । भोगा-
पवर्गयोः प्रकृतिगतयोरपि विवेकामहात् पुरुषस्यैव उपपादित इति सर्व-
मुपकलम् ॥ ६२ ॥

नन्ववगतम् ‘प्रकृतिगता बन्धसंसारपवर्गाः पुरुषे उपचर्यन्ते’ इति ।
(२६४) प्रकृत्या धर्मादि- विज्ञाधनाः पुनरेते प्रकृतेः ? इत्यत आह—
सत्तत्त्वैर्बन्धनमेकरूपेण
तत्त्वज्ञानरूपेण च मोक्ष-
णम् ॥

रूपः सन्नभिरेव तु यद्भान्यान्मानमात्मना प्रकृतिः ।

सैव च पुरुषार्थप्रति विमोचयत्येकरूपेण ॥ ६३ ॥

“रूपः” इति । तत्त्वज्ञानवर्जं बध्नाति धर्मादिभिस्त्वसमी रूपमार्धरिति ।
“पुरुषार्थप्रति” भोगापवर्गप्रति “आत्मानाऽऽत्मानम्” एकरूपेण तत्त्व-
ज्ञानेन विवेकव्याप्या विमोचयति, पुनर्भोगापवर्गं न करोतीत्यर्थः ॥ ६३ ॥

अवगतमीदृशं तावम्, ततः किमित्यत आह—

एवन्तस्याभ्यासाज्जासिष न मे नाहमित्यपरिशेषम् ।

अविपर्ययाद्विशुद्धं केवलमुत्पद्यते ज्ञानम् ॥ ६४ ॥

“ एवम् ” इति । तत्त्वेन त्रिवयेण तत्त्वज्ञानमुपलक्षयति । उक्तस्य
(२६५) अभ्यासात्तत्त्वज्ञानस्य तत्त्वविषयज्ञानाभ्यासादादयन्तत्त्वं दीर्घकालेति
नोत्पत्तिः ॥ तत्रैवपुरुषान्वयतासाक्षात्कारिज्ञानमुत्पद्यते । यद्विपर्य
म्यावित्यविपर्ययमेव साक्षात्कारमुपजनयति, तत्तत्
पयश्चाभ्यास इति तावत्साक्षात्कारं जनयति । अथ उक्तम्—“ विशुद्धम् ”
इति ॥

कृतं विशुद्धमित्यत आह—“ अविपर्ययात् ” इति । संशयविपर्ययोऽपि
(२६६) तत्त्वज्ञानस्य ज्ञानस्याविशुद्धी, तद्वद्विषयं विशुद्धतादिदुष्कृतं
विशुद्धिहेतुः अविपर्यय “ अविपर्ययात् ” इति । निवृत्तमनिसततया गृह्य
त्वम् ॥ संशयोऽपि विपर्ययः, तेन ‘ अविपर्ययात् ’ इति
संशयविपर्ययाभावो दर्शितः । तत्रैवविपर्ययाद्य मय
अविपर्ययाभावः ॥

स्यादेतत्—“ उपपत्त्यार्थात्साभ्यासात् तत्त्वज्ञानम्, तथा उपपत्त्यादिना
(२६७) अनादेर्मिथ्या मिथ्याज्ञानमंशक्येण मिथ्याज्ञानं जनयितव्यम्, तथा
ज्ञानाकाररसादिमत्ता च तन्निवृत्त्यनस्य संसारस्यानुच्छेदप्रयत्न इत्यत उक्तम्—
तत्त्वज्ञानमर्थकारण “ केवलम् ” इति—विपर्ययेणाप्यभिप्रायम् । यद्यपि
मनुच्छेदः ॥ नात्रिविपर्ययेवाभ्यासा तथा अपि तावज्ञानवापनः—

नयविपर्ययाज्जासिषमाह्वयया ऽऽदिगत्या ऽपि ज्ञानया समुच्छेत्तम् । तत्पर
पानः हि ज्ञानं स्वभावात्, यदाहुर्वाह्यं अवि—

“ निगमद्वयभूतार्थमवधारय विपर्ययः ।

न वाधोऽयमवधारय ऽपि मुच्छेदगन्तव्यतातः ” इति ॥

ज्ञानस्वरूपमुक्तम्—“ नास्मि, न मे, नाहम् ” इति । ‘ नास्मि ’ इत्यात्मनि क्रियामात्रक्षिपेयति । यथाहुः ‘ कृत्रमयः (२६८) तत्त्वज्ञानस्वरूप- क्रियामामान्यवचनाः ’ इति [मिदान्तकौमुदी.] । प्रदर्शनम्—सर्वविवाद्वा- तथा चाध्यवसायाभिमानमद्वैत्यालोचनानि चान्तराणि रनिवृत्तिः ॥ वाङ्मात्रं सर्वं ध्यायारा आत्मनि प्रतिबद्धानि बोद्धव्यानि । यतश्चात्मनि व्यापारावेशो नास्त्यतो ‘ नाहम् ’ ।

अहमिति कर्तृपदम्, ‘ अहं ज्ञानाभ्यासं श्रोत्रम्यहम् इदं ’ इति सर्वत्र कर्तुं परामर्शात् । निष्क्रियत्वे च सर्वत्र कर्तृत्वाभावः । ततः सुष्ठुक्तम्—“ नाहम् ” इति । अत एव “ न मे ” । कर्ता हि स्वामितां लभते, तस्मात् कुतः स्वाभाविकी स्वामितेत्यर्थः । अथवा “ नास्मि ” इति “ पुरयो ऽस्मि, न प्रमवधर्मा ” । अप्रसवधर्मित्वात्कर्तृत्वमाह—“ नाहम् ” इति । अकर्तृत्वाच्च न स्वामितेत्यन भावः—“ न मे ” इति ॥

ननु ‘ एताव’मु ज्ञातेष्वपि कश्चिन् कदाचिदज्ञातो विषयो ऽस्मि, न तज्ज्ञान- (२६९) तत्त्वज्ञानस्या- जन्तून् बन्धयिष्यति ’ इत्यत आह—“ अपरिशीपम् ” परिशीपत्वम् ॥ इति । नास्मि किञ्चिदस्मिन् परिशिष्टम् ज्ञातव्यम् यदज्ञानं बन्धयिष्यतीत्यर्थः ॥ ६४ ॥

(२७०) तत्त्वमाक्षात्कार- किं पुनरीदृशेन तत्त्वमाक्षात्कारेण निध्ननीयत फलम् ॥ आह—

तेन निवृत्तप्रसवामर्थवशान् सप्तरूपविनिवृत्ताम् । प्रकृतिम् पश्यति पुरुषः प्रेक्षकवदवस्थितः ‘ स्वच्छः ॥ ६५ ॥ ” तेन^१ इति । भोगविवेकमाक्षात्कारं हि प्रकृतेः प्रयोनयौ । तौ च प्रमृताविति नाम्नाः प्रसोतव्यमवशिष्यत इति निवृत्तप्रसवा प्रकृतिः । विवेक-ज्ञानरूपो यो ऽर्थमस्य वशः ग्रामर्थ्यम् तस्मात् । अतएवज्ञानपूर्वकाणि खलु धर्माधर्माज्ञानवैराग्यावैराग्यश्रवणनिध्यानि । वैराग्यमपि केवलनीष्टिकानाम- तत्त्वज्ञानपूर्वकमेव । तत्र तत्त्वज्ञानं विरोधित्रेनातत्त्वज्ञानमुच्छिनत्ति । कारण-

१. ‘ नाहमिति ’ तादात्म्यनिषेध इति केचिन् २. “ पुरय ” इति पाठान्तरम् । ३. विशुद्धे बलशानेनेति यावत् ।

निवृत्त्या च सप्तस्थाणि निवर्तन्त इति “सप्तस्थविनिवृत्ता प्रकृतिः”
 “अवस्थित” इति निष्क्रियः, “स्वच्छः” इति स्वस्तमोवृत्तिकलुष्य
 बुद्ध्या ऽसम्भिन्नः । सात्त्विक्या नु बुद्ध्या तदा ऽप्यस्य मनाक् सम्भेदो ऽस्थेयः,
 अन्यर्थवम्भूतप्रकृतिदर्शनानुपपत्तेरिति ॥ ६५ ॥

स्यादेतत्-‘निवृत्तप्रसवामिति न सृष्ट्यामहे । संयोगकृतो हि सर्ग इत्युक्तम्,
 (१७१) एकविषयम- योग्यता च संयोगः, भोकृत्वयोग्यता ॥ पुरुषस्य
 पक्षे निवृत्ताया अपि चैतन्यम्, भोग्यत्वयोग्यता च प्रकृतेर्जडत्वम् विषय-
 प्रकृतौर्विषयान्तरं प्रति त्वञ्च । न चैतन्योरस्ति निवृत्तिः । न च करणीया-
 प्रवृत्तिशङ्का ॥ भावाच्चित्तुः, तज्जानीयस्यान्यस्य करणीयत्वान् पुनः
 पुनः शब्दाद्युपभोगवत्-’ इत्यत आह—

दृष्टा मयेत्युपेक्षक एको, दृष्टा ऽहमित्युपरमत्यन्या ।

सति संयोगे ऽपि तयोः प्रयोजनप्राप्तिर्गर्गस्य ॥ ६६ ॥

“दृष्टा” इति । करोतु नाम पौनःपुन्येन शब्दाद्युपभोगप्रकृतिर्वया विवेक-
 रत्यातिर्न कृता, कृतविवेकरत्यातिम्बु शब्दाद्युपभोगञ्च
 (१७२) तज्जितः ॥ जनयति । अविवेकरत्यातिनिवन्धनो हि तदुपभोगो,
 निवन्धनाभावे न तज्जितुमर्हति, अंकुर इव बीजा-
 भावे । प्राकृतात् हि सुखदुःखमोहहमनः शब्दादीन्तद्विवेकान् ‘ममेतत्’
 इत्यभिमत्यमान आत्मा भुञ्जीत । एवं विवेकरत्यातिमपि प्राकृतीमविवेका-
 देवात्मा ‘मदर्थेयम्’ इति मन्यते । उत्पन्नविवेकरत्यातिम्बु तदर्थसर्गाच्छब्दा-
 दीन्प्रभोगोऽनुमर्हति नापि विवेकरत्यातिप्राकृतीमपि कर्तुम् । ततो विविक्त-
 आत्मा न स्वार्थमभिमतुमर्हति पुरुषार्थो च भोगविवेको प्रवृत्त्यारम्भप्रयो-
 जकश्चित्पुरुषार्थो मन्ता न प्रवृत्तिं प्रयोजयतः । नदिदमुक्तम्-“प्रयोजन-
 प्राप्तिर्गर्गस्य” इति । अथ प्रयुज्यते मर्गे प्रवृत्तिरनेनेति प्रयोजनम्, तद-
 पुरुषार्थो नाम्नीत्यर्थः ॥ ६६ ॥

१. उत्पन्नविवेकरत्यातिः

स्यादेतन्—“ उत्पन्नतत्त्वसाक्षात्कारश्चेद्वनन्तामेव मुक्तस्य तस्य देह-

(२७३) विविक्तस्या-
त्मनो देहपानात्प्रवृत्ति-
दर्शनमभ्यवशाद् ॥

पातः स्यादिति कथमदेहः प्रवृत्तिमप्येव । अथ
तत्त्वज्ञानेऽपि न मुख्यते कर्मणामप्रक्षीणत्वात् ? तेषां
कुतः प्रक्षयः ? ‘भोगात्’ इति चेत्, हन्त भोस्त-
त्त्वज्ञानञ्च भोगसाधनम्—इति ‘व्यक्ताव्यक्तविज्ञान-
जन्मना तत्त्वज्ञानेनापवर्गं’ इति रिक्तं वचः । ‘भोगेन

चापरिसंन्येयः कर्माशयप्रचयोऽनियतविपाककालः क्षेतभ्यः, ततश्चापवर्ग-
प्राप्तिः’ इत्यपि मनोरथमाश्रम्” इत्यत आह—

सम्यग्ज्ञानाधिगमात् धर्मादीनामकारणप्राप्तिः ।

तिष्ठति संस्कारवशात्, चक्रभ्रमिवद्धतशरीरः ॥ ६७ ॥

“सत्यम्” इति । तत्त्वसाक्षात्कारोदपादेवानादिरप्यनियतेविपाक-
कालोऽपि कर्माशयप्रचयो दुग्धधीजभावेतया न

(२७४) तजिराम.-
विविक्तस्यापि संस्कार-
वशाच्छरीरधारणम् ॥

आत्यायुर्भोगलक्षणाया कलाया कल्पते । क्लेशमलिला-
वसिक्तायां हि बुद्धिभूर्मा कर्मबीजान्यहुरं प्रमुवते ।
तत्त्वज्ञाननिद्रावनिर्गतसकलक्लेशसलिलायासूपरायां
कुतः कर्मबीजानामहुरप्रसवः ? तदिदमुक्तम्—“ धर्मा-

दीनामकारणप्राप्तिः” इति, अकारणत्वेप्राप्ताविगर्हः । उत्पन्नतत्त्वज्ञानोऽपि च
संस्कारवशात् तिष्ठति, यद्योपरतेऽपि कुण्डालभ्यापारे चक्रं वंगाल्यसंस्कारवशात्
भ्रमन् तिष्ठति । कालपरिपाकवशात्पुनरते संस्कारे निष्क्रियमभवति । शरीर-
स्थिती च प्रारब्धपरिपाकी धर्माधर्मा संस्कारी । तथा चानुभूयते—“ भोगेन
स्वितरे क्षयित्वाऽथ सम्पद्यते” इति “तस्य तावदेव चिरं यावन्न
विमोक्ष्येऽथ सम्पद्यते” इति च [छान्दोग्य, ६।१।२] । प्रक्षीयमाणाविद्या-
मंस्कारावशेषश्च संस्कारस्तद्वशात् तत्सामर्थ्यात् एतदशरीरस्तिष्ठति ॥ ६७ ॥

स्यादेतन्—“ यदि संस्कारशेषादपि एतदशरीरस्तथाऽपि कदाऽस्य मोक्षो
मविष्यति ? इत्यत आह—

(२७५) शरीरनाशे स-
कान्तिकारयन्तिकमुक्तिः ॥

प्राप्ते शरीरभेदे चरितार्थत्वात् प्रधानविनिवृत्तौ ।

ऐकान्तिकमात्यन्तिकमुभयं कैवल्यमाप्नोति ॥ ६८ ॥

“ प्राप्ते ” इति । अनारब्धविपाकानान्तावत् कर्माशयानां तत्त्वज्ञाना-
ग्निना बीजभावो दग्धः । प्रारब्धविपासनान्तूपगोणेन क्षये सति, “ प्राप्ते,
शरीरभेदे ” इति=विनाशे—“ चरितार्थत्वात् ” इति=कृतप्रयोजनत्वात् ।
प्रधानस्य तत्पुरुषप्रति विनिवृत्तौ—“ ऐकान्तिकम् ”=अवश्यम्भावि “ आत्य-
न्तिकम् ”=अविनाशि-इत्युभयं । “ कैवल्यम् ” दुःखत्रयविगममप्यप्येति
पुरुषः ॥ ६८ ॥

(२७६) सांख्यशास्त्र-

प्रमाणेनोत्पादिते उपत्यन्तधर्मात्पादनाय पर-

स्य परमर्षिप्रणीतत्वम् मर्षिपूर्वकत्वमाह—

पुरुषार्थज्ञानमिदं गुह्यम्परमर्षिणा समाख्यातम् ।

स्थित्युत्पत्तिप्रलयाश्चिन्त्यन्ते यत्र भूतानाम् ॥ ६९ ॥

“ पुरुष ” इति । “ गुह्यम् ” गुह्यानिवासि, स्थूलधियां दुर्बोधमिति
यावत् । “ परमर्षिणा ” कपिलेन नामैव श्रद्धामागमिकत्वेन द्रवयति—
“ स्थित्युत्पत्तिप्रलयाश्चिन्त्यन्ते यत्र भूतानाम् ” इति । ‘ यत्र ’ ज्ञाने=यदर्थम्,
यथा ‘ चर्मणि कृषिर्निहन्ति ’ इति । “ भूतानाम् ”=प्राणिनां “ स्थित्यु-
त्पत्तिप्रलयाः ” आगमः “ चिन्त्यन्ते ” ॥ ६९ ॥

(२७७) सांख्यशा-

स्त्रस्य गुह्यतयापरम्परा

कपिलाश्वत्थस्य परमर्षि-
परमन्तम् ॥

स्यादेतत्—“ यत् परमर्षिणा साक्षात्कथितम् तत्पू-
र्यमिह, दत्तुनरीश्वरकृष्णेन कथितम् तत्र वृत्तः
श्रद्धा ? ”—इत्यत आह—

एतन् पवित्रमन्यं मुनिरामुरयेऽनुरूपया प्रदर्श ।

व्यासुतिरपि पञ्चशिखाय, तेन च बहुधा कृतन्तन्धम् ॥ ७० ॥

“ एतन् ” इति । “ एतन् पवित्रम् ”=पावनम्-दुःखत्रयहेतोः पावनः
गुणानि—“ भाष्यम् ”=मर्षेभ्यः पवित्रेभ्यो मुन्यम्, “ मुनिः ” वदितः

आमुरये ऽनुकम्पया प्रददां, आमुरिरपि पञ्चशिखाय, तेन च बहुधा कृतं
नम्रम् ॥ ७० ॥

शिष्यपरम्परया ऽऽगतमीश्वरकृष्णेन चैतदार्याभिः ।

संक्षिप्तमार्यमतिना सम्यग्विज्ञाय सिद्धान्तम् ॥ ७१ ॥

(२७८) ईश्वरकृष्णस्य “ शिष्य ” इति । आरात्त्याता तत्वेभ्य इत्याद्यां,
आयां मनिर्यस्य सो ऽयम् “ आर्यमतिः ” इति ॥ ७१ ॥
गुरुशिष्यपरम्परा ॥

(२७९) सप्ततिक्कारि- एतच्च शास्त्रम्, सकलशास्त्रार्थमूषकद्वयात्, न तु
क्षाणा शास्त्रत्वम् ॥ प्रकरणमित्याह—

मतस्यां फिल येऽर्थास्तेऽर्थाः कृत्स्नस्य पण्डितम्बस्य ।

आख्यायिकाविरहिताः परवादविवर्जिताश्चापि ॥ ७२ ॥

“ मत्स्याम् ” इति । तथा च राजवार्तिकम् ॥

“ प्रधानास्तिष्यमेकवचमर्थवत्त्वमथान्यता ।

पाराध्यं च तथाऽनैक्यं वियोगो योस्य एव च ॥

दोषवृत्तिरकर्तृत्वं मालिकार्थाः स्मृता दश ।

विपर्ययः पञ्चविषयस्तथोक्तो नव तुष्टयः ॥

करणानाममामर्थ्यमष्टाविंशतिषा मतम् ।

इति षष्टिः पदार्थानामष्टभिः सह मिद्विभिः ॥ इति ॥

तेषां पण्डितपदार्थी कथितेति सकलशास्त्रार्थकथनाद्वेदभूतकरणमपि तु शास्त्रमेवे-
दमिति सिद्धम् । एकवचमर्थवत्त्वम् पाराध्यं च प्रधानमधिकृत्योक्तम् । अन्यत्रम-
कर्तृत्वम् यदुक्तञ्चेति पुरुषमधिकृत्य । अन्तिवम् वियोगो योगश्चेत्युभयमधि-
कृत्य । वृत्तिः क्यतिरिति स्थूलसूक्ष्ममधिकृत्य ॥ ७२ ॥

मनांभिः कुमुदानीव बोधयन्तो मतां मदा ।

ग्रीवाचस्यतिमिश्राणां कृतिः स्तात् तत्त्वकौमुदी ॥

इत्यखिलतन्त्रापरतन्त्रप्रतिभद्वादभदर्शनटीकाकृच्छ्री-

मदाचस्यतिमिश्रकृता सांख्यतत्त्वकौमुदी ॥

THE TATTVA—KAUMUDĪ S. N... [SĀṂKHYA]

An English Translation.*

(1) We bow to the One Unborn, Red, White and Black, producing many offsprings; we bow also to those Unborn Ones Who have recourse to Her while She is active, and renounce Her, on having undergone the experiences afforded by her.

—

To the Great Sage Kapīla, and to his disciple Āsuri, as also to Pañcasīkha and Is'varakṛpāna—to these we bow in reverence.

—

(2) In this world, that expounder is listened to by the audience, who offers expositions of facts Introduction to
Kārikā I whose knowledge is desired by them. On the other hand, one who expounds doctrines which no one cares for is regarded to be ignorant of worldly affairs as also devoid of the critical faculty; and such an expounder would be disregarded. The doctrine that people care to understand is just that which, on being understood, leads to the fulfilment of the highest aim of man. Consequently, as the science to be (hereafter) explained supplies the means to that final goal, the author introduces the inquiry into its subject-matter :—

—

* The translation of the Tattvakaumudī was done by me as a class-exercise when I was a student of the M. A. Class at the Queen's College, Benares. The revising of it, therefore, is a debt that I owe to the world of Scholarship. This revising I have done now. Though, having been done during the busiest part of my life, it may not be much of an improvement upon its predecessor, yet I am sending it out for what it is worth, and leave it to the mercy of competent critics. [Ganganath Jha.]

Kārikā 1

There being (in this world) an impediment caused by the three kinds of pain (there arises) a desire for enquiry into the means of alleviating them. And if (it be urged that) the enquiry is superfluous on account of (the existence of) obvious means,—(we reply that it is) not so; because these (latter) are neither absolute nor final.

(3) The subject-matter of a science would not be enquired into—(1) if there existed no pain in this scientific enquiry world; or (2) if, though extant, its removal were not desired; or (3) even if desired, its removal were impossible—such impossibility arising either from the fact of the pain being everlasting in its nature, or from the ignorance of the means of alleviating it, or (4) notwithstanding the possibility of removing it, if the subject-matter of the science did not afford the adequate means; or (5) lastly, if there were other and easier means elsewhere available.

(4) Now, that there is no pain and that its removal is not universally desired, are opposed to facts. **The three-fold division of pain** This is what is meant by the words: *There being an impediment caused by the three kinds of pain.* The three kinds of pain constitute (what is ordinarily called) the "triad of pain." These are : (1) the intrinsic (*Ādhyāt-mika*), (2) the extrinsic (*Ādhibhautika*) and (3) the divine or superhuman (*Ādhidaivika*). Of these the intrinsic is two-fold, bodily and mental. Bodily pain is caused by the disorder of the several humours, wind, bile and phlegm; and mental pain is due to desire, wrath, avarice, affection, fear, envy, grief, and the non-perception of particular objects. All these are called intrinsic on account of their being amenable to internal remedies. Pains amenable to external remedies are two fold : extrinsic and superhuman. The extrinsic are caused by men, beasts, birds, reptiles, and inanimate things; and the superhuman ones are due to the evil influence of

planets and the various elementals (Yakṣa etc.). Thus the fact that pain, which is a particular modification of the attribute of Rajas—is experienced by each soul, cannot be gainsaid. *Impediment* (*Abhigāta*) is the connection of the sentient faculty with the three kinds of pain subsisting in the internal organ, which are felt to be disagreeable. It is this idea of disagreeableness which has been mentioned as the incentive to the alleviation of pain. Though pain cannot be absolutely prevented, yet it is possible to alleviate it—as will be explained later on. This is what is meant by (enquiry to be made) *into the means of alleviating the three kinds of pain*. In the compound *tadapaghātake*, the pronoun *tat* refers to the three kinds of pain; and though this forms the subordinate factor in the preceding compound (*duḥkhatraya* etc.), yet in the mental conception it is the more proximate (and hence the following pronoun refers to it in preference to the other and primary factor of the compound)—What is meant by all this is that the means of alleviation, too, is only that which is set forth in the sciences,—none other.

(5) *An objection is raised: "On account of obvious remedies, such enquiry is superfluous."* That

Objection Inquiry
superfluous in pre-
sence of obvious
means

is to say: We grant that the triad of pain is there, and also that its removal is desirable; as also that the removal is possible, we go further, and grant that the means set forth in the sciences are adequate to the removal. With all this, however, the present enquiry becomes superfluous, because we have easier and obvious means for the removal of pain; and further because of the difficult character of the means prescribed in the sciences,—which consists of a full knowledge of abstruse philosophical principles, attainable only by a long course of traditional study extending over many lives. Says a popular maxim: 'When a man can find honey in a much-frequented place, wherefore should he go to the mountains?' So, when

the object of desire has been attained, which wise man will make any further attempt? Hundreds of remedies for *bodily* pain are laid down by eminent physicians; for *mental* pains also we have easy remedies in the shape of the attainment of the objects of enjoyment—such as women, desirable food and drink, unguents, dress, ornaments and the like. Similarly, of *extrinsic* pains we have easy remedies—such as expert knowledge of moral and political science, residence in safe places, etc. In the same manner, of *superhuman* troubles we have remedies in the shape of charms, incantations and the rest.”

(6) This objection is answered as follows—Not so—why?—Because these are neither absolute

Reply: Obvious means are not absolute nor final. Absoluteness of the means consists in the certainty of its effect; and its finality consists in the non-recurrence of the pain once removed. The absence of these two properties is denoted by the expression, “*Ekāntāyantaśobhāvah.*” The universal affix *īstā* has a genitive force here. The upshot of the whole is this: As a matter of fact, we find that even on the employment in the prescribed manner of the remedies mentioned above, such as medicines, women, moral and political science, incantations and the rest—the various kinds of pain are not actually alleviated; hence we predicate the want of certainty of the cure effected thereby; and similarly from the recurrence of pain once cured, we infer non-permanence of the cure. Thus though easily available, the obvious means do not effect absolute and final removal of pain. Consequently, the present enquiry is not superfluous.

(7) Though the mention of the word *pain* in the very beginning is inauspicious, yet that of the extirpatory means as leading to its removal is auspicious; and as such quite appropriate at the commencement of a treatise

Auspiciousness
of the beginning
word

(8) The following argument might be put forward:—

Objection: Vedic means adequate to removal of pain | “We grant the inadequacy of the obvious remedies; but we have others prescribed in the Vedas—in the shape of a host of such acts as the *Jyotistoma* etc., which extend over the whole year; these will certainly remove the three kinds of pain absolutely and finally. Says the *S’ruti*: ‘Desiring heaven one must perform sacrifices,’ and *Heaven* is thus described: ‘Happiness, unmixed and uninterspersed with unhappiness and attainable by pure longing for it’ is what is denoted by the word *Heaven*.’ *Heaven* thus consists in such happiness as is diametrically opposed to unhappiness or pain and which by its inherent capacity extirpates pain from its very roots; nor is this happiness short-lived,—for, declares the *S’ruti*: “We drank the *Soma* and became immortal.” [Atha-rvashiras III]. And if the celestial happiness were short-lived how could there be ‘immortality’? Hence the Vedic remedies for the removal of pain, which can be gone through in a moment, a few hours, a day, a month, or a year,—are far easier than discriminative knowledge, which can be attained only by a continuous effort extending over many lives. Thus again, the proposed enquiry remains superfluous.”

The answer to this is suggested in the following *Kārikā*.

Kārikā II

The revealed is like the obvious, since it is connected with impurity, decay and inequality. That which is contrary to that is better, proceeding from the right cognition of the Manifested, the Unmanifested and the Cogniser (Spirit).*

* This *Kārikā* embodies, as Davies rightly remarks, the leading principle of Kapila's philosophy according to which final emancipation is attainable not by religious rites, but by discriminative knowledge, as explained by Kapila.

- (9) *Anas'raṇa* is Veda, that which is heard during the tutorial lectures of a qualified teacher—and

Reply : The Vedic is like the obvious

not done (written). *Anas'raṇika* is that which is related to *Anas'raṇa* or Veda, i. e. which is derived or known therefrom. The

host of religious rites laid down in the Veda is equal to the obvious (remedies mentioned before);—both being equally inefficient in the absolute and final removal of the three kinds of pain. Though the text uses the generic term "Vedic" (*Anas'raṇika*), yet it ought to be taken as implying only the ritualistic section of it: because discriminative knowledge also forms part of the Veda (which of course is not what the author means). Says the S'ruti: "The Spirit should be known and discriminated from Primordial Matter." (*Brhadāraṇyaka*, 2-4-5); (by so doing) "the agent does not return, yea, he does not return (into this world)". (*Chāndogya*, 8-15)

- (10) Reasons for the above assertion are given: since it is connected with impurity, decay and

Because impure, decaying and excessive

excess. The impurity lies in the fact of the Soma and other sacrifices being accompanied by the killing of animals and the destruc-

tion of grains and seeds. Says the revered Pāṇcas'ikācārya: "It (the sin attendant upon slaughter) is slightly mixed, remediable and bearable." The 'slight mixture' meant here is that of the principle effect (*Apūrva* i. e. merit) of the *Jyotistoma* and other sacrifices, with the minor *apūrva* due to animal-slaughter which is the source of sin. The epithet 'remediable' implies that the sin is removable by certain ex-
the
ele-
ants:

and as long as these latter are being experienced, they are borne with patience; hence the qualification 'bearable'. Experts (in rituals) dangling in the nectar-tanks of heaven

attained by a mass of righteous deeds, have to bear the spark of the fire of pain brought about by the element of sin (involved in the rituals).

(11) It will not be right to argue that the generic law

The impurity of
animal slaughter
in a sacrifice
established

—"Kill not any animal," is set aside by the specific one, "Kill the animal dedicated to Agni-Soma"—because they do not contradict each other; and it is only when two laws are mutually contradictory, that the

stronger sets aside the weaker. In the present instance, however, there is no contradiction, the two laws treating of two entirely different subjects. For the negative law "Kill not etc.," only declares that killing is productive of sin or evil (and hence pain); but it does not deny the fact of its being necessary for the performance of sacrifices; and in the same manner, the injunction "Kill the animal etc.," declares that the killing of animal helps in the performance of sacrifice, but does not negative the fact of its being productive of sin. If it did so, there would be a syntactical split [*i. e.* the sentence "Kill the animal etc.," would bear two predicates—(1) 'The killing is helpful in the performance of sacrifice,' (2) and that 'it is not conducive to sin']. Nor is there any contradiction between the *productivity of sin* and the capability of *helping the performance of a sacrifice*. Animal-slaughter can produce sin in the man, and at the same time quite consistently help the performance of the sacrifice.

(12) The properties—"decay" and "inequality"—belong

Decay and ex-
cess shown to
apply to the re-
sults of Vedic
action

entity and a product. Further, the *Jyoti'soma* and other sacrifices are the means to the attainment of *Heaven* only, whereas the *Vājareya* and others lead to the attainment of the kingdom of *Heaven* (or, "the

sovereignty'). This is what constitutes the *inequality* spoken of. The greatness of the magnificence of one man is a source of pain to another of lesser magnificence.

(13) In the passage "Drinking Soma, we became immortal"—*immortality* stands for *long-durability*,—as is declared elsewhere: "Immortality is duration till the final dissolution of all finite existence." Hence the Śruti: "Neither by deeds, nor by children nor by wealth, but by renunciation alone they got immortality." [Mahānārāyaṇa Upaniṣad X—5], and again "Heaven shines in a remote and secluded valley, which the ascetics alone enter; by actions did the ascetics with children, desiring wealth, come by death; while those other wise sages, who were above all action, got immortality."

(14) With all this in view it is declared: *That which is contrary to that is preferable—proceeding from discriminative knowledge of the Manifested, the Unmanifested, and the Cogniser.* The term *that* stands for the Vedic remedy of removing pain. A method—contrary to the impure Soma sacrifice etc. bringing about unequal and short-lived results,—is pure i. e. unmixed with the evils due to animal-slaughter and leading to results not unequal. This is clear from the Śruti precluding all return to metempsychosis for people possessing discriminative knowledge. The argument based on the said result being a caused entity cannot be urged as a ground for its non-permanence, because this holds only in the case of the effect being a positive entity; in the present case, however, the effect—the removal of pain—though a product,

Kārikā III

Root-matter is not a product; the group of seven consisting of the Great Principle and the rest are both product and productive; and the Spirit is neither a product nor productive.

Briefly, the objects treated of in the system are of four kinds: some of them are merely *productive*, some merely *products*, others *both productive and products*, and others, *neither the one nor the other*.

(18) To the question—What is the *productive*?—the answer is—Primordial Root-matter is not a

The Productive product; 'Root-matter' (*Prakṛti*)* is that which produces (*prakaroti*): it is also called 'Pradhāna' (Primordial), which represents the three Attributes of *Sattvas*, *Rajas* and *Tamas* in the state of equilibrium;—that is *purely productive*. Why it is so is explained by the term 'Mūla', 'Root'; i e, it is that 'Matter' which is the 'Root'; it is the root of the Universe which is an aggregate product; of this Matter itself there can be no root; or else we would be landed in an unwarranted *regressus ad infinitum*.

(19) How many are the objects that are *both productive and products*, and which are these? The

The Productive-Products answer is—The group of seven consisting of the Great Principle and the rest are both; i e, they are *products* as well as *productive*. The Great Principle (*Buddhi*) is the root of Egoism (*Ahāṅkāra*), and the product of Root-matter; so is Principle of Egoism the root of the

* What the term 'prakṛti' stands for has been made clear here. Henceforth, the term shall be rendered either as 'Root-matter' or simply as 'Nature.'

five subtle Primary Substances together with the eleven sense-organs, and it is also the product of the Great Principle; and so are the five subtle Primary Substances the root of the grosser elements, Ākāśa and the rest, and, at the same time, the product of Egoism.

- (20) How many are the *products*; pure and simple, and what are they? Answer:—*The products are sixteen—i. e., sixteen in number, the*

The Products

'tu', which should be taken as coming after 'vikārah' (in the text). Though the cow, the jar, the trees and the rest are products of the earth, and so are curd and sprout, of milk and seed respectively, which latter are the products of the cow and the tree, yet these facts do not touch our position, since trees etc., do not differ from earth, in their essence, and it is the productiveness of something different in essence, for which the term Root, "Prakṛti" stands; and that the cow, the tree etc., do not differ from each other in their essence, is proved by the fact that they have, in common, the properties of grossness and perceptibility.

- (21) That which is *neither productive nor product*, is now

The non-productive

described—*the Spirit is neither a product nor productive*. All this will be explained later on.

- (22) In order to prove the above statement, the different kinds of proof (Means of Right Cognition)

Three kinds of proofs

have to be described. Nor can there be a particular definition without a general one. Hence the definition of Means of Right Cognition in general follows:—

Kārikā IV

Perception, Inference, and Valid Assertion are accepted as the three kinds of Means of Right Cognition; because these include all forms of Means of Cognition. It is through the Means of Cognition that the objects of Cognition are properly cognised.

(23) *Means of Cognition are accepted*:—here the term 'Means of Cognition' only states the thing to be defined; and the explanation of the term would constitute the definition of 'Means of Cognition'; this explanation being that the *Means of Cognition is that through which things are cognised*. Thus the said Means comes to be recognised as the *Instrument of Right Cognition*. This represents a mental condition free from the contact of all that is either doubtful or wrong or unknown, what is brought about by this instrument is Right Cognition in the form of an apprehension by the human agent; and that which leads to such right notion is the 'Means of Cognition.' Thus the 'Means of Cognition' become differentiated from all that leads to wrong notion, viz. doubt, misconception, remembrance, and the like, which (on that account) are not the 'Means of Right Cognition.'

(24) The author now rejects the different views with regard to the number of Pramāṇas: "Of three kinds;"—that is, of the Means of Right Cognition in general there are three kinds, neither more nor less. This we shall explain in detail after the particular definitions of the various Means of Right Cognition.

(25) Now, there arises the question—*which are the three kinds of Means of Right Cognition?*
 Only three kinds of proof The answer is—*Perception, Inference, and Valid Assertion*. The above is an exposition of what are popular forms of Cognition; as a philosophical

system is expounded for the benefit of the ordinary people, who alone are capable of benefitting by it. The intuition or supernatural forms of Cognitions which appear in the great sages and adepts,—though realities,—do not in any way help the ordinary people, and as such are not treated of here

(26) *Objection*:—"We grant that the number of *Prāmāṇas* is not less than three; but wherefore should the inclusion of is not less than three; but wherefore should
~~it not be more than three? The different~~

is, all forms of Right Cognition are included—i. e. comprehended—under these three, Perception, Inference, and Valid Assertion. This is going to be explained later on, as said above.

(27) *Question*:—"Why should the philosophic system proceed with general and special definitions of the Means of Right Cognition, when it is launched forth with the express purpose of defining the *Prameyas*, i. e. the objects of Right Cognition?" *Answer*—It is by the Means of Right Cognition that objects of Cognition can be rightly cognised. Siddhi means apprehension—Cognition.

(28) The explanation of the *Kārikā* follows the sense, not the order of words.
 The order of explanation

(29) Now on the occasion of the definition of the special Means of Cognition, the author of the *Kārikā*, first of all, defines Perception, since it precedes and is superior to other Means of Cognition, and because these latter, Inference and the rest, are dependent upon it; and lastly, because with regard to it all parties are agreed.

Karika V

'Perception' is definite Cognition of particular objects. Inference has to be by means of signs and Revela-
tion.

The term 'Per-
the sentence
differentiation
(of the thing defined) from things of the same class, as
well as from those of other classes.

(30). The literal meaning (of the definition of Perception
— '*prativisayaādhyavasāyah*') may be thus
defined as the definite cognition
of particular ob-
jects obtained
through senses

The Earth and other substances, as also Pleasure, Pain
and the rest are 'objects' for us; but things in the form of the
Elemental Substances are not 'objects' for us; though these also
are 'objects' for the Yogin and the divine beings.—The
term '*prativisaya*' denotes that which bears upon each particu-
lar object, i. e. the sense-organ;—'bearing upon' means
contact so that what the term '*prativisaya*' stands for is the

stands for that exuberance of the attribute of Sattva
which results from the suppression in the Will of the attribute
of 'Tamas' due to the contact of the sense-organs with
their respective objects;—this is what is called *crtti* and
also '*jñāna*,'—i. e. 'Cognition'.—This sense cognition is a means

of cognition and what is brought about by this means is the Right Cognition which is a form of assistance rendered to the Sentient Faculty.

(31) In its essence the *Buddhi* is insentient, being, as it is, a product of Root Matter; consequently the Cognitions are insentient Cognition which is a function of the *Buddhi* is also insentient, just like the Jar and such things. Similarly such other products of *Buddhi* also as pleasure and the rest are insentient. The Spirit, however, not being radically affected by pleasure and the rest, is sentient; this Spirit appears as if having the Cognition and the Pleasure and such other things by virtue of the image cast therein by the reflection of the Cognition and the Pleasure which really subsist in *Buddhi*; also it is in this manner that the Sentient Being (Spirit) comes to be favoured (by *Buddhi*), and *Buddhi* as also its Cognition, though in themselves insentient, appear as if sentient by virtue of being reflected in the Sentience (of the Spirit). This is what is going to be described under *Kārikā* 20, below.

(32) The use of the term '*adhyasaṃyā*,' 'Definite Cognition,' in the text excludes Doubt. Differentiation of terms in the definition of Perception

term '*viśāya*,' 'object,' excludes Wrong Cognition, the object of which is non-existent.—The use of the particle '*prati*' indicates the contact of the sense-organ with the object and as such excludes Inference, Remembrance and other forms of Cognition.

(33) The use of the term '*prati*' indicates the contact of the sense-organ with the object and as such excludes Inference, Remembrance and other forms of Cognition.

Final Definit
of Perception

excluding, as it does, all other things, those of the same kind as well as others. Other definitions provided by philosophers have not been either defended, or criticised for fear of prolixity.

(34) The *Lokāyatika* (materialist) says that Inference is

Inference, a distinct Means of Cognition

not a Means of Cognition; if so, how could he know whether the person he was addressing was ignorant or in doubt or perverse? Certainly the ignorance, doubt and perverseness

of another person cannot be cognised through Sense-perception, by a person with ordinary powers of perception. Nor can they be said to be cognised by any other Means of Cognition: as the Materialist does not admit of any such means except Sense-perception.—Under the circumstances, if, without knowing whether the person addressed is ignorant or in doubt or perverse, the Materialist were to go about addressing any and every person at random—he would be despised by all intelligent persons as mad and as one whose words should not

of Cognition.

(35) Inasmuch as Inference follows from Perception, it

Definition of Inference general

is only right that it should be defined after Perception; then again, inasmuch as a definition of Inference in general must precede that

of particular forms of it, the author provides the definition of

natural concomitance (with the Major Term) has been duly recognised after all suspected and assumed adventitious

accidents have been eliminated; and that with which the Middle Term is so concomitant is the 'more extensive' Major Term. The terms "Middle Term" and "Major Term" which

Inference is led up to by the Cognition of the fact that the Smoke is 'less extensive' than the Fire which is 'more extensive';—
 "Smoke is in-
 which has
 as to be
 repeated and taken in the sense of that in which the 'Linga', (Middle Term) is present; that in the cognition that the Middle Term (Smoke) is present in the Minor Term (Hill).
 —Thus then the definition of Inference in general comes to

(36) —The author recalls the particular forms of Inference described under another philosophical system

Definition of
particular forms
of Inference (Nyāya)—Inference has been declared to be of three kinds ; i. e. Inference that has been just defined in its general form has three special forms, called (1) 'Pūrvavat' A priori, (2) 'Ś'esavat' A posteriori, and (3) 'Sāmānyatodrsta' based on general observation.

(37) First of all, Inference is of two kinds—Vita and Acita;—that which functions through an affirmation is the Vita-affirmative, and that which functions through negation is the Acita, Negative.

First division of
Inference into
Vita and Acita

(38) Of these two, the *Aviśta* is also called 'S'esavat.'

Aviśta, the negative Inference defined

I-f-----A-----S'----- that which
 nce is
 x its
 t- (in

the *Nyāyabhāṣya* on 1. 1. 5).—The *S'esavat* Inference is that in which, with regard to an object, some of the likely properties being denied and eliminated, and there being no likelihood of their belonging to some others, we have the Cognition of *that which remains* (undenied and uneliminated). An example of this negative *Aviśta* will be cited later on (under *Kārikā* 9, Para 70).

(39) The *Vita* Inference is of two kinds—(1) The

Two kinds of
Vita

Pūrvavat, *A Priori*, and (2) the *Sāmānyatodṛṣṭa*, 'Based on general observation.' Of these the first '*Pūrvavat*,' has for its object

that 'universal' of which a specific 'individual' has been perceived; the term '*Pūrvavat*' [contained in the name '*Pūrvavat*'] means *well-known*,—i. e. that 'universal' of which the 'specific individual' has been perceived;—and that Inferential Cognition of which such a 'universal' is the object is called '*Pūrvavat*': e. g. when, from the presence of Smoke, we infer the presence of the particular '*Universal Fire in the Hill*'; and in this case this '*Universal Fire* is one of which a

must be an organ by the instrumentality whereof the Cognition of Colour, or of Touch, has been brought about';—though of

the 'Universal', 'Instrument', we have seen the 'specific individuals' in the form of the Axe etc.; yet that particular form of 'instrument' which is referred in relation to the Cognition of Colour and such things has never been perceived: that particular form of 'instrument' is that which is regarded as belonging to the 'Universal' 'sense-organ,' and any 'specific individual' of that *Universal* sense-organ cannot be perceptible to us, persons of ordinary vision,—in the way in which the particular 'individual' of the *Universal* 'Fire' is seen.—This is what distinguishes the *Pārcavat* from the *Sāmānyatodrsta*, though both are equally '*Vila*'.—In the term '*Sāmānyatodrsta*', '*drsta*' stands for '*dars'ana*,' Cognition.—'*Sāmānyatah*' stands for '*Sāmānyasya*', of the '*Universal*',—the affix '*tan*' being capable of signifying the sense of all case-endings;—thus the term '*Sāmānyatodrsta—anamāna*' stands for the '*Anumāna*,' Inferential Cognition, of that particular '*universal*' of which a '*specific individual*' has not been perceived.—All this has been fully explained by us in the '*Nyāyavārtikāt-para*!ikā, and we do not repeat it here for fear of being too prolix.

- (40) When an experienced person, directing another experienced person; utters a few words (such as 'Bring the Cow'),—and the latter, thus directed, acts in a certain manner (i. e. brings the cow),—the person watching all this infers that the action of the directed person was not to be understood etc.

and the action performed,—further, a word is found to express its meaning when the action is performed of the

finer Valid Assertion—'Valid Assertion is right revelation'; 'Valid Assertion' 'āptavacanā' is the term to be defined, and the rest of the sentence is its definition; the term 'āpta-s'rati' means that 'S'rati', revelation, which is 'āpta'; 'right'; the term 'revelation' stands for that Cognition of the meaning of a sentence which is brought about by that sentence.

(41) This Valid Assertion is self-sufficient in its authority; i. e. it is always right, in as much as it is brought about by the words of the Veda which being independent of human authorship, is free from all defects (that make words unreliable). It is for this same reason that the knowledge derived from the Itihāsa and the Smṛiti, which are based upon the Veda, is regarded as right.

(42) As regards the primeval sage Kapila (the founder of the Sāṃkhya Philosophy), it is possible that he remembered the revealed texts that he had studied during previous time-cycles; just as things known on the previous day are remembered on the next day, after waking from sleep. That such remembrance is possible is indicated by the conversation between Avatyā, and Jaigīśavya, where the revered Jaigīśavya speaks of his remembering things that occurred in past lives, extending over ten Time-cycles—in the text—"while I was evolving during ten Time-cycles etc., etc."

(43) The introduction of the epithet 'āpta' 'Right', in the term 'Right Revelation' ('āptavacanam') serves to exclude all pseudo-revelations, such as the scriptures of the 'S'ākya-Bhikṣu' (Buddhist) the 'Nirgranthaka' (Jaina), the 'Sāṃsāramocaka' (Materialist who regards killing an animal virtuous because it frees it from the pains of existence) and others. That these scriptures are not right is to be inferred from (a) internal

contradictions, (b) being devoid of any sound basis, (c) containing assertions unsupported by proofs and (d) being accepted by only a few low and beast-like persons *Mlecchas* and others.

(44) The particle 'ta' (' and ') distinguishes 'Valid Assertion' from 'Inference'. *What the Sentence* 'Valid Assertion' expresses (the meaning) is an *object cognised* (by means of that Sentence), but the Sentence is not a 'property' (characteristic) of that *object*; and hence it could not serve as its *inferential indication* (as the *Smoke* is of the *Fire*). Further, when the C.

expresses a meaning that has never before been cognised as expressed by that sentence, [So that there has been no previous cognition of the invariable concomitance between the Sentence and the Meaning, and without the cognition of such concomitance, there can be no Inference].

(45) Thus then, the nature of 'Means of Cognition' in general and of that of the particular means of cognition being as described above,—it follows that all the other means of cognition, —such as 'Analogy'—and the rest,—which have been posited in the other philosophical systems, are all included among those that have been described above.

(46) For instance, 'Analogy' has been illustrated by means of the assertion 'As the Cow so the *gavaya*'; and (in as much as this is a verbal 'Analogy' included under 'Valid Assertion', and 'Inference' and 'Perception')

fines Valid Assertion—'Valid Assertion is right revelation': 'Valid Assertion' '*āptavacanā*' is the term to be defined, and the rest of the sentence is its definition; the term '*āpta-s'ruti*' means that '*S'ruti*', revelation, which is '*āpta*', 'right': the term '*revelation*' stands for that Cognition of the meaning of a sentence which is brought about by that sentence.

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Pseudo-Revelations

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(44) The particle 'ta' ('and') distinguishes 'Valid Assertion' from 'Inference'. *What the Sentence 'Valid Assertion' expresses (the meaning) is an object cognised distinct from 'Inference' (by means of that Sentence), but 'the Sentence is not a 'property' (characteristic) of that object, and hence it could not serve as its inferential indication (as the Smoke is of the Fire). Further, when the Sentence expresses its meaning it does not stand in need of a previous connection (concomitance) between itself and*

expresses a meaning that has never before been cognised as expressed by that sentence [So that there has been no previous cognition of the invariable concomitance between the Sentence and the Meaning, and without the cognition of such concomitance, there can be no Inference].

(45) Thus then, the nature of 'Means of Cognition' in general and of that of the particular means of cognition being as described above,—it follows that all the other means of cognition,—such as 'Analogy' and the rest,—which have been posited in the other philosophical systems, are all included among those that have been described above.

(46) For instance, 'Analogy' has been illustrated by means of the assertion 'As the Cow so the *gavaya*'; and (in as much as this is a verbal 'Analogy' included under 'Valid Assertion', and 'Inference' and 'Perception'

denotative of the animal similar to the cow* [which has been regarded as the cognition resulting from *Analogy*],—this is purely *inferential*; the inference being in the following form—

'When experienced persons use a certain term in reference to a particular thing, it should be regarded as denoting it,—specially, when there is no function other than *Direct Denotation*, (through which the term could be applicable to that thing); —as is found in the well-known case of the term 'cow' applied to the animal genus 'cow'; (*Major Premiss*).

'The term *gavaya* is used (by experienced persons) in reference to the animal similar to the cow':—(*Minor Premiss*).

'Therefore, the term *gavaya* must be regarded as denotative of that animal.' (*Conclusion*)

This cognition is purely *inferential*

Lastly, the notion that 'the animal before our eyes is similar to the cow',—this is purely *perceptual*. Thus then, when the cow is remembered, and its remembrance is seen in the *gavaya*, this is perception pure and simple; certainly it is not something regarded to be a conglomeration of the component parts of the body of one animal is found to be almost the same as that in the body of another; and this same conglomeration can be one only; so that when it has been perceived in the *gavaya*, it must be the same in the cow also.—Thus then, (every notion involved in what has been regarded as *Analogical Cognition* being found to be either *verbal* or *inferential* or *perceptual*), there is nothing left which could be regarded as the objective of a fourth means of cognition in the shape of 'Analogy'. We conclude therefore, that 'Analogy' is not a distinct means of Cognition

(47) Similarly 'Presumption' also is not a distinct Means of Cognition. For instance, the

'Presumption' included under 'Inference' example of 'Presumption' that has been cited by the Ancients is the case where on finding

that *Caitra*, who is alive, is not in the house, there is presumption of his being somewhere outside. As a matter of fact, however, this also is a case of Inference. In the case of our own body we easily recognise the premiss that 'when a finite object is not present in one place, it is present in another place,—and also that when a finite object is present in one place, it is not present in another place';—when, therefore, we find that 'the living *Caitra* is not in the house,'—and from this Minor Premiss (taken along with the former Premiss) we deduce the conclusion that he must be somewhere outside the house,—this is a clear case of Inference. The presence of *Caitra* somewhere in the world cannot set aside his *absence in the house*; and when it is not so set aside this *absence in the house* cannot fail to be a valid reason for his *presence outside the house*. [So that the Inference would not be open to the Fallacy of the 'Unknown']. Nor again does *Caitra's absence in the house* set aside his *existence* entirely; and only if it were so set aside would this *existence* be unable to establish itself outside the house. [So on this ground also the Inference is not fallacious]. To explain—Is *Caitra's non existence in the house* inconsistent with his *existence* itself? Or only with his *existence in the house*?—It cannot be the former, because there can be no inconsistency between *existence somewhere* and *non-existence in the house*; for the simple reason that the two things are entirely different.—It might be argued that—"When it is asserted that *he must be somewhere*, his *existence in some place in general* being asserted (without any particular place being specified),—in as much as the *House* also would be included under 'place in general', the assertion might imply *existence*

in the house also; and in this manner the subject-matter being the same, there would be an inconsistency between *existence somewhere* and *non-existence in the House*."—This, however, cannot be right. *Non-existence in the house* is known definitely and for certain, while (even in the manner shown) the notion of *existence in the house* (as implied by *existence somewhere*) would be only doubtful and implied, and as such this could never set aside the former definite cognition—And though the definitely ascertained *non-existence in the House* sets aside the implied and doubtful *existence in the House*, it cannot set aside the man's *existence*; nor can it remove the doubt (regarding the possibility of *existence in the house* implied in the general notion of *existence somewhere*). What is

when on the basis of *non-existence in the House*, as the only ascertained reason (Middle term), we deduce the man's *existence outside*,—it is a case of *Inference*.

This same reason disposes of also another definition of 'Presumption' as consisting in 'the removal of the inconsistency between two valid cognitions by relegating them to distinct spheres;' because, as a matter of fact, there is no inconsistency between what is restricted (*non existence in the House*) and what is not restricted (*existence somewhere*).

Other examples of Presumption may be shown, as above, to be included under Inference.

From all this it follows that as a means of cognition, Presumption is not distinct from Inference.

(48) Similarly, *Abhāpa*, 'Absence', is only a form of Perception. The absence of the Jar, at a

'Absence' included
under 'Percep-
tion'

certain place is not anything distinct from a particular modification of the place itself in the form of *vacancy*; all entities—with the

'sole operation' of the Sensitive Faculty—~~are~~ consequently

"... the modifications

"... be no object,

"... which could form

the subject-matter of a distinct means of cognition in the form of 'Absence'.

(49) 'Probability' has been regarded as a distinct means of cognition, as leading to such cognitions as

that of the presence of the lesser weights—such as the '*Drona*' the '*Āḍhaka*' the '*Prastha*'—in the heavier weight the '*Khāri*'

—This also is a case of Inference only. As a matter of fact, the heavier weight of the *Khāri* has been found to be invariably concomitant with the lesser weights of the *Drona* etc.; and it is this concomitance that leads to cognition of the presence of these lesser weights in the heavier weights.

(50) As for 'Rumour' it is a mere continuity of a vague assertion of which the original source cannot

'Rumour' is not
a valid means of
cognition

be traced; it generally appears in the form 'the old people have said so and so'; such assertions for instance as 'there is a ghost

living on this banyan tree'.—This is not a distinct means of cognition; because, its original source being undetermined, it must remain open to doubt; and if the original source is known and known to be trustworthy, then, it is a case of 'Verbal Cognition' pure and simple.

Thus it becomes established that *there are three Means of Cognition*.

(51) Thus have been defined the Means of Cognition or Proofs, necessary for the demonstration of the existence of the 'Manifest', the 'Unmanifest' and the 'Knowing' (Spirit). As for the 'Manifest', in the shape of Earth and the rest,—even the dusty-footed ploughman knows it directly through Perception; he knows also such (invisible) things as the Fire (in the mountain-cave) by means of a priori Inference based upon the perception of such indicative marks as the Smoke and the like. Under the circumstances, if a philosophical system were to deal with such things, it would not be of much use. It follows, therefore, that what should be dealt with by Philosophy is what is difficult to know by the ordinary means of Knowledge—Hence the author proceeds to show what Means of Cognition among those above described are capable of providing the knowledge of what things.—

Kārik VI

The knowledge of supersensuous things is obtained through 'Inference, based on general observations' that imperceptible thing which cannot be known even through that is known through Trust-worthy Revelation.

(52) The particle 'in' (in the text) distinguishes the 'Inference based on general observation' from 'Perception' and from the 'A priori Inference'. The former is the knowledge of things and the rest—observations; the latter is the operation of the Buddhi in the form of its reflection in the Cognitive Spirit.—The mention of this particular form of Inference is only illustrative; it should be taken to include the *A posteriori* Inference also.

(53) *Question*—"Is it only the *Inference based on general observation* that is effective in bringing about

Things known
through Revela-
tion

the cognition of all supersensuous things?"

If that were so, then it would mean that no such things exist as Heaven, Unseen Force,

Divinities, or the order of evolution of the *Mahat* and the other Principles,—in regard to which the said Inference is not applicable"—In answer to this it is added—'That *imperceptible thing etc.*:' what was intended to be said would have been secured by the use of the term '*Tasmāt*' only; hence the presence of the particle '*ca*' is to be taken as meant to include the *A Posteriori* Inference also

(54) "Granted all this. But the non perception of

Objection

such objects as 'sky-flowers,' 'tortoises' hair,' 'hare's horns' and the like leads to

their being regarded as non-existent; in the same way we might infer the non existence of Nature and the rest (which are, like sky-flowers, not amenable to perception). This being the case, why should the existence of them be sought to be proved by a recourse to the various kinds of Inference?"

The answer to this is as follows—

Kārikā VII

(Non-perception of things arises) from excessive distance, proximity, destruction of the sense-organs, absence of mind, subtlety, intervention, suppression, (of other objects), and intermixture with other like objects.

(55) '*From excessive distance*'—The "non-perception"

The different
causes of the
non-perception
of objects, ex-
plained

of the following Kārikā is to be construed along with this, in accordance with the maxim of the 'Lion's back-ward glance'—

* "The maxim of 'the lion's back-ward glance' is generally used to mark the connection of a thing with what precedes and follows "

A bird soaring high, though existing, is yet not perceived by the eye, on account of its *extreme remoteness*. 'Excessive' (*ati*) must also be taken with 'proximity' (*sāmiptya*)—e. g. the collyrium applied to the eye is not seen, because of extreme nearness.

"*Destruction of organs*"—e. g., blindness, deafness, etc.

"*From absence of mind*"—e. g., a person, under the influence of love or some other strong emotion does not perceive things, even in bright day-light, though quite within the range of his senses.

"*From subtlety*"—e. g., however much one may concentrate one's mind (i. e., however attentively one may look) one can never perceive atoms and such other things, though they may be under one's very eyes.

"*From Intervention*"—e. g., one cannot see the Queen and other persons hidden behind the walls.

"*From suppression*"—e. g., the planets and stars are not seen during the day, because they are suppressed by the brighter rays of the sun.

"*From intermixture*"—e. g., one does not perceive drops of rain-water, disappearing in a tank.

(56) The particle 'ca' in the Kārikā has a collective force, and it includes even those not here mentioned; such as 'non-manifestation' also becomes included (among the causes of non-perception)—as one cannot perceive, in the milk, the curd, because the latter has not become manifested.

(57) The upshot of the whole then is this:—The non-existence of a certain object cannot be inferred merely from the fact of its not being perceived; for there is danger of such a principle being unwarrantably stretched too far. For instance, a certain individual, getting out of his house, would in that case, conclude that the people in the house are non-existent, simply because he does not see them. As a matter of fact, however, it is not so. The fact is that it is only

with reference to objects capable of being perceived at the time, that their non-perception leads to the inference of their non-existence. And this *capability of being perceived* can never belong to such things as Nature, Spirit and the rest (which are by their nature imperceptible); and as such it cannot be right for intelligent men to infer their non-existence merely from their non-perception.

Question—Which of the above mentioned causes (of non-perception) applies in the case of Nature etc. ?

The answer is—

Kārikā VIII

The non-perception of these (Nature and the rest)

is due to its subtlety, not to its non-existence; since it is actually apprehended through its effects. These effects are the Great Principle, and the rest—effects (some of) which are similar, and (some) dissimilar to Nature.

(58) " Why should we not," continues the objector, "attribute the non-apprehension of Nature to its non-existence, as we do in the case of the seventh kind of Raga (in eatables) ?"

The Author replies — "*Not due to its non-existence*". Why? "*Because it is apprehended through its effects.*" 'It' refers to Nature. The proofs of the apprehension of the Spirit will be adduced later on, in Kārikā XVII. If we find direct sense-perception inapplicable in the case of objects whose existence is ascertained by sound and valid means of knowledge, what this proves is the incapacity of sense-perception (and not the non-existence of the object itself).* The seventh

Rasa, however, has not its existence ascertained by any valid means of knowledge, and hence the *incapacity* of sense-perception cannot be urged in its case. Such is the sense of the text.

(59) *Question*.—"What are the effects from whose existence, you infer that of Nature?"

Answer.—"The Great Principle, and the rest are the effects." This will be explained later on (Kārikā XXII).

Next are mentioned the similarity and dissimilarity in forms, of these effects, with Nature—the comprehension of both of which is helpful to discriminative wisdom:—"Similar and dissimilar to Nature."

This will be further explained in Kārikā XXIII *et. seq.*

(60) All that (the existence of) the effect indicates is

Different views with regard to the nature of the effect. (1) The Buddhist view of the effect being an entity arising from non-entity. (2) The Vedānta view of the whole series of effects being a mere evolution from a single real entity. (3) The Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika view of the effect being a non-entity arising from entity. (4) The Sāṃkhya view of the effect being an entity arising from an entity.

that there is a Cause; in regard to this subject (of cause and effect) there is a difference of opinion among philosophers. (1) Some people assert that the 'existent' (effect) emanates from the 'non-existent' (cause); (2) others represent all effects as mere illusory evolutions from out of a single entity, and not real entities in themselves; (3) others again hold that the 'non-existent' (effect) emanates from the existent (cause); (4) lastly, the revered ones declare that the 'existent' (effect) emanates from the 'existent' (cause).

(61) Under the first three of these theories, the existence of Nature (Primordial Root-Matter) cannot be proved. As a matter of fact, the world is found to consist of Sound and other Elements which are only different forms and modifications of Pleasure, Pain, and Delusion; and it is this fact which goes to prove that the cause of the world is the Primordial Matter consist in its being *Satva, Rajas* and of Pleasure, Pain and Delusion. *Just as the cause, if the 'existent' effect*

non-existent can never be of the nature of the existent.—If (as under the second view) the entire phenomenon of Sound and the rest were the illusory evolution out of a single 'existent' Being,—then also it cannot be proved that the 'existent' effect

phenomenal as constituting the phenomenal must be wrong.—Even under the theory of Kaṇḍa and Gautama,—that 'the non-existent effect is born out of the existent cause,'—as there could be no identity between the 'existent' and the 'non-existent,' the effect could not be regarded as constituted entirely by (being of the same nature as) the cause; and hence, under this theory also, there could be no proof for the existence of Primordial Matter (Nature).

(62) Hence, in order to establish the existence of Primordial Matter (Nature), the author at the outset declares that the effect is 'existent', (even before the causal operation)

Kārikā IX

The effect is existent; (1) because what is 'non-existent' cannot be produced; (2) because there is a definite relation of the cause (with the effect); (3) because all is not possible; (4) because the efficient can do only that for which it is efficient; (5) (lastly), because the effect is of the same essence as the cause.

(63) Because what is non-existent cannot be produced, etc. 'The effect is existent,'—even before the operation of the cause,—this is what is meant. The followers of Nyāya cannot urge against this doctrine the objection that it involves the absurdity of 'doing what is already done' (i. e., if the Effect is already existent, the operation of the Cause must be superfluous);—such an objection cannot be raised [for reasons to be explained later on].

[As regards the theory that 'the Existent effect emanates from the Non-existent cause'] though it is true that products like the sprout and the jar are found to be produced after the destruction of the seed and clay-lump [so that it would appear as if the products were the outcome of this Destruction, which is non-existent],—yet the causal efficiency cannot be attributed to Destruction, which is a pure negation; it can belong only to the positive entities in the shape of the constituent particles of the seed and the clay-lump. If a

a.

c.

things being produced at all places and at all times. All this has been fully explained by us in the Nyāya-sūtra, 12/paryāyikā.

(64) [As regards the Vedānta theory] the belief in the existence of the phenomenal world can, not be said to be illusory unless we have some proof invalidating its existence.* [Hence the effect cannot be regarded as a mere 'illusory evolution'].

(65) Now remains the theory of Gautama and Kanāda, with reference to which the author asserts—
The Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika view criticised; and the Sāṃkhya view established "The effect is existent." In support of this assertion, the following proofs are adduced—(1) "What is non-existent cannot be produced." If the effect were 'non-existent' before the operation of the cause, it could never be brought into existence by anybody; by even a thousand artists blue can never be made yellow. If it be held that " 'existence' and 'non-existence' are mere properties belonging to the jar," even so, if the object to which the property belongs is 'non-existent', there can be no property belonging to that object; so that the question of the 'existence' of the jar remains as it was (and is not affected by your assertion). Nor can 'non-existence' (be the property of the jar); because if the 'non-existence' is unconnected and non-coalescent with the jar (as it must be, the jar being now existent, ex-hypothesis), how could the jar be regarded as 'non-existent'?—Hence it follows that, as after the causal operation so also before it, the effect must be 'existent'.

Such being the case, all that remains to be done by the cause is the manifestation or unfolding of the pre-existing effect [i. e. its emanation from the cause wherein it has been lying latent]. The manifestation of something already existing is a fact quite compatible with experience, e. g. there

* This is urged against the Vedānta theory of the effect being an evolution from a single real entity.

is the manifestation of oil from sesamum, by pressure,—of rice from paddy by thumping,—and of milk from cows, by milking. On the other hand, we have no instance of the manifestation of what is 'non-existent'; in fact what is 'non-existent' is never found to be either manifested or produced.

(66) (2) For the following reason also should the effect be regarded as subsisting even before the operation of the cause—*"Because there is a definite relation of the cause with the effect."* The term '*Upādāna*' (in the text) stands for Cause,—and the '*Grahana*' of the cause stands for its relation to the effect, so that the compound '*Upādānagrahanāt*' means 'because there is a definite relation of the cause with the effect.' What is meant is that the cause produces the effect.

(67) *Objection*: "Granted all this; but why should not the effect be produced by causes without being related to them? In that case it could be a 'non-existent' effect that would be produced."

In answer to this we have the next clause—

(3) "*Because all is not possible.*"—*If the effect could*

'Causes being always related to existent things, can have no connection with non-existent; for one who would have an unrelated effect produced, there would be no restriction at all'.

(68) *Objection*: "Be it so: But the Cause, even though unrelated, will always produce that effect only for which it is efficient; and this efficiency could always be inferred from

actually seeing the effect brought about; so that there would be no absence of restriction (such as has been argued above)".

Answer: (4) "Because the efficient Cause can do only that for which it is efficient."—Now then, asks our author,

if the latter, then it has to be explained how it can operate upon what is 'non-existent'. On this point if it be asserted

particular effect or not? In the former case, no relation being possible with what is 'non-existent', the effect will have to be regarded as 'existent'; in the latter, you have the same confusion remaining.—Thus it is rightly argued that 'because the

should

(70) The proofs establishing the non-difference of the effect from the cause are the following: (a)

Proofs of the non-difference of cause and effect—The cloth (an effect) is not different from the yarns (constituting it),—because it subsists in the yarns;—an object differing in

where any two things are entirely different, one is never found

to be the constituent cause of the other, e.g. in the case of the *Jar* and the *Cloth*; as between the *Cloth* and the *Yarns*, however, the *Yarns* are the constituent cause of the *Cloth*:—hence it follows that the two are not different.—(c) For the following reason also, there is no difference between the *Cloth* and *Yarns*: because there is no conjunction between them and because there is no separation between them:—‘conjunction’ is found to take place in objects different from one another, as between the well and the bucket; the same with regard to ‘separation’, as between the *Himavān* and the *Vindhya*.—in the case of the *Cloth* and the *Yarns*, however, there is neither ‘conjunction’ nor ‘separation’;—hence it follows that they are not different.—(d) For the following reason too, the *Cloth* and the *Yarns* are not different things because the *Cloth* does not contain in itself any product which makes its weight different from the weight of the *Yarns* constituting it:—as a matter of fact, an object differing in essence from another always has a weight different from that of the latter—e.g., the lowering of the balance caused by a bracelet weighing two *pālas* is more than that caused by the bracelet weighing a single *pālā*;—but we find no such difference between the effect of the weight of the *Cloth* and that of the weight of the *Yarns* constituting it:—hence the *Cloth* is not different from the *Yarns*. These are the proofs afforded by a process of negative inference—[*Avitānumāna*—see, *Kāṅkī* V] establishing the non-difference (of the *Cloth* and the *Yarns* in particular, and of cause and effect in general).

(71) The non-difference between the cloth and the yarns having been thus established, it follows that the cloth is only the yarns arranged in a particular shape and that the two do not differ from each other in essence. Nor can the two be proved to be entirely different by such arguments as—(a) “If the cause and effect were not different, it would involve self contradictory actions [that is, when the ‘cloth’ is

torn and reduced to 'threads', it involves the action of being *destroyed* on the part of the *cloth* and that of being

■ notion and assertion of the cause and the effect being *related* [which means that the two members of the relation-
 ship are distinguished by the function of the useful purpose

arguments, we say, cannot prove the difference between cause and effect; because all the said differences can be explained and reconciled by attributing the notions to the *appearance* and *disappearance* of certain factors (a) For instance, the limbs of the tortoise *disappear* on entering its body and appear again on emerging from it; but for this, we cannot say that the limbs are either *produced* from, or *destroyed* by, the tortoise; in the same manner, the jar, the crown, and other things, - which are only particular modifications of clay, gold and so forth, are said to be *produced* on *emanating* and *appearing* from these latter, and to be *destroyed* on entering

is *no* being for the non-existent, nor non-being for the *existent*.
 —In the instance cited, the *Tortoise* is not different from its *appearing* and *disappearing* limbs; and similarly the jar, the crown and other products are not different from clay, gold and so forth — (b) The 'assertion' (of difference between the cloth and the yarns) implicit in such notions as 'This cloth ■ in (made up of) these yarns' is explicable, as being

analogous to the assertion 'There are *Tilaka* trees in the forest'.—(c) As for the *difference in the useful purpose served*, that also does not establish the difference between the cause and the effect; because one and the same thing is found to serve several useful purposes; for instance, the single thing, Fire, serves the purposes of *burning, cooking and lighting*. As a matter of fact, any variation of functions cannot be a ground of difference; because we find that the functions of the same things vary with their operating collectively or severally; for instance, each individual Bearer performs the function of indicating the path, but not that of carrying the palanquin, while collectively, they carry the palanquin; in the same manner, even though the yarns severally do not serve the purpose of *covering*, yet on combining and thereby appearing in the form of the *cloth*, they can serve the purpose of *covering*.

(72) *Opponent*.—" [You say that the cloth is already existing in the cause, the yarns; and when

An objection based on the nature of the manifestation of the effect it is supposed to be produced, it is only the manifestation of the effect

the cause?

production of what was non-existent becomes admitted. If the former, then the causal operation is superfluous. When the effect (in the shape of the manifestation of the cloth) is already there, we see no use for the operation of the cause. If it be said that 'though the manifestation is existent', yet it is the manifestation of this manifestation (for which the operation of the cause is needed).—then this would involve an endless series of 'manifestations'. Thus we conclude that there is no sense in the assertion that when the cloth is produced what happens is that the yarns become manifested in the form of cloth."

(73) This is not so, we reply. Even under your own theory that the non-existent effect is produced,

Reply—The objection set aside as common to both theories

what is this 'production'? Is it existent or non-existent? If it is existent, then there is

(74) It is not to give the authors cause of 'production' than th

onymous with 'production'; so that, when the term 'cloth' has been uttered, one should not utter the term 'is produced' (because it would be a useless repetition); nor could one say 'the cloth is destroyed': because *destruction* and *production* (denoted by *cloth*) can never co-exist.

(75) Thus, [Even under the Nyāya theory] the 'production of the cloth' must consist either in 'the inherence of the cloth in its cause', or in 'the inherence of the cloth in its Being'; in either case, the said 'Production' cannot be produced (as Inherence is eternal); and yet for the purposes of

to an operation that causes are directly related, as otherwise (without being related to operation) they would not be 'causes' (active) at all.

(76) Thus, it has been fully established that the Effect is ever existent.

(77) Having thus proved the effect to be 'existent', a fact favourable to the proof of the existence of Nature, the author next states the similarity and dissimilarity between the

Manifest and the Unmanifest, a right comprehension of which is conducive to discriminative wisdom; and this is done in order to show the character of Nature, whose existence is going to be proved.

Kārikā X

The Manifest is 'with cause', 'not eternal', 'not pervasive', 'active', 'multiform', 'component', 'soluble', 'conjunct' and 'dependent'.—The Unmanifest is the reverse of this.

(78) 'With cause' (Product). The question as to what is the cause of what, will be dealt with later on (Kārikā XXII).
All the qualifications explained

(79) 'Not eternal'—destructible, i. e., evanescent [being absorbed in its material cause.*]

(80) 'Not pervasive',—that is to say, the Manifest does not pervade (or is not all over) space. It is the effect that is measured

Nature and as such they are 'non-pervasive'.

(81) 'Active'—i. e., mobile. The Sentient Faculty (Buddhi), and the other evolutes are regarded as 'mobile', inasmuch as they are found to renounce a body they have hitherto occupied, and to occupy another; as for the mobility of earth and such other substances, it is too well-known (to need an explanation).

(82) 'Multiform';—as the Sentient Faculty and other evolutes vary with each person; earth and other substances also are 'multiform' in the forms of the jars and other things.

(83) 'Component'.—of its cause: though the Products like the Sentient Faculty and the rest are non-different from their cause, yet the assertion that they stand to their cause in

* Since the Sāṃkhya do not admit of an utter annihilation of a substance,

forest' (when the trees have no existence apart from the forest).

(84) 'Soluble'.—into Nature. The Sentient Faculty
to be ex-
itself though

(85). 'Conjunct'.—Bearing within itself the relation of whole and parts. [Unsatisfied with this explanation on the ground of the relationship between the whole and its parts being eternal,—the author offers another explanation].—Or, the term 'avayasa' [in the compound 'Sācayasa'] may be explained as equivalent to 'avayasa', i. e., the mutual adhesion, contact,—i. e., *Conjunction*,—between wholes and parts. 'Conjunction' consists in union following on disunion; and that which has such union or contact is what is expressed by the word 'Sācayasa'. For instance, there is such
stances;
the one
rest; be.

Nor can there be any conjunction between the three Attributes of *Sattva*, *Rajas* and *Tamas*, because there is no disunion (absence of contact) among these

(86) 'Dependent'.—the Sentient Faculty and the rest are such. In the producing of its product, in the shape of the I-principle, the Sentient Faculty requires the assistance of Nature. Without such assistance it would be too weak to produce the I-principle. Similarly, the I-principle and other things also require assistance in the producing of their representative products.—Thus, in the producing of its product, everything requires the assistance of Nature. Therefore, even though efficient as a cause in the producing of its product, the Man-

fest is dependent, requiring, as it does, the assistance of the Supreme Nature.

(87) *'The Unmanifest is the essence'—of the Manifest.*
That is to say—
pervasive, and in
action of evolution,
component, not soluble, unconjunct and independent.

(88) Having thus explained the dissimilarities between the Manifest and the Unmanifest, the author now mentions the similarities between these, and the dissimilarity of both of these again from the Spirit.

Kārikā XI

The Manifest is 'with the three Attributes' (Gūṇas).

The points of similarity between the Manifest and the Unmanifest and those of dissimilarity of these from the soul

'undistinguishable (or non-separative)', 'objective', 'common', 'insentient' and 'productive'. So also is Nature. The Spirit is the reverse, and yet also (in some respects) similar.

(89) *'With the three Attributes.'*—That is to say, the Manifest has the three attributes of pleasure, pain and delusion. By this assertion are set aside all those theories that attribute pleasure and pain to the Spirit.

(90) *'Undistinguishable';*—just as Nature cannot be distinguished from itself, so also the Great Principle (Buddhi), being one with Nature, cannot be distinguished from

(91) Some people have held that it is *Idea* (Viśiṣṭa) alone that constitutes pleasure, pain and delusion, and that there exists nothing besides this *Idea* that could possess these (pleasure, etc.) as its attributes.

An objection based on the Idealism of the Buddhists

In opposition to this view it is asserted that the Manifest is 'objective' ; 'objective' here stands for 'what can be apprehended'. That is, it is exterior to the Idea.—And because it is 'objective', therefore, 'common'—i. e., apprehended (simultaneously) by all men. If it were not so, it would be less than the in the for individuals, all that is 'manifest' would have to belong

In the case of [Manifest substance such as the] glance of a dancing girl, it is found that many persons continue to stare at it at the same time. This could not be the case if it were otherwise (i. e. if the glance were a mere *Idea*)

(92) 'Insentient'—Nature (Prakṛti), Sentient Faculty (Buddhi) and the rest, are all insentient. That is, 'sentience' cannot belong to the *Buddhi* as held by the *Vaiśiṣṭika* (Buddhist)

(93) 'Productive'—i. e., possessed of the faculty of producing. The form of the word to be used would have been '*prasavadharmā*', but the author has used the particular possessive affix (*ṣini*), in order to indicate the constant character of the property of *productiveness* as belonging to the Manifest, the sense being that the Manifest is never devoid of similar as well as dissimilar products.

(94) The author attributes the properties of the *Manifest* to the *Unmanifest*—'So also is Nature',—i. e., as the Manifest, so the Unmanifest (Nature). [That is, the properties of the Manifest, just enumerated, belong to Nature also.]

(95) The dissimilarity of these from the Spirit is next stated—'The spirit is the reverse.'

(96) 'Objection':—"How can you assert the Spirit to be the reverse of the Manifest and the Unmanifest:

Objection—There are points of similarity also between the soul and the Manifest as well as the Unmanifest and so on—as also between the Spirit and the Manifest—such as being 'without cause', 'eternal' Manifest—such as being 'multiform'?"

Answer: 'Yet also similar':—that is to say, though there are points of similarity, such as being 'without cause' and the rest, yet there are points of dissimilarity also, in the form of being as of dissimilarity devoid of the three Attributes and the rest.

(97) The Manifest and the Unmanifest have been described as having 'three Attributes'.* Now the question arises—What are these three Attributes, and what is their characteristic. The author answers this question in the following text—

* This word 'Attribute' requires some explanation. It stands for the *Gunas* of the Sāṅkhya—a term denoting the constituent elements of Nature or Primordial Matter—as says Colebrook—"These three qualities are not mere accidents of Nature, but are of its essence and enter into its composition." On this Davies remarks—"Nature or Primordial Matter is described, in the system of Kapila as formed by the *Gunas*, which were primarily in equilibrium, and as long as this state existed, there was no emanation into separate forms of matter." And, as we shall see later on, this most condition of Nature is disturbed by the subsequent preformance of the Attribute of *Rajas*. Davies has rendered this important word—*Guna*—by 'Mode'. This is apt to mislead. For *Mode*, as understood by Western philosophers, is an affection of a substance, and not a constituent element of it.

sense imparted to it specially, by Spinoza, who thus distinguishes between Attribute and Mode. "By Attribute, I understand that which the mind perceives of substance as constituting its essence; by Mode, I understand the affections of substances, etc."

Kārikā XII

The Attributes are of the nature of pleasure, pain and delusion; they serve the purpose of illumination, action and restraint, and they are mutually subjugative, and supporting, and productive and co-operative,

The Character of the three Attributes (Gunas)

(98) These are called *Gunas* (literally, subsidiary or secondary) because they exist for the sake of others (the *Spiritus*). The three Attributes will be named in order in the next *Kārikā*. And according to the maxim of presight, or in allowance with a convention among writers of treatises, the 'pleasure' ('*priti*' and 'delusion') of this *Kārikā* are to be taken in the same order (as '*Sattva*, etc., in the next)

(99) Thus then, the meaning is that '*Prīti*' being *Pleasure*, the *Sattva* attribute is of the nature of pleasure; '*Aprīti*' being *Pain*, the *Rajas* attribute is of the nature of pain; and, lastly, '*Viśāda*' being *Delusion*, the *Tamas* attribute is of the nature of delusion. The word '*Ātman*', 'nature' has been added with a view to discard the theory that "*pleasure is nothing more than mere negation of pain and vice versa*". As a matter of fact, *Pleasure* and *Pain* are not mere negations of one another, on the contrary, they are positive entities, and the term '*ātman*' 'nature' connotes positive reality, so that those things are '*prītyātman*', whose nature, i. e., *Existence*, is in the form of *pleasure*, similarly with the other terms ('*aprītyātman*' and '*viśādātman*'). The idea of *Pleasure*, *Pain* and *Delusion* being positive entities, and not mere negations of one another, is vouched for by common experience. If they were mere mutual negations, they would be mutually dependent; and thus the non-fulfilment of one would lead to the non-fulfilment of the other.

(100) Having thus described the nature of the Attributes, the author next describes their several functions:—"They serve the purpose of,"

Similarly the *Rajas* attribute helps the other two by its activity (or mobility) through the help of *illumination* and *restraint*,—and the *Tamas* attribute helps the other two by its restraint, through the help of *illumination* and *activity*.
 (3) "*Mutually productive*." That is to say, one can produce

this 'modification' is not regarded as 'caused' (produced), what brings it about not being essentially different from itself; nor is it *non-eternal*, transient,—there being no merging of it into anything essentially different from itself. (4) "*Mutually concerned*." That is to say, mutual concern. The particle *ca*

In support of the above, we have the following Smṛu text: "All the attributes are mutual consorts; all omnipresent; *Sattva* is the consort of *Rajas*, *Rajas* of *Sattva*, both of these again of *Tamas*, which latter again of both, *Sattva* and *Rajas*. The first conjunction or separation of these has never been perceived." (*Devī-Bhāgavata*, 2. 8).

(102) It has been said that the Attributes "*serve the purpose of illumination, activity and restraint*." Now it is going to be explained what those Attributes are, and wherefore are they so.—

Kārikā XIII

The *Sattva*-attribute is held to be buoyant and illuminating; the *Rajas*-attribute exciting and mobile; and the *Tamas*-attribute sluggish and enveloping. Their functioning is for a (single) purpose, like that of the Lamp.

The three Attributes named and their nature explained

(103) *The Sattva-attribute, etc.*—The Sattva-attribute alone has been held by the teachers of Sāṅkhya, to be buoyant and illuminating. Buoyancy—as opposed to sluggishness—is that which enables things to shoot up; it is to this that the up-rising of the flame of fire is due. In some cases, it is conducive to lateral motion also, as in the case of air. Thus, generally, buoyancy may be said to be that which is conducive to the efficient functioning of all instruments (causes); sluggishness, on the other hand, would make the instruments inefficient. The illuminative character of the Sattva-attribute has been already explained (under Kāṛhā XII).

(104) *Satva and Tamas, being by themselves inert, are unable to produce their effects, the driving force is supplied by Rajas, which excites them and rouses them from their natural inertia, and urges them on to the accomplishment of their respective effects.* It is for this reason that Rajas is said to be exciting. This exciting character of *Rajas* is next accounted for—“(it is also) mobile.” This shows that the operation of *Rajas* is necessary for all activity.

(105) On account of its ‘mobility’, *Rajas* would keep the triad of Attributes in a continuous whirl of activity, but for its being restrained by the “sluggish and enveloping” *Tamas*, which obstructs its activity, which is operative in certain cases only. Thus, in order to be distinguished from the active *Rajas*, *Tamas* has been said to be the restrainer—“Darkness is sluggish and enveloping.” The particle ‘eva’ is to be construed—not only with ‘*Tamas*’ but with ‘*Sattva*’ and ‘*Rajas*’ also.

(106) The enq

Objection—The
Attributes of
contradictory
natures cannot
co-operate

do
pe
Sunda and Upsunda (two wrestling champi-
ons); there can be no possibility of their

combining for a single purpose." The author replies—

"Their functioning is for a single purpose,

like that of the lamp." We have all
observed how the wick and the oil—each,

in giving light

bile, and phlegm—though possessed of contradictory pro-
perties, co-operate for the single purpose of sustaining the body.
Precisely in the same manner, do the three Attributes, though
possessed of mutually contradictory properties, co-operate
towards a single end;—for the single purpose, of the
emancipation of the Spirit. This will be further explained
in Kārikā XXXI.

(107) Pleasure, Pain and Delusion, being mutual con-
tradictions, lead to the assumption of three
different causes connate with themselves

Necessity of
postulating the
three Attri-
butes as causes
of pleasure, pain
and delusion res-
pectively

by their very nature, they are mutually sup-
pressive. As an example (of the multifarious

character of these various causes of Pleasure, Pain and Delu-
sion), we have the following: A single girl, young, beautiful,
gentle and virtuous, is a source of delight to her husband,—
why?—because for him she appears in the form of Pleasure;
she pains her co-wives—why?—because for them, she appears
in the form of Pain; and lastly the same girl deludes or

stupefies another man who is unable to get at her—why?—because for him she appears in the form of Delusion. The case of this woman illustrates the nature of all things. In the above case, that which is the cause of pleasure is the Attribute

Goodness the
cause of Pleasure;
Foulness of Pain,
and Darkness of
Delusion

of *Sattoa*, the essence of which is Pleasure; the cause of pain is the Attribute of *Rajas*, the essence of which is Pain, and lastly, the cause of delusion is the Attribute of *Tamas*, the essence of which is Delusion.

As regards Pleasure, Illuminateness and Buoyancy (which are the properties attributed to *Sattoa*), these are not mutually contradictory, and as such, not incapable of co-existing in a single substratum; in fact, they are actually found together (subsisting in *Sattoa*). Hence, Pleasure, Illuminateness and Buoyancy, being mutually not contradictory, do not necessitate the assumption of three different causes (one for each of them severally)—as is done by Pleasure, Pain and Delusion which are mutually contradictory (and as such unable to cohere in a

established that there are *three*—and only *three*—Attributes.

(108) *Objection*—“As regards earth, and other things

known to us, we actually perceive the properties of ‘undistinguishableness’ and the rest (described in *Kārikā* XI) as belonging to them, and we admit them so far,

But the *Sattoa* and other Attributes can never come within the range of perceptible experience; how then, can we attri-

Question—Indiscernibility, etc., of the Attributes, how proved?

Let us show that the undistinguishableness of these ^{indistin-}
ve (as

Answer :

Kārikā XIV

The proper

Two reasons for
the above given.
Existence of
Nature proved

of these (the three Attributes) in their
absence. And the existence of the Un-
manifest (Nature) too is established on the ground of the
properties of the effect being of the same nature as those
of the cause.

(109) By "avipekṣi" in the Kārikā is to be understood

First Proof. From
the existence of
the three Attri-
butes

the abstract form 'avipekṣitva'; just as 'dvī'
and 'eka'—in the Sūtra "Dvyekeyordvivaca-
naikavacanā" (Pāṇini 1-IV-22)—stand for
'dvitva' and 'ekatva' respectively; if it
were not so, then the form of the compound would be "dvye
keśa" (and not "dvyekeyaḥ") * Question.—How do you prove
the properties of "undistinguishableness" and the rest?—

sition, implied by the text, has not been stated in so many
words because it is clearly known.—It proceeds to state the
negative premise in the next sūtra. "Let the non-existence of
these in their ab-

* For if the

sum would be three, and would thus require a plural ending, and not the
dual,—which is explained by making 'dvī' and 'eka' stand for 'dvitva'
and 'ekatva' making only two nouns, and thus having a dual ending.

'being undistinguishable' and the rest are absent,—as in the *Spirit*,—the three Attributes of *Sattva* etc., are non-existent. Or, we may have the *Manifest* and the *Unmanifest* (both together) as the subject (minor term) of the syllogism, and then we shall have the reasoning—"By the existence of the three Attributes"—as a purely negative inference* (*Avāta*), there being no other case (besides the minor term) where there could be an affirmation (of the reason, Middle term—existence of the Attributes).

(110) *Objection*:—"The existence of the properties of 'being undistinguishable' and the rest, cannot

Question—How is Nature proved to exist?

be proved before the object possessing these properties (the *Unmanifest*) has been proved to exist. The existence of the *Unmani-*

fest itself has not yet been proved; how then can the existence of the said properties be proved?"

Answer:—The existence of the *Unmanifest* is established on the ground of the properties of the effect

Reply: From the properties of the effect being due in those of the cause.

being of the same nature as those of the cause. The sense of the argument is as follows: All effects are found to possess properties similar to those of their respective

* The syllogism has been previously explained as—"Whatever has pleasure etc., is undistinguishable, as the perceptible, material substances,"—and here we have the affirmation (*Anūya*) of the reason in the "perceptible substances" whose connotation is different from that of the subject of the syllogism, "All things having pleasure etc." Now, what our author proposes is that we might explain the reasoning thus: "All things besides the *Spirit* (the *Manifest* and the *Unmanifest*) are undistinguishable, since they have the three Attributes and whatever is not undistinguishable does not have the three Attributes." Thus in the latter syllogism, we have for the minor term *The Manifest and the Unmanifest* which comprehend all cases where reason (the presence of the three Attributes) could be found; for nothing besides the *Manifest* and the *Unmanifest* can be said to have the three Attributes.

causes; e. g., the cloth possesses properties of the same nature as those of the yarns; similarly, we find that all products, like the Great Principle and the rest are endowed with Pleasure, Pain and Delusion; from which it follows that this must be due to the presence of Pleasure, Pain and Delusion subsisting in their cause;—it is thus that the existence of this cause, in the shape of the Unmanifest, Primordial Matter (Nature) is established.*

(111) Says the enquirer, "the followers of Kaṇāda (the

Why not accept
the atomic
theory which dis-
cards the neces-
sity of an
Unmanifest
Entity ?

Vaiśeṣikas) and Gautama (the Naiyāyikas) assert that Manifest is produced out of the Manifest ; According to them Atoms are manifest, and these produce the manifest product, from the binary compound onwards to the Earth, Water and other substances ;

and the qualities of the latter, Earth and the rest, are produced in accordance with the similar qualities in the

* And consequently Nature too is proved to have the properties in question, in accordance with the proposition laid down before—"Whoever has pleasure etc., has the said properties etc., also." The reasoning may be rendered clearer by reducing it to the form of two Aristotelian syllogisms —

Properties of the effect (Intellect) are properties of the cause (Nature).

✓ Pleasure etc., are properties of the effect (Intellect)

✓ ∴ Pleasure, etc., are properties of the cause (Nature).

And again :—

Whoever has pleasure, etc., has indiscreetness, etc.

Nature has pleasure, etc., (as first proved).

∴ Nature has indiscreetness, etc.

(constituent) atoms.* And in as much as all the Manifest along with its properties, being produced out of the *Manifest*, what is the use of postulating an Unmanifest, an imperceptible Entity (in the form of Nature ?) :

We reply—

Kārikā XV

(i) Because of the finite nature of specific objects.

(ii) because of homogeneity, (iii) because

Reply—we must postulate an Unmanifest Reality—reasons given of evolution being due to the efficiency of the cause, (iv) because of separation between cause and its product, and

because of the merging of the whole world (of effects), —there is the Unmanifest as the cause (next Kārikā).

(112) " Of specific objects " i. e., of the products in the shape of the Great Principle and the

rest—the cause, root-cause is the *Unmani-*
 First proof of the existence of Prakṛti. Since there is separation of cause and effect, and reunion of the whole Universe.
fest (Nature). Why so ?—(iv) " because of the separation between the cause and effect and because of the merging of the whole Universe ",—It has been established that the effect is already existent in its cause ; the

* The atomic theory of Kanāda and Gauṇama may be thus summed up—In the beginning there existed only atoms of various substances (Earth, Water, Fire and Air) besides, of course, Ākāśa, etc., which are in themselves eternal. These various atoms were respectively endowed with four different sets of properties, latterly perceived in their compounds. By some agency or other—mainly that of Adṛṣṭa, the Unseen (Fate)—all homogeneous atoms combine, one with one, into couples and thus form binary compounds, which latter again combining in the same manner, but three at a time, give rise to tertiary com-

atoms are not be-
 ried to
 which
 of the
 is II—

already existing limbs of the Tortoise emerging out of its body, become distinguished from it—'this is the *Body* of the Tortoise and these are its limbs' and on again entering the

other substances, emerging out of their cause in the shape of the Primary Elements (Tanmātras) become distinguished from them; the already existing Primary Elements on emerging out of their cause, the 'I-principle', come to be distinguished from it; the already existing 'I-principle', emerging from its cause, the Great Principle, becomes distinguished from it; and lastly, the already existing Great Principle, emerging from its cause, the Highest Unmanifest (Nature), becomes distinguished from it. This 'distinguishing' or separation from the final cause, the Highest Unmanifest, of the whole world of effects—related to it either mediately (as with Earth, etc.)

the shape of the Jar or the Crown, merges into its cause, in the shape of the Clay or the Gold, and thereby disappears,

these latter 'unmanifest' in so far as their own form is concerned, —when the I principle merges into the Great Principle, it renders the latter unmanifest in so far as its own form is

concerned,—and finally when the Great Principle merges into its cause, Nature, it renders this latter unmanifest. In

the cause, there must be Unmanifest as the cause.

(113) From the following reason also the Unmanifest is the cause—*“Because of evolution being due to the efficiency of the cause.”*—It is a well-known fact that the evolution of the effect is due to the efficiency of the cause; for certainly, no effect can arise from an inefficient cause. This

in the cause. The difference of *sand* from *sesamum*—the material cause of oil—lies only in the fact that it is only in the latter, not in the former, that oil exists in its unmanifested condition.

(114) *Objection:* “The above two reasons that you have urged—the fact of evolution being due to the efficiency of the cause and that the separation and merging of the cause and effect—might be taken as proving the supreme ‘Unmanifest’ character of the Great Principle itself. Why should we have one more Unmanifest entity beyond that?”

Answer: “*Because of the finite nature of specific objects*”;—*‘parimāṇāt’* stands for *‘parimitat-vaḥ’*, ‘because of being measured, i. e., finite’. [The reasoning is stated in the syllogistic form]—The specific objects in question, the

Reply—Third proof—“From finiteness” (of all manifested existence)

have, for their cause, clay and other things, (in which inhere) the unmanifested (state of the effects); we have already shown that the cause is that wherein the effect already exists in the unmanifested state. Under these circumstances, the cause of the Great Principle must be that highest Unmanifest which must be the *final* cause, for there is no ground for postulating a further Unmanifested Reality.*

(115) For the following reason also the specific objects in question must have causes wherein they lie

Fourth proof—
"Because of

unmanifested:—*"Because of homogeneity"*—

rest—are found to be 'homogeneous' in the sense that they consist in Pleasure, Pain, and Delusion. And whatever is immutably connected with a nature from must have for its

the specific objects, the Unmanifested (Nature) is the cause.**

Having proved the existence of the Unmanifest, the author next states the manner of its operation:—

(118) The enquirer —

Objection—How
can an Attribute
of uniform nature
bring about
diverse actions

of opere
each of
reply—
all kno

taste "

Reply—" By
modification as
water "

different modifications of earth and becomes
transformed into the juice of fruits such as
cocoanut, palm, wood-apples and so forth;

in the same manner, (owing to the *blending* and the *mutual*

difference arising from the predominance of one or the other of the Attributes " That is, by the peculiarities due to the predominance of one or the other of the Attributes

(119) There are some self contented (Materialists) who accept, as 'Spirit', either the Unmanifest (Nature) or the Great Principle or the 'I-principle' or the Sense-organs, or the elemental substances. As against these, the Author makes the following declaration.

Kārikā XVII

(a) Because all composite objects are for another's use, (b) because there must be absence of the three Attributes and other properties, (c) because there must be control, (d) because there must be some one to experience and (e) because there is a tendency towards

Reason for the
existence of
Spirit

'Isolation' or final beatitude, therefore, the Spirit must be there.

(120) The Spirit exists ;

because all
compound objects
are for another

form, would stand thus—Nature, the Great Principle, the 'I-principle', and other things must exist for another's use, because they are composite like the bedstead, the chair, the unguent and other things—Nature and the rest are all 'composite', being composed as, they are, of pleasure, pain and delusion.* (represented by the three Attributes of *Sāttva*, *Rajas*, and *Tamas*).

(121) "But", says the objector, "the bedstead, the chair, and other composite things are found to

Objection: The
above reasoning
would only lead
to another set of
compounds, not to
an Elementary
Spirit

exist for the Body, which is itself a composite thing, and not for the Spirit as apart from Nature etc; so that the fact of Nature &c., being composite, should only lead to the inference of another composite thing—(for whose use they exist) and not to that of a non-composite Spirit

We reply—*Because there must be absence of the three Attributes and other properties.*—That is to

Reply—Since the
reverse of that
which possesses
the three Attributes
must exist

say, if from the fact of Nature, &c., 'being for another's use', we were to infer only another composite object, then in that case, we would have to assume such composite

* This sounds rather absurd. But we must not forget that the whole set of material objects are mere emanations from Nature, whose constituent elements are the three Attributes, which latter consist in pleasure, pain and delusion, respectively.

objects *ad infinitum*; for even this latter compound would lead to the influence of another for whose use it will exist and this again to another, and so on *ad infinitum*. And when we can escape this *regressus ad infinitum* by postulating a reasonable terminus, it is not proper to multiply unnecessary assumptions (in the shape of an infinite series of composites). Nor can it be urged that "Multiplication of assumptions becomes excusable when supported by evidence" because when the 'composite character (of the bedstead) etc., is put forward in the inferential argument, it is only in so far as it is concomitant with 'being for another's use' (and it is not meant to include all the properties of the said composite objects), in fact if one were to insist upon the inference to be in accord with all the properties of the corroborative instance (in this case, the bedstead &c.),—then there would be an end to all inference (no inference being possible).* We have explained this in our *Nyāyavārtika-tātparyatikā*.** Thus then, in order to escape the regressus ad infinitum, if we accept

and ourselves con-
sidering it as being without
any non-objective"

* Because there can scarcely be found any two occurrences in nature which could be quite identical. Even in the stock example of the Naiyāyikas—"Fire, because smoking as the culinary hearth"—we have a dissimilarity between the subject matter of the syllogism and the instance cited. Thus, in the culinary hearth the fire is for cooking food, and proceeding from a house made by men, &c. &c., whereas such is not the case with the fire in the mountain.

** This is a commentary on Udayotakara's *Nyāyavārtika* (a gloss on the *Vākyānyāyikā* on the *Nyāyasūtras* of Gaṅgeśa). This work with the Paris' addhā of Udayanācārya is generally counted as closing the epoch of ancient Nyāya, latterly supplanted by the modern system, introduced and most extensively expounded by Gaṅgeśa's *Upādhyaṅga*, in his *Tattva-Cintāmaṇi*.

(subjective), "uncommon (specific)", "sentient", and "not productive". Because 'being with three Attributes' and other properties are always accompanied by that of 'being composite' which latter being absent in the Spirit.

he cannot be a 'kaiṣa' (a special class of Brahmanas). Hence when he laid down that "there must be absence of the three Attributes etc.," he means that there must be something which is not composite, and this is the Spirit.

(122) For the following reason also there must be a Spirit apart from Matter: *"Because there must be control"*; that is to say, because the *objects constituted by the three Attributes are such as are always controlled*;—as a matter of fact it is found that everything consisting in pleasure, pain and delusion, (i. e. in the three Attributes) is controlled by something else—e. g., the chariot by the charioteer; and the Great Principle and the rest have been proved to 'consist in pleasure, pain and delusion'; therefore, they must have a 'controller'—and this 'controller' must be beyond* the three Attributes and independent,—and this is the Spirit.

(123) Again there must be the Spirit "because there must be some one to experience". The term 'some one to experience' indicates the objects of experience in the shape of pleasure and pain. The objects of experience are pleasure and pain, which are felt by everyone as agreeable and disagreeable respectively. That is to say, there must

* Otherwise the Controller also will stand in need of another, for the presence of the Attributes in the former will necessarily lead to that of pleasure, &c. which again will necessitate its control by something beyond itself. And so we shall be landed in a *regressus ad infinitum*.

things operating upon themselves; as the Great Principle and the rest are all themselves integrally composed of pleasure and delusion. Then the thing which whom thing else must be the Spirit.

(124) Others, however, interpret the above reasoning of the Kānkā thus: The term 'Bhogyā'

A different interpretation of the stands for visible; and the visibility of the

per is to be inferred from the visible. The visibility of the Great Principle and the rest is to be inferred from the fact of their consisting,—like the Earth and other substances,—of pleasure, pain and delusion.

(125) Lastly, the Spirit must be there—"because there is tendency towards Isolation."—The 'Iso.'

Because of the tendency of writers and sages towards beatitude is recognised by great sages and others possessed of divine insight—as the absolute

and dulness, cannot be properly said to feel pleasure etc., for that would imply the feeling of pleasure by pleasure;—or worse still—by pain; and vice versa, which is absurd.

since a substance cannot be absolved of something that forms its constituting element.—It is only when one is distinct from the Great Principle etc., and does not consist in pleasure, pain and delusion, that the said Isolation can be possible. Thus, the conclusion is that in as much as there is a tendency in all the scriptures and among all intelligent persons towards 'Isolation', there must be something beyond (pleasure, etc., and hence) the Great Principle and the rest,—and this is the Spirit.

(126) Having thus proved the existence of the Spirit, the author next raises the question—Is this Spirit one* (manifesting itself) in all bodies, or many, being different in each body? And in reply, he lays down the theory of the plurality of Spirits.

Kārikā XVIII

(1) Because there is definite adjustment of birth, death, and the organs, (2) because there is non-simultaneity of activity and (3) because there is diversity due to the three Attributes—the plurality of Spirits is established.

(127) "Because etc."—The plurality of Spirits is established,—why? "Because there is definite adjustment of birth, death and the organs. The 'Birth' of the Spirit consists in the set of body, Principle and a composite

Plurality of
Spirits—reasons

From allotment of
birth, death and
the organs

sen-
feel

tw set of body,
Principle and
a composite

A subject, immediately preceding, is referred to by the pronoun *this*; whereas one not so immediate is denoted by *that*; hence the *that* here refers to Kārikā XI.

(132) Thus, the 'contrast' of the character of "having the three Attributes, etc.", and the rest (which have been set forth in Kārikā XI as belonging to the Unmanifest, Nature, as also to the Manifest, Products.)—connotes the Spirit's property of being without the three Attributes and being 'distinguishable', 'non-objective', not common, 'sentient' and 'non-productive'. Now the characters being 'sentient' and 'non-objective' also indicate the characters of being 'witness', and 'seer'. Since it is only a 'sentient' being that can be a witness and a seer, and we have their dispute to the witness; similarly does the Nature exhibit its isolation by which is meant the final separation of the three kinds of entities and this is the same reason, the Spirit is also the 'seer'.

(133) Further, from the absence of the three Attributes in the Spirit follows its isolation—by which is meant the final separation of the three kinds of entities and this is the same reason, the Spirit is also the 'seer'.

Delation.

(134) From the absence of the Attributes, again, follows neutrality: since this latter property is such as cannot belong either to the happy and satisfied, or to the sad and grumbling. It is only one who is devoid of both pleasure

and pain, who can be called *neutral*—also called *Uddisina* (indifferent). Lastly, the *inactivity* of the Spirit follows from its being ‘distinguishable’ and ‘non-productive.’

(135) *Objection.* “We grant all this; but in ordinary

Objection-*Iselli*.
gence and activity
always found co-
existent

experience, we first decide, what is to be done by us and then think in the following strain—‘I, who am a sentient being, wishing to do a certain act, am going to do it; so that, we find by our experience that ‘sentience’ and ‘activity’ are co-existent in the same person.” And this goes against the Sāṅkhya tenets which make the ‘Sentient’ being ‘inactive’ and the ‘active’ agent ‘insentient.’

Answer :—

Kārikā XX

Reply :—The
apparent activity
of the soul due to
union with Buddhi
and the apparent
intelligence of the
latter due to union
with Purusa

Thus from this union, the insentient ‘Evolute’ appears as if ‘sentient’; and similarly, from the activity really belonging to the Attributes, the Spirit, which is neutral appears as if it were active.

(136) The sense is that in as much as ‘sentience’ and ‘activity’ have been proved by reasons to be differently located, therefore, the feeling referred to by the objector must be a mistake. The word ‘*Liṅga*’ ‘Evolute’, here stands for everything from the Great Principle down to the primary elements to be described later on. The cause of the mistake is said to be the ‘union’ i. e., proximity of the Spirit with the ‘Evolute.’ The rest is clear enough.

(137) *Objection* :—"You say that the feeling is due to Union, etc. But no union between two distinct things is possible, without some need, which again is not possible without the relation (between the two things) of the helper and helped. [How is this possible in accordance with your tenets, with regard to the union of the Spirit with the Evolute?]"

In reply, the author explains the 'help' or 'benefit' which forms the basis of the need.

Kārikā XXI

For the perception of Nature by the Spirit and for the isolation of the Spirit, there is union of both,—like that of the halt and the blind; and from this union proceeds evolution.

(138) In the term "*Pradhānya*" the genitive affix has the accusative force, the meaning being—"for the perception by Spirit of Nature, the source of all things, thus implying the fact of Nature being an object—something to be enjoyed. This enjoyability, however, is not possible without an enjoyer, whose existence thus becomes needed by Nature.

tion, this isolation is dependent upon due discrimination between the Spirit and the three Attributes; thus discrimination is not possible without the Nature (and its evolutes in the shape of Buddhi and the rest, without which no knowledge

of any kind is possible);—thus it is that for his own Isolation the Spirit needs Nature. In as much as this series of unions (between the Spirit and Nature) is eternal, it is only right and proper that the Spirit, though he had been already united for the purposes of 'enjoyment', should be united with it again, for the purpose of 'Isolation'.

(140) "Granted that there is this union between these two; but whence the evolution of the Great

The necessity of the creation of Buddhi etc.

Principle and the rest? "Answer" "From this union proceeds evolution." The said union (of Spirit with Nature) cannot by

itself suffice either for 'enjoyment' or 'Isolation' if the Great Principle and the rest be not there; hence the union itself brings about the Evolution for the sake of 'enjoyment' and 'Isolation'.

The process of Evolution is now explained.

Kārikā XXII

From the (Prakṛti Primordial Matter, Nature) issues

The process of Evolution from Prakṛti downwards Mahat (Buddhi, the Great Principle); from this issues Ahaṁkāra (I-principle); from which proceed the 'set of sixteen'; from five of this 'set of sixteen' proceed the five elementary substances.

(141) From Prakṛti, etc.,—Prakṛti is the Unmanifest (Nature); Mahat (Great Principle) and Ahaṁkāra (I-Principle) will be described later. The 'set of sixteen' is made up of the eleven sense-organs, to be described later on, and the five primary elements. Out of these sixteen, from the five primary elements, proceed respectively the five elementary substances (Ākās's, Earth, Water, Air and Fire).

(142) Thus, (a) from the primary element of 'sound' proceeds Ākāśa, having sound as its characteristic property; (b) from the primary element of 'touch' as combined with that of 'sound' proceeds Air, with sound and touch as its characteristic properties; (c) from the primary element of 'colour' combined with those of 'sound' and 'touch' proceeds Fire, with sound, touch and colour for its characteristic properties; (d) from the primary element 'taste' combined with those of 'sound', 'touch' and 'colour' proceeds Water, with sound, touch, colour, and taste as its characteristic properties; and lastly, (e) from the primary element of 'odour' combined with those of 'sound', 'touch', 'colour' and 'taste' proceeds Earth with all sound, touch, colour, taste and odour as its characteristic properties.

(143) The Unmanifest Nature has been already defined in general terms in Kārikā X, and specifically in Kārikā XIII; the Manifest also has been generally defined in Kārikā X; now the author defines *Buddhi*, a particular form of the Manifest, the *Buddhi*—the knowledge of which is helpful towards discriminative wisdom.

Kārikā XXIII

Buddhi, the Great Principle of Determination

Buddhi defined.
Its properties
stated

when abounding in the Tamas-Principle.

he does is to review the situation; he ponders over it, regards himself as entitled to do it and then makes up his mind (determines) that he should do it and then does it. Now eristic which acuity (of the spirit); and Buddhi is regarded as not different from the said 'determination' (on the principle that the action is not different from the active agent); this also constitutes the 'definition' (differentia) of Buddhi, in as much as it distinguishes it from all like and unlike things

(145) Having thus defined Buddhi, the author, in order to help the attainment of discriminative wisdom states the properties of Buddhi, as abounding in the Sattva and Tamas attributes: "Virtue, etc., etc.". "Virtue" leads to prosperity and the Highest Good,—that brought about by the performance of sacrifices, charity and the like lead to the former, and that due to the practice of eight-fold Yoga lead to the latter. Wisdom

The properties of Buddhi-Virtue, Wisdom, Dispassion and Power, and the reverse of these

(146) Of this Dispassion there are four stages named

The four kinds of dispassion (1) Yatamāna-Saṁjñā, (2) Vyatireka-Saṁjñā (3) Ekendriya-Saṁjñā and (4) Vas'ikāra-Saṁjñā. (1) Love (Attachment) and other emotions are so many impurities residing in the mind, and

they incite the sense-organs to activity towards their respective objects in order that the sense-organs may turn towards their objects. (1) After this process of cure has commenced, it may be found that while some are already cured, others have still got to be cured, this sequence being there, those

stage. (2) After this process of cure has commenced, it may be found that while some are already cured, others have still got to be cured, this sequence being there, those

stage. (3) After the sense-organs have been rendered incapable of action, the impurities that have been cured continue to lie there in the mind in the form of a mere 'longing' (or eagerness); this is the third stage of Dispassion, the 'Fhanda' or 'Sāṃjñā' stage. (4) The

Patañjali: "The dispassion named 'Vas'ikara-Sāṃjñā' belongs to one who has no desire for either sensuous or super-sensuous objects." [Yoga-Sūtra 1-15].—Such is Dispassion, a property of *Buddhi*

(147) Power also is a property of *Buddhi*, and it is to

The eight kinds of power

is the power by which one can enter the densest substances, such as stones. (2) *Laghimā*, 'Buoyancy' = that to which

* There is some confusion as to the number of these perfections. As enumerated here, they appear nine, but they ought to be eight only; hence I have taken *Vas'itra* and *Is'itra* as one.

is due the ability to traverse the solar regions by means of the sun's rays. (3) *Garimā*, 'Gravity' leads to heaviness; and (4) *Mahimā*, 'Grandeur' brings greatness. (5) *Prāpti*, 'Approach' is the ability to touch the moon with the fingers (6) *Prākāmya*, Fulfilment of desires, is such as can enable one to dip into the earth and rise again as in water. (7) Things

ereig-

intain

matter and material things. (8) *Kāmōasāyitā*, Infallibility of purpose is that by which all objects follow the course dictated by the will of the person. The decisions of ordinary mortals follow the course of events, where as those of the trained devotee precede them and dictate their course. 1

(148) These four are the properties of *Buddhi*, abounding in the *Sattva*-Attribute. Those abounding in the *Tamas*-attribute are the reverse of these—viz., Vice, Ignorance, Passion and Weakness

The author next defines *Ahankāra*—the 'I-Principle'—

* Kārikā XXIV

The 'I-Principle' is self-consciousness; from that The principle of proceeds a two-fold evolution—the set of Ahankāra defined. eleven and the five rudimentary substances. Its effects

(149) "The I principle is egotism" and this 'I-principle' is perceptible in such ideas as—"To what I have observed and thought of I am entitled,—'I am able to do this'—'all these things are for my use'—'there is no one else entitled to it'—'hence I am;—the egotism involved in all such notions forms the characteristic function of the 'I-principle':—it is through this principle that the Will performs its deter-

minative function appearing in such decisions as "this is to be done by me"

(150) The different products of this Principle are next mentioned—"From that proceeds a two-fold evolution." The two forms of this evolution are next mentioned—"The set of eleven consisting of the sense organs, and "the five rudimentary substances,"—only these two forms of evolution proceed from the I-principle;—this is what has been emphasised by the particle 'eva'.

Objection:—"The I-principle itself being of one uniform nature, how can two different kinds of evolution the 'dull and inert (elements)' and the illuminative (the sense organs) proceed from it?"

Answer.

Kārikā XXV

The 'set of eleven' abounding in Sattva attribute, evolves out of the 'Vaikṛta' form of the I-principle; the set of Rudimentary substances from the 'Bhūtādi' form of the I-principle; and both of them from the 'Taijasa' form of the I-principle.*

Reply—The difference due to the diversity of the operating Attributes.

(151) 'The set of eleven', sense-organs, being illuminative and boyant is said to abound in the Sattva-attribute;

* (a) 'Vaikṛta,' (b) Bhūtādi and (c) Taijasa are purely technical terms names applied to the three forms or states of the 'I-principle' When the 'I principle' is dominated by the Sattva-attribute, it is called 'Vaikṛta', when it is dominated by the Tamas attribute, it is called 'Bhūtādi' and when it is dominated by the Rajas attribute, it is called 'Taijasa'. These are mere technical names, and do not connote anything—Gauḍapāda.

and it proceeds from the 'Vaikṛta' 'I-principle'. From the 'I-principle' as dominated by the Tamas-attribute proceeds the set of Rudimentary substances. How so? Because these substances abound in Sattva attribute. That is to say—though the I-principle is one and uniform, yet by reason of the domination or suppression of one or other of these Attributes it evolves products of diverse kinds.

(152) *Objection*.—When all the necessary products

Objection: The purposelessness of Passions

are brought about by the action of the attributes of *Sattva* and *Tamas* only, have done with the attribute of *Rajas*, which serves no useful purpose.

Answer.—"And both of these from the 'Taijasa' form

Reply-Passions necessary for urging the other Attributes to action

of the I-principle" i. e., from the 'Taijasa Form', that is from the form abounding in *Sattva*, *Tamas* and *Rajas* attributes, the set of sub-

product from the *Rajas*-attribute exclusively by itself, yet

the *Sattva* and *Tamas* attributes not-per-energised form their al in the

evolving of both the sets of products mentioned above, through the exciting of activity of the other two attributes, *Sattva* and *Tamas*. Thus it is not true that the *Rajas*-attribute serves no useful purpose.

In order to describe the 'set of eleven' abounding in the Sattva-Attribute, the author first describes the ten external sense-organs.

Kārika XXVI

The 'organs of sensation' are, the Eye, the Ear, the Nose, the Tongue and the Skin; those 'of action' are, speech, hand, feet, the arms and the generative organ.

The ten External
Organs

(153) 'Sense-organ' has been defined as that which

they are characteristics of 'Indra' (the Spirit).

The Sense-organs are named. "The eye etc."—Of these, the eye is the organ for perceiving colour, the ear for perceiving sound, the nose for perceiving odour, the tongue for perceiving taste, and the skin for feeling touch. These are the names of the 'Sensory' sense-organs. The function of the organs of speech and the rest will be spoken of later on (Kārika XXVIII.)

The eleventh sense-organ is next described—

Kārika XXVII

Of these (sense-organs) Mind partakes of the nature of both (Sensory and Motor): it is the

The eleventh sense
blind defined

common to sense.
its diverse external
modifications of the Attributes.

(154) "Partakes, etc."—Among the eleven sense-organs the mind partakes of the nature of both—i.e., it is an organ of sensation, as well as one of action: Since the eye and the other sensory

The double nature
of mind

organs, as well as speech and other *motor* organs are able to operate on their respective objects only when influenced by the Mind.

(155) The author next gives specific definition of the Mind defined *Mind*—"It is the observing principle"—That is to say Mind is defined by observation, when a certain object has been just vaguely apprehended by a

writer—"At first, one apprehends a certain object vaguely as a *thing* and then the *mindful* people observe—cognise—definitely as belonging to a certain *genus* and possessing certain well-defined properties".—Again (says another writer) —"It is a well-known fact that on the first apprehending an object, the first idea that one has of it is that *it is a thing*, this idea being indeterminate and vague, like the idea in the Mind of the infant, the dumb and other people; after this the thing comes to be cognised as possessing certain properties and belonging to a certain genus; the cognition that observes and apprehends all this has also been regarded as *sense-perception*"—"This function of *observing* belongs to the Mind, and as it serves to differentiate the Mind from all other like and unlike things, it serves as its *differentia*."

(156) *Objection*:—"Granted all this: But we have seen that the I-principle and the Will,

Objection:—Who make Mind a sense when it has in the distinct function of its own? should not be

classified among *sense-organs*.

The author replies—'It is a sense-organ'. Why?

"Because it has properties common to sense-organs." The property meant is that consist-

Reply—It is a sense-organ in as much as

a Sense

belongs to the Will and the I-principle also; and as such these two also would have to be

issued among 'sense-organs'. Thus then "being the characteristic of the Spirit" should be regarded only as an explanation of the derivation of the term *Indriya*; it cannot be to form its connotation.

(157) Question—"How can the eleven sense-organs proceed out of the single entity in the shape

Whence the Multifarious effects from Egoism

of the 'I-principle' abounding in the "Sattva-attribute?" Answer.—"Its multifariousness as well as its diverse external forms are

due to the particular modifications of the Attributes"—The diversity in the products is due to the diversity of auxiliaries in the shape of the 'Unseen Force' which brings about the experiences due to the perception of sound and other objects of sense; and the 'Unseen Force' also is only a 'modification' of the Attributes.

(158) The 'diverse external forms' has been added by way of illustration, the sense being that just as the diverse external forms, so the multifariousness also is due to the modification of the Attributes.

(159) Having thus described the forms of the eleven sense-organs, the specific functions of the first ten are next described.

Kārikā XXVIII

The function of the five senses, in respect to Sound, etc., is said to be mere 'perceiving'; The functions of the external organs 'speaking,' 'handling', 'walking', 'excretion' and 'gratification' are (the functions of) the other five.

By "Perception" here is meant the primary abstract apprehension (Nirvikalpa) through the sensory sense-organs. "Speaking, Handling, Walking, Excretion and Gratification are the functions of the other five," i. e., of the five motor organs (of action). The vocal organ is located in the throat, the palate, etc., and the function of this organ is 'Speaking'. The functions of the sensory organs are quite clear *

The functions of the three 'Internal organs' are next described:—

Kārikā XXIX

Of the three, (the internal organs), the functions consist of their respective characteristics; this is peculiar to each. The function common to the organs consists in the five Prāṇa and the rest.

(100) "The functions of the three ..."

Reflection of Manas, Self-Consciousness of Ahnara and determination of Buddhi stands for "those that have their own distinctive characteristics"—that is, the Will.

... aṅgā) ... their ... (or comprehending) sound—and thus the function of the ear is perception of sound, and so with the others.

stands for those *distinctive characteristics* themselves; the sense, therefore, is that the property which serves as the

ns,
in
of

the mind.

(161) The next sentence describes the dual character

The five vital
airs, the common
function of the
three internal
organs

of these functions based on the fact of their being *specific or common*—"These are *peculiar*," etc. "The five Breaths constitute the common function." The five 'vital airs' i.e., the *Life itself*—forms the common

function of the three internal organs; since the latter exists while the former do and ceases to exist when these are absent. Of these five, the 'Air' called '*Prāṇa*', is located in the nape of the neck, the back, the arms and the generative organ; that called '*Samāna*' in the heart, the naval and all joints; that called '*Udāna*', in the heart, the throat, the palate, the head and between the eye brows, and that called '*Vyāna*', in the skin—These are the 'five vital airs.'

The author now describes the order of the functions of these fourfold organs (the external organs and the three internal organs)

Kārikā XXX

With regard to perceptible things, the functions of the whole set of the four organs are said

The instantaneous
and the gradual
character of these
functions

to be simultaneous, as well as gradual; with regard to imperceptible (as well as perceptible) things, the functions of the three (internal organs) are preceded by

hat: (i. e., the cognition of some perceptible object.)

(162) "*Simultaneous*,"—"With regard to perceptible things"; e. g., when one sees in the dark

Instantaneous
with regard to
visible objects

by means of a flash of lightning, a tiger facing him, his perception (by the Eye), observation (by the Mind), Egoism or self-consciousness (by the I-principle) and determination (by the Will) are instantaneous and accordingly he runs away from the place at once.

(163) "*Gradual*"; e. g., in dim-light, a person has at first only a vague perception of a certain

Gradual with re-
gard to visible
objects

object; then fixing his Mind intently he observes that it is a robber with his drawn bow and arrow levelled at him; then follows the self-consciousness that 'the robber is advancing against me'; and lastly follows the determination to run away from the place.

(164) With regard to imperceptible things, on the other

With regard to
invisible objects,
the operation of
the internal org-
ns independent
of the external
organs

hand, the (three) internal organs operate without the aid of the external organs—"The function of the three is preceded by that," i. e., the instantaneous as well as the gradual functions of the three internal organs are preceded by some perception of a visible object; since Inference, Testimony and Remembrance—which are the means of cognising imperceptible things—operate only when they have for their background some sort of perception (of perceptible things). The sense is that in regard to 'perceptible' as well as 'imperceptible' things the functioning of the internal organs is always preceded by the perception of some external object.

(165) *Objection* : “The functions, either of the four or of the three (organs), cannot depend on

Objection : Functions permanent or otherwise ? themselves alone; for in that case, as these organs are everlasting their functions also would be everlasting; if, on the other hand,

the organs were transient, adventitious, then their functions also would be transient and adventitious, and this would lead to a commingling of the functions, as there would be nothing to regulate them.”

Answer :—

Kārikā XXXI

They (the organs) betake themselves to their respective functions, through mutual impulse. The purpose of the Spirit is the sole motive; by nothing (else) is an organ made to act.

The word ‘Karanāni,’ ‘organs,’ has to be supplied (as the subject of the sentence).

(166) When a number of persons wielding different weapons,—lances, sticks, bows and arrows, swords etc.,—combine for suppressing a common enemy, and proceed to act, they do so only after knowing each other’s ‘impulse’ (motive).—and in so doing the man with the lance takes up the lance only, not the stick or other weapons,—similarly the man with the stick takes up the stick only, not the lance and the other weapons. In the same manner each of the organs

(167) Another objection—"The lancers, etc., being

Objection—How can the non-intelligent organs understand each other's motives?

sentient beings, it is only right that they should comprehend each other's 'impluse' (motive) and act towards the fulfilment thereof. The organs, on the contrary, are all in-sentient, and as such can never act in the said manner (and hence your analogy does not apply to the case in question). Consequently the insentient organs must have an intelligent controller who is cognisant of their nature, capacity and uses."

Answer :—"The purpose of the Spirit is the sole motive, by nothing (else) is an organ made to act"

Reply—Soul's purpose urging them to action

What urges the organs to act is the 'Spirit's purpose'—in the shape of, 'Experience' and 'Isolation',—prior to its fulfilment; so that there is no need for the postulating of a 'Controller' cognisant of their nature. This point will be further elucidated in Kārikā LVII.

(168) It has been declared that "by nothing is an organ made to act." The author next proceeds to classify the organs :—

Kārikā XXXII

Organs are of thirteen kinds, having the functions of 'seizing', 'sustaining' and 'illuminating'. The objects of these are of ten kinds,—the 'seized', the 'sustained' and the 'illuminated.'

The organs divided—their functions—seizing, retaining and manifesting

(169) The 'thirteen organs' consist of the eleven sense-organs, the I-principle and the Will.

The thirteen organs—the ten external organs, *Manas*, *Ahaṅkāra* and *Buddhi*.

Seizing—the function of the senses of action.

Retention—the function of *Buddhi*, *Ahaṅkāra* and *Manas*.

Manifestation—of the intellectual organs

An organ is a particular kind of active agent, and nothing can be an 'active agent' unless it has a function; hence the author next states the functions of the organs—

seizing; that is, they take up their respective objects; i. e., extend their activities over them;—the Will, the I-principle and the

(170) Since every action must have an object, the objects of the above-mentioned functions are next named and classified—"The

The objects of these functions,

or sound, touch, colour, taste and odour. Each of these five being both 'celestial' and 'non-celestial'; these objects 'to be sustained' also come to be *tenfold*. Similarly the objects affected by the five sensory organs are five—sound, touch,

colour, taste, and odour; and each of these being both 'celestial' and 'non-celestial,' the objects 'to be illumined' also become *tenfold*.

(171) A further subdivision of the thirteen organs is next stated —

Kārikā XXXIII

The *internal* organs are three; and the *external*, ten. The organs numbered and the difference between the external and internal in point of time noted

The 'external' organs act at the present time and the 'internal' at all the three points of time.

(172) "The internal-organs are three;" (1) Mind, (2) I-principle and (3) Will; these are called *internal* because located *inside* the body.

(173) The external-organs are ten; viz., the ten sense-organs. These latter exhibit objects to the three internal organs, i. e., they supply the means for observation, self-consciousness and determination regarding objects,—the sense-organs doing this through perception, and the motor-organs, through their respective functions.

(174) The author next states a further point of difference between the *internal* and *external* organs.

The external senses acting at time present; the internal with reference to all three divisions of time

"The external organs act at the present time." The "present" here includes also the time closely preceding and following the immediate present; so that, Speech* also pertains to the present. "The internal

* The special qualification is necessary for the case of Speech, because no two letters can be pronounced at the same moment, and, as such, no word could be uttered at the present if by this were meant the present moment only. This difficulty, however, is avoided by counting a few moments before and after the present moment as 'present.'

organs at all the three points of time." e. g., the idea that "there has been rain, because the river has risen—" (for the past); "there is fire in the mountain, since there is smoke"— (for the present); and lastly, "unless there is something to prevent it, we shall have rain, since we see ants carrying their eggs"—(for the future).

(175) According to the *Vaiśeṣikas*, Time is one (indivisible) and hence it cannot admit of such divisions as 'past,' 'present' and 'future'. They attribute these divisions to certain 'accidents' (adventitious conditions), but what the Teachers of *Sāṅkhya* hold is that these same 'accidents' themselves may be regarded as the basis of the notions of 'future,' 'present' and 'past,' and there is no need for the postulating of an intervening entity as 'Time'. This is the reason why we do not accept Time as a distinct Entity.

(176) The author next discusses the objects of the external senses operating at time present —

Kārikā XXXIV

Of these, the five sensory organs are concerned with objects specific as well as non-specific. Speech is concerned with sound; the rest are concerned with five objects.

The intellectual sense touching specific as well as unspecific objects; speech touching sound, the rest regarding the five objects of sense

(177) Of the ten external organs, the five sensory ones are concerned with 'specific' as well as 'non-specific' objects. The term 'specific' here stands for the 'gross' Sound (Touch, Colour, Taste, and Odour) in their

'calm,' 'turbulent' and 'deceiving' forms, as manifested in the form of *Earth* (*Water*, *Air*, *Fire* and *Ākāśa*);—and

'non-specific' stands for the subtle forms of Sound etc., manifested as the Rudimentary Elements. (*Tanmātrās*). In this name '*tanmātra*', the particle '*mātra*' serves to exclude the *Gross* forms of the Elements. Thus the sensory

Sound; but the Ear of the people like ourselves can perceive the gross Sound; similarly the Tactile organ of those beings can perceive gross as well as *subtile* Touch, while our organ can perceive gross Touch only; similarly, the Eye and other organs of those beings can perceive Colour and other things in their gross as well as *subtile* forms, while our organs can perceive these in their *gross* forms only.

(178) Among the Motor-organs, Speech is concerned with sound, in its gross form, because organ of Speech is the producer of such sound. The organ of Speech, however, cannot produce Rudimentary Element of sound, which is the direct effect of the 1-principle (*Ahankāra*), and as such has the same cause as the organ of speech itself (which also being one of the sense-organs, proceeds directly from the 1-principle).

"The rest" i. e. the four other motor-organs—the Arms, the Generative organ, the Hands and the Feet are 'concerned with five objects'; because the jar and such other objects—which are what are dealt with by those organs, are all made up of the five primary elements of Sound, Colour, Touch, Taste and Odour.

Among the thirteen organs, some are described as superior to others. reasons for which are given :

Kārikā XXXV

The superiority of internal over external organs Since the Will along with the other internal organs extends over all things, these three are the 'warders', and the others are the gates.

(179) 'Warders' i. e., most important, superior, 'Gates', i. e., mere instruments; the external organs are mere instruments. Since the Will

The superiority accounted for

The Will, Buddhi is superior, not only to the external organs, but also to the other internal organs, the I-principle, and the Mind. To this effect it is said —

Kārikā XXXVI

The (external organs together with the Mind and the I-principle) characteristically different from one another and being different modifications of the Attributes, resemble a lamp in action; (and as such) having first illumined (rendered manifest) the whole of the Spirit's purpose, present it to the Will.

The superiority of Buddhi over all others accounted for

(180) As the village-officer collects the rent from the different heads of families and delivers the collection to the Governor of the District, who again, in his turn, delivers it to the Governor of the country, who finally makes it over to the king: so, in the same manner, the external organs, having 'perceived' an object, present it to the Mind, which 'observes' it (and thereby imparts thereto its qualifications) and pre-

sents it to the 'I-principle'
 of them, and finally Will.
 Hence it is said: " the
 Spirit's purpose prese

(181) The external organs, the Mind and the I-principle are various modifications of the Attributes, i. e., phases of Sattva, Rajas and Tamas. Even though these are mutually nugatory yet they are led to co-operate for the supreme purpose of Spirit; just as the wick, oil and fire (though variously opposed to the action of one another,) yet combine, in the form of the lamp, in removing darkness, and thus illumine (manifest) the different colours. The same is the case with the modifications of the Attributes; such is the connection.

Objection .—“Why should it be said that the other organs present their impressions to the Will? Why should not we make it the other way: the Will presents its impressions to the I-principle and the Mind, which latter being ‘superior’?”

Answer :—

Kārikā XXXVII

In as much as it is the Will that accomplishes the Spirit's experiences, and again it is Will that discriminates the subtle difference between Nature and Spirit [it is Will that is regarded as superior to the other two].

Reply the superiority of Buddhi accounted for, because it directly fulfils the soul-purpose, and bridges the gap between Spirit and Matter

Answer—“ It afterwards discriminates the difference between Spirit and Nature.”—

Reply—It latterly shows to the soul its distinction from Matter

tes “*Visināṣṭi*” here stands for ‘bringing about’ the construction of clause ‘*Antaram Visināṣṭi*’—‘discriminates the difference’; and is similar to that of ‘*Odanpākam pacati*’* (cooks the cooking of rice); and ‘bringing about’ in this context stands for ‘showing’ or ‘expressing’.

The objector retorts: “*The difference between Spirit and Nature being thus, according to your-*

The difference must have olation or at differ-

The answer to this is contained in the word ‘discriminates’, the meaning is that the idea that

Reply—the dif- ‘I am one thing and Nature with its evolves

non-discrimination, has appeared to be non-existent; the Will does not produce the difference, whereby it would be transitory. This shows that *Emancipation* (Isolation) is the end or purpose of the Spirit.

‘*Subtle*—the said difference is’ subtle i. e., ‘hard to perceive.’

The organs having been described, the author next describes the specific as well as non-specific (objects):—

* *Viśināṣṭi* itself has been explained as “expresses the difference”, then the mention of *Antaram* would seem superfluous. But it is not so, it helps to intensify the meaning of the sentence.

Kārikā XXXVIII

The Rudimentary Elements are 'non-specific;' from these five proceed the five gross elements; these latter are said to be 'specific,' because they are calm, turbulent and deluding

The division of objects into specific and non-specific

(184) The Rudimentary Elements i. e., Sound and the rest in their subtle form; what the particle 'Mātra' (in the term 'tanmātra,' which is the name of the Rudimentary Elements,) connotes is that these subtle elements are devoid of that 'specific character' consisting of the 'calmness, turbulence and delusiveness' which would make them objects of direct experience.

(185) Having thus described the 'non specific' things, the author, with a view to describing the 'specific' objects, mentions the manner of their production. "*From these etc.,*" from the five Rudimentary Elements of Sound, Touch, Colour, Taste and Odour proceed respectively the five gross Elements—Ākās'a, Air, Fire, Water and Earth—these 'five' proceeding from the aforesaid 'five' Rudimentary Elements.

(186) *Objection* —"We grant that these are thus produced, but what about their being 'specific'?"
Specific because soothing, terrific and deluding *Answer*. "*These are said to be specific;*"—why? because "*they are calm, turbulent and deluding.*" The first च indicates the reason (meaning because) and the second च has the cumulative force (meaning that the things have all the three characteristics). The sense is that, in as much as among the gross elements, Ākās'a and the rest, some abounding in the Sattva attribute, are in the con-

perceived to be distinguished from one another are said to be *specific* and *gross*. The Rudimentary Elements on the contrary cannot be similarly distinguished by ordinary people; and as such they are said to be *non-specific* and *subtle*.

A further sub-division among the 'specific' objects is next stated.—

Kārikā XXXIX

(1) The 'subtle' bodies, (2) 'those born of parents', and (3) the 'gross' elements,—these are the three kinds of the 'specific'. Of these the 'subtle' bodies are everlasting, and 'those born of parents' are perishable.

(187) "*The specific objects are of three kinds*": these three forms are mentioned: (1) *subtle bodies* which (are not visible, but) are postulated (in order to explain certain phenomena); (2) *Those born of parents, i. e.,* those consisting of the six 'sheaths' (Kośas) Among these six, hair, blood and flesh are from the mother; and the arteries, bones and marrow from the father; these six are the six 'sheaths' (of the physical body). (3) The last are the '*prabhūta*' i. e. the '*prakṛṣṭa*', Great, 'bhūta', Elements, along with these, the other two constitute the 'specific'. Thus subtle bodies form the first kind of 'specific' objects, 'bodies born of parents', the second kind and the 'gross elements' the third kind. Ordinary things like the jar, are included in this last.

(188) The difference between the 'subtle' body and the body 'born of parents' is next explained—
The subtle bodies are permanent, those produced of parents perishable "*The subtle bodies are permanent and those born of parents, perishable*"; that is to say, among the specific things, those that are subtle are lasting, while those 'born of

parents', are *perishable*, i. e., ending in (dissolving into) either fluids or ash or dirt.

The subtle body is described—

Kārikā XL

The 'mergent' (subtle) body formed primevally,
unconfined, lasting, composed of Will

The Body is un-
confined, perma-
nent and migrat-
ing, invested with
dispositions

and the rest down to the Rudimentary

(189) 'Formed primevally':—when the emanations

Unconfined and
Permanent

untrammelled; as such, it can enter even a solid piece of stone. It is "lasting"*, since it continues to exist all the time from the first Evolution to the Final Dissolution. This Body is "composed of the Will and the rest, down to the Rudimentary Elements." Therefore, the subtle body is composed of the Will, Rudimentary

sense-organs which are 'calm, turbulent and delusive'.

(190) *Objection*.—"This Subtle body might be the only vehicle of experience for the Spirit;—what is need of the Physical Body comprised of the six 'sheaths'?"

Objection.—un-
necessariness of
postulating two
bodies, subtle
and gross

* The word *niyata* is differently interpreted by Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha (in his Sāṅkhyā Candrikā). He takes it in the sense of "restricted" i. e., the Subtle Body is restricted to one particular Spirit; and so there is a distinct subtle body for each Spirit. The interpretation of Gaudapāda closely resembles that of the Kaumārī.

Answer.—"It migrates" i. e. the Subtle Body goes on deserting and occupying one six-sheathed (physical) body after the other.—"But why?"—Because it is "devoid of experience", that is to say, because the subtle body by itself, without a corresponding physical body of six sheaths to afford the vehicle of experience—would be devoid of experience; that is why it migrates.

Objection:—How can the subtle Body migrate, being without dispositions?

(191) **Objection:**—"As a matter of fact, transmigration is due to Virtue and Vice; and these have no connection with the Subtle Body (belonging as they do primarily to the Will, and then, by reflection, to the Spirit); then how can this Subtle Body migrate?"

Answer.—(Ramanuja) "it is invested with dispositions." ice. 324

Reply.—It has dispositions?

sign, Power and Weakness; and it is the Will which is endowed, that is, directly connected with them; and the Subtle Body is connected with the Will; hence the Subtle Body becomes invested with those dispositions; just as a piece of cloth becomes perfumed with the fragrance of the Campaka flowers by coming into contact with them. Thus then, it is because it is invested with dispositions, that the Subtle Body migrates.

(192) **Question.**—"Why should not the Subtle Body—The subtle Body like Nature—last even after the Final pralaya Dissolution?"

Answer.—(Because it is) "mergent," that is to say, because it dissolves (into Nature). This mergent character of the Subtle Body is inferred from the fact of its being product; i. e., having a cause it must merge into it.

Objection :—“ We grant all this. But why not attribute migration to the Will itself as equipped with the I-principle and sense-organs? There is no need for the postulating of the Subtle Body, for which there is no authority. ”

Objection—Why not attribute migration to Buddhi etc ?

Answer —

Kārikā XLI

As a painting stands not without a ground, nor a shadow without a solid object like the pillar,—so neither does the ‘*Linga*’ (Will etc.) subsist supportless, without ‘*Specific Bodies*’.

Reply—the Buddhi cannot rest without substrate

(193) The term ‘*Linga*’ here stands for the Will, the I principle and the Rudimentary Elements, *because they are the means of knowing* (hīganāt) and these cannot subsist without a substrate.* In support of this the author puts forth a syllogism—During the time intervening between death and re-birth, Will and the rest must have some sort of evolved body for their receptacle, because they are such Will and the rest as are equipped with the five Rudimentary Elements; like the Will etc., found in the ordinary physical body.

“*Without specific bodies*” i. e., without Subtle Bodies. In support of this assertion, we have the following

scriptural text (from the Mahābhārata).

“Then Yama extracted from Satyavān’s body the thumb-sized body which he had

entrapped and under his control.” Here the mention of the extracted body as “thumb-sized” implies the fact of its having been the Subtle Body, since it is impossible that the Spirit

The existence of the Subtle Body corroborated by the Mahābhārata

* Cf. ‘The Pañcīkarana-vivaraṇa-Tattvacandrikā’—where a similar explanation of the word is given.

could have been so extracted. 'Puruṣa' in the above extract, stands for the Subtle Body, in the sense that it sleeps (lies—s'ete) in the body (puri)

Having thus proved the existence of the Subtle Body, the author states the reason and method of its migration.—

Kārikā XLII

Formed for the sake of Spirit's purpose the Subtle

Reasons and
manner of the
migration of the
Subtle Body

Body acts like a dramatic actor, on account of the connection of 'causes and effects' and by union with the all-embracing power of Nature.

(194) "Formed for the Spirit's purpose", the Subtle Body acts like a dramatic actor, on account of its connection with the 'causes' in the shape of Virtue, Vice, etc.,—and 'effects' in the shape of the taking up of different kinds of physical bodies, the latter being the effects of Virtue, etc. That is to say, just as a dramatic actor, playing different parts, acts like Paras'urāma or Yudhiṣṭhira or Vatsarāja, so does the subtle body, occupying various physical bodies, act like a man or a brute or a tree

(195) Question:—"Whence this capacity of the Subtle

The capacity of
the Subtle Body
is due to the Power
of Nature

Body?" Answer:—"By union with the all-embracing Power of Nature." As is declared in the Purāṇa—"All this wonderful evolution is the all-embracing Power

of Nature."

It has just been said that the Subtle Body acts "on account of connection with causes and effects"; the author next describes the causes and effects:—

Kārikā XLIII

Virtue and other dispositions are—(a) natural, which are innate and (b) incidental; and these are related to the 'cause'; and the ovum etc., related to the 'effect.'*

The means and consequences
Dharma, etc.

(196) 'Incidental,' adventitious; i. e., brought about after the man's birth, by the subsequent propitiating of the deities and such other causes.

"The natural dispositions are innate," e. g., it is declared that at the beginning of the Evolution the revered primeval sage Kapila emerged into existence fully equipped with Virtue, Wis-

II Essential, innate

dom, Dispassion and Power. The 'incidental' dispositions, on the other hand, are not innate, that is to say, they are brought about by the personal effort of the man; such Virtue etc. are those belonging to Vālmīki and other great sages. The opposites of The same is to be understood with regard to Dharma etc., similarly explained Vice, Ignorance, Passion and Weakness.

(197) The aggregate formed of the ovum, foetus, flesh, blood, etc., of the child in the mother's womb is related to the gross physical body; that is to say, they are particular states of the latter; so also are the childhood, youth and old age of the person after the birth.**

Flesh, blood, etc.
related to the
Gross Body

* It may be pointed out that Davies has quite misunderstood this Kārikā. In the first place he renders *Sāmsiddhikāḥ* by "transcendental" the very reverse of what it does mean. Secondly, he renders *Karaṇas rayiṇāḥ* by "including cause" though in reality the compound means "located in organs"—as explained by the *Kaumudī* as well as the *Candrikā*.

** Gauḍapāda has taken the Kārikā as setting forth three kinds of dispositions—(1) '*Sāmsiddhikā*' innate, (2) '*Prākṛtikā*' natural due to the operation of Nature, Primordial Matter and (3) '*Vaiśṛtikā*' incidental.

(198) *Question*:—"We have understood what are 'causes' and 'effects' in general; what are the particular effects of particular causes?"

Answer:—

Kārikā XLIV

By virtue (is obtained) ascent to higher planes,
by vice, descent to the lower; from
wisdom (results) the Highest Good;
and bondage from the reverse

(199) "By virtue etc." i. e., to the Heaven and other
higher planes
Virtue leads to regions
higher planes

"By vice, etc.," i. e., to the nether regions known as
Vice to lower Sūtaṅga etc.

"From wisdom, the Highest Good" Nature ministers
to the progress of the Soul so long
Wisdom brings about beatitude brought
accomplished

plished, Nature finds its work in connection with that particular Spirit entirely fulfilled, and accordingly retires from activity so far as that Spirit is concerned. As is declared, "The Operations of Nature continue only till the attainment of discriminative knowledge" "From the reverse, etc.", i. e., from wrong knowledge, results bondage.

(200) This bondage is of three kinds: 'Natural', 'Evolutional' and 'Personal'. (1) The
From the reverse of the above, respectively, contradictory results The three kinds of bondage
'Natural' bondage is that of those who worship Nature as the Spirit; with reference to such men, who are called 'Prākṛtika' ('Merged into Nature'), it is said in the Purāṇas: "The contemplators of the Un-

manifest (Nature) continue (in the chain of metempsychosis) till a hundred thousand years"; (2) The 'Evolutional' bondage is of those who worship the various evolutes of Nature,—the elements, the sense-organs, the I-principle, and the Will-as Spirit. With regard to these it is said. "The contemplators of the sense-organs continue till ten Manvantaras; those of the elements, till a hundred Manvantaras, those of the I-principle till thousand; and lastly, those of the Will, do away with all feverish excitement, and continue till ten thousand Manvantaras bondage are Videha. due to Istāpūrta (actions tanks etc., done with the sole motive of personal gains hereafter). Those performing such actions, having their minds influenced by desire, are ignorant of the true nature of the Spirit, and as such undergo bondage.

Kārikā XLV

From Dispassion results 'mergence' into Nature';

Consequences of
various means:

from Attachment which abounds in the
Rajas-attribute, transmigration; from
Power, non-impediment, and from the
reverse, the contrary.

* Davies takes the Hindu commentators to task, and remarks
"It (the mergence) is not mergence into N.

by the
destruction
of the
All the

the "Hindu Commentators," who, at least Vācaspati Miśra, do not
assert the final absorption of the bodies into Nature, all that they mean
is that by dispassion, the soul—or more properly its seat, the subtle
body—is absorbed into Nature and rests there till it is born again.

(201) "From Dispassion results Mergence into Nature."

Those who are in passion, but are
ature of the Spirit.
nature. 'Nature'

Here stands for the whole set consisting of
Nature, Will, 1-principle, the elements, and the sense-organs.
Those who worship these as 'Spirit', become absorbed into
these (i. e., those mistaking the senses for the Spirit become
absorbed in the senses, and so on), that is to say, they rest
there till, in the course of time, they are born again.

(202) "From attachment which abounds in the Rajas-

II Transmigra- attribute, results transmigration." The epithet
tion from passion. "Rajasa" implies the painful character of
ate attachment

transmigration; because (as has been pre-
viously described) the Rajas attribute is the source of pain

(203) "F e., the non-
"with power

III. Non-impedi
ment from power

"From the reverse", i. e., from absence of Power "the

IV Obstruction contrary "i. e., the obstruction of one's de-
of desires from sires everywhere
weakness

With a view to describe collectively as well as severally
the eight dispositions of the Will—Virtue, Vice etc.,—in
order to show which of these are to be adopted, and which
relinquished, by those desiring Isolation—the author first
describes them collectively :—

Kārikā XLVI

Such is the "volitional" (Subjective) Evolution
distinguished by Error, Disability, Con-

The intellectual
creation described sentiment and Success. By reason of the
mutual suppression of the Attributes due
to their inequalities, the different forms of this Evolu-
tion become fifty.

(204) '*Pratyaya*' is that by which anything is known

i. e., *Will*; and '*pratyayasarga*' is the '*sarga*'

I. Error
II. Disability
III. Contentment
IV. Success

'*evolution*' proceeding from the *Will* i. e.,

the volitional or '*Subjective*' evolution.

"*Error*" i. e., ignorance, illusion, is a property of the *Will*; so is also "*disability*" which results from the incapacity of the sense-organs;—"contentment" and "*success*" also are properties of the *Will*, as will be described later on.

Of these, the three former,—"*error*," "*disability*" and "*con-*

tentment"—include *Virtue* and the other six

Virtue &c. included in the above four

dispositions leaving aside *Wisdom* which is included in "*success*".

(205) These properties are next described severally.

"*The forms of these are fifty.*" How so?

Subdivisions of the above are fifty

"*By reason of the mutual suppression of the Attributes due to their inequalities.*" This

"... is the reason in the Indian

the two conjointly with that of the third The various grades of this '*inequality*' are assumed in accordance with the re-

The '*fifty forms*' are next enumerated:

Kārikā XLVII

There are five forms of *Error*: twenty eight of

5 forms of Error.
28 of Disability.
9 of Contentment.
8 of Perfection

Disability, arising from the imperfection of the organs; *Contentment* has nine forms; and *Success* eight.

(206) The five forms of Error are *ignorance, egoism, love, hate and clinging*, respectively named '*obscurity*' (Tamas), '*delusion*' (Moha), '*extreme delusion*' (Mahāmoha) '*gloom*' (Tāmisra) '*blind gloom*' (Andhatāmisra). Egotism and the rest partake of the nature of 'Error'; though, as a matter of fact, they are the products of Error. Or, the idea may be that it is only after a certain thing has become the object of Error that Egotism and the rest also, partaking of the nature of Error, come to bear upon that same thing. It is for this reason that the revered Vārṣaganya has declared that 'Ignorance is five-jointed.'

(207) The author next describes the sub-divisions of the five forms of Error.—

Kārikā XLVIII

Of Error there are eight forms: as also of Delusion;

Sixty-two subdivisions of Error Extreme Delusion is ten-fold; Gloom is eighteen-fold, and so is also 'Blind Gloom'.

(208) "Of Error"; i. e., of Ignorance. "there are eight forms".
of Ignorance eight forms

Of 'Darkness' i. e., Ignorance, there are eight forms; Eight of Delusion it consists in the notion of 'Spirit' with principle, of which institutes

'Darkness' or Ignorance.

(209) The particle 'ca' connects 'eight forms' with Delusion also. The Deities having attained the eight occult powers, regard themselves as immortal, and their several powers—*anima*, and the rest—also to be everlasting; this is the error of Egotism, and since this appertains to the eight Powers it is said to be eight-fold.

(210) "*Extreme Delusion is ten fold*". By *Extreme*

Ten of Extreme
Delusion

Delusion is meant the attachment to the objects of sense, sound, odour and the rest—which are ten-fold, each of the five being

earthly and heavenly; and having these ten for its object,
Extreme Delusion is said to be *ten fold*.

(211) "*Gloom*", i. e., Hatred, "*is eighteen-fold*"

Eighteen of
Gloom

The ten objects of sense, sound, &c. are loveable by themselves; the eight occult 'powers'—Attenuation &c., however are

not loveable, by themselves, but only as means to the attainment, of the various objects of sense. And the objects of sense, being mutually suppressive, the means to the attainment,—in the shape of Attenuation and the other Powers also become obstructed. So that the eight Powers together with the ten objects of sense become sixteen and the sixteen

Eighteen of Utter
Darkness

for Clinging). The word "*tathā*" applies *eighteen-fold-ness* to Blind Gloom. The deities having attained the eight occult

powers—Attenuation and the rest—and enjoying in consequence, the ten objects of sense,—Sound and the rest—

and objects) being *eighteen*; and this dread *ade* which is 'Blind' objects the afore-said

eighteen things—the eight powers and the ten objects—is said to be *eighteen-fold*.

(213) Thus the five forms of Error—which is a sort of Fancy,—with their sub-divisions become sixty two.

(214) Having thus described the five forms of Error, the author next describes the twenty eight forms of Disability.

Kārikā XLIX

The injuries of the eleven-organs, together with those of the Will are pronounced to constitute Disability; the injuries of the Will (itself) are seventeen—due to the reversion of 'contentment' and 'success'.

Twenty-eight
forms of Dis-
ability

(215) The 'injuries of the organs' are mentioned only as causes of so many injuries of the Will, and not as, by themselves, independent forms of Disability. These injuries—Deaf-

The eleven caused
by injuries to the
sense-organs

ness, insensibility to touch, blindness, numbness of tongue, insensibility of the olfactory nerves, dumbness, palsy of hands, lameness, impotency, intestinal paralysis and idiocy,—consequent on the failure of the several sense-organs—auditory and the rest—are the eleven forms of disability. The disability of the Will in regard to its own function also due to the said injuries of the senses, is of eleven kinds, as it is due to *eleven* causes. These two have been mentioned together with those of *Buddhi* (itself) in accordance with the theory of non-difference of cause and effect.

(216) Having thus described the disabilities of the

Seventeen caused
by the reversion
of contentment
and success

Will, arising from the injury of the sense-organs, the disabilities of the Will by itself are next described—*With injuries of the Will.* Question—"How many Disabilities are there of the Will itself?" Answer—"Seventeen are the injuries of the Will;" why? "due to the reversion of content-

fold,—thus making the seventeen disabilities proper of the Will.

(217) The author next enumerates the nine forms of Contentment.—

Kārikā L

The nine forms of Contentment have been held to be the following:—Four internal named 'Prakṛti' (Nature), (2) 'Upādāna' (Means), (3) 'Kāla' (Time) and (4) 'Bhāgya' (Luck); and five external due to the abstinence from objects.

(218) The

The four internal forms

do not make further attempts to obtain the direct apprehension of that difference by such means as 'Hearing', 'Contemplating' and the like;—these forms are called 'Nature', 'Means', 'Time' and 'Luck' i. e., whose names are 'Nature' and the rest.

(219) The Contentment called "Nature" consists in

I. Amb

is only
every
need of

So, my child, remain as you are! This Contentment is called 'Ambha'.

(220) The second form of Contentment arises from the following instruction; 'wisdom cannot be attained in the ordinary course of nature:

II. Saṁ

hence

Renunciation, and so, O long living one, thou must have recourse to Renunciation and give up all practice of meditation. The satisfaction arising from this instruction is named 'Upā-dāna' (Means), also called 'Salila.'

(221) The Contentment that follows upon the feeling
 III. Ogha of satisfaction arising from the instruction
 that "Renunciation" also cannot bring about

Contentment named 'Time', also called 'Ogha'

(222) The fourth form of Contentment is the feeling of
 satisfaction arising from the following:
 IV Vṛṣṭi "Discriminative-wisdom proceeds neither
 from nature nor from any other means (such
 as Renunciation) nor does it depend solely upon time, but it
 comes only by luck; thus it was through mere luck that the
 children of Madālasā obtained wisdom in their infancy
 through their mother's instructions and thereby attained
 Emancipation. This form of contentment is named 'Luck'
 also called 'Vṛṣṭi'.

(223) The external forms of Contentment are next
 described. The external forms are five.
 The five external forms are five, four,
 and
 the non-Spirits—Nature, Will, I-principle and the rest—to be
 pre-
 13,
 1240
 nce
 ive,
 ch-

ment to find it is the same as Contentment in question also

(224) To explain :—The means of acquiring wealth consist of service etc., and these are sources of pain to the servants;—as is declared in the following words:—“who would ever be attracted towards service, when one thinks of the pain caused by the insults suffered at the hands of the wardens of a haughty and wicked master?” Similar is the case with other means of acquiring wealth. The contentment resulting from the abstinence from objects of sense due to the consideration of such troubles, is called ‘Pāra’.

(225) And then, the wealth having been acquired, it brings with it further trouble of saving it from the ravages of the king, thieves, floods and fire;—the contentment due to abstinence arising from such considerations is the second one called ‘Supāra’.

(226) Thirdly, the wealth having been acquired with great effort (and safely hoarded), there arises the fear of its being spent up,—this contentment arising from the abstinence from objects of sense is called ‘Parapāra’.

Thus the five *external* forms of Contentment, along with the four internal ones, make up the nine forms mentioned above.

(229) The author next describes the primary and secondary forms of success:—

Kārikā LI

The eight forms of success are—(1) reasoning, (2) oral instruction, (3) study, (4-6) *The eight powers* three-fold suppression of pain, (7) acquisition of friends, and (8) purity. The three before-mentioned are checks to success

(230) The most important 'Success' among those enumerated above is the three-fold suppression of pain—three fold, on account of the three kinds of the pains to be suppressed.

The other 'successes' mentioned are only the means to said suppression of pain, and as such are regarded as secondary in relation to it. And these five are both causes and effects; e. g., of these study is only a cause; those of the more important kind are only effects; while the rest, of the middle class are both cause and effect.

(231) The first study consists in reading in due form with the teacher, of the philosophical texts; thus is also called 'Tāra'.

(1) Tāra

(232) ... from the first ... instruction which

ing). This constitutes the second *success* also called '*Satūra*'.
 —These two—reading of the text and comprehension of the
 meaning together constitute the '*Śravaṇa*' (Hearing)
 [which along with *manana* and *nididhyāsana* is the means of
 realising the highest Truth.]

(233) Reasoning consists in the investigating of the
 meaning of the scriptures by a process of

(3) *Tāratāra* ... with the question
 themselves.
 ultimate
 regard to

by writers on the Vedas. This success is called '*Tāratāra*'.

(234) The ... of friends. Even

(4) *Ramyaka* ... until he has discussed them
 with his friends and fellow-
 ends as the
 fourth success

(235) By *dāna* here is meant *purity*, of discriminative

(5) *Sadānudita* wisdom—the word being derived from the
 root '*Daip*', to purify. This '*purity*' has
 been thus described by the revered Patañjali: "An unin-

different kinds of cravings or desires. * This purity is no obtainable without the refinement arising from a long, careful and uninterrupted course of practice; hence the word *Dāna* 'purity' includes (as a means to success) this practice also. Thus the fifth success called '*Sadā-mudita*'.

(236) The aforesaid three primary 'successes' (three suppressions of Pain) are called, '*Prāmōda*', '*Madita*' and '*Modamāna*'. And these three with last five are eight forms of Success.

(237) Other people explain the text as follows:—(1)

Another explanation of the Powers the perception of truth, without the instruction of others, brought about purely by means of practices during past lives, is what

is the first 'success' meant by *ūha*. (2) And that which is obtained by listening to another person reading the texts of the Sāṅkhya Philosophy, is the 'second success' called '*Sādā*', because it follows solely from the verbal text.

(3) Where the truth is learnt from the study of the words and meaning of the Sāṅkhya texts in the course of regular residence in the Teacher's,—it is the third form of success, due to study, and is called '*adhyayana*'.

(4) The fourth consists in the attainment of wisdom by coming in contact with a true person, who has already attained the form of Success described above.

... .. *śikṣāprāpti*. (5) Fifthly, to 'Success' because

true wisdom is imparted by the teacher duly propitiated with gifts.

The propriety of either interpretation we leave to the learned to judge; and we desist from pointing out the faults of others, because our business lies only in elucidating the cardinal doctrines of the Sāṅkhya Philosophy.

(238) The Disabilities of the Will arising from the 'reversion of Contentment and Success' thus become seventeen

in number. It is well known that in the whole range of 'Subjective Evolution' and 'Success' there are three checks to Success. "The aforesaid three" are Error, Disability and Contentment. And these act as curbs on the various forms of Success,—because they retard their progress; the Success being likened to so many elephants whose movement is curbed by the goad, 'Ankas'a,' and thus being opposed to success the latter three are ever to be abandoned.

(239) *Objection*—"Granted all this. But it has been said that Evolution is for the Spirit's purpose. This purpose can be fulfilled either by the 'Subjective Evolution' or by 'Objective Evolution' alone. Why have both the Evolutions?"

Answer—

Kārikā LII

Without the 'Subjective', there would be no 'Objective', and without the 'Objective' there would be no 'Subjective'. Therefore, there proceeds two fold evolution, the 'Objective' and the 'Subjective'.

(240) The term 'Linga' 'Objective' stands for the Evolution out of the Rudimentary elements, and 'Bhāva' 'Subjective' for the evolution out of the Will.

The meaning of the Kārikā is that the 'Objective'

the objective. Hence the necessity of a two-fold evolution.

That is to say, *Experience*, which is the purpose of the Spirit, is not possible unless there are the objects of experience and also the vehicle of experience in the form of the two bodies (Subtle and Physical) evolution;—converse without the organs of other Dispositions. Lastly, the Discriminative wisdom, which leads to the final End (Emancipation), is not possible without both these forms of Evolution. Thus is the need for both forms of Evolution established.

(241) The possible objection of 'mutual interdependence' is explained away on the analogy of the fault of reciprocal causality explained as due to the eternality of creation beginning of the present cycle are due to the impulse of residual tendencies left by the corresponding evolutions of the previous cycle—Thus the whole theory is free from difficulties.

(242) The various forms of the 'subjective evolution' have been described; the author next describes those of the elemental (objective, material) evolution:—

Kārikā LIII

The 'celestial' evolution has eight forms, the 'animal' has five; the 'human' has only one form; thus in brief is the 'material' evolution.

The force of elemental creation

(243) The eight divine sorts

The eight divine
sorts

(244) The five animal forms are cattle, deer, bird,
reptile, and the immobile things.

Five of the lower
animals

(245) *Mankind is single, not counting its sub divisions—*

Brāhmaṇas &c. as separate; as the bodily
Mankind single *form is the same in all classes of men.*

Such, in brief, = the *material* evolution. Such objects
as the *Jar* and the like,—though not having a 'body' in the
ordinary sense,—are all included under the category of the
'Immobile'.

(246) The author next describes the three-foldness of
this 'material evolution', based on the higher and lower
degrees of intelligence.—in the form of the 'higher', the
'middle' and the 'lower'.

Kārikā LIV

The 'higher' evolution abounds in the Sattva attri-
bute; the 'lower' evolution abounds
in the Tamas attribute; and the 'Middle'
evolution abounds in the Rajas-attribute;
—all these comprising the entire Uni-
verse, from Brahmā down to the tuft of

The different divi-
sions of beings
based on the
predominance of
the Attributes
GRASS.

(247) All the Heavenly regions—Bhuvah, Svah,
Mahah Janā, Tapas and Satya—abound in
the Sattva-attribute.—The 'lower' evolution
abounds in the Tamas attribute; that all

The six Heavenly
Regions

things from the cattle down to the *Immobile* things, abound in the *Tamas*-attribute, as full of 'Delusion'. The regions of the earth—consisting of the seven *Dvīpas* (continents) and Oceans—form the 'middle' evolution abounding in the *Rajas*-attribute, as it is full of pain and because in it actions, righteous and unrighteous, are performed.

The entire Universe is summed up in the phrase "*from Brahmā to the tuft of grass*"—the 'tuft of grass' including the trees and such other things.

(248) Having thus described the evolution, the author proceeds to show that it is the source of pain,—a fact the knowledge of which would be conducive to that "*Dispersion*" (Freedom from attachment) which is helpful in attaining the Final Goal.

Kārikā LV

Therein does the Sentient Spirit experience pain arising from decay and death, due to the non-discrimination of the Spirit from the body [or, until the dissolution of the subtle body]: thus Pain is in the very nature of things.

'*Therein*'—in the body. Among corporeal beings the body is the vehicle of various forms of Pain of decay and death, the common lot of all creatures. Decay and death are common to all creatures, may I continue to be" &c.,—being common to man as well as to the smallest insect; and the cause of fear constituting pain, death is a source of pain.*

(249) *Objection* :—"Pleasure and pain, (according to the Sāṃkhya) are material and are the properties of the Will; as such how can these be said to belong to the Sentient Spirit?"

Answer :—The term "*Puruṣa*," literally means "one who lies in the subtle body;" and this latter being connected with the Will and its properties, leads to the idea of the Spirit being connected with them

Explanation of
the word *Puruṣa*

(250) *Question* :—How can pain which is related to the body be said to belong to the Spirit?

Reply :—"Due to the non-discrimination of the Spirit from the body;" the Spirit cognising its distinction from the body, mistakes the fluctuations of the latter for its own. Or the भा in भाविनिर्मुक्ते, may be taken as pointing to the limit of the Spirit's pain—the meaning being, "Until the subtle body has ceased to be, the Spirit suffers pain."

(251) The author next deals with the different views that have been held regarding the cause of 'Evolution' or 'Creation'.

Kārikā LVI.

This evolution from the Will down to the specific elements, is brought about by the (modifications of) Prakṛti. This work is done for the emancipation of each Spirit, and thus is for another's sake, though appearing as if it were for the sake of Nature herself.

The question as
to the Maker of
the Universe
decided

(252) The term 'ārambha' stands for *what is brought about, i. e. evolution; 'this' evolution—from*
The different views of the cause of creation set aside

yika) nor it is an evolution from Brahman (as held by the Vedāntin); nor is it without cause (as held by the Atheist). If it were the latter, there would never be any evolution at all or it would be eternally going on;—nor can it be said to be evolved from Brahman (the Vedānta view), for there can be no modification of what is pure intelligence, (which is Brahman, as postulated by Vedānta) Nor, again can evolution be brought about by Nature, as controlled by God; as no controlling can be done by one who is not active, e. g. an inactive carpenter does not manipulate his tools

(253) *Objection* —“Granted that the evolution is due to Nature alone. But Nature is eternally active, and as such, her operations should never cease, so that there would be no emancipation for the Spirit”

Ans. —“*Reply*—“*tion in the Spirit's ceases with the purification of* he was engaged retires from the work;

sake is just like the action for one's own benefit

(254) *Objection* : "Granted all this. But it is only a sentient being that acts either for its own or for another's purpose, and Nature, being insentient, cannot act in the manner described; and, as such, she requires a sentient controller (over her blind force); the Spirits residing in the body cannot be such controllers, because such conditioned Spirits are ignorant of the true character of Nature; consequently there must be some other omniscient sentient being who controls *ab extra* the operations of Nature,—and to this Being we give the name God "

Answer :—

Kārikā LVII

As the insentient milk flows out for the growth of the calf, so does Nature act towards the emancipation of the Spirit

Instance of an insentient object acting towards a definite end

(255) It is a fact of observation that insentient objects also act towards definite ends: e g., the milk which is insentient, flows for the nourishment of the calf. Similarly Nature, though insentient, could act towards the emancipation of the Spirit.

(256) It would not be right to urge that "the flow of the milk being due to the superintending care of God, its action does not afford an instance vitiating the general proposition that the action of insentient things are due to the control of sentient beings";—the activity of every sentient

The view of a Personal, Universal Lord over-thrown

Further, God, being the Lord of the Universe, has all that He

'be roused? And if the pain subsequent to creation be held to be the cause of creation, then we should be in the inextricable nooze of 'interdependence': creation due to pity, and pity due to creation! and again, if God were moved to

for God's compassion).

(257) As regards the action of the insentient Nature, on the other hand, it is due neither to selfishness nor to pity; and thus in this case, none of the above incongruities arise; the only motive of Nature is the *fulfilment of another's purpose*. Thus, therefore, the instance cited in the Kārikā is quite appropriate.

(258) It has been said—"as if for its own purpose;" The author proceeds to explain this:—

Kārikā LVIII

As people engage in acts to satisfy desires, so does
 The Spirit's end— the Unmanifest (Nature) act for the
 the motive of
 Nature emancipation of the Spirit.

'*Autsukya*' is 'icchā.' desire Desire is satisfied and
 ceases on the attainment of the desired object; the object
 is the purpose of the agent; because the end of an action is
 that which is desired.

The analogy is pointed out. "*So does the Unmanifest
 (Nature) act for the Emancipation of the Spirit*"

(259) *Objection* — "We grant that the purpose of the
 Spirit is the motive for the action of Nature, but whence
 the cessation of her operations?"

Answer .—

Kārikā LIX

✓ As a dancing girl, having exhibited herself to the
 The cause of the spectators of the stage, ceases to dance,
 cessation of so does Nature cease to operate when
 Nature's operations she has made herself manifest to the
 Spirit.

The word "Stage",—the place—implies the specta-
 tors—th
 i e., hav
 &c., are

(260) *Objection* — "We grant that the action of
 Nature is for the Spirit's purpose But she could surely
 expect some recompense for her pains, from the Spirit,—
 just as a servant does from his gratified master, and as such
 the action of Nature cannot be said to be entirely for *another's*
purpose."

Answer :—

Kārikā LX

Generous Nature, endowed with Attributes, brings
 about by manifold means, without
 Nature excepts no compensation **benefit to herself, the good of the Spirit,**
who is devoid of Attributes, and confers
no benefit in return.

As a qualified servant accomplishes the good of his unqualified master—who is devoid of good qualities and confers no benefits,—through purely unselfish motives, without any benefit to himself; so does poor generous Nature, endowed with the three Attributes, benefit the Spirit without any good in return to herself. Thus the pure unselfishness of Nature's motives is established

(261) *Objection* :—"We grant all this : But a dancing girl having retired from the stage after her exhibition, returns to it again, if so desired by the spectators; similarly would Nature act even after having manifested herself to the Spirit."

Answer—

Kārikā LXI

Nothing is more modest than Nature, such is my
 The reason why Nature does not revert to her actions **conviction ; once aware of having been**
seen, she does not again expose herself
to the view of the Spirit.

By modesty here is meant extreme delicacy (of manners), the unbearability to suffer exposure to the Puruṣa's view. If a well-bred lady who is not to be seen even by the Sun, with her eyes cast down, happen to have her body uncovered by chance and thus seen by a stranger, she tries to hide herself in such a way as not to be seen again; so Nature also—even more modest than such a lady—having once been seen by the Puruṣa (Spirit) will in no case show herself again

(262) *Objection*.—"This may be so. But *Parusa*
(Spirits) being

tions and troubles, it is not possible for the unmodifying *Parusa*. And as the *Parusa* is devoid of action, it can have no migration—which latter is only another name for *Rebirth*. Hence it is meaningless assertion that 'Evolution' is for the purpose of the *Parusa*.

The author meets the above objection by accepting it in the course of winding up his disquisition

Kārikā LXII

Thus verily no Spirit is bound, or emancipated; nor does he migrate; it is Nature alone that having many vehicles is bound, or is released, or migrates

(263) Verily no Spirit is bound; nor does any migrate; nor is any emancipated. Nature alone, having many vehicles, is bound, migrates and is released. *Bondage, migration and release are ascribed to the Spirit in the same manner as*
 that take
 of or profit
 science and
 are attri-
 butation of
 1. So our

doctrine is entirely sound.

(264) *Objection*.—"We understand that bondage, migration and emancipation, though really belonging to Nature, are ascribed to the Spirit; but of what good are these to Nature herself?"

Answer.—

Kārikā LXIII

Nature by herself binds herself by means of seven forms; and by means of one form, she causes deliverance for the benefit of the Spirit.

Nature binds and releases herself by means of her own developments

"Nature binds herself by means of seven forms"

'by means of one form', i.e. by wisdom—by discrimination. That is to say, she does not again bring about the experience or emancipation of that same Spirit.

Objection.—"We have understood all this; what then?"

Kārikā LXIV

Thus it is that from the practice of truth follows wisdom in the form,—"I am not, naught is mine, and not—I"—which is complete, pure on account of the absence of error, and absolute.

The form and character of discriminative wisdom

(265) The term "truth" stands for the knowledge of Truth—From the practice of the knowledge of truth, in the formal manner described, through a long course of repeated, uninterrupted and devoted exercise,—there follows the wisdom, manifesting the distinction of Spirit from Matter. All practice brings about the knowledge of the same object to which the practice pertains; so in the present case practice pertaining to Truth results in the direct perception of Truth. It is for this reason of its leading to Truth that the wisdom is called "pure."

(266) "Why pure?"—"On account of the absence of Error." Doubt and Error are the two im-

The purity of the wisdom explained

purities of wisdom and on the other hand

what is meant by

in thinking as uncertain what is certain, and hence doubt also is a form of Error. Thus 'absence of Error' means the absence of both Doubt and Error (mistake); this 'absence of Error' also is due to the fact of the wisdom relating to Truth

(267) *Objection*—"It may be that the knowledge of Truth follows from the said Practice, but the eternal tendency towards false knowledge is sure to bring about its results in the shape of false knowledge, which will lead to its inevitable effect, the miseries of birth and rebirth of which thus there would be no end."

In reply to this, it is added that the knowledge is

Absoluteness explained

'Absolute', i.e., unmixed with error

Though tendency towards error is eternal,

yet it is capable of being removed by the

tendency towards the knowledge of Truth, culminating in that knowledge.

pur
dec
of
tru

(268) The form of the knowledge is eternal?

The form of the knowledge

root ■ (as in 'asmi') together with *bhū* and *kr* signify action in general." Hence all actions, external as well as internal,—such as determination, self-consciousness, observation and apprehension—all become precluded from the

Spirit. it, there arises
 the idea the agency in
 general, for libations",
 in all of which the active agent is represented by "I";
 there can be no active
 From this
 it is only an
 active agent that can be a possessor; and hence the preclusion
 of action implies the preclusion of possession also.

Or we may interpret the three forms in another way.
The sentence "I am not," means that "I am the Spirit,
not producti
action "
 possessions,

(269) *Objection* :—"Even after the knowledge of all this, there might be left something yet unknown, which would lead to Bondage."

Answer :—"It is complete," i. e. there is nothing left unknown after the attainment of such knowledge as the above, which want of knowledge could lead to Bondage

(270) *Question* :—"What is it that is accomplished by the said knowledge of truth?"

Answer :—

Kārikā LXV

Thus (possessed of this knowledge) the Spirit, as a spectator, pure, at ease, beholds Nature, which has ceased to be productive and has turned back from the seven forms of evolution, under the influence of the purpose (of the Spirit).

The two things for the production of which Nature had begun her action were experience and the perception of truth; so

Kārikā LXVI

"She has been seen by me", thinks the one and hence loses all interest; "I have been seen," thinks the other, and ceases (to act). Hence though their connection is still there, there is no motive for further evolution

do "this after she has once brought about discriminative wisdom. Because experience (enjoyment) is due to erroneous

under

is the

only

spirit

and

the

also

which is a modification of Nature, is regarded by the Spirit as 'for himself'—only by reason of the want of discrimination. When however, right discrimination has been brought about, the connection of the Spirit with Nature ceases, and so he ceases to enjoy the things; nor is the Spirit by himself

Spirit, supply the only motive to the operations of Nature; but when these two have ceased to be the 'purpose of the Spirit', there is no motive for the operation. This is what is

*. Because wisdom is a property of Buddhi which is an emanation from Nature.

meant by the words—" *There is no motive for evolution* " A 'Motive' is that which moves Nature to act towards evolution; and no such motive is possible, when there is no purpose of the Spirit.

(273) *Objection* :—" We grant all this. But no sooner would wisdom be attained than the body would fall off; and then how could the bodiless Spirit behold Nature (as distinct from himself)? If it be asserted that "emancipation does not follow immediately on the attainment of wisdom, on account of the unspent residuum of past deeds,"—then, we ask,—how is this residuum destroyed? If by mere fruition (i.e. by experience), then you tacitly imply the inability of wisdom alone to bring about emancipation; and hence the assertion that "emancipation follows from a limited number of *Karmas*,"—
"emancipation would be obtained on the destruction of the residuum of *Karma*, by means of experience extending to an uncertain period of time"—is too sanguine ever to be realised."

Answer :—

Kārikā LXVII

By the attainment of perfect wisdom, Virtue and the rest become devoid of causal energy: yet the Spirit remains awhile invested with the body, just as a potter's wheel continues to revolve through the momentum of the impulse previously imparted

Reason why the body does not dissolve immediately on the attainment of wisdom

to it.

(274) When true knowledge appears, the 'Karmic

seeds' ^{at its time of} ~~are~~ ^{oyed and is} ~~are~~ ^{birth, life} ~~are~~ ^{and life's experiences}. It is only when the 'soil of the Will' is watered with the waters of the 'Kles'as' (i. e. Ignorance, Egotism, Love, Hate and Clinging), that the 'Karmic seeds' give out sprouts; so that when the said soil is rendered barren by reason of the waters of Ignorance and the rest having been sucked up by the heat of the 'knowledge of Truth',—how could there be any possibility of the 'Karmic seeds' sprouting up? With this view it is said—"Virtue and ^{they cease to} ~~are~~ ^{tained, the body} ~~are~~ ^{vious impulse;} ~~are~~ ^{vious impulse;}

just as, even after the action of the potter has ceased, the wheel continues to revolve on account of the momentum imparted to it. In due time, however, when the impulse becomes exhausted, it becomes inactive. In the continuance of the body, the impulse is supplied by such virtue and vice whose fruition has already commenced; as is declared in *S'ruti*—"Having exhausted the others by means of experience, the soul attains beatitude" and "The delay is only so long as beatitude is not attained" [*Chāndogya* VI. 1. 2]. The 'impulse' (to which the continuance of the Body is due) is in the remnant of that impulse which had been imparted by the Disappearing Ignorance, it is true that on account of the momentum of this impulse the Spirit continues to be invested with the body for a time.

(275) Question.—"This may be so; but if the Spirit remains invested with the body by some sort of impulse, when will his Emancipation come about?"

Answer:—

Kārikā LXVIII

When the cessation from the three kinds of pain

Final

cease

Isolation.

The productivity of those actions, whose fruition has not commenced, having been destroyed, and those also whose fruition has commenced having been exhausted by experience, the purpose having been fulfilled, Nature desists from her activity with respect to that particular Spirit, who thus obtains eternal and absolute Isolation, i. e. cessation of the three kinds of pain

(276) Though the Philosophy has been established by reasoning, yet in order to inspire respect towards it, the precedence of the great Sage is stated :

Kārikā LXIX

This abstruse knowledge adapted to the fulfilment of the purpose of the Spirit, wherein (wherefore) the origin, duration, and dissolution of beings are considered, has been expounded by the great sage.

The precedence
of Kapila

"Abstruse"—*guhya* (lit. in a case) i. e. hard to be grasped by dull-brained persons.

"By the great sage" i. e. by Kapila. The feeling of reverence, thus aroused is strengthened by declaring that the doctrine is scriptural. "Wherein are considered, etc ; 'in which' knowledge means for the sake of which knowledge; as in the expression '*Carmani dōṣinam hanti*', the word '*carmani*' (lit. in the skin) is taken to mean 'for the sake of the skin, one

TATTVA-KAUMUDĪ

NOTES

I

The first benedictory stanza—अज्ञानेनां etc., is taken from ५: (४. ९). वाच० has changed the readings as follows —

(b) ममाम् in place of सरूपाः; (c) अज्ञा ह्येते जुषमाणोऽनुशेते in place of अज्ञोऽज्ञेको जुषमाणोऽनुशेते; (d) अहत्येनां भुक्तभोगां दुमस्तान् in place of महात्येनां भुक्तभोगावजोऽन्यः। The change was, of course, necessary in view of the idea of plurality of souls in सांख्य, which is not favoured by the readings of the उपनिषद्. The वेदान्तिव्याख्या explain this verse quite differently. शङ्कराचार्य has refuted the claim of the सांख्य that this verse lays down the principles of the सांख्य system. For fuller discussion, see शङ्करभाष्य on अमृतसर्वविशेषात् (म. घ. १. ४. ८) It has already been pointed in the Introduction that this verse gave rise to the idea of the three गुणः. It is, therefore, in the fitness of things that this verse should have been chosen by वाच० for बहुलाचरण.

About कपिल, आशुरि, पञ्चशिख and ईश्वरकृष्ण, see Introduction. आधिर्मानिक. The word भूत stands for living beings according to चन्द्रिका.

आधिर्भूतिक, according to गौड०, includes miseries due to cold, heat, wind etc., because these are due to supernatural powers. On देवानामिदं देवैः, Davies remarks—"But in old time, gods of higher class, and not demons merely, were supposed to afflict men with disease and pain. In the Rig-Veda (ii 33, 7), Gṛtsamada prays to Rudra that he may be freed from his bodily pains, which he affirms to have been sent by the Devas or gods (*daivya*) " (p 15)

The reading adopted by गौड०, *viś*, तदधिघातके is more expressive of the सांख्य idea of complete cessation of pain, than तदधिघातके of वाच० (See, S. N. S., i, 1a.) cf. तत्र त्रिविध-इत्यात्मन्तानि वृत्तिरत्यन्तदुःखार्थं (सां घ. १. १) The reading of जय०

etc., तद्व्यपनके does not materially differ from तद्व्यपनके. Compare also Wilson, pp. 6-7; Davies, pp. 13-14, note on this reading.

विष्णुपुराण describes the three दुःख in the following verses:

अध्यात्मिकोऽपि द्विविधः शारीरो मानसस्तथा ।

शारीरो बहुभिर्भेदैर्बिभ्यते धूयनां च यः ॥ २ ॥

शिरोगाप्रतिदयायज्वरगूलभगन्दरैः ।

गुल्माहोःश्वयधुषासङ्घर्षादिभिरद्रेकधा ॥ ३ ॥

तथाशिरोगातीमारुतुष्टांगमयमंजितैः ।

निघने देहजन्तापो मानसं भ्रान्तुमर्हति ॥ ४ ॥

कामक्रोधमद्वेषदोमनोहविषादजः ।

शोकामृषावमानेभ्योमात्मनांदिमवस्तथा ॥ ५ ॥

मानसोऽपि द्विजधेष्ट तापो भवति त्रैकधा ।

इत्येवमादिभिर्भेदैस्तापो ध्याध्यात्मिको मतः ॥ ६ ॥

मृगशक्तिमनुप्यार्थः विशाचोत्तराक्षर्यः ।

स्त्रीमृतार्थश्च नृणां जायते चाधिर्भानिकः ॥ ७ ॥

क्षीनवानोष्णवर्षांशुवैद्युतादित्यमुद्भवः ।

तापो द्विजवरधेष्टः कथ्यते चापिर्द्विविधः ॥ ८ ॥ (६. ५)

The reading अर्के, (found in some editions), in the verse अर्के चेन्मयु etc., has अर्कः as its variant. On this वाङ्मय remarks — अर्क इति वाटि तु-समीपे-गृहवर्णे, इति वार्थो बोध्यः । वस्तुतस्तु जैमिनी. दृष्टमाये शबरस्वामिभिः यपि जातेर्के मधुस्मृत्य तैत्तिरीय पथा यथा मन्त्रार्थिनः पर्वतं न गच्छेत्पुत्रित्यभिवाच्य 'अर्कं चेन्मयु विन्देन' इत्येवमुपन्यासाद् अर्क-इत्येव पठितं साधीयान् ॥ (p. 14, note 1).

II

The quotation 'यद्यदुत्तेन सम्मिलनं' etc., = ascribed to अति by वाङ्मय. On this वाङ्मय remarks—'यद्यदुत्तेन सम्मिलनम्' इति मद्रवार्तिधमिति वेचिन्, स्पष्टीरिषमिति विज्ञानभिषयः, परिमलादिषु प्रामाणिक-धन्येषु अतित्वेन व्यवहारार्थवादरूपा अतिरिषमिति साक्षात् ॥ (p. 16, note 3) The word स्वर्ग in this quotation has been variously

explained by different writers as temporary pleasure or heaven or salvation. See बालराम (pp. 39-40) who has dwelt exhaustively over this question.

अपाम सोमममृता अभूम etc., is from ऋग्वेद VIII. 48. 3. and is fully quoted and explained by गौड०, मांडर and जय०

With the sense of this कारिका, cf. श्रीमद्भागवत—

श्रुतं च रश्चद्रष्टुं स्वर्गसूच्यप्यन्यथैः ।

यद्वन्नरायकामत्वात् कृषिश्चापि निष्कलम् ॥ (11.10.21)

एवं लोकं परं त्रिषाक्षधरं कर्मनिर्मितम् ।

मनुष्यातिशयध्वंसं यथा मण्डलवर्तिनान् ॥ (11.3.20)

It is interesting to compare —जय०— अस्या भार्याया वक्ष्यमाणो याः, मयी पश्चादेन माप्यस्थानीया इत्यादि (p. 4), with the remark of Daves, quoted in the foot-note in the translation (p. 5).

The quotation of पञ्चशिख, viz., स्वप्न सद्गुरुः etc., is found in full in व्यासभाष्य on यो० सू० २, १३. See Introduction also.

The reconciliation of वेदिकी हिना with the श्रुति text—मा हिंस्यात् सर्वा भूतानि—, is an interesting topic which has taxed the ingenuity of all the orthodox systems of philosophy (See, S. N. S., p. 5, fn. ; Sovani, p. 400). बालराम has discussed this question at length, quoting extensively from the standard authors (See pages 24-36).

न च कार्यत्वेनानित्यता कलस्य युता, भावकार्यस्य तथात्वात् etc., (para 14)—Says an objector : Just as स्वर्ग has been declared to be अनित्य, because it is an effect (यत्कारण्ये तदनेत्यम्), similarly, this दुःखध्वंस should also be अनित्य, because it is an effect. To this वाच० replies that this maxim of अनित्यत्व holds good in the case of positive effects only, and not in the case of negative effects like दुःखध्वंस. But how can दुःखध्वंस be called मोक्ष according to the सांख्य philosophy, which advocates सत्कार्यवाद ? To this बालराम replies—यद्यपि सांख्यनये सत्कार्यवादोक्तिः, कारणेन दुःखप्रवर्धनस्य मोक्षत्वाभिधानं व्याहृतं, तथापि दुःखप्रवर्धनपदेनात्र दुःखान्नाशवशात् एव सांख्यविषयत्वेनाभिधानान् व्याहृत्यभानोऽत्रमेव ॥ (p 43).

Compare the notion of मुक्ति according to the वैशेषिक philosophers—दुःखनिवृत्तेष्वत्यन्तिकत्वं समानाधिकरणदुःखप्रागभावात्समकार्त्तानत्वं, इत्युत्पन्नसमानाधिकरणसर्वात्मविशेषगुणध्वंससमानकार्त्तानत्वं वा, ओषधिविहादुरध्वंसावधिकदुःखप्रागभावा वा ॥ (उपस्कान्ध on वैशेषिकसूत्र १. ४)

The order of व्युत्पाद्यव्युत्पन्नविज्ञान is based on the procedure of cognition. The same order is observed in the following सूत्र—
—स्युत्पान् पञ्चतन्मासस्य (१. ६२); बाह्याभ्यन्तराभ्यां तथाद्वयस्य (१. ६३); तेनाद्वयस्य (१. ६४); ततः प्रकृतेः (१. ६५); and संज्ञतपरार्थत्वात् इत्यस्य (१. ६६).

Sovani is quite pertinent in pointing out the confusion with regard to the meaning of the word व्युत्. Some call the महाभूतस्य as व्युत्, whileas, the author of कारिका seems to regard everything व्युत् (and, therefore, प्रत्यक्षयोग्य), except the प्रकृति and इन्द्रिय. वाच० agrees with the latter explanation, in his commentary on this कारिका, but, changes his opinion in the comment on the 6th कारिका. At the latter place he says—सामान्यतो दृष्टाद्भुतानात् अतीन्द्रियाण्यं प्रत्यक्षपुष्टादीनाम् प्रतीतिः. He would seem to include महत्तत्त्व etc., by the word भावि (See वाचराम p. 16 In.). In order to avoid the contradiction, we should interpret the word भावि, according to बर्हीवर, to mean the union between प्रकृति and इन्द्रिय. cf. आदिना तत्संयोगप्रवृत्तिः प्रकृतिपुरुषनलसंयोगं नित्यादमेवा इत्युक्तेः (बर्हीवर, II. 183) 1 See Sovani, pp. 401 and 402 and notes 36 and 37.

III

In connection with Jacobi's remark that it is very strange that intellect should be regarded as a form of matter by the Sāṅkhyaas (See Ent. Gott. Ind. p. 32), it is interesting to compare Davies (p. 17, 9a)—Modern Science, like the system of Kapila, makes intellect, a mere form of matter. "Mind, used in the sense of substance or essence, and brain, used in the sense of organ of mental function are at bottom names for

the same substance." (Maudsley's Physiology of Mind, 3rd Ed., p. 38).

The nature of *बुद्धि* is explained by चन्द्रिका as अजनकत्वे सत्त्वमय इत्यर्थः । आयद्विशेषणेन प्रकृतिनिपत्तः, द्वितीयवेन्द्रियसामान्यादिनिपत्तः । Unlike the नैयायिकs, the सांख्यs maintain that सामान्य is a product.

On *बुद्धि* as pure inward light, Davies quotes (p. 18, ln.) Hegel on Thought (Das Denken), in connection with the Absolute:—"It is that light which lights; but it has no other content except that light." (Phil der Rel., 1. 117) [Translated from German by H. Sharma].

From अहङ्कार (Ego) proceed not only the इन्द्रियs, but everything material cognised by them. That is, the Ego (which is the I principle) is the 'base of the reality of all our sense-perceptions' (Davies, p. 21, note 1), and consequently of all the existence. Davies quotes Schelling (System des Transcendentalismus, § 60) in support of this idea—"If at all there exists *Something Real* as opposed to *ideal*, then that *Something Real* must be I, because it is the principle of all reality." (Translated from German by H. Sharma). This position, of course, differs from that of the वेदान्तिक, who does not regard the reality of the I-principle (अहङ्कार) even, but that of the Pure Consciousness (ब्रह्म),—the I-principle itself being imaginary and due to माया. Distinction should be drawn from the विज्ञानवादी-बौद्ध also, who denies the existence of everything external, except consciousness. The सांख्यवादिन् does not deny the external existence, but considers it to be a modified product of consciousness, in which it lies latent, cf. न विज्ञानमार्थं बाह्यप्रतीतिः (सां. ध. १. ४२.).


IV

Apart from the three Means of Right Cognition, *viz.*, प्रत्यक्ष, अनुमान and शब्द, recognised by the सांख्यकारिका, the commentators discuss the other Means of Right Cognition, recog-

प्रमाण has been defined as the instrument of प्रमा. प्रमा is that state of mind which is free from doubt, mistake, indecision and memory—, and which arises from the contact of the sense-organs with their objects. The result is the cognition by mind. But वाच० says—बोधश्च परिणयेः कर्तुं प्रमा. This might mean that the result of the mental state is cognition in the Spirit. Does it mean that the cognition arises in the spirit? No, we reply—what happens is that when the Spirit is reflected in the mind, which has assumed the shape of the object with which the sense-organs come into contact, it (the Spirit) also appears to be cognising. This is a kind of misapprehension arising from the mistaken identity between the Spirit and the mind. This is what is expressed in the योगसूत्र—'द्रष्टा दृशिमात्रः शुद्धोऽपि प्रत्ययानुपपन्नः' (II. 20) and 'चित्तेऽप्रतिभं क्लमायास्तदाकारात्पत्तिं स्वशुद्धित्वेदेवम्' (IV. 22).

V

Following the म्यायसूत्र—सत्पूर्वकं त्रिविधमनुमानं पूर्ववत् शेषवत् सामान्यतोद्भूतं च । (1, 1, 5), वाच० first divides अनुमान into three kinds. Again he gives another classification :



The commentators differ in the explanation of these terms. वाचस्पत्य himself proposes two alternative explanations.

(1) (a) पूर्ववत्—*A priori* or inference of effect from cause,—as of rain from the clouds in the sky.

(b) शेषवत्—*A posteriori*, or an inference of cause from effect,—as of rain from the flood in a river.

(c) सामान्यनोद्घट—*Commonly seen*, or based on Analogy.— e. g., we observe that a particular man in one town now, is seen in another next day, because he has moved. Similarly, the Sun must also move, as he is seen at different places in the sky at different times.

Or

(2) (a) पूर्ववत्—If we have seen two things together in the past, then when we see one of them now, we infer the existence of the other also. For example, from smoke on the hill, we infer fire.

(b) शेषवत्—Inference by exclusion (प्रसक्तप्रतिषेधेऽन्यत्रा-
प्रसङ्गात् सिध्यमाने संप्रत्ययः परिक्षेपः). The question is—, under which of the seven categories (द्रव्य, गुण etc.) should we include शब्द (sound)? Now, शब्द cannot come under सामान्य, विशेष and the rest, and its inclusion under द्रव्य has been denied. Therefore, by the law of the residue, शब्द falls under गुण.

(c) सामान्यतोद्घट—Where the relation of the व्याप्ति is not within ordinary perception, there we take another object within ordinary perception and similar to the हेतु in question; and on this similarity or Commonness, we transfer the व्याप्ति from the perceived to the unperceived instance. For instance, we have got to infer the existence of the Spirit. We do so on the basis of the qualities like the desire, etc. The desire, etc., are qualities. Qualities always reside in objects (as we perceive in the case of form, taste and the rest). Therefore, the desire etc., must also reside in some object; and that object is the Spirit.

The two alternative explanations given by वात्स्यायन show that the meaning of these terms had become doubtful at his time. Cf Principal A. B. Dhruva's paper—'Trividham anumānam', POC, Poona, pp. 251-280.

वाच० agrees with the second explanation of वात्स्यायन. But भवति or शेषवत् according to वाच०, is a negative reasoning.

वात्स्यायन's instance of शेषवत्, viz. शब्द is a गुण, is rejected by वाच° in his तात्पर्यटीका (p. 183, काशीमंस्कृतसीरीज). According to him शेषवत् or परिशेष stands for व्यतिरेक्यनुमान. The inference of शब्द being a गुण is not a व्यतिरेक्यनुमान but अवयवव्यतिरेक. The correct example of शेषवत्, therefore, is that the qualities—desire etc., reside in the आत्मन्. These qualities cannot reside in पृथिवी, जल, तेजस् and वायु; nor can they reside in आकाश, because the qualities of the latter are perceived by the external sense—organ (ear). Similarly the desire etc. being विशेषगुणः cannot be the qualities of दिशः, काल and मनस्—for the qualities of the latter three dr̥vya's are साधारण. Thus ultimately the desire etc., reside in the ninth dr̥vya, viz., आत्मन्. So there being no सपक्ष of आत्मन्, it is an instance of व्यतिरेक्यनुमान जय° and गौड° agree with the first explanation of वात्स्यायन. गौड° and मातर explain शेषवत् differently—समुद्रादिकं जलपलं लवणमासाद्य शेषस्याप्यस्ति लवणभाव इति (गौड°) ॥

लिङ्गलिङ्गिपूर्वकम्—वाच° would read one more लिङ्ग i. e. लिङ्ग-लिङ्गिपूर्वकम्. गौड° has a curious explanation to offer—तदनुमानं लिङ्गपूर्वकं यत्र लिङ्गं लिङ्गः अनुमीयते, यथा दण्डेन यतिः । लिङ्गिपूर्वकं च यत्र लिङ्गिना लिङ्गमनुमीयते, यथा हृष्टा यतिः, अभ्येदं त्रिदण्डमिति । जय° agrees with it. It enumerates seven kinds of सम्बन्धः which ought to exist between the लिङ्ग and the लिङ्गि. They are—

- | | | | | |
|--------------------|------------|----------|-----|--------------|
| (1) स्वस्याभिभाव | as between | राजा | and | पुत्रः. |
| (2) प्रवृत्तिविकार | | यव | .. | सकण. |
| (3) कार्यकारणभाव | | धेनु | .. | वामन |
| (4) पात्रपात्रिक | | परिवृद्ध | .. | निविष्टपत्र. |
| (5) सादृश्य | | चक्रवाक | .. | चक्रवर्ती. |
| (6) प्रतिद्वन्द्व | | शीत | = | उष्ण. |
| (7) निमित्तनमितिक | | भोज्य | .. | भोजक. |

The conversation between आश्व and जैमिनी, referred to by वाच°, occurs in व्यासभाष्य on यो. सू. 3. ३८.

The भयः mentioned by वाच° are—

(a) भयवर्धिनः or the Buddhist monks, described in the शिंशुश्रिताम्, vii 275 (as quoted in the सर्वदर्शनसंग्रह) as—

कृतिः कमण्डलुर्जीवन्तं चीरं पूर्वाह्नभोजनम् ।

मयो रक्ताम्बरत्वं च शिथिले बौद्धभिन्नुभिः ॥

(b) निर्ग्रन्थकः or the Jains, and

(c) संसारमोचकः or the materialists, बालराम observes—
संसारमोचकः —(संसारमोचकादेश्च हिंसा पुण्यत्वममता) इत्यभिहिता हिंसादि-
परायणाः षट्पद्मे तदन्तर्गतमण्डिलविलयवद् देहपद्मे तदन्तर्गतजीवमङ्ग एव मोक्ष
इत्येवं बुद्धाणां धार्वाकविशेषाः ॥ (p. 82)

‘तु’ शब्देनानुमानाद् व्यवहियति—As pointed above, the Bud-
dhists and the followers of the वैशेषिक school do not recognise
ह्य as a separate प्रमाण, but include it under अनुमान. वाच०
says that the relation between a वाक्य and its अर्थ is not that of
लिङ्ग and लिङ्गिन्, as between धूम and वह्निः. वाक्यार्थे, being only
an object of cognition cognised by the वाक्य, cannot be known
by inference.

उपमान. According to the नैयायिकः (प्रसिद्धसाधर्म्यात् साध्यमाधन-
उपमानम्—न्या० सू० ११६), उपमान is that sentence which esta-
blishes a relation between a word and its sense. But, ac-
cording to the सांख्यः, a वाक्य is not a प्रमाण, but the knowledge
(ज्ञान) derived from the वाक्य. It is the चित्तवृत्ति alone which is
प्रमाण. So, उपमान cannot be a separate प्रमाण, but is included
under अनुमान. According to the मीमांसकः, उपमान is the सादृश्य-
ज्ञान (or the cognition of similarity, as of गो residing in the direct-
ly perceived गवयः). A man who saw a cow in the town, now
observes a गवयः in the forest. At this moment he is reminded
of the cow which is qualified by the similarity of गवयः directly
perceived. This is the कल of उपमान. वाच० replies that this
उपमान and its कल are both included under प्रत्यक्ष. For, सादृश्य
is like the सामान्य. Just as we have मोक्ष in गो, so we have
गोसादृश्य in गो. And as we directly perceive मोक्ष along with गो,
so we perceive गोसादृश्य and गवयसादृश्य along with गवयः. There-
fore, गोसादृश्यज्ञान (उपमान) and गवयसादृश्यज्ञान (उपमानकल) both
are प्रत्यक्ष. सादृश्य is not a relation (like संयोग) which should
reside on two objects; it is only मूषोद्भवसाधनयोग, that is, the

existence of a large number of qualities of one object in another. This सादृश्य is, thus, one like गौत्व; and if it is perceived in गो, then it is perceived in गवय also.

अर्थापत्ति is Presumption. We presume the existence of living चैत्र outside the house, if he is not visible inside the house. But, the मीमांसक objects—देशसामान्येन गृहविशेषाशेषोपपत्तिः etc. He says that when we hear जीवन् चैत्रः क्वचिदस्ति, then the substratum of the existence of चैत्र is देशसामान्य (or space in general), which includes the particular space of गृह also. Thus, चैत्र's non-existence in the गृह is opposed to his existence in देशसामान्य. And, in order to remove this opposition, we have to resort to अर्थापत्ति. वाच० replies that गृह (in which the non-existence of चैत्र has been established by means of Right Cognition) cannot be included in देशसामान्य. Similarly चैत्र's non-existence in गृह (which is opposed to his existence in गृह) cannot be a case of opposition to his existence everywhere.

अभाव is no प्रमाण, but is included under प्रत्यक्ष. For, पराभाव-यद्भूत is merely a modification of भूतत्वं. But, says an objector, how can अभाव (a negation) be a परिणाम (something positive)? Answer. • Under एतेन भूतेन्द्रियेण चक्षुर्दृष्ट्यापेक्षयापरिणामा व्याख्याताः यौ० सू० III. 13), व्यास has defined परिणाम as अवस्थितस्य द्रव्यस्य पूर्ववर्तमानवृत्त्या पर्यवर्तमानवृत्तिः परिणाम इति—i. e. modification is the manifestation of another characteristic on the removal of the previous characteristic of an object, which (object) always remains constant. So, when एत was on the भूतत्वं, then it was अतिरिक्तपरिणाम of भूतत्वं; and when there is no एत, then it is the चैत्रत्वं or अतिरिक्तपरिणाम of भूतत्वं.

VI

Things directly perceived by the senses need not be taught by the गुरु, as they can be easily cognised by even an ordinary person. Now "things beyond the senses are not

only those which are too subtle for organs of the sense, but those which are imperceptible by accident, as the fire in a mountain that smokes" (Davies, p 27). The latter is an instance of पूर्ववत् अनुमान, which वाच० regards to be as unimportant for our inquiry as the प्रत्यक्ष. The most important kind of अनुमान, from our point of view, is सामान्यतोद्घ (and शेषवत्, which is not mentioned by the कारिका, but added by वाच०), which leads us to infer things which are too subtle for the organs of sense. But जव० rejects पूर्ववत् and शेषवत् both (p 9)

VII

पतञ्जलि lays down six causes of अनुपलब्धि (महाभाष्य IV. I 3). See Introduction. The eight causes of अनुपलब्धि mentioned in the कारिका are reduced to four by जव०—

- (1) देशदोष includes अतिदूर and अनितामीप्य
- (2) इन्द्रियदोष .. इन्द्रियबाध and मनोऽनवस्थान
- (3) विषयदोष = संक्षिप्त, and

(4) अर्थांतरदोष includes व्यवधान, अभिभव and समानाभिहार. Sovani is right in remarking that all these can be reduced to two—इन्द्रियदोष and विषयदोष (See p 405). माडर lays down the causes of अनुपलब्धि of अमन् (non-existent) things even—इदानीमसतां चतुर्धा भवति । तत्रोच्यते-प्राक्प्रवृत्तमेतरेतरास्पन्ताभावभेदात्..... एवमिदं द्वावशयानुपलब्धिः । सतामप्यसतां चतुर्धा ॥

VIII

On the reading प्रवृत्तिसवरूपं, Davies remarks—"Lassen has in the text स्वरूपं (having its own form), from the सौख्यकामुदी, which must be referred to intellect (यद्वा) All the Mss. but one have स्वरूपं (like), which the sense requires. In his translation he has "dissemble et simile" (p 27, 1a).

IX

वाच० here lays down the opinions of (1) the बौद्धs, (2) the नैयायिकs and the वैशेषिकs, and (3) the वेदान्तिन्s as पूर्वपक्ष.

(1) The बौद्धs maintain that *existence* comes into 'being' from *non-existence* (असन्ः सञ्जायते).

(2) The नैयायिकs and the वैशेषिकs maintain that an *existent* cause produces a *non-existent* effect (सतोऽमञ्जायते)

(3) The वेदान्तिन्s maintain that the cause alone is *existent*, the effect being only an apparent change (एकस्य सतो विवर्तः न कार्यजातं वस्तु सत्). All these views are fully discussed in the Introduction.

उपादानग्रहणात्—वाच० interprets ग्रहणात् as सम्बन्धान्. But जय०, गौड०, माडर and चन्द्रिका explain it as taking or seeking. S. N. S. observes that although गौड०'s explanation is simpler, yet apparently, the same idea is repeated in शकस्य शक्यकरणात्. वाच०'s explanation is also included in सर्वसम्भवाभावात् "It is also to be noted that while उपादानग्रहणात् emphasises the adequacy of the cause to the effect, शकस्य शक्यकरणात् looks at the adequacy of the effect to the cause; hence, the latter does not merely repeat the idea of the former." (S. N. S. p 28, 1n).

कारणमादाव्—जय० gives two explanations of this phrase—कारणस्य मत्प्रादित्यर्थः । यद्यस्तत्कार्यमुत्पद्यते किमिति कारणभावेन कार्यस्य भावो भवति । भवति च । तस्माच्छ्रुतिरूपेणावस्थितमिति गम्यते । अथवा—कारणमादाविति कारणस्यमादान् । यन्स्वभावं कारणं तत्स्वभावं कार्यम् । यथा स्निग्धभावाव्यस्तितेजस्य क्षिप्रमेव तेजम्, सूक्ष्मे सूक्ष्मभावो घटः॥ (p. 12). माडर and गौड० agree with the latter explanation. वाच०, on the other hand, explains it as कार्यस्य कारणान्यक्तत्वात्—on account of the identity of cause and effect.

तस्मादित्ये पदोत्पत्तिः स्वकारणसमवाये वा स्वमत्तानमवायो वा, उभयपार्थिवोत्पत्तये etc. (para 75). After having disproved the नैयायिक's theory of origination of effect (उत्पत्तिः), वाच० proceeds further—Now, what is your उत्पत्तिः ? Is it the नेमराय (Inherence) of the effect in its cause ? That is, is it the समवाय which is

produced ? If you say yes, then your उत्पत्ति produces only the समवाय and not the effect. Or, do you mean to say that उत्पत्ति is the समवाय of सत्ता (existence) in the effect ? That is, सत्ता is the genus presiding over the effect. It is by means of this सत्ता (genus), that we call an existing object as existent. Just as गो is गो, because she is related to गोत्व, similarly, a सत्पदार्थ is सत्, because it is related to सत्ता. So, the other alternative of the वेद्याधिक is that what is originated is the समवाय (Inherence) of सत्ता in the effect. Here also, as above, what is originated is समवाय and not the effect. Moreover, asks बालराम, how can you establish the समवाय relation of the non-existent पद with the existent तन्मय ? And, how again, can there be the समवाय of सत्ता in the असत् पद, when there can be no relation between the existent and the non-existent objects ?

Thus, it will be seen that a कारण is related with the आविर्भाव of कार्य. The opponent asks—why should a कारण be not related with the रूप of कार्य ? वाच० replies.—Because आविर्भाव is a क्रिया and रूप is a गुण. A कारण can be related with क्रिया only and not with गुण; otherwise, a कारण will not be a कारण. The very derivation of the word कारण—क्रियतेऽनेनेति कारणम्—implies its relation with क्रिया.

X

हेतुमतः—, i. e., caused. व्यक्त or the evolved is caused. Cause, according to मातर, is of two kinds : कारक (producer) and ज्ञापक (illuminator or indicator). प्रधान, बुद्धि, अहङ्कार and पञ्च-तन्मात्रा's are the कारकहेतु's, as they produce effects. That is, बुद्धि, अहङ्कार and पञ्चतन्मात्रा's are हेतु's and हेतुमतः both; whereas, अभ्यक्त (i. e. प्रधान) is only a हेतु. The ज्ञापक हेतु's are five-fold, श्रुति, विपर्यय, अशक्ति, मुष्टि, सिद्धि and अनुषङ्ग. Now, विपर्यय, अशक्ति, श्रुति and सिद्धि are the प्रत्ययसर्ग's (i. e. creations of Intellect), and thus they pervade all the twenty-three तत्त्व's. (But what is this अनुषङ्ग ?) Thus अभ्यक्त is only a कारक हेतु.

अनित्यम्—non-eternal, destructible. Destruction is the return of a product to its cause cf.—नाशः कारणतयः (सां० म० १. १२१). For, according to the theory of सत्कार्य, there can be no real destruction or annihilation. प्रधान is नित्य, because it has no कारण to which it could return.

अध्यापि—The twenty-three तत्त्वs are not all-pervading, like प्रधान and दुरयः "each of these principles (tattwa) is not found in every form." (Davies, p. 34). But, is not the महत्त्व all-pervading? To this वंशीवर replies—महत्तदेः स्वस्वकारणाध्यापकत्वादुपचरितव्यापकरवमित्यर्थः (p. 201).—the pervading-ness of महत्त्व, etc., is secondary, as they do not pervade their causes. And as प्रधान has no cause to pervade, it is व्यापि.

सक्रियम्—परिस्पन्द means the action of leaving one body and entering another. विज्ञान०, on the other hand, says—सक्रियत्वमध्यवन्तादादिरूपनियतकार्यकारित्वम्। प्रधानस्य तु सर्वक्रियासाधारण्येन कारणत्वात् कार्यकदेनमात्रकारित्वम्। न च क्रिया कर्मैव वक्तुं शक्यते। प्रकृतिर्धोमात् सृष्टि-श्रवणेन प्रकृतेरपि कर्मव्रतयान सक्रियत्वापत्तेरिति (१. १०४). On this बाळराम remarks—धोमादिपरिणामलक्षणाक्रियायाः प्रधाने मत्त्वेऽपि गमनागमन-लक्षणापरिस्पन्दात्मकक्रियाया अमत्यात् प्रकृतावतिव्याप्तिरिति व्यर्थोऽयं भिन्नोः प्रपात इति बोध्यम् (p. 121).

अनेकम्—i. e. सजातीयभेदवत्, having a variety of similar objects; as a mango-tree has सजातीयभेद, several other mango trees of the similar type. So, बुद्धि, etc., although alike, are different in different individuals. But विज्ञान० explains it otherwise—अनेकत्वं सर्गभेदेन भिन्नत्वम्—सर्गद्वयमाचारण्यमिति यावत्। न पुन. सजातीयानेकव्यक्तित्वम्, प्रकृतावतिव्याप्तिः। प्रकृतेरपि मत्त्वापनेकरूपत्वात्। The fallacy of विज्ञान० is pointed out by बाळराम—प्रकृतेर्नेकरूपत्वेऽप्यनेकव्यक्तित्वत्वाभावेन प्रकृतिप्रतियोगिबन्धन्योन्याभावस्य प्रकृतायमम्भवात्, किञ्च—'अजामंशम्' इति अरण्यद्वयमाणिकं प्रकृतेर्नेकव्यक्तिकस्य भिन्नानमित्यप्याह एव व्यामोहो भिन्नोऽपि। (pp 121-122)

लिट्—According to गौड० and माडर, it means, that which merges into its primary cause. In addition to the above explanation, जय० and विज्ञान० give another alternative explana-

tion, viz., that which indicates, or which is the characteristic of प्रधान. This is the sense taken by वाच० also. But प्रधान itself is a characteristic (लिङ्ग) of पुरुष. It is for this reason that वाच० remarks—प्रधानं न प्रधानस्य लिङ्गं पुरुषस्य लिङ्गं भवदपीति भावः. On this, S. N. S. remarks that it "seems hardly adequate to the contrast intended between the evolved and the unevolved." (p. 32, 1ne)

Why can there be no अवयवावयविसंयोग between प्रधान and बुद्धि, etc. ? Because, between these, the relation is समवाय (=identity or तादात्म्य), and not संयोग. There can be no संयोग between the तन्तुs and the पद produced out of them. But, will there be any संयोग between बुद्धि and अहङ्कार, etc. ? No commentator answers this, although, here also we can show that अहङ्कार, being a product of बुद्धि, stands in समवाय relation to बुद्धि. It is for this reason that गौड०, माडर and जय० explain the word अवयव as शब्द, रूप, स्पर्श etc., But they land themselves in another difficulty; for, the entire व्यक्त (viz., बुद्धि, अहङ्कार etc.) cannot be called as अवयवसंयोग. If it be urged that these शब्द and the rest do reside in a latent form in बुद्धि and the rest, then it may be pointed out that शब्द and the rest do reside in a latent form in प्रधान also. Even वाच०, who tries to avoid this difficulty, has illustrated this संयोग as—तथा हि पृथिव्यायः परस्परं संयुज्यन्ते एवमन्येऽपि ।

परतन्त्रम्—Although, each of the twenty-three तत्त्वs is subordinate to the other in the ascending order, yet, ultimately, all are subordinate to प्रकृति. Again, although बुद्धि is independent in producing अहङ्कार, and the latter in producing the इन्द्रियs and the तन्मात्राs, yet each one is ultimately dependent upon प्रकृति, the fountain-head of all energy.

XI

त्रिगुणम्—The three गुणs or Attributes are the essence of प्रकृति. प्रकृति is nothing but these three गुणs in equilibrium.

The kinds of temperaments observed in living beings may broadly be divided into three—spiritual, passionate and dull. Therefore, the सांख्य theory of three गुणs, although a mere hypothesis, is yet a very useful and appropriate hypothesis. Davies remarks—“In the system of Valentinus the Gnostic, all men and all substances are divided into three classes: (1) spiritual, (2) the vital and (3) the material (Hylic). This corresponds to the गुणs of कपिठ and is probably an importation from India.” (p. 37, 2n.)

विषयः—The view-point of the विज्ञानवादिन् बौद्ध is that there is no existence of the external objects, except in mind. That is, concept and the object denoted by the concept are identical, because both are comprehended simultaneously. Things, which are not identical, are not necessarily comprehended simultaneously; cf. ‘सहोपलब्धमनियमाश्चेतोऽप्येतद्विषयोः । भेदश्च भ्रान्ति-विज्ञानैर्दृष्टेन्द्रियाविद्यादये ॥’ (सर्वदर्शन०, p. 32), वाचस्पति’s refutation of this view has been thus illustrated by बालराम—एव किल कस्मिन्नेव यो विदुषे वस्तुनि रक्तद्विष्टविमृशानां जनानां विभिन्नानि सुखादिशान्तिनि जायमानान्युपलब्धे तत्र प्रमातृणां परस्परप्रतिमन्यानां वस्त्वैक्येऽपि ज्ञानानास्त्वं दृश्यते । यदि हि वस्तु विज्ञानात्मकं भवेत् तर्हि विज्ञानस्याभावात्तदेकविज्ञानादम्बनमेकं साधारणं वस्तु न सम्भवेत् । अतः वस्तुभावात्स्योपपत्तये विज्ञानातिरिक्तं तद्वस्तुपेयमिति । (p. 123).

अचेतनम्—बुद्धि (intellect) is merely an instrument of Pure Intelligence or चैतन्य, and not identical with it, because बुद्धि is a material product of प्रकृति.

The phrase तद्विषयितत्वात् च पुमान् means that in some respects the Spirit is similar to व्यक्त and अव्यक्त, and in other respect it is different from व्यक्त and अव्यक्त.

Difference of पुरुष from व्यक्त and अव्यक्त—

व्यक्त, and अव्यक्त

निगुण

अविशेषः

विषय

पुरुष

अगुण

विवेकी

अविषय

व्यक्त and अव्यक्त-

सामान्य

अचेतन

प्रमथवर्धि

पुरुष

असामान्य

चेतन

अप्रमथवर्धि

Similarity of पुरुष to व्यक्त and अव्यक्त and difference of व्यक्त from अव्यक्त—

व्यक्त	अव्यक्त	पुरुष
हेतुमन्	अहेतुमन्	अहेतुमन्
अनिष्ट	नित्य	नित्य
अप्रापि	व्यापि	व्यापी
संशय	निश्चय	निश्चय
अनेक	एक	अनेक
आभिन्न	अनाभिन्न	अनाभिन्न
विद्वान्	अविद्वान्	अविद्वान्
सावयव	निरवयव	निरवयव
परतन्त्र	स्वतन्त्र	स्वतन्त्र

It should be noted that गौड० and माडर say पुरुष एक, which is opposed to the doctrine of पुरुषबहुत्व. शङ्कर० and वाच०, therefore, rightly point out that पुरुष is similar to व्यक्त with regard to अनेकत्व. After discussing this point, Wilson concludes—“Either, therefore, Gaurapāda has made a mistake, or by his *eka* is to be understood, not that soul in general is one only, but that it is single, or several, in its different migrations, or, as Mr. Colebrooke renders it (R. A. S. Trans Vol I, p. 31), ‘individual’. So in the Sūtras it is said, ‘that there may be various unions of one soul, according to difference of receptacle, as the ethereal element may be confined in a variety of vessels’ (I, 150). This singleness of soul applies, therefore, to that particular soul which is subjected to its own varied course of birth, death, bondage and liberation; for, as the commentator observes ‘one soul is born, not another (in a regenerated body)’. The singleness of soul, therefore, as asserted by Gaurapāda, is no doubt to be understood in this sense.” (p. 65)

XII

गुणs do not mean qualities residing in a substance, as understood in the न्याय and वैशेषिक systems. They are of the nature of substance; they are the constituent elements of प्रकृति. Hence, वाच० says—गुणा इति परार्थाः. That is, they are called गुणs (secondary), because they exist for the Spirit and not for themselves.

तन्त्रयुक्ति literally means 'device of science', and probably refers to the device of the मीमांसकs known as स्थान (position or order). So it will mean that प्रीति, अप्रीति and विषाद stand for सत्त्व, रजस् and तमस् respectively.

गौड०, माडर and जय० mention अन्योन्यवृत्तयः also, whiles वाच० and चन्द्रिका add अन्योन्य before and वृत्ति after अभिमत, आश्रय, जनन and मिथुन each. वृत्ति according to वाच०, means क्रिया (operation) जय० explains वृत्ति as सुखादिरूपेण परिणतिः. According to गौड०, अन्योन्यवृत्तयः means परस्परं वर्तन्ते, i. e. are reciprocally present. माडर, however, seems to take वृत्ति in the sense of function. In a note on this word, Davies remarks—"वृत्ति means state, condition, or manner of being, and the meaning is that each गुण may, in some circumstances, assume the nature of the others or be the same in effect." (p 36, 1n.)

The quotation, अन्योन्यमिथुनाः सर्वे, etc., ascribed to आगम by वाच०, is found in the 8th chapter of the 3rd स्कन्ध of देवी-भागवत. गौड० माडर and जय० quote only one verse, viz., रजसो मिथुनं सत्त्वं, etc., जय० ascribes this verse to शिण्डुगीता, which it is difficult to identify, unless it stands for हरिगीता = भगवद्गीता. But there is no such verse in the भगवद्गीता. The verse found there is—रजस्तमश्रयिभूय सत्त्वं भवति भारत । रजः सत्त्वं तमश्च तमः सत्त्वं रजस्तया ॥ (XIV. 19). We find a similar verse in the अथर्व-पर्व of the महाभागवत—तमसो मिथुनं सत्त्वं सत्त्वस्य मिथुनं रजः । रजसश्रयि सत्त्वं स्यात् सत्त्वस्य मिथुनं तमः ॥ (३६. ६)

XIII

सांख्याचार्यैः—stands for पञ्चाशेष्ट and others. विज्ञान० quotes पञ्चाशेष्ट on प्रीत्यप्रीतिविषयशब्दगुणानामन्योऽन्यं वैषम्यम् (सां. म. I. 127)—
 “सर्वं नाम प्रसाददायवाभिष्वङ्गप्रीनितिनित्तासन्नोपादिरूपान्तभेदं समासतः
 मूलात्मकम् । एवं रजोऽपि शोकादिवान्मभेदं समासतो दुःखात्मकम् । एवं तमोऽपि
 निजादिवान्मभेदं समासतो मोहात्मकम् । ”

अर्थतः—अप० and वाच० explain it as पुरुषार्थत, but गौड० takes it in the sense of साधना, and माडर explains it as कार्यवशात्.

Now, these गुणs, on account of their having the characteristics of अन्योऽन्यभाषिव, etc., assume different shapes. But, how do these गुणs perform functions of so different a nature? In reply to this वाच० gives an example of a woman, who, according to him, illustrates all the different functions of the गुणs. गौड०, माडर and जय०, on the other hand, illustrate सर्व by a lady, रजस् by warriors and तमस् by clouds. A virtuous woman (and therefore, a नायिक type) pleases her husband, pains her rivals and deludes the passionate people. The brave soldiers (and therefore, representing रजस्) of a king please their master, pain their opponents and delude the fugitives. The dark clouds covering the sky (and therefore, a तामस type) please the people suffering from heat, rouse activity among the peasants and delude the lovers in separation. But, there is one difficulty. The 3 गुणs (= ब्रह्मृति or मूलकारण) assume various shapes by permutation and combination. This amounts to saying that the मूलकारण is not one but many. Now, how does this position differ from that of the वैशेषिकs who also assume the plurality of causes? Cf.—अन्वेदं मूलकारणस्य परिच्छिन्नार्थस्यव्यक्तत्वे वैशेषिकमतादय को विशेष इति चेत्—The reply is कारणद्रव्यस्य स्पर्शादिराहित्यमेव ॥ “अहस्पर्शविहीनं तु रूपानिभिरसंयुतम् । त्रिगुणं तजगदोविरतादिप्रमवाप्यम् ॥ ” इति विष्णुपुराणसिद्ध्य. ॥ विज्ञान० (I 123).

But are not these गुणs opposed to one another? The reply is—yes. Still they unite for पुरुषार्थ, as wick, oil and lamp. The illustration is not a happy one, as we do not find any apparent opposition between तैल, वति and दीप in spite of

the attempt of चन्द्रिका: cf.—दीपोपरि तैलपतनेन दीपनाशात् तैलमपि दीप-
विरोधि, एवं वर्तिरपि स्वल्पेन दीपनाशिकेति ॥ For this reason वाच°
gives another example of this विरोध,—viz., यथा वा वातपित-
श्लेष्माणः etc., बालराम quotes a parallel passage from the देवी-
भागवत (3.9)—“प्रदीपश्च यथा कार्यं प्रकरोत्यर्पदर्शनम् । वर्तितैर्ल यथाचिश्च
विच्छाद्य परस्परम् ॥ २९ ॥ विच्छेदं हि तथा तैलमाग्निना सह सङ्गतम् । तैर्ल ‘वर्ति-
त्रिरोज्येव पादकोऽपि परस्परम् ॥ ३० ॥ एकत्रत्या- पदार्थानां प्रकुर्वन्ति प्रदर्शनम् ॥”
(pp. 139-140). Really speaking, there can be no विरोध of
these गुण in any evolved thing (say, a human body). If at
all there could be any विरोध, then it would be in the साम्यावस्था
i. e. प्रकृति. In no परिणाम of प्रकृति are the गुण in equal quantity.
On the other hand, there is predominance of one over the
others. So, there is no तुल्यवैतल्य in the विकारस. Cf. कृपातिशया
कृपातिशयाश्च परस्परेण विरुध्यन्ते सामान्यानि स्वतिथयः सह प्रवर्तन्ते—(ध्याम-
भाष्य on यो. सू. II. 15)

अत्र च सुखदुःखमोहा परस्परविरोधिनि etc.—Here वाच° has in
his view the attack of the वेदान्ति against the सांख्य philosophy.
According to the latter, all the objects (or evolved entities)
are of the nature of pleasure, pain and delusion. The वेदान्ति
(वाच° himself) retorts—भान्तराः सुखदुःखमोहविपादा बाधे-
भ्यश्चन्दनादिभ्योऽतिविच्छिन्नप्रत्ययवेदनीयेभ्यो व्यतिरिक्ता अभ्यशमीक्ष्यन्ते । यदि
पुनरेत एव सुखदुःखादिस्वभावा भवेयुस्ततः स्वरूपत्वात् हेमन्तेऽपि चन्दनं सुख-
म्यात् । न हि चन्दनं कदाचिदचन्दनं ।तस्मादसुखादिस्वभावा अपि
चन्दनवदुमादयो जातिकालवैभवापेक्षया सुखदुःखादिहेतवो न तु स्वयं सुखादि-
स्वभावा इति रमणीयम् ॥ (भावती on प्र. सू. II. 2 1). To this argu-
ment वाच° (as an exponent and defender of सांख्य) replies
—स्वैवानुपाणि सुखदुःखमोहान्येव निमित्तानि कल्पयन्ति । Although
सुख, दुःख and मोह are all present in every object, yet, they are
not experienced simultaneously. For the experience of one
or the other of these (सुख, दुःख and मोह), they stand in need
of excitant causes, which themselves are of the nature of सुख,
दुःख and मोह. For example, सुख, for its own experience,
stands in need of the predominance of धर्म, which is of the
nature of सत्त्वगुण (or सुख).

XIV

The difficulty lies in the expression तद्विपर्ययाभावात्. गोड० and माडर explain it as—'on account of the absence of the contraries of वैगुण्य in the प्रधान, अविवेक्यादि resides in the प्रधान.' राव० offers an alternative explanation—'on account of the absence of अविवेक्यादि in the contrary of व्यक्त, i.e., पुरुष, अविवेक्यादि resides in the प्रधान and its constituents.' चन्द्रिका adopts the second explanation. अय० also agrees with it cf. वैगुण्यस्याभावेऽविवेक्यादयोऽस्याभावात् (?) । न हि निर्गुणस्य पुरुषस्याविवेक्यादिः संभवति । तस्माद् वैगुण्यादेवाविवेक्यादिः सिद्धः ॥ (p. 20) The explanation of गोड०, as rightly pointed out by S. N. S (See p. 41, in.), renders the other half of the वारिष्ठा redundant, because, it simply repeats the same argument.

XV and XVI

The term भेद stands for the diverse forms of the evolved which differ from one another. As compared with its effects, a cause is unlimited and thus unmanifest. अय० uses a curious expression, (संसर्गिन्) for cause. It seems that the word संसर्ग stands for the union or contact of different effects in their cause; cf.—तस्मात्तेषामभेदेन संसर्गिण्या भवितव्यम् । संसर्गो संसर्गस्तद्व्यक्तं कारणमस्ति (p. 21).

समन्वय = एकस्पर्शा, similarity, or एकजात्यनुगम (i.e. belonging to one genus), according to जय०. गोड० understands समन्वय in the sense of 'inference'—यथा वक्तापरिणं बद्धं हृदया समन्वयति, नूनमस्य पितरौ ब्रह्मणाविति । The explanation of समन्वयान् (भा. सु. I 131) as offered by विज्ञान०, viz., ब्रह्मणादिना धीर्ज्ञेयं दि ब्रह्मणादितत्त्वमप्रादिभिः समन्वयेन समनुगतेन पुनरुपचीयते (i.e. intellect and the rest, emaciated by fast are again strengthened by food, etc.), does not directly fit in this Kārikā, as rightly pointed out by Sovani (p. 411)

कारणकार्यविभागात्—वाच० understands the word विभाग as 'emergence';—just as the jar, etc., emerge from the clay, etc. जय०, माडर and गौड० explain it as 'separation' or 'distinction' between the functions of the cause and the effect:—just as you can bring water in a jar but not in clay. Thus there is a distinction between a cause and its effect, because both serve different purposes (वृथगर्थक्रियाकरणात्). But, it is difficult to understand how one can conclude from this argument that तस्मादस्य कारणेन भवितव्यम्. जय० here quotes the explanation of some other commentary (which is not traceable):—अस्मिन् व्याख्याने, 'कार्यतत्त्वदुपलब्धेर्मंडादि तत्र कार्यम्' इत्यनेनैवमिदं तत्रादित्यस्य व्याख्यायते—यदुपक्ररोति तन् कारणम्, यदुपक्रियते तत्कार्यम्, 'तपोविभागान्, उपकार्योपकारकभावादित्यर्थः। यथाध्यात्मिकानां बाह्यानां चोपकार्योपकारकभावो बुद्धिदृष्ट इव दृश्यते तदस्य कश्चिद् व्यवस्थापितो [पापिता] स्यात्, इतोऽयं विभाग इत्यन्यथानुवपतेः ॥ (pp 21-22).

अविभागात् वैशङ्क्यम्—According to वाच०, गौड० and माडर, the term अविभाग means 'merging';—because this diverse evolved merges into the unevolved. जय० also quotes the opinion of some unknown commentator who adopts the reading अविभागे, where अविभाग means एव. जय०'s own explanation is different. It takes अविभाग in the sense of अविवक्त, and explains the phrase as—'because this diversity is produced out of unity.' cf. ॥ एतेनैव विभक्त्यादेरुक्त्यादिभिरुपस्थापितमविवक्तमविवक्त्यादि-वैशङ्क्यं मानात् दृश्यते.....एवमाध्यात्मिकानां बाह्यानां च वैशङ्क्यम् । तस्मा-देशमविभक्त्येनैव भवितव्यम् । (p. 22)

another in different proportions, one predominating over the others. The other commentators take विष्णुतः and समुत्थात् both, as referring only to the creative activity of प्रकृति

XVII

तैत्तिरीयः—Those who are contented or those whose aim is to get the nine kinds of बुद्धिः (dealt with in कारिका 50). But वाच० here refers to only the five external (बाह्य) बुद्धिः. The internal (आध्यात्मिक) बुद्धिः are gained after the attainment of the discriminative knowledge of the Spirit and the non-Spirit. The internal बुद्धिः are not referred to here. Therefore, वाच० says—अव्यक्तं ॥ महावर्त वा, etc.

The reading संज्ञापरार्थत्वात्, adopted by Wilson, is not supported by गोड०, who reads संगतपरार्थत्वात्. Wilson's reading of the text is an obvious mistake (based upon, perhaps, the सं, म्.—संज्ञापरार्थत्वात्, l. 140), as it is not supported by any commentary.

इहान्तद्वयमवयवमनुरोपेन, etc. In order to prove that a संगत is वयव, वय्या, etc., are given as an illustration.—Just as वय्या, भ्रमन and the rest, being संगतः, are वयव, so अन्यक and its constituents are for another person, viz., पुरुष. But in this illustration, पर is शरीर, which is itself a संगतः and thus पुरुष also becomes a संगतः. On this वाच० remarks that if you go to establish the similarity of all the qualities found in a इहान्त with all the qualities found in a वयव, then there can be no inference. The point is cleared in the न्यायवार्तिक (Chowkhamba edn., pp. 315-345) and the न्यायवार्तिकालम्पटीया (Kāshi Sanskrit Series, No. 21, p. 600).

अविज्ञातः—पुरुष is the अविज्ञात of प्रकृति, as a charoteer is that of a chariot. Question:—But, a charoteer is active, and your पुरुष, being निर्गुण=निष्किय, is not active, how can he become an अविज्ञात? Reply.—It is not essential that only an

active entity can move or urge anything. Sometimes mere proximity or contact brings about activity, as we see in the case of iron and load stone Cf. तत्संनिधानादभिजातृत्वं मणिर (मं. सू. I. 96). Or, mere presence also can bring about an activity, as in the case of a King. Cf.—

न च सर्वत्र तुल्यत्वं स्वाश्रयोजककर्मणाम् ।
 बालेन हस्तिं योद्धा प्रयुञ्जे द्येदं प्रति ॥ ८५ ॥
 मेनारनिम्नु वाचय भृत्यानां त्रिनियोजकः ।
 राजा साक्षिधिमात्रेण विनियुङ्क्ते कदाचन ॥ ८६ ॥
 तस्माद्वचनोऽपि स्वाश्रयत्वे कर्तृतामनः ।

(कुमारिल's छोट्टवार्तिक on मं. सू. I. 5,
 Chowkhamba edn., p. 710)

बालराम thanks that this argument about the अभिजातृत्व of पुत्र्य answers all the criticisms brought forward by शङ्कराचार्य in his भाष्य on रचनावृत्तपक्षे and प्रवृत्तेषु (मं. सू. II. 2. 1 and 2)

स्वामिनि वृत्तिविशेषात्—It is very succinctly explained by बालराम as follows—न कस्मिंश्चाप्यस्मान् विनति बहिर्वात्मानं दहतीति भावः ।

अन्ये भ्वाद्.—भोग्या इदं वा उदपाद्य etc. अन्ये refers to those who cannot reconcile the निष्कृता of इदं with his भोक्तृत्वं They would, therefore, explain भोग्या as द्रव्य But the same objection can be brought against these people also.—पुत्र्य being निःसङ्ग can be a द्रव्य, only through बुद्धिः see व्याख्यानम् on इदं दृशिमात्रं बुद्धोऽपि प्रत्ययावृत्तयः—(यो. सू. II. 20). Similarly, he can be a भोग्या also through बुद्धिः—“अथ च दद्रुत्वद् भोक्तृत्वस्यापि सम्प्रदाशयव्याख्यानमपि समीचीनमेवेति ध्येयम् ॥” (बालराम, p. 160).

कस्मिन्मार्गे प्रवृत्तेषु—शङ्कर assigns this प्रवृत्ति to प्रवान, whereas वाच and others take this प्रवृत्ति as belonging to the दान्य and the sages—अगमिनां महाविषां च ॥

“एकत्वधूर्तानां च प्रमाणान्तर्विरोधान् कथंचिदेशकालविभागाभावेन भक्त्याप्य-
पपत्ते । प्रकृत्येकपुरुषनानास्वयोऽव श्रुत्येव साध्यात् प्रतिपादनात् । ‘अजानेकां
सोहितशुद्धकृष्णां बह्वीः प्रजा. मृजमानां मरुपाः । अत्रो हंको जुषमाणोऽनुगेते
जहाम्येनां शुक्लभोगामजोऽन्य ॥’ (तै. आ ६ १०) ॥” तत्त्ववशाद्दी, on
यो. म. 11. 22.

Further on, says the सांख्य, if you are going to explain away this नाशस्व by उपाधिस, then you will land yourself into another absurdity. For, as शरीर is the उपाधि of आत्मन्, so the limbs (अवयवस) are the उपाधिस of a body (a संघात) And when we see the appearance and disappearance of the limbs in a body, will the वैशान्तिन् call these phenomena the births and deaths of the same body ?

XIX, XX and XXI

माध्यस्थ्य or औदासीन्य is of seven kinds according to जय०—
सप्तविधं चार्थादानीन्यम् । तथा चोक्तम्—पश्यति शृणोति सर्वं करोति स्थितिं
प्रसङ्गं च नापि । स्वतो न परतो...बोभयतभाष्युदासीनः ॥ जय०, further
raises the question that if पुरुष is माध्यस्थ्य and अकर्ता, then how
is he a भोक्ता ?—ननु च यश्कर्ता तत्कर्तृ भोक्तृभावाद्यस्ति पुरुषः । तथा चाहुः—
बालदृताद्यनतरवः स्वयमवृत्तानां यथा हि भोक्तारः । पुरुषोऽपि विषयकजनानां
स्वयमवृत्तानां तथापि भोक्ता ॥ इति ।

अचेतनं चेतनावदिव लिङ्गम् etc. Intellect and the rest, although non-intelligent, seem to be intelligent, on account of the proximity of the Spirit. Thus alone can the experience—‘I know’ be explained. Although the entire activity belongs to the Attributes (transformed into महत्, अहङ्कार and the rest), yet, on account of its reflection in the Intellect, the really indifferent Spirit seems to be active. Cf: उपरागान् कर्तृत्वं किम्मानिध्यान् (मां सू. I, 164). The Spirit in its turn transfers its intelligence to matter. This transference is thus illustrated by various commentators—‘यथाग्निर्मयोगान् सोहमग्निरित्युच्यते । (जय०)
‘भ्रूष्णाग्नीतो घटः शीताभिरग्निः संस्पृष्टः शीतो भवति, अग्निना संयुक्त उष्णो भवति । (माडर) ॥ ‘यथान्धयमो परस्परं संयोगविशेषान् परस्परार्थमन्वेषात्

आयायिको यथा वा जलमययोः संयोगान् परस्परवर्मातोपस्तथैव बुद्धिपुरुषयोपिति
मात्र । (विशान०, सं. म. I, 164) ॥

अकर्तृत्व of पुरुष is further supported by जय० by the following
quotation—प्रवर्तमानान् प्रकृतैरिमान् शुण्ठास्तमोऽभिभूतो विपरीतदर्शनः । अहं
करोमीत्यनुभोऽभिभूयते नृणस्य कुञ्जीकरणेऽप्यनीश्वरः ॥ This quotation
is found in the तत्त्वमसामप्रवृत्ति (Chow. S S No. 246, p 124) and
मांशानस्यविवेचन also (ibid, p. 12) with slight variants.

वाच० connects दर्शनार्थे (in पुरुषस्य दर्शनार्थे केवल्यार्थ तथा प्रधानस्य)
with प्रधानस्य, and केवल्यार्थे with पुरुषस्य. The other commenta-
tors take the line as it stands, i. e. पुरुषस्य दर्शनार्थे and प्रधानस्य
केवल्यार्थम्. While explaining 'विमुक्तमोक्षार्थं स्वार्थं वा' (सं. म.
II, 1) विशान० also connects केवलय with प्रधान.

XXII

In the माय (on यो म. II 19) व्यास describes the तन्मात्र as
the products of महत्त्वं (—एते सत्तामात्रस्यात्मनो महत् पदविशेषपरिणामाः).
But there the महत्त्वं should not be taken as the immediate
cause (i. e. producer) of these तन्मात्रः व्यास has himself said
at another place (यो. म. I 45) that these तन्मात्रः are the
products of अहङ्कार.

मांडू and गौड० hold that these तन्मात्रः singly produce the
महाभूतः. The other commentators hold that the each succeed-
ing महाभूत is produced from the combination of the preceding
तन्मात्रः. For example, शब्दतन्मात्र and स्पर्शतन्मात्र produce वायुः
शब्दतन्मात्र, स्पर्शतन्मात्र and रूपतन्मात्र produce तेजस and so on. But
this theory of वाच० violates the orthodox पञ्चीकरण theory of
the वेदान्तिन्ः. The point is noticed by जय्यतएव, who says—

सम्प्रदायाध्वना पञ्चीकरणं यद्यपि स्थितम् ।


तथापि युक्तिदृष्टत्वाद्वाच्यनिमित्तं शुभम् ॥

श्रुतिध्वन्यात्पुनः यगने पयने ऽपि हेत् ।

रूपशब्दमहावाय्वा वायुस्त्वं दमय्यते ॥

XXV


अहङ्कार is divided into three kinds —



the eleven इन्द्रिय

सम्भाषणपञ्चक

This is the scheme adopted by वाच^० and others. But विश्व^० (on सां. सू. II. 18) would have—



In support of his classification, विश्व^० quotes from some श्रुति—

वैकारिकरुतैजसश्च तामसश्चेत्यहं त्रिधा ।
अहंत्वादिपूर्वाणामनो वैकारिकाहभूत् ॥
वैकारिकाश्च ये देवा अर्थाभिव्यक्तनं यतः ।
सैजसादिन्द्रियाण्येव ज्ञानकर्ममयानि च ॥
तामसो भूतसूक्ष्मादिर्यतः सन् त्दिग्मात्मनः ।

But this explanation is wrong: for सत्य and तमस are inactive by themselves, and cannot produce anything unless helped by the mobile राजस. वैशेषिक's explanation, viz.,—'मम-इन्द्रियाणि मनोऽपेक्षयाऽप्यसत्त्वेन राजसत्त्वापेक्षेना स्मृतिरिति निर्दिष्टान्यत्र तु व्यर्थेन्द्रियापेक्षयाऽपि सत्त्वेन सात्त्विकाहङ्काररूपेणोपायनीयमिति' is very lame (See सांख्यनिरुद्धादीनां of वैशेषिक Chou S. S., p. 34; see further वाङ्मय, pp. 177-178 and Sovani, p. 415)

XXVII

The first phrase **वमयात्मकं**, gives the general characteristic of the mind and the second phrase **संकल्पकं मनः** gives the proper function of the mind. गौड^० interprets **संकल्पकं** as **प्रवृत्तिं कल्पयति**, i. e., which determines the functioning (of the two sets of **इन्द्रिय**s). वाच^० understands **संकल्पकं** as **विशेषणविशेष्यभावेन कल्पयति** i. e. perceives the definite properties as belonging to the thing apprehended **जय^०** and **अन्द्रिय** agree with वाच^०. What वाच^० means is that all the senses of perception cognise their respective objects vaguely, and this is **निर्विकल्पकप्रत्यक्ष** or simple-perception. But as mere simple-perception of an object is of no use in our every-day life, so the help of mind is sought to give a definite and concrete shape to that percept. This is what is called **सविकल्पकप्रत्यक्ष** or complex-perception. The first is **नामजात्यादियोगवाहीनं आलोचनज्ञानं**, and, therefore, **निर्विकल्पक**, the second is **नामजात्यादिसंयुक्तं ज्ञानं**, and, therefore, **सविकल्पक**. In his support, वाच^० cites **अस्ति त्वत्तोषितज्ञानं** etc., from **कुमारिल**'s **श्वेद्वार्तिक** (on **मी. सू.** I 4, verses 112 and 120, pp 168 and 172, Chow. S. S.). The phrase **ततः परं पुनर्वस्तु यदेतज्ज्ञादियभिर्न्या**। **इदमवसीयते**, has been thus explained by **पार्थसारथि** in his commentary on the above—**ततो निर्विकल्पादुत्तरकालं जात्यादिनिर्विकल्प्य वस्तु एवा इदमवसीयते**—, which is the same as **विशेषण-विशेष्यभावेन विवेचयति** of वाच^०. S. N. S. is beside the point when he says that according to वाच^० “mind explicates what is indeterminate, it does not add to the given material. But the verses cited by Vācaspati would suggest that forms and qualifications are created or added to the original perception by the mind” (p 61). For, according to the author of the **श्वेद्वार्तिक** whose verses are quoted here, we have the knowledge of **नामान्य** and **विशेष** both in the **निर्विकल्पक** stage; but this knowledge is not combined into a definite concept, as in the **सविकल्पक** stage. We are cognisant of both, **घट** and **पटल** in the **निर्विकल्पक** stage, but separately; but we cognise

पदन्वविशिष्टो घटः in the सविकल्पक stage. So, there is no new addition or creation of anything new by the mind. That this is the sense of कुमारिल, is evident from his own verse in this context :—“ निर्विकल्पकबोधेऽपि आत्मकस्यापि वस्तुनः । ग्रहणं लक्षणाद्वैयं शयं दृढं तु गृह्यते ॥ ११८ ॥ ” (p 171). पार्थसारथि explains it—आत्मकस्य, सामान्यविशेषात्मकस्येत्यर्थः । सामान्यावभासोऽपि प्रतीतिमिद एव । न हि निर्विकल्पकेनाऽगृहीतस्य सविकल्पकेनापि ग्रहणं सम्भवति, न वाऽगृहीते सामान्यं व्यक्त्यन्तरे प्रत्यभिज्ञा संभवति । तस्मान् सामान्यं विशेषश्च निर्विकल्पेऽपि प्रकाशत एव etc.

इन्द्रियं च माधव्यान्—मय० remarks :—यथान्यदिन्द्रिङ्गं तथा मनोऽपीत्यर्थः. But वाच० criticises this view :—इन्द्रियान्तरेः सात्त्विकाहङ्कारोपादानत्वं च साधर्म्यम्, न त्विन्द्रिङ्गत्वम् । महद्द्वारयोरप्यात्मनिद्रुत्वेनेन्द्रियत्वप्रमत्तान् । तस्माद्गुणवृत्तिमात्रमिन्द्रिङ्गत्वं, न तु प्रवृत्तिनिमित्तम् ।

माडर reads प्राचभेदात् in place of आचभेदात्. This is noted by चन्द्रिका also. माडर's reading is preferable, because the second line of the कारिका lays down the reasons of the नानात्व of इन्द्रियस, the two reasons being, गुणपरिणामविशेषात् and प्राचभेदात्.

The question is—how can one अहङ्कार create these manifold इन्द्रियस whose functions differ? This question is raised by रघोन्नकर in his न्यायवार्तिक (Chow S. S., p 70)—यदि पुनरिन्द्रियाण्येकात्मकानि स्युः, कारणस्वभावानुविधानादेकात्म्यादिष्वप्यवस्था न स्यात्, सर्वं मर्शमेकं वा सर्वार्थमनि स्यात् । The reply to it is—गुणपरिणामविशेषात्. Although अहङ्कार is one, yet the three गुणस, accompanied by चर्म and अरमं, act and react upon one another; therefore, the modified effects of अहङ्कार (i. e. the इन्द्रियस) differ in their functions.

XXVIII

माडर reads क्वादिभु in place of शब्दोदिभु in the text. वाचस्पत्य also adopts this reading and observes :—क्वद्वारादिभवेन पुरांदिन्द्रियाणामभिधानात्, “ क्वादिभु ” इति पाठो न सतिवेति । (p. 134, ln)

XXIX

सामान्यकरणवृत्तिः प्राणाया वायवः पञ्च । Does the word करण stand for त्रिविध अन्तःकरण or त्रयोदशविध करण? While वाच^० adopts the former view all the other commentators agree to the latter interpretation, although वाडर curiously says at one place—समस्तान्तःकरणस्येत्यर्थः । विज्ञान^० also explains the word करण as अन्तःकरण in his भाष्य (on स्रं. सू. II 31). But वाच^०, while commenting on समस्तेन्द्रियवृत्तिः प्राणादित्यष्टा जीवन्म (योगभाष्य on III 39), has given a different interpretation, viz., न हि प्रपल्लभेः शरीरोपगृहीतमास्तपित्यभेदेभुः सर्वकरणसाधारणः यथाहुः 'सामान्यकरणवृत्तिः प्राणाया वायवः पञ्च' इति । वाडराम correctly points out the discrepancy. He suggests that योगभाष्येऽपि समस्तेन्द्रियवृत्तेनान्तःकरणममेव ग्राह्यं, न तु बाह्येन्द्रियमपि, because in deep sleep when all the external sense-organs are dormant, we see the five vital airs functioning. Therefore, these vital airs cannot be said to be the function of external sense-organs.

XXX

Cognition has been divided into three kinds in the सांख्य philosophy, viz., perception (प्रत्यक्ष), inference (अनुमान) and valid testimony (शब्द). Now, in प्रत्यक्ष, the three अन्तःकरण and one of the organs of sense—all four seem to function simultaneously and gradually. But, according to the नैयायिकs, there are only gradual stages, which, however, are not observable on account of the swiftness of the different functions. Cf. ज्ञानार्थगोचरं मनः (न्या. सू. III. 2. 57), न युगपदेक-नियोरच्छेदः (ibid., III. 2. 58), अत्यन्तचक्षुर्दर्शनवत् तदुपलब्धिगन्तव्यकारणं (ibid., III. 2. 59). For, according to the नैयायिकs, the mind is अनुपरिमाण. The followers of सांख्य, on the other hand, regard the mind to be of पथ्यमपरिमाण, and, therefore, there can be a युगपदवृत्ति.

In the case of अनुमान and शब्द, only the three अन्तःकरण functions. They can operate simultaneously and gradually both, but they do not depend upon the cognition of senses at that particular moment.

XXXI

आहूत—Davies observes:—“*Āhūta* is glossed in the Petersb. Lexicon by *Abzucht* (= purpose), *Antrieb* (= motive). Colebrooke's translation is “incited by mutual invitation.” ... The meaning of “incitement to activity,” mentioned by Wilson, expresses more nearly the sense of *āhūta*..... It is composed of *ā*, to, towards, and *hū*, to cry. Gaudapāda says that it means *ādarasambhrama* (respectful eagerness in action).” (p. 68, 1n).

Davies is wrong in considering that शब्द is correct in applying this verse to the three internal organs only (See Davies, p. 68, 1n). All the other commentators apply it to all the organs, for each and every इन्द्रिय functions for उदघातं.

The spirit of the सं. सू., “न हि सर्वविद् सर्वज्ञः” (III. 56) and “इहोचेष्टमिदिः मिह” (III. 57), goes directly against the theory of the कारिका, where no ईश्वर is mentioned. Nor is the position helped by विज्ञान's remark, तद्. प्रवृत्तिरीत्यस्य ज्ञानं-वस्तुमिदिः ‘यः सर्वज्ञः सर्वविद् यस्य ज्ञानमयं तदः’ इत्यदिभिरुक्तं सर्व-ज्ञमनं, निगम्योचेष्टमिदिः विज्ञानस्य तद्वदित्यर्थः ॥ कवेवमीश्वरप्रतिषेध-निरोधतया—‘इहोचेष्टमिदिः मिह’ । सात्त्विकमात्रेणेवमित्यदिभिरु सर्व-ज्ञमनमयः । (सं. सू. III. 57).

XXXII

The three functions of seizing, retaining and manifesting etc. as Davies rightly points out (pp. 69-70), common to all the organs. Thus “the organ of sight seizes and holds the impression conveyed by an external object and manifests it to manas.” (ibid). According to शब्द, आहूत and धारण

belong to कर्मेन्द्रियs and प्रकाशन to बुद्धीन्द्रियs. मातर ascribes आहरण to इन्द्रियs in general, and धारण and प्रकाशन to अहङ्कार and बुद्धि respectively. वाच० followed by चन्द्रिका, would relegate आहरण to कर्मेन्द्रियs, धारण to बुद्धि, अहङ्कार and मनस्, and प्रकाशन to बुद्धीन्द्रियs.

The word दशधा in the second half of this verse presents a difficulty. वाच० takes दशधा with आहार्य, धार्य and प्रकाश्य each. The objects seized by the इन्द्रियs, being only five, are doubled by dividing them into दिव्य and अदिव्य. Similarly, the body which is retained by the अन्तःकरण, is made up of five vital airs; but these are also दिव्य and अदिव्य, and so tenfold. The objects manifested by the बुद्धीन्द्रियs are also tenfold because of being divided into दिव्य and अदिव्य varieties. I think there is another and better way of explaining the कारिका. The objects seized, retained and manifested are altogether ten, viz., five objects of organs of action and five objects of organs of sense. These ten are supervised by the three internal organs.

XXXIII

वाच० explains why काळ is not recognised as a separate category in the सार्वत्रिक philosophy. According to the वैशेषिकमूलन "अपरस्मिन्नपरं पुनपक्षिरं विप्रमिति विद्वानि" (II. 2 6), काळ is one category which is divided into three parts—past, present and future—, according to different circumstances. प्रज्ञस्तपाय clarifies this point—"एकत्वेऽपि सर्वकार्याणामारम्भकियाभिनिर्गृहीतिरिति निरूपेणोपाधिभेदात्मनिवत्पाक्षकादिवद्वा नानात्वोपचार ; that is, just as one and the same man is called a पाक्षक or a पाचक in different circumstances, or just as one and the same piece of crystal assumes different colours according to the objects placed near it, so all the effects, though of one nature, become different under the different circumstances of beginning, ending, remaining and perishing. Thus, there is only one काळ. To this वाच० replies—
Why should we first assume one काळ and then assume differ-

ent circumstances or *व्यापि*s to make this *ब्रह्म* multifarious ? Why should we not recognise the *व्यापि*s only ? Cf. स सत्त्वं कालो वस्तुगन्धोऽपि बुद्धिनिर्माण-शब्दज्ञानानुपाती लौकिकानां व्युत्पितदर्शनानां यन्तुस्वरूप इवाभासते-योगभाष्य on III, 52.

XXXIV

आविशेष = non-specific, *i. e.*, तत्कालात्. विशेष = specific, *i. e.*, पञ्चमहाभूतस.

पाष्पायाहादाणां घटादीनां पञ्चाशब्दायात्मकत्वान्.—Here वाच० suggests that the *विषय*s of the *कर्मेन्द्रिय*s (except वाक्) are endowed with all the constituents of the five elements in some measure. But this will lead to accepting the theory of पञ्चीकरण, which is opposed to वाच०'s view on कारिका XXII, where he says आप-शब्दवर्गवस्तुगुणा. Can a person not bring water with his hands ? If so, then water must also be पञ्चाशब्दायात्मक. See notes on Kārika XXII and S. N. S., pp 72-73 with footnotes.

XXXV

The word *ह्यारि* has been translated by S. N. S., as 'principal'. The translation is based upon जय०'s phrase *ह्यारिष्यन् सत्मानि*. I think that 'warder' expresses the sense of *ह्यारि* better than 'principal'. For, in spite of the fact that all the sense-organs bring their percepts to the अन्तःकरण, the latter itself receives these percepts for delivering them to पुष्ट, as is clear from the next कारिका. The criticism of S. N. S. would have been right if अन्तःकरण were to retain these percepts for itself and not present them to the Spirit. Therefore, the three-fold अन्तःकरण acts as a warder for the Spirit and not as the principal (one).

XXXVII

वाच० interprets both the lines of this कारिका as the causes of the superiority of बुद्धि. गौड०, on the other hand, inter-

pretends the first line as the cause of the second;—because intellect brings about the entire enjoyment of the Spirit, therefore, it brings about also the discrimination between the Spirit and the Nature. मातर quotes the following speech of अहङ्कार—

अहङ्कारो धियं ब्रूते मैत्रं सुखं प्रबोधय ।
 प्रबुद्धे परमानन्दे न त्वं माहं न तज्ज्ञात् ॥
 मयि तिष्ठत्यहङ्कारे पुरुषः पञ्चविंशतः ।
 तत्पञ्चवृण्वं पस्तिष्यस्य स कथं मोक्षमिच्छति ॥
 योऽस्मीं सर्वेश्वरो देवः सर्वव्यापी जगद्गुरुः ।
 देहति पद्मसुचार्यं हा मयात्मा लघुः कृतः ॥

मातर further remarks—न हि भगवतः कपिलस्य मते किमपि कर्तव्यमनुतेपतया, किं तु सांख्यार्थं पञ्चविंशतितत्त्वज्ञानमेव साधर्म्येण धैर्यम्येण च निश्चेयतदेतु । उक्तं च—

इमं पितृ लल मोद निरयं विषयानुपभुञ्ज कुत च मा गडाम् । यदि विदितं ते कपिलमर्तं तत्प्राप्स्यसे मोक्षमार्ग्यं च ॥ This verse is more of tirade against the सांख्य philosophy than an exposition.

XXXVIII

In para 185, read भूतान्याकाशानिजलज्जलदिलयनिरूपानि.

Why तन्मात्राः are called अविशेषाः?—This has been explained by गौड० and मातर as देवानामेते मुखलक्षणा विषया इ. लमोहरहिता, which is wrong. For, तन्मात्राः, being evolved out of त्रिगुणान्मिषा प्रकृति, cannot be said to be devoid of इ ल and मोह (= रजस् and तमस्). Therefore, the explanation of वाच०, viz., न सर्वं शान्तत्वादिस्वरूपभोगयोग्यो विशेष इति मात्रास्यार्थः, is better. That is, all the Attributes are present in the तन्मात्राः, but they are not patent enough to be enjoyed.

XXXIX

The specific elements are divided into three divisions—
 “(1) Subtle body; (2) those which are born of father and mother; and (3) gross substances or inorganic matter.....”

It (subtle body) becomes 'specific' by the aggregation of the subtle elements which in themselves are 'non-specific' or diversified." (Davies, p. 76). But, according to वाच०, सूक्ष्मशरीरं शान्तपोषुदेरिन्द्रियैरन्वितादिवेषः (Kār. 40);—the subtle body is called specific because it is endowed with the sense-organs possessed of the qualities of calmness, violence and delusion.

XL

पूर्वोक्तप्रश्न—According to वाच०, each Spirit is endowed with a subtle-body at the beginning of the creation. But according to सां. ख. सत्तरशेकं लिङ्गम् (III. 9), there is an aggregate of subtle-bodies which is created in the beginning. Cf. विज्ञान०, लिङ्गशरीरं, तच्च सर्गादौ समष्टिरूपमेकमेव भवति, इत्यर्थः. Then, how do the subtle bodies separate? To this, the सूत्र replies—व्यक्तिभेदःकर्मविशेषात् (III. 10)—they are separated or differentiated according to particular actions. On this विज्ञान० comments—यद्यपि सर्गादौ हिरण्यगर्भोपाधिरूपमेकमेव लिङ्गम्, तथापि तस्य पञ्चाङ्गव्यक्तिभेदो व्यक्तिरूपेणागतो वायान्वयमपि भवति । But, is not this idea of हिरण्यगर्भ foreign to सांख्य ?

According to this कारिका, the number of the constituents of लिङ्गशरीर is eighteen, but according to सूत्र, it is seventeen. विज्ञान० has ingeniously removed this discrepancy by saying—अष्टादश च बुद्धादेवान्तर्भावः ।

XLI

A distinction should be made between लिङ्ग and लिङ्गशरीर. The latter is the vehicle of the former, which consists of thirteen principles, viz., intellect, ego, mind, five organs of sense and five organs of action, and which is referred to as अनुत्पन्न. पुरयः in the authority quoted by वाच०.

The reading of गौड० and माडर is विना अविशेषः, whereas वाच० has विना विशेषः. वाच० calls the सूक्ष्मशरीर as विशेष in Kārikā XL.

pretends the first line as the cause of the second;—because intellect brings about the entire enjoyment of the Spirit, therefore, it brings about also the discrimination between the Spirit and the Nature. मांडर quotes the following speech of अहङ्कार—

अहङ्कारो धियं वृत्ते मेनं सुतं प्रबोधय ।
 प्रबुद्धे परमानन्दे न त्वं नाहं न तज्जगत् ॥
 मयि तिष्ठत्यहङ्कारे पुरुषः पञ्चविंशकः ।
 तत्त्वचूडं परित्यज्य स कथं मोक्षमिच्छति ॥
 योऽयं सर्वेश्वरो देवः सर्वभ्यापी जगद्गुरुः ।
 वेदोति पदमुच्चार्य हा मयात्मा लघुः कृतः ॥

मांडर further remarks—न हि भगवतः कपिलस्य मते किमपि कर्तव्यमनुवेद्यतया, किं तु मांस्थानं पञ्चविंशतितत्त्वज्ञानमेव साधर्म्येण वैषर्म्येण च निःस्पृहहेतु । उक्तं च—

इमं विदुः कल मोहं नित्यं विषयानुपभुङ्गन् कुरु च मा छट्याम् । यदि विदितं ते कपिलमर्तं तन्प्राप्यसे मोक्षसाध्यं च ॥ This verse is more of tirade against the मांस्थ philosophy than an exposition.

XXXVIII

In para 185, read भूतान्याद्याशानिखलमदित्यादिरूपाणि

Why तन्मात्राः are called अविशेषः?—This has been explained by मांडर and मांडर as देवानामेते मुखलक्षणा विषया दुःखमोहरहिता, which is wrong. For, तन्मात्राः, being evolved out of त्रिगुणानिष्टा प्रकृति, cannot be said to be devoid of दुःख and मोह (= रजस् and तमस्). Therefore, the explanation of वाचः, viz., न सर्वं गान्तत्वारिरस्युपभोगयोग्यो विशेष इति मात्रशब्दाद्यैः, is better. That is, all the Attributes are present in the तन्मात्राः, but they are not patent enough to be enjoyed.

XXXIX

The specific elements are divided into three divisions—
 “(1) Subtle body; (2) those which are born of father and mother; and (3) gross substances or inorganic matter.....

It (subtle body) becomes 'specific' by the aggregation of the subtle elements which in themselves are 'non-specific' or diversified." (Davies, p 76). But, according to वाच०, सूक्ष्मशरीरं शान्तचोरोद्देसिन्द्रियरञ्जितत्वाद्विशेषः (Kār. 40):—the subtle body is called specific because it is endowed with the sense-organs possessed of the qualities of calmness, violence and delusion.

XL

पूर्वोत्पन्न—According to वाच०, each Spirit is endowed with a subtle-body at the beginning of the creation. But according to सां. य. सप्तदशैकं लिङ्गम् (III. 9), there is an aggregate of subtle-bodies which is created in the beginning. Cf. विशान०, लिङ्गघटीरं, तच्च सर्गात्ता समष्टिरूपमेकमेव भवति, इत्यर्थः. Then, how do the subtle bodies separate? To this, the सूत्र replies—व्यक्तिभेदःकर्मविशेषात् (III. 10)—they are separated or differentiated according to particular actions. On this विशान० comments—यद्यपि सर्गात्ता हिरण्यगर्भोपाधि रूपमेकमेव लिङ्गम्, तथापि तस्य पञ्चाङ्गपक्षिभेदे व्यक्तिरूपेणान्यथा भावास्त्वपि भवति । But, is not this idea of हिरण्यगर्भ foreign to सांख्य ?

According to this कारिका, the number of the constituents of लिङ्गशरीर is eighteen, but according to सूत्र, it is seventeen. विशान० has ingeniously removed this discrepancy by saying—अद्वयत्वात् च बुद्धावेवास्तर्भावः ।

XLI


A distinction should be made between लिङ्ग and लिङ्गशरीर. The latter is the vehicle of the former, which consists of thirteen principles, viz., intellect, ego, mind, five organs of sense and five organs of action, and which is referred to as अङ्गुष्ठमात्रः पुरुषः in the authority quoted by वाच०.

The reading of गौड० and माडर is विना अविशेषः, whereas वाच० has विना विशेषः. वाच० calls the सूक्ष्मशरीर as विशेष in Kārīkā XL

So विना विशेषः means विना गर्भः गर्भरः. But this is confusing because, to say that the लिङ्ग (composed of thirteen principles) cannot exist without सूक्ष्मशरीर (composed of लिङ्ग and पञ्चतन्मात्राः) is not logical. गौड^०'s explanation is better when he says that लिङ्ग cannot exist without अविशेषः viz., the five subtle elements. चन्द्रिका gives a different opinion of some commentator—“किंचित् स्थूलशरीरावश्यकत्वाभिप्रायकमिति वर्णयन्ति । तथा हि, लिङ्गं समुद्रात्मकं लिङ्गशरीरं विशेषं स्थूलदेहं विना निरात्म्यं सन्न तिष्ठति, किन्तु स्थूलशरीरमाभिरूप्य तिष्ठति । अतो न लिङ्गशरीरेण स्थूलशरीरस्यान्यपासिद्विरेति मात्रः ॥

XLIII

According to वाच^० and जय^० dispositions may be divided like this—



The प्राकृतभावः, which are innate, are of four kinds, viz., धर्म, ज्ञान, वैराग्य and ऐश्वर्य. They belong to कपिष्ठ only. Those depending on the instruments (करणभूषणः) are eight viz., धर्म, ज्ञान, वैराग्य, भवभूषण, ऐश्वर्य and भवभूषण. Those dispositions which depend on the effect or body (कार्यभूषणः) are also eight, viz., five when the body is in the womb and three, i. e., childhood, youth and old age, when the body is outside the womb. गौड^० and माडर, however, divide the भावः into three kinds—सांतिदिष्ट, प्राकृत and वैकृत. धर्म, ज्ञान, वैराग्य and ऐश्वर्य are born along with कपिष्ठ, so they are सांतिदिष्ट or cognate in his case; but they come to सच्च, सन्दन, समातन and सनरकुमार (the four sons of वदन्) after their birth, and are therefore, प्राकृत or natural in their case. The वैकृत or acquired dispositions reside in ordinary human beings and depend upon the instruments and the effected body.

XLIV and XLV

According to माडर, the मूढमयरीर rises to the eight states by practising virtue. The states are ब्रह्म, प्राज्ञापत्य, ऐन्द्र, पित्र्य, गान्धर्व, दाक्ष, राक्षस and वैशाख गौड^० gives सौम्य for पित्र्य, and दाक्ष has been dropped in Wilson's text and ours, but is given in the Benares edition. By practising vice, the मूढमयरीर sinks to the five states of पशु, पक्षी, मृग, सर्पमृग and न्यावर. The प्राकृतिकबन्ध, according to वाच^०, is due to the identification of the Spirit with प्रकृति itself; but माडर includes the eight kinds of evolvents * (प्रकृतis) in this bondage. The वैकारिकबन्ध, according to वाच^०, is the identification of the Spirit with the विकारs of प्रकृति (i. e. the evolutes); but according to माडर, this bondage is brought about by making the eight states, viz., the ब्रह्म, प्राज्ञापत्य and others, as the *summum bonum*. These three kinds of bondages are explained by वाच^० at length in his तत्त्वव्याख्यान on योगभाष्य I. 24.

The word प्रकृति in प्रकृतिलयः, stands for महदहङ्कारभूतेन्द्रियाणि, according to वाच^०; but, according to गौड^० and माडर, the word denotes प्रबान्धुद्वयहङ्कारतन्मात्राः

XLVI

For the criticism of Keith, see Sovani (p. 424). This creation of intellect or "the conduct of the human understanding" (Davies, p. 84), distinguished by Ignorance, Incapacity, Contentment and Attainment, is divided into fifty kinds.

गौड^० and माडर illustrate all these four states by means of an example of post. There is विषय, when you are in doubt, whether you are seeing a man or a post. There is भ्रमति, when even after seeing the post clearly, you are not entirely free from the doubt. There is तुष्टि, when you do not want to remove the doubt as to the identity of the post. There is सिद्धि when you succeed in establishing the correct identity of the

post The explanation of वाच० is better. विषयं is that which obstructs the path of the Spirit to liberation. "Incapacity (अशक्ति) arises from the imperfection of senses. Acquiescence or Contentment (तुष्टि) is a passive state of intellect. Perfection (सिद्धि) means perfect knowledge, not completeness in moral virtue." (Davies, pp. 84-85).

XLVII

विषयं or अविद्या is of five kinds :—अविद्या, अस्मिता, राग, द्वेष and अभिनिवेश, which, are called तमस, मोह, महामोह, तामिस and अन्यतामिस by the कारिका.

XLVIII

तमस or अविद्या is of eight kinds and arises on account of identifying the Spirit with Nature, Intellect, Ego, and the five subtile elements.

मोह or अस्मिता is also of eight kinds. The gods and the rest consider the eight varieties of Attainment or सिद्धि as the *summum bonum*.

महामोह or राग is of ten kinds and arises from the attachment to the objects of five senses; these objects are ten, five belonging to gods and five to human beings.

तामिस or द्वेष is of eighteen kinds, and arises from the hatred towards one or the other of the ten objects of sense (mentioned above) and the eight varieties of Attainment or सिद्धि.

अन्यतामिस or अभिनिवेश is also of eighteen kinds and arises from the fear of losing the eight सिद्धि or the ten objects of sense. Or it may be the fear of death which might obstruct the enjoyment of these eighteen objects. Cf. स चायमभिनिवेशः द्वेषः स्वस्मिन्नादी हृत्पति जातमात्रस्य प्रत्यक्षानुमानागदरमेवार्थितो मरणशम उच्छेददृष्ट्यात्मकः पूर्वतन्मात्रभूतं मरणदुःखमनुमापयति (व्यासभाष्य on यो. सू. II. 9) " मरणशमोऽन्यतामिस इत्युक्ते । " (जय० p. 31)

Thus, there are 62 kinds of विषयं.

XLIX

The quotation in वाच०, enumerating the list of the injuries to organs, is found with a variant (सुषता: for मन्दता:) in the सांख्यसंग्रह (Chow. S. S. No. 246, p 77). गौड० uses प्रभुति (or paralysis) for कुट, and उपजिह्विका for जडता Cf. " निह्वाणा जात्यम्." in जय०, p. 52. माडर and गौड० adopt शुदावर्त for उदावर्त (=obstruction of bowels).

L

माडर (and not गौड०, as S N. S says, page 91, 1n) reads आप्यात्मिकः in place of आप्यात्मिकाः. आप्यात्मिकाः is grammatically wrong, as आप्यात्मिक = derived from आप्यात्म + क्तृ ("अप्यात्मादेऽभिप्यते" वार्तिक on पाणिनि IV. 3, 60). आत्मनि = अप्यात्मं, is an अव्ययीभाव compound in the sense of locative case, according to "अव्ययं विभक्तिः" पाणिनि II. 1. 6. Then the feminine termination क्विप् (and not दाप्) is added to आप्यात्मिक by the सूत्र of पाणिनि, "दिङ्गणन्" IV. 1 15 and the form will be आप्यात्मिकी.

The names of external varieties of Contentment vary with different commentators :—

	वाच०	जय०	माडर	गौड०
1.	पारम्	सुतारम्	तारम्	सुतमः
2.	सुपारम्	सुपारम्	सुतारम्	पारम्
3.	पारपारम्	lost	सुनेत्रम्	सुनेत्रम्
4.	अनुत्तमांशः	अनुत्तमांशः	समरीचम्	अनुत्तमांशसिकम्
5.	वत्तमांशः	वत्तमांशः	वत्तमांशसिकम्	वारीकम्

If अर्जन, रञ्जन, क्षय, भोग (or संग, according to गौड०) and हिंसा are named in the order given above, then गौड० calls the last two as वारीक and अनुत्तमांशसिक respectively—, which is against the order observed by other commentators. My teacher, the late Mahamahopādhyāya P. Rāmāvatāra Śarma has tried to explain these varieties of तुष्टि as follows :—
पनार्जनदुःखपारप्रतिवृत्तान् पारस्वयेयं तुष्टिः । अर्जनरोपशानेति


कदाचिद्भोगाभिव्ययेन प्रवृत्तिः स्यात्, रक्षणप्रयत्नस्य ■ प्रवृत्तेरतितरामसंभव इति तदीयायास्तुष्टेः सुपारता, क्षयं भावयन्ः कदाचिन् प्रवृत्तिः कदाचिरप्रवृत्तिः इति तदीया तुष्टिः पागवापाख्या (read पागवापाख्या ?), भोगे रोगंभये भावयन्-स्तुष्टिः स्वाधंपरेति तस्या वतरेताराम्यस्त्वम्. हिंसादोषतन्मास्यास्तुष्टेस्तु कारण्य-मुत्पन्न्यादुत्तमास्त्वम् ॥ बालराम, pp. 219-220.

LI

No commentator has given the names of असिद्धिः जप^० which gives them—तत्तां असिद्धीनां मोक्षकुण्मात्रमित्यायः (1) संज्ञाः—, has a defective reading.

वाच^० criticises the view of some writer in para 237. This view, as has been shown by me in my article ("Jayamaṅgalā and other commentaries on the Sāṅkhya-Kārikās", Indian Historical Quarterly, Vol. V, in, p. 429), belongs to जप^०, this point is of great importance for the question of the relative chronology of the different commentaries. I have discussed it in my article referred to above.

Following is the scheme of the division of सिद्धिः according to वाच^०



The last three are the effects of all the remaining five together.

While वाच० construes अहुश्च as निवारक and refers by it to विषयं, अशक्ति and तुष्टि, विज्ञान० (on सं. च. III. 49) explains अहुश्च as आकर्षक and refers by it to the three मिदिस, viz. ऊह शब्द and अध्ययन, leaving सुहृत्प्राप्ति and दान as of secondary importance. He criticises वाच० as follows—कश्चित्तेतासामथसिद्धिनामहुगो निवारकः पूर्वश्रित्वो विषयंयाशक्तिस्तुष्टिरूपो भवति चन्पकत्वापिति व्याचष्टे तत्र। तुष्ट्यभावस्याशक्तितया बाधिर्यादिवत् मिदिविरोधितालाभेन तुष्ट्यतुष्ट्यो. सिद्धिविरोधित्वान्नमवान्. In reply to this it may be said that तुष्टि and अतुष्टि are not mutually contradictory, but positive धर्मस. See Sovani p. 427.

LII

The word लिङ्ग has been explained as बहुलत्वं बुद्धिरिति by विज्ञान (on सं. च. III 45). But this is not correct. वाच० is right in explaining it as referring to the objects of senses and the two bodies—subtle and gross. Davies remarks :—“Some commentators make the *linga* itself to be *Buddhi* (intellect) and *bhāvas* to be its conditions. The former interpretation (i e. वाच० H) is preferable, for the *linga*, though formed of intellect and other internal organs, is yet something different from them. It is, moreover, conditioned by the state of a former life, which is due to ‘intellect’. (p. 90)

LIV

सत्त्वविशाल means where सत्त्व predominates. It may be asked why this state should not be the human goal, why should men hanker after मोक्ष? To this the सूत्र replies.—आतृप्तिस्तत्राप्नुतरोत्तरयोर्नियोगादेयः (सं. च. III 52). विज्ञान explains it as—तत्राप्नुतर्ध्वगतावपि सत्यामातृप्तिस्तत्र उत्तरोत्तरयोर्नियोगादधोऽप्योयोनिजन्मनः सोऽपि लोको देय इत्यर्थः. Thus very idea is expressed in the next श्रुति.

According to गौड० there are sixteen forms of creations—“that is, apparently, each of the four classes of beings

proceeds from four modifications of nature; or from the invisible principles, from the subtle rudiments, from conditions or dispositions of intellect and from the gross elements." (Wilson, p. 220). It seems that गौड० takes देव, मातृप and तयंम्योन (= two, जड़म and स्थावर), and divides each of them into four classes, viz., अर्थात्मिक, लिङ्ग, भाव and भूत.

LV

पतञ्जलि also expresses the same idea—'परिणामतापसंस्कार दुःखं गुणवृत्तिविशेषाच्च दुःखमेव सर्वं विवेकिनः' (योग. सू. II. 15). Compare also, समानं जलमरणं दुःखम्' (सां. सू. III. 53).

स्वभावेन is explained by चन्द्रिका as स्वत एव सर्गो दुःखरूपः, विवेकिनामिति शेषः।

माठर reads अत्र in place of तत्र, and समासेन in place of स्वभावेन in the text. The former term he explains as विषु लोकेन and the latter as संक्षेपेन.

LVI

The illustration of a cook cited by वाच० and the (सां. सू. III 63)—विविक्तबोधात् मृष्टिनिवृत्तिः प्रधानस्य सूक्ष्मं फले, has got the disadvantage that सूक्ष्म is चेतन्य. The illustration of गौड० viz., यथा कश्चिन् स्वार्थं त्यक्त्वा मित्रकाम्यं करोति, has the same disadvantage. The second illustration of गौड०, viz., तथा चोक्तं कुम्भवन् प्रधानं पुरुषार्थं कृत्वा निवर्तते, is better, because कुम्भ = non-intelligent.

चन्द्रिका quotes two योगसूत्रs in support of the purport of this वारिका—"तदर्थं एव दृश्यस्यात्मा" (II 21) and "कृतार्थं प्रति नदमप्यनष्टं तद्व्यवसायारणत्वान्" (II 22).

LVII

साध्यव्यभिचार । The syllogism of the प्रतिपक्षिन् is चेन्नान्यविहितं अचेतनं प्रवृत्तिमन्यथा, अचेतनत्वान्, रथादिवन् ।

Now, the साध्य is प्रवृत्तिव्यत्यय. The सिद्धान्तिन् says that we can show a case which is the reverse of your syllogism. That is,

चेतनानभिहितं अचेतनं अपि प्रवृत्तियुक्तम्, अचेतनत्वाद्, धरिवत् ।

Here we have साध्यव्यभिचार. Now, the प्रतिपादिन् says that your case does not bring about the साध्यव्यभिचार, because, even in your case we shall assume ईश्वर as the cause of प्रवृत्ति. To this the सिद्धान्तिन् replies:—Your argument is not sound, because a चेतन or प्रेम्हावान् can act only with the motive of स्वार्थ or कर्तव्य. But, it would be absurd to impute any motive to God, much less these two motives.

माडर, गौड^० and जय^०, interpret this कारिका as illustrating the प्रवृत्ति and निवृत्ति (of प्रवान्) both, while as वाच^० speaks of प्रवृत्ति only.

LVIII

आत्मसुक्य means इच्छा; but it is only a blind instinct or activity, which is the nature of the three गुण in साध्य philosophy. It is not the इच्छा of the नैयायिका according to whom it is the quality of a sentient being.

LXI

This कारिका has given rise to a great controversy. With whom should we construe the word मे ? Is it वृत्त which feels that there is nothing सुहृत्तर than प्रवृत्ति or is it प्रवृत्ति itself which feels that there is nothing सुहृत्तर than myself ? The first meaning is adopted by माडर ; वाच^० and गौड would seem to mean that it is the author of the कारिका who feels that there is nothing सुहृत्तर than प्रवृत्ति.

The next difficulty is about the meaning of the term सुहृत्तरता जय^० explains it by 'subtlety', वाच^० and माडर, by 'bashfulness', and गौड^० by 'enjoyability'.

Again, in the 59th कारिका, प्रकृति is compared to a नदी but here to a कुलवधू.

As to the existence of another कारिका on the basis of गौडः, see my foot-note to the text of the कारिका and introduction

“पुनर्न दर्शनमुपैति पुरुषस्य”—वाच० explains it as—अप्रमत्तां यथेनां परपुरपान्तगाणि न पुनः पश्यन्ति । This is not a good interpretation. गौडः is much nearer the mark when he says—अहमनेन परपुरवेन दृष्टात्मीत्यस्य पुनः पुनर्दर्शनं नोपैति ।

LXII

यथा जयपराजयो भृत्यगर्ता etc., (वाच०) is evidently derived from व्यासभाष्य—“यथा जय. पराजयो वा षोडशु वतंभाव. स्वामिनि व्य-दिश्यते” (यो. सू. 1 24)

LXIV

The word तत्त्वाभ्यास, according to जय०, गौड० and माडर, means the अभ्यास or practice of the twenty-five तत्त्वः. वाच० clarifies this अभ्यास as तत्त्वविवेकज्ञानाभ्यास, which leads to the realisation of the distinction between पुरुष and प्रकृति

The following scheme shows the different interpretations of the phrases नास्मि, न मे and नाहम्, as given by various commentators,—

	वाच०	माडर	गौड०	जय०
नास्मि	अहं क्रियावान् नास्मि ।	नास्मि तत्त्वानि ।	नाहमेव भवामि ।	सूक्ष्मशरीरे भातिके च न भवामि, अपि तु प्रकृतिः ।
न मे	न मे स्वामित्वास्ति ।	न मे तत्त्वानि ।	न मम शरीरम्, यतोऽहमन्यः शरीरमन्यन् ।	न ममेदमपि तु प्रकृतेः ।
नाहम्	अहं कर्ता न	नाहं तत्त्वानाम् ।	अहंशरीरहितोऽहम् ।	नाप्यहं प्रकृतिः ।

The quotation—"निष्कलममृतार्थं, etc., " given by वाच०, is also found in this तत्त्ववेङ्कटी on यो. सू. I. 50, where, वाच० reads न बाधोऽनारिमतत्वेऽपि in place of न बाधोऽप्यलक्ष्यत्वेऽपि. The meaning of the verse is—निष्कलमः यो मृतार्थः, तदुपलक्षितः स्वभावे यस्य, तस्य शास्त्राय विपर्ययः, अद्वयत्वेऽपि न बाधः, बुद्धेस्तत्त्वज्ञानतः । निष्कलम = free from all (the) flaws (of प्रतीति, etc., according to the बौद्ध), मृतार्थ = truth (आद्यविज्ञान, according to the बौद्ध), विपर्ययः = contradictions (in the shape of प्रतीतिविज्ञान, according to the बौद्ध), अद्वयत्वेऽपि, etc., = although there is no effort to free this आद्यविज्ञान from the flaws of प्रतीतिविज्ञान, yet this आद्यविज्ञान is not contradicted because बुद्धि is partial to it. वाच०'s introduction here favours the reading अनारिमत्त्वेऽपि, which will mean—"although विपर्ययज्ञाना is अनारि."

LXVI

" एवं विरिक्त्यातिशयि प्राकृतीयाविरिक्तैरात्मनः 'मदर्थे' इति मयुक्ते " (वाच०, para 271) = on account of ignorance, the Spirit thinks that as the enjoyable products of Nature, *viz.*, sound and the rest, are for my sake, so the discriminative knowledge brought about by Nature (and hence a product of Nature) is also for my sake.

प्रयोजनं भावि न गम्य—The idea is that भोग and विरिक्त are for the purpose of the Spirit (*i. e.*, पुरुषार्थः). They urge the Nature into activity. But, after the Spirit has enjoyed the products of Nature and has attained the discriminative knowledge, there remains no other purpose of the Spirit. भोग and भरणे are no more पुरुषार्थः. So, in the case of this particular Spirit, भोग and भरणे cannot urge the Nature into activity.

LXXVII

The ten māhātmyās are—

(१) प्रधानास्तित्व, (२) प्रधानैकत्व, (३) प्रधानस्य अर्धत्वम् (= विषयता), (४) प्रधानस्य अन्यता (= पुण्यान्नेदः), (५) प्रधानस्य पारार्थ्यम्, (६) अर्धत्वम् (= पुरुषबहुत्वम्), (७) त्रियोगः (= पुरुषान् प्रकृतेः), (८) योगः (= पुरुषेण सह प्रकृत्याः), (९) त्रैपद्युतिः (= संस्कारवशात् स्थूलसूक्ष्मशीरद्रूप-विपत्तिः) and (१०) अकर्मत्वम् (= पुरुषस्य) For this quotation and राजवार्तिक, see introduction
